State v. Craig: Limited State Right to Appeal Montgomery Hearing Resentencings Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 912(B)

Introduction

In State of Louisiana v. Dale Dwayne Craig, the Supreme Court of Louisiana resolved an important question at the intersection of juvenile sentencing reform and criminal appellate procedure: whether the State may appeal a trial court’s retroactive parole-eligibility determination and resultant resentencing of a juvenile homicide offender conducted under La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1(B)(1) (a “Montgomery hearing”).

The case arises out of a long procedural arc. Craig, convicted and sentenced to death in 1994 for the murder of Kipp Gullet, later saw his sentence reduced to life without parole following Roper v. Simmons, which barred the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Subsequent landmark rulings in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana required individualized sentencing consideration for juvenile homicide offenders and applied that requirement retroactively. Louisiana implemented those rulings via La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1 and amendments thereto. After a post-Montgomery hearing, the district court resentenced Craig to life with the possibility of parole. The State appealed; the First Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the State has a right to appeal such rulings.

The central issues were:

Whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 912(B), whose list of appealable State judgments is “not limited” to the enumerated items, allows an appeal from a Montgomery hearing determination and resentencing.
Whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2, which regulates sentence review, forecloses State appeals of “legal” sentences and thus bars the State’s appeal here.
How the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence (Miller/Montgomery as clarified by Jones v. Mississippi) informs the standards trial courts must apply at Article 878.1 hearings.

The Court reverses the dismissal, recognizes a limited State right to appeal in this setting, and remands to the court of appeal for full merits review. A separate concurrence by Justice Cole provides substantive guidance on how Article 878.1 hearings should be conducted and reviewed, while Chief Justice Weimer dissents, asserting the State lacks a statutory right to appeal a legal sentence and criticizing the decision to remand rather than resolve the merits now.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Griffin, J.) holds that the State may appeal a trial court’s retroactive parole-eligibility determination and resultant resentencing of a juvenile homicide offender conducted under La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1(B)(1). The Court reads La. C.Cr.P. art. 912(B) to confer judicial discretion to permit State appeals of final judgments beyond those expressly enumerated, citing the Official Revision Comment stating that courts “have the discretion and the power to allow an appeal if the basic test of finality is satisfied.” The Court concludes that a ruling from a Montgomery hearing is a final judgment because it puts an end to the resentencing proceeding; therefore, the appeal may proceed. The Court emphasizes that this State right to appeal is limited to this specific context—Montgomery hearings under Article 878.1(B)(1)—and remands to the First Circuit for briefing, argument, and a merits opinion.

The Court also:

Grants the defendant’s motion to strike supplemental letters filed by the State as irrelevant to the narrow jurisdictional question.
Denies the defendant’s motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the parole process, citing La. R.S. 15:574.2 which expressly authorizes the Attorney General and District Attorney to present testimony and information to the Committee on Parole.

Chief Justice Weimer dissents, arguing that neither Article 912(B) nor Article 881.2 gives the State a right to appeal a legal sentence, and that the court of appeal’s refusal to convert the appeal to a supervisory writ was within its discretion. She would exercise the Supreme Court’s plenary supervisory authority to decide the merits now rather than remand.

Justice Cole’s concurrence, joined by Justices Crain and McCallum, underscores that under Jones v. Mississippi the sentencer need not make a finding of “permanent incorrigibility” to impose life without parole; thus, trial courts err by treating incorrigibility as a legal prerequisite. He further counsels that resentencing courts should give paramount consideration to the factual record and determinations underlying the original sentence, and that any findings at Article 878.1 hearings must be supported by admissible evidence and by the record.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion operates against a rich backdrop of juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and Louisiana procedural law:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005): Bars the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles. Craig’s 1994 death sentence was reduced to life without parole under Roper.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012): Holds mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles unconstitutional and requires individualized consideration of youth and its mitigating attributes before imposing LWOP.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016): Declares Miller retroactive; Louisiana responds legislatively via La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1 (enacted 2013, amended 2017) and La. R.S. 15:574.4.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1(B)(1): Governs retroactive resentencing for offenders indicted before August 1, 2017. If the State timely notices intent to seek LWOP, the court conducts a hearing to determine whether to impose life with or without parole. A finding of parole eligibility triggers resentencing and parole eligibility under R.S. 15:574.4(G).
La. C.Cr.P. art. 912: Sets out appealable judgments/rulings. Article 912(B) lists examples of state-appealable judgments but declares the list “not limited” to those items. The Official Revision Comment recognizes judicial discretion to allow appeals beyond enumeration if “the basic test of finality is satisfied.”
La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2: Regulates sentence review. It expressly authorizes State appeal or review when the sentence is not in conformity with a mandatory statutory requirement or habitual offender enhancement, and the State objected or moved to reconsider. The dissent argues this specific provision should control and foreclose a State appeal of a “legal” sentence imposed under Article 878.1.
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021): Clarifies that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Miller/Montgomery requires a separate factual finding of “permanent incorrigibility” before imposing juvenile LWOP; discretion to consider youth suffices.
State v. Craig, 95-2499 (La. 5/20/97), 699 So.2d 865: The Court’s prior capital opinion in this case, affirming the original conviction and sentence and finding sufficient aggravation.
Other Louisiana authorities:
- State v. Diano, 24-0888 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So.3d 530 (de novo review for statutory interpretation).
- U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Swann, 424 So.2d 240 (La. 1982) (appeals maintained absent clear legal grounds to dismiss).
- State v. Quinones, 94-0436 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/29/94), 646 So.2d 1216 (final judgment “puts an end to the proceedings”).
- State v. Gillis, 07-1909 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08), 985 So.2d 745 (recognizing state’s ability to appeal outside the express list, illustrating Article 912’s non-exclusivity).
- La. Const. art. V, § 26(B); La. C.Cr.P. arts. 61, 381 (State’s interest in prosecutions and preserving valid sentences); La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6(B) (State’s right to suspensively appeal orders granting postconviction relief).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in three steps:

First, Article 912(B) is non-exclusive and permits judicial discretion to allow State appeals of final judgments beyond those listed. The text expressly says the State’s appealable judgments “are not limited to” the enumerated items. The Official Revision Comment confirms courts may allow an appeal if the judgment is final. The Court reads this as the legislature “empower[ing] courts to allow an appeal provided that the underlying judgment sought to be appealed from meets the test of finality.”
Second, a Montgomery hearing ruling and resultant resentencing is a final judgment. A final judgment “puts an end to the proceedings.” Because a finding of parole eligibility under Article 878.1(B)(1) necessarily culminates in resentencing (and vice versa, a denial forecloses parole eligibility), the hearing’s outcome ends the resentencing proceeding. Therefore, the finality test is satisfied.
Third, the Court exercises its discretion to allow a State appeal in this limited context. Emphasizing the State’s institutional interest in preserving prior capital sentences and valid convictions, the Court allows the appeal but strictly confines this right to trial court rulings on retroactive parole eligibility determinations and the resentencings that flow from them—i.e., Article 878.1(B)(1) Montgomery hearings for offenders indicted before August 1, 2017. The Court implicitly distinguishes—without foreclosing—other sentencings governed by Article 881.2, leaving that broader framework intact.

Importantly, the Court declines to decide the merits of the State’s challenge (e.g., whether the trial court misapplied Article 878.1 or improperly weighed the evidence) and remands to the court of appeal for full briefing, oral argument, and a merits opinion.

3) The Dissent’s Statutory Objection (Weimer, C.J.)

Chief Justice Weimer argues the State has no statutory right to appeal a legal sentence:

Article 912 read as a whole: Subsection B’s non-exclusive list does not include “a judgment which imposes sentence” for the State, whereas Subsection C expressly lists that item for defendants. Reading the statute holistically, if the legislature intended State appeals of sentences, it would have said so explicitly, as it did for defendants.
Article 881.2 is the specific sentence-review statute and controls: It authorizes State appeal or review only when a sentence is not in conformity with mandatory requirements or habitual-offender enhancements and the State preserved the issue. Here, a sentence of life with parole is authorized by Article 878.1; thus, the sentence is “in conformity” with the governing statute, foreclosing State appeal or review under Article 881.2.
Supervisory jurisdiction: While appellate courts have constitutional supervisory power to review rulings, the decision to convert an appeal to a writ application is discretionary. The First Circuit’s refusal to convert was permissible, and Article 881.2’s limits could reasonably guide the exercise of supervisory discretion.
Judicial economy: Given the complete record and briefing in the Supreme Court, she would exercise the Court’s plenary supervisory authority to decide the merits now rather than remand, avoiding further delay.

4) The Concurrence’s Substantive Guidance (Cole, J.; joined by Crain, J. and McCallum, J.)

Justice Cole agrees the State may appeal but writes separately to clarify how courts should conduct and review Article 878.1 hearings:

No incorrigibility requirement: Jones v. Mississippi makes clear that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Miller/Montgomery requires a sentencer to find “permanent incorrigibility” before imposing LWOP. A trial court’s focus on whether the defendant is among “the rarest of juvenile offenders” reflecting permanent incorrigibility is legal error if treated as a necessary predicate.
Record-centered review: Article 878.1(C) permits aggravating and mitigating evidence relevant to the offense or the offender’s character, but resentencing courts should give paramount consideration to the factual determinations and evidentiary record underlying the original conviction and sentence—especially where a jury already considered youth-related mitigating factors (e.g., in the capital phase under Article 905.5). Appellate review will assess whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by admissible evidence in the record and whether expert testimony complies with the Louisiana Code of Evidence (Chapter 7).
Statutory guardrails remain meaningful: Article 878.1(D) requires the court to state for the record the considerations and factual bases for its determination and provides that LWOP “should normally be reserved for the worst offenders and the worst cases.” Even so, “worst of the worst” is not a constitutional threshold; it is a legislative guideline that does not import an incorrigibility requirement.

5) Impact and Implications

The decision has both procedural and substantive ripple effects:

Appellate procedure in juvenile resentencings: The State now has a recognized pathway to appellate review of retroactive parole eligibility determinations and resulting resentencings under Article 878.1(B)(1). Courts of appeal must entertain these appeals as within Article 912(B)’s discretionary ambit once finality is established. Expect increased appellate litigation following Montgomery hearings in legacy juvenile homicide cases.
Preservation and standards of review: Although the Supreme Court did not specify the standard, appellate courts are likely to review the trial court’s Article 878.1 application and weighing of factors for abuse of discretion, while reviewing legal questions (e.g., whether the court imposed improper legal prerequisites like “incorrigibility”) de novo. Parties should build robust records tailored to these standards.
Guidance on Article 878.1 hearings: Justice Cole’s concurrence will likely shape trial practice and appellate review:
- Trial courts should not require or center their rulings on a finding of “permanent incorrigibility.”
- Courts should anchor analysis in the original trial/sentencing record, particularly where a capital jury already considered youth as mitigation.
- Findings about the offender’s background or culpability must be supported by admissible evidence of record; courts should articulate their factual bases as Article 878.1(D) requires.
Legislative-judicial dialogue: The dissent invites legislative clarification. The majority’s reliance on Article 912(B)’s non-exclusive text and official comment creates a narrow exception to the usual understanding that State sentence appeals are tightly confined by Article 881.2. The legislature may respond by codifying or cabining this new appellate pathway.
Parole process participation: By denying the motion to disqualify the Attorney General and citing La. R.S. 15:574.2, the Court reaffirms that the Attorney General may participate before the Parole Committee. This ensures the State’s continued institutional voice in both judicial resentencing and administrative parole proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Montgomery hearing (La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1(B)(1)): A resentencing hearing for juvenile homicide offenders indicted before August 1, 2017, where the court decides whether life should be with or without parole. Triggered when the State timely notices intent to seek LWOP after Miller/Montgomery.
Final judgment (for appealability): A ruling that “puts an end to the proceedings.” The Court treats an Article 878.1(B)(1) decision and resulting resentencing as final for purposes of Article 912(B) appeals.
Article 912(B) non-exclusivity: The statute lists examples of State-appealable rulings but says the list is “not limited” to those items. The Official Revision Comment authorizes courts to allow appeals of other final judgments.
Article 881.2 sentence review: Generally restricts State appeals or review to cases where the sentence is not in conformity with mandatory provisions or habitual-offender enhancements, provided the State objected or moved to reconsider. The dissent would confine State review to this provision; the majority recognizes a limited exception under Article 912(B) for Montgomery hearings.
Appeal vs. supervisory writ: An appeal is a right to have an appellate court review a final judgment. Supervisory writs are discretionary tools allowing appellate courts to review non-final or otherwise unappealable rulings. The First Circuit declined to convert the State’s appeal into a writ; the Supreme Court instead recognized a limited right to appeal.
“Incorrigibility” after Jones v. Mississippi: The sentencer is not required to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible to impose LWOP. The constitutional requirement is a discretionary process that takes youth into account; no special factual finding is mandated.

Practical Guidance for Future Cases

For prosecutors:
- Timely file the Article 878.1(B)(1) notice to seek LWOP where appropriate.
- Develop a detailed record tailored to Article 878.1(C) and (D): facts of the offense, character evidence, and any expert testimony vetted under the Code of Evidence.
- Object to misstatements of law (e.g., any suggestion that “incorrigibility” is required) and to findings not supported by the record.
- Preserve all issues for appeal, anticipating abuse-of-discretion and de novo standards on different questions.
For defense counsel:
- Prepare comprehensive mitigation consistent with Article 878.1(C), including social history and youth-related factors, supported by admissible evidence.
- Ensure the court articulates on the record its considerations and factual bases as required by Article 878.1(D).
- Be ready to defend the trial court’s discretionary weighing on appeal and to argue that the sentence aligns with statutory guidance reserving LWOP for the “worst offenders and worst cases.”
For trial judges:
- Avoid imposing an incorrigibility requirement; frame analysis around discretionary consideration of youth and related factors.
- Ground findings in the record, with attention to the original trial/sentencing evidence and jury determinations where applicable (especially in former capital cases).
- State the factual bases and considerations in detail to facilitate meaningful appellate review.
For appellate courts:
- Entertain State appeals from Article 878.1(B)(1) rulings as authorized by Article 912(B) where the finality test is satisfied.
- Separate legal errors (e.g., misreading Jones or Article 878.1) from discretionary judgments, applying appropriate standards of review.

Conclusion

State v. Craig marks a significant, carefully cabined development in Louisiana appellate criminal procedure. Recognizing that Article 912(B) is non-exclusive and that a Montgomery hearing decision is final, the Supreme Court allows the State to appeal retroactive parole-eligibility rulings and the resentencings that follow under Article 878.1(B)(1). At the same time, Justice Cole’s concurrence provides crucial substantive guidance: courts need not, and should not, require “permanent incorrigibility” as a legal prerequisite; instead, they must engage in a discretionary youth-sensitive analysis anchored in the record and in prior factfinding.

The decision will shape how courts and litigants conduct, preserve, and review Article 878.1 hearings. It ensures that, in legacy juvenile homicide cases, the State’s interest in preserving prior sentences can be tested through appellate scrutiny while the statutory promise of individualized consideration for juvenile offenders remains intact. Whether the legislature will further refine the scope of State sentence appeals after Craig remains to be seen. For now, the Court has charted a precise path: a limited State right to appeal, confined to Montgomery hearings, with a strong admonition that trial courts faithfully implement Jones and Article 878.1’s standards through transparent, evidence-based reasoning.