State v. Chemuti: Superior-Court Petition Is the Exclusive Path to Obtain Law‑Enforcement Recordings Under N.C.G.S. § 132‑1.4A

Introduction

In State v. Chemuti (Supreme Court of North Carolina, Oct. 17, 2025), the Court resolved a recurring question born of the rapid proliferation of police body-worn cameras: how can a criminal defendant obtain body‑cam and dash‑cam recordings for use in a district court prosecution? The case pitted defendant Charlotte Chemuti—charged in district court with resisting a public officer—against the Town of Mooresville and the Mooresville Police Department, custodians of the requested recordings.

The district court ordered compliance with Chemuti’s subpoena for “any bodycam videos” of the incident. The Town moved to quash, arguing that N.C.G.S. § 132‑1.4A protects law‑enforcement recordings from release except through a superior‑court process the General Assembly enacted in 2016. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Town’s interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review both the jurisdictional dismissal and, directly, the district court’s order.

Two core issues framed the dispute:

Appellate Jurisdiction: Whether an order compelling release of materials claimed to be statutorily confidential is immediately appealable.
Merits: Whether § 132‑1.4A makes a superior‑court petition the exclusive procedure for obtaining law‑enforcement recordings (including by criminal defendants in district court), or whether a defendant may still compel production by district‑court subpoena or district‑court order.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice Dietz held:

Immediate Appealability: The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Town’s appeal. Orders compelling disclosure of materials claimed to be statutorily protected are immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right because disclosure cannot be undone (Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159 (1999); Gardner v. Richmond County, 386 N.C. 594 (2024)).
Exclusive Superior‑Court Procedure: Section 132‑1.4A makes a superior‑court order the exclusive mechanism for “release” of law‑enforcement recordings; district‑court subpoenas cannot compel release. The statute repeatedly channels release decisions to “the superior court in any county where any portion of the recording was made,” authorizes discretionary release subject to enumerated factors and conditions, and provides a separate, streamlined provision for district attorneys’ law‑enforcement uses (N.C.G.S. § 132‑1.4A(f), (g), (h)).
Constitutional Compatibility: The statutory procedure does not violate defendants’ rights to due process, compulsory process, or confrontation. It changes the procedure but not the constitutional entitlement to favorable, material evidence. Under State v. Tindall, trial‑court discretion must yield to a defendant’s constitutional rights; under Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, states may adopt protective procedures (including in camera review) to safeguard confidential materials while ensuring constitutionally required disclosures (United States v. Nixon; Ritchie; Tindall).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order enforcing the subpoena and remanded so Chemuti may pursue the proper petition in superior court under § 132‑1.4A.

Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissented. The dissent would hold that § 132‑1.4A requires a “court order” but does not mandate that the order be from a superior court; superior‑court petitions are permissive, not exclusive. Invoking plain language, the shall/may dichotomy, constitutional avoidance, and judicial efficiency, the dissent would affirm the district court’s order and conclude the Town lacked an immediately appealable substantial right.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974): Establishes that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to compel production of evidence necessary to present a defense. The majority uses Nixon as the baseline constitutional backdrop.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987): The cornerstone for upholding protective state procedures. Ritchie approves requiring requests for confidential records to be presented to a court for in camera review, with release limited to favorable and material information. The majority analogizes § 132‑1.4A to Ritchie and underscores that the statute’s process is even more generous because it creates a defined access route rather than foreclosing access altogether.
State v. Tindall, 294 N.C. 689 (1978): Holds that judicial discretion over access mechanisms must be exercised consistent with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process right. The majority uses Tindall to ensure that, even within § 132‑1.4A’s discretionary framework, constitutional rights control outcomes when defendants are entitled to evidence.
Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159 (1999): Establishes immediate appealability of orders compelling disclosure of allegedly confidential materials because disclosure would irretrievably defeat confidentiality—a substantial right. The Court of Appeals should not examine the merits at the jurisdictional stage; a nonfrivolous claim suffices.
Gardner v. Richmond County, 386 N.C. 594 (2024): Reemphasizes what is required to show an immediate, substantial right is at stake and confirms that the Town did so.
In re McClatchy Co., 386 N.C. 77 (2024): Recognizes § 132‑1.4A’s broad confidentiality regime and judicially managed access, framing the statute’s structural context for release and disclosure decisions.
Sturdivant v. N.C. Dep’t of Public Safety, 386 N.C. 939 (2024); Rhyne v. K‑Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160 (2004); In re A.P., 371 N.C. 14 (2018): Canons of statutory construction. The majority relies on whole‑text and structural reading, rejecting isolated phrase parsing.
State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 19 (1952): Courts interpret and apply statutes as written, not as they might prefer; supports the majority’s deference to legislative design.
Dissent’s authorities: Fearrington v. City of Greenville, N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., Ferguson v. Riddle (plain‑text primacy and no judicial rewriting); State v. Young; In re Hardy; Felton; Rector (shall vs. may); Brady v. Maryland; State v. House; State v. White (efficiency and fairness); James v. Bartlett; Anderson v. Assimos (constitutional avoidance); State v. Cornett; State v. Newell; State v. Love (district‑court practices). These authorities underpin the dissent’s textual, constitutional, and practical critiques.

Legal Reasoning: How the Majority Reached Its Decision

The Court proceeds from text to structure. Section 132‑1.4A(g) provides: “Recordings in the custody of a law enforcement agency shall only be released pursuant to court order.” Crucially, the very next sentence specifies who must issue that order and how to obtain it: “Any custodial law enforcement agency or any person requesting release of a recording may file an action in the superior court in any county where any portion of the recording was made for an order releasing the recording.”

Rejecting the defendant’s isolated focus on “court order,” the Court reads the sentence pair together. The first imposes a mandatory court‑order requirement; the second directs all requesters to seek that order from the superior court of the county where any portion of the recording was made. The statute:

Repeatedly references “the superior court” in subsections (b3), (e), (f), and (g), signaling a specific forum for judicial release decisions.
Vests the superior court with discretion to order release of all or part of the recording, after considering eight enumerated factors, and to impose conditions or restrictions. One factor asks whether the person is seeking evidence to determine legal issues in a “current or potential court proceeding” (g)(3), a phrasing that makes sense only if the deciding court is not necessarily the court of the “current” proceeding—reinforcing that the superior court is the designated gatekeeper regardless of where the criminal case is pending.
Creates a distinct, streamlined pathway in subsection (h) for district attorneys to obtain recordings without a court order “for law enforcement purposes,” including for district court proceedings. The targeted drafting for district attorneys underscores the absence of any comparable, streamlined mechanism for criminal defendants, thereby implying exclusivity of the superior‑court path for all others.

On appellate jurisdiction, the Court applies Sharpe v. Worland. A compelled‑disclosure order threatens to irretrievably destroy a claimed statutory confidentiality; therefore, it affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. The Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the appeal and by implicitly questioning the merits of the Town’s confidentiality claim at the jurisdictional threshold.

On constitutional rights, the majority emphasizes that § 132‑1.4A regulates procedure, not the ultimate constitutional entitlement to favorable, material evidence. Ritchie confirms that states may employ gatekeeping mechanisms, including in camera review, to protect confidentiality while honoring due process and compulsory process. Tindall ensures that judicial discretion under the statute must be exercised consistently with a defendant’s constitutional rights. Thus, any portion of a recording that is constitutionally required—because it is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment—must be released; the statute cannot be read to deny that outcome.

The Dissent: Competing Interpretation and Policy Concerns

Justice Riggs’ dissent advances a different textual and practical reading:

Textual point: The statute says “court order,” not “superior court order,” when establishing the mandatory prerequisite for release. Elsewhere, the statute uses “may” in connection with filing in superior court (f), (g), which the dissent reads as permissive—one optional route among others. Where the legislature intended to require a superior‑court filing, it used “shall,” as in subsection (b3) (agency “shall file a petition in the superior court” to effectuate disclosure procedures). Under North Carolina’s well‑settled shall/may interpretive canon, the dissent contends the statute does not foreclose district‑court orders or subpoenas that are “court‑sanctioned.”
Constitutional avoidance: If the statute is ambiguous, it should be construed to avoid tension with due process and compulsory process, particularly given district court defendants’ lack of a broad statutory discovery right. Reading § 132‑1.4A as supplemental, not exclusive, would preserve longstanding district‑court practices—subpoenas and motions—to secure potentially exculpatory evidence.
Judicial efficiency and fairness: Requiring defendants to initiate separate civil actions in superior court injects delay, cost, and complexity, risking docket burdens and hampering prompt resolution of misdemeanors—contrary, the dissent argues, to the constitutional command that justice be administered “without delay.”
Jurisdictional consequence: Because, on the dissent’s reading, the Town asserted only an interest in procedure “matters of form,” there was no immediately appealable substantial right, and the Court of Appeals’ dismissal should stand.

The majority’s structural analysis implicitly answers these points: the combined sentence structure in (g), the repeated forum designation across subsections, the “current or potential” factor, and the DA‑only exception in (h) collectively demonstrate a legislative choice to centralize release decisions in superior court.

Potential Impact

Defense practice in district court: Defense counsel can no longer obtain body‑cam or dash‑cam recordings by subpoena or district‑court order. They must file a petition in the superior court of any county where any portion of the recording was made. Counsel should budget for additional time, filing, service, and hearing logistics and should request continuances in the district court as needed while the superior‑court petition is pending.
Prosecutors: District attorneys retain expedited access to recordings under § 132‑1.4A(h) “for law enforcement purposes,” including use in district court, without a court order. However, that subsection does not authorize release to defense or compliance with defense subpoenas; prosecutors will need a court order to provide copies to defendants unless other law requires disclosure.
Law‑enforcement agencies: Agencies gain clarity and uniformity. Recordings are not public or personnel records and can be released only by superior‑court order (except as provided in (h) for district attorneys). Agencies receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before release, and the court can tailor protective conditions.
Superior‑court workload: Expect an uptick in § 132‑1.4A petitions, especially from misdemeanor defendants with cases pending in district court. Courts should prepare for in camera review, partial redaction, and protective‑order crafting. The eight statutory factors provide a framework but will require disciplined application to ensure consistency and constitutional compliance.
Discovery sequencing: For cases that later proceed to superior court, defendants will likely obtain recordings via prosecutorial discovery obligations rather than petitions. But for misdemeanors resolved in district court, the superior‑court petition is now the exclusive release mechanism.
Interlocutory appeals: Because orders compelling release of allegedly protected recordings are immediately appealable, parties should anticipate potential appellate pauses. Trial judges may need to calibrate scheduling to avoid prejudice arising from the timing of release disputes.
Legislative options: If the General Assembly wishes to streamline access for district court defendants, it could add a targeted subsection—parallel to (h)—or create expedited procedures or presumptive timelines to mitigate delay.

Complex Concepts Simplified

District court vs. superior court: In North Carolina, misdemeanors are typically tried in district court. Superior court handles felonies and more significant civil matters. Under § 132‑1.4A, even if your criminal case is in district court, your petition to obtain body‑cam/dash‑cam recordings must be filed in superior court in the county where the recording was made.
“Release” vs. “disclosure” under § 132‑1.4A: “Disclosure” means allowing someone to view or listen to a recording without providing a copy, at a time and place set by the agency. “Release” means providing a copy. This case concerns “release,” which requires a court order under § 132‑1.4A(g) unless a specific exception applies (e.g., DA access under (h)).
In camera review: A judge privately reviews the requested materials to decide what, if anything, should be turned over. This safeguards confidentiality while ensuring a defendant receives favorable, material portions.
Compulsory process and due process: Constitutional rights that guarantee a defendant a meaningful chance to present a complete defense, including access to evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. Procedures may regulate how access is sought, but courts must ensure the end result honors these rights.
Interlocutory appeal of a “substantial right”: Normally, appeals wait for a final judgment. But if an order threatens to irreversibly compromise a substantial right—like confidentiality mandated by statute—an immediate appeal is permitted. Once confidential material is disclosed, the bell cannot be unrung.
Constitutional avoidance: A canon instructing courts to choose an interpretation that avoids serious constitutional problems when the statute is reasonably susceptible to multiple readings. The majority concluded the statute is clear; the dissent would apply avoidance to resolve any ambiguity in favor of broader district‑court access.

The Eight Statutory Factors for Release (N.C.G.S. § 132‑1.4A(g))

When deciding whether to release all or part of a recording, the superior court must consider:

Whether release is necessary to advance a compelling public interest.
Whether the recording contains information otherwise confidential or exempt under state or federal law.
Whether the requester seeks evidence to determine legal issues in a current or potential court proceeding.
Whether release would reveal highly sensitive personal information.
Whether release may harm reputation or jeopardize safety.
Whether release would seriously threaten the fair, impartial, and orderly administration of justice.
Whether confidentiality is necessary to protect an internal or criminal investigation (active or inactive) or potential investigation.
Whether good cause is shown to release all portions of a recording.

The court may conduct in camera review, limit release to portions of the recording, and impose protective conditions.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

For defense counsel in district court:
- File a verified petition in the superior court of any county where the recording was made, citing § 132‑1.4A(f) and (g). Identify with specificity the date, time, location, officers, incident number, and why the recording is favorable and material.
- Request in camera review and propose tailored protective orders (e.g., redactions, limited dissemination, sealing) to address privacy and safety concerns.
- Address the eight factors, especially factor (3) (evidence for a current or potential proceeding) and factor (8) (good cause), and explain constitutional necessity where applicable (Ritchie/Tindall).
- Coordinate with the district court for continuances while the superior‑court petition proceeds. Build a record of diligence to avoid speedy‑trial concerns.
For prosecutors:
- Use § 132‑1.4A(h) to obtain recordings without a court order for law‑enforcement purposes, including district‑court prosecutions, but be mindful that providing “release” (copies) to defendants generally still requires a court order unless discovery rules or constitutional obligations compel otherwise.
- When opposing or narrowing release petitions, articulate privacy, safety, and justice‑administration concerns under the eight factors and suggest protective conditions rather than categorical denials where appropriate.
For law‑enforcement agencies:
- Upon receiving a petition, ensure timely notice to interested parties and prepare to facilitate in camera review, including compiling relevant segments and metadata.
- Propose reasonable protective restrictions to balance transparency and confidentiality, including redactions of victims and sensitive third parties.

Open Questions and Points to Watch

Standard of review: The statute affords broad discretion to superior courts. Appellate courts will likely review release decisions for abuse of discretion, tempered by de novo review of constitutional entitlements. Future cases may clarify the precise standards.
Timelines: The statute does not impose express deadlines for adjudicating petitions in (g). Best practices and local rules may develop to mitigate delay in district‑court prosecutions.
Venue complexities: For multi‑location incidents, petitioners may choose among counties “where any portion of the recording was made.” Courts may address forum considerations and coordination across counties.
Scope of DA access under (h): The majority emphasizes that (h) is limited to “law enforcement purposes” and does not authorize sharing copies to defense absent a court order. The precise boundary of “law enforcement purposes” and its interaction with discovery obligations may see further development.
As‑applied constitutional challenges: While the procedure is facially valid, denials that thwart access to favorable, material evidence may yield as‑applied claims under Ritchie and Tindall.

Conclusion

State v. Chemuti sets a clear and consequential rule for North Carolina: law‑enforcement recordings covered by § 132‑1.4A may be released only by order of the superior court in the county where any portion of the recording was made, and district‑court subpoenas cannot compel their production. The decision harmonizes the statute’s confidentiality aims with defendants’ constitutional rights by preserving judicial discretion and requiring that discretion to give way when the Constitution demands disclosure of favorable, material evidence. Procedurally, the case also reaffirms that orders compelling disclosure of materials claimed to be statutorily confidential are immediately appealable to protect the substantial right of confidentiality.

In practice, Chemuti will reshape defense strategies in district court, shift significant motion practice to superior court, and require careful, factor‑driven judicial management of release requests with in camera review and protective conditions. The dissent highlights costs, delays, and fairness concerns for misdemeanor defendants and invites legislative attention. Until then, Chemuti provides a definitive roadmap: the superior‑court petition is the exclusive gateway to copies of law‑enforcement recordings, and constitutional safeguards remain intact within that process.