State v. Brown (Kan. 2025): Constitutional Claims Are Not Cognizable Under K.S.A. 22-3504; Postrelease Supervision Cannot Attach to Off-Grid Life Sentences and May Be Vacated on Appeal Without Resentencing

Introduction

In State v. Brown, No. 126,814 (Kan. June 6, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court clarified two recurring issues in Kansas postconviction and sentencing practice:

First, a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 cannot be used to litigate constitutional claims, including Sixth Amendment challenges under Apprendi and Alleyne.
Second, a sentencing court lacks authority to impose postrelease supervision on an off-grid indeterminate life sentence (here, a “hard 20” for first-degree felony murder); any such pronouncement is illegal and may be vacated on appeal without resentencing, particularly where the written journal entry already complies with the governing parole statute.

The case arose from Quortez E. (a/k/a Quartez) Brown’s pro se motion under K.S.A. 22-3504 arguing that his hard-20 life sentence was unconstitutionally imposed by a judge rather than a jury. The district court summarily denied the motion as procedurally improper. On appeal, Brown renewed the constitutional challenge, asked the court to recharacterize his motion as a K.S.A. 60-1507 petition, and—raising a new issue for the first time—argued that the sentencing judge illegally pronounced lifetime postrelease supervision rather than parole.

Summary of the Opinion

The Kansas Supreme Court (Luckert, C.J.) affirmed in part and vacated in part:

Affirmed: The district court’s denial of Brown’s constitutional challenge under K.S.A. 22-3504. A sentence’s failure to conform to constitutional requirements is not a cognizable illegal-sentence claim under 22-3504(c)(1).
Affirmed: The district court did not err by declining to construe Brown’s motion as a K.S.A. 60-1507 petition. Brown repeatedly invoked K.S.A. 22-3504 and did not attempt to satisfy 60-1507’s procedural requirements, including the one-year time limit and the “manifest injustice” standard for late filings.
Vacated: The oral pronouncement imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. For off-grid indeterminate life sentences, K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(2) mandates parole, not postrelease supervision. Although the journal entry already reflected parole, the oral pronouncement was illegal; the Court vacated that portion without remand because the written judgment already conformed to law.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Background

Approximately 15 years prior, Brown and an accomplice committed aggravated burglary, resulting in the shooting death of Otis Bolden and the aggravated assault of Ashley Green. A jury convicted Brown of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The district court imposed a “hard 20” life sentence on the felony-murder count, plus sentences on the remaining counts. The judge orally pronounced “postrelease supervision duration of life,” but the contemporaneous journal entry (and later amended entries) correctly reflected lifetime parole rather than postrelease supervision.

On direct appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed most issues, remanding on two discrete points unrelated to the ultimate sentencing configuration. See State v. Brown, 300 Kan. 565, 331 P.3d 797 (2014); State v. Brown, 305 Kan. 413, 382 P.3d 852 (2016).

In 2023, Brown filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States, and citing a Hawaii case (Flubacher v. State, 142 Haw. 109, 414 P.3d 161 [2018]) that treated a constitutional defect as rendering a sentence “illegal.” The district court denied the motion, and Brown appealed. On appeal he also newly argued (1) the motion should be treated as a K.S.A. 60-1507 petition; and (2) the sentence was illegal because the court orally ordered postrelease supervision rather than parole on the off-grid life sentence.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

K.S.A. 22-3504(c)(1) defines “illegal sentence” narrowly as one imposed without jurisdiction, one that does not conform to the applicable statutory provision in character or punishment, or one that is ambiguous with respect to time and manner of service at the time pronounced.
State v. Gayden, 281 Kan. 290, 130 P.3d 108 (2006): Constitutional claims are not cognizable under K.S.A. 22-3504. The Brown court expressly relied on this foundational rule.
State v. Johnson, 320 Kan. 246, 564 P.3d 782 (2025): Recently reaffirmed that K.S.A. 22-3504 does not reach constitutional claims; also recognizes appellate vacatur of improper lifetime postrelease supervision.
State v. Martis, 319 Kan. 650, 556 P.3d 888 (2024): A court should not reach the merits where there is a procedural bar; de novo review of summary denial under K.S.A. 22-3504.
K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 60-208(e) and State v. Redding, 310 Kan. 15, 444 P.3d 989 (2019): Courts liberally construe pro se filings based on content, but are not required to “divine every conceivable interpretation,” especially where the litigant persistently invokes a specific statute.
K.S.A. 60-1507: Separate postconviction avenue with a one-year filing deadline (K.S.A. 60-1507[f][1]) that may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice (K.S.A. 60-1507[f][2]).
State v. Cook, 319 Kan. 777, 560 P.3d 1188 (2024): Jurisdiction to review a postconviction illegal-sentence motion tracks the court’s jurisdiction over the direct appeal.
State v. Steinert, 317 Kan. 342, 529 P.3d 778 (2023): Illegal sentences may be corrected at any time, even if raised for the first time on appeal.
K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(2)K.S.A. 21-3401: For first-degree felony murder (an off-grid indeterminate sentence), postrelease supervision does not apply; parole applies if the person is ever released from prison.
State v. Boswell, 314 Kan. 408, 499 P.3d 1122 (2021) and State v. Fraire, 312 Kan. 786, 481 P.3d 129 (2021): A sentencing court has no authority to impose postrelease supervision together with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence; such a sentence is illegal because it fails to conform to statute.
State v. D.W., 318 Kan. 575, 545 P.3d 26 (2024): Confirms that imposing postrelease supervision on an off-grid life sentence is illegal; the sentence is effective when pronounced.
State v. McMillan, 319 Kan. 239, 553 P.3d 296 (2024): The journal entry memorializes the sentence; it is not a vehicle to correct errors in the oral pronouncement.
State v. Harsh, 293 Kan. 585, 265 P.3d 1161 (2011): Error in ordering postrelease supervision where parole is required does not necessitate resentencing; the improper portion can be vacated.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): Sixth Amendment jury-finding requirements for facts that increase statutory maximums or mandatory minimums; distinguished here as constitutional claims not reachable via K.S.A. 22-3504.
State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002): Prior convictions can be considered by a judge for sentencing without violating Apprendi; noted in Brown’s earlier direct appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) K.S.A. 22-3504 does not reach constitutional claims

Brown attempted to frame his Apprendi/Alleyne challenge as a “nonconformance with statute” under K.S.A. 22-3504(c)(1), arguing that statutes requiring a life-with-20-year-minimum sentence implicitly necessitate jury fact-finding. The Court rejected that reframing. The relevant statutes (K.S.A. 21-3401; K.S.A. 22-3717[b][2]) were satisfied on their face—life imprisonment with no parole for 20 years—and any complaint about the absence of jury fact-finding sounds in the Constitution, not in statutory nonconformance.

Reaffirming Gayden and Johnson, the Court held that “a claim that a sentence fails to conform to constitutional requirements is not a claim it fails to conform to statutory requirements.” Consequently, the constitutional challenge was not cognizable under K.S.A. 22-3504’s narrow definition of “illegal sentence.”

2) Limits on liberal construction: no recharacterization as a K.S.A. 60-1507 petition

Brown asked the Court to treat his pro se filing as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Invoking Redding and K.S.A. 60-208(e), the Court acknowledged the duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings by content, not labels. But it emphasized the limits: courts are not required to “divine every conceivable interpretation,” especially when the movant repeatedly and exclusively relies on a specific statute—as Brown did with K.S.A. 22-3504, discussing its definition of illegal sentence and its “at any time” language.

Moreover, K.S.A. 60-1507 carries its own gatekeeping rules: a one-year time limit and a manifest-injustice safety valve. Brown’s 2023 filing came more than six years after the last appellate mandate in his direct appeal, and he did not assert manifest injustice. Indeed, he conceded that the manifest-injustice question would first need to be addressed by the district court. Under these circumstances, the Court declined to recharacterize the motion as a 60-1507 petition.

3) Postrelease supervision cannot attach to off-grid life sentences; remedy is vacatur without resentencing

For the first time on appeal, Brown argued that the sentencing court’s oral pronouncement of lifetime postrelease supervision was illegal for an off-grid life sentence. The State conceded error and preservation, and the Court agreed. Consistent with Boswell, Fraire, and D.W., a court has no authority to impose postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence; K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(2) instead mandates parole if and when the person ever leaves prison.

The complication here was that the written journal entry (and amended entries) already reflected parole—not postrelease supervision—while the oral pronouncement at sentencing said otherwise. The Court reiterated two points:

“A sentence is effective when pronounced.” D.W., 318 Kan. at 581.
“The journal entry is intended to enshrine the pronounced sentence, not correct any errors or omissions made during its pronouncement.” McMillan, 319 Kan. at 252.

Because the oral pronouncement was illegal, the Court vacated the postrelease supervision portion. Yet following Harsh and Johnson, the Court held that no resentencing was necessary, and—unlike Johnson and Boswell—no remand was required for an amended journal entry because the existing written judgment already conformed to law (parole, not postrelease supervision).

Impact and Practical Implications

Postconviction strategy: K.S.A. 22-3504 is not a backdoor to litigate constitutional claims. Sixth Amendment (Apprendi/Alleyne) challenges, cruel-or-unusual punishment claims, and other constitutional theories must be pursued through K.S.A. 60-1507 (or other appropriate vehicles), subject to its one-year deadline and the manifest-injustice standard for late filings.
Limits on liberal construction: While courts read pro se filings liberally, Brown reinforces that courts are not obligated to recharacterize a motion where the movant consistently invokes a specific statute and does not attempt to satisfy an alternative statute’s procedural rules. Label and content both matter, especially when the alternative route (60-1507) would be time-barred absent manifest injustice.
Sentencing hygiene for off-grid life cases: Judges should never pronounce postrelease supervision for off-grid indeterminate life sentences (hard 20/40/50). The correct post-prison regime is parole under K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(2). Defense counsel and prosecutors should vigilantly correct any misstatements at the hearing, given that the oral pronouncement controls.
Efficient appellate remedies: Where an illegal component (e.g., postrelease supervision) is pronounced but the written judgment is already correct (parole), the Supreme Court can simply vacate the illegal oral portion without remand or resentencing. This promotes finality and efficiency while ensuring statutory conformity.
Record accuracy: Clerks and counsel should ensure consistency between pronouncement and journal entries. McMillan cautions that journal entries memorialize—they do not fix—oral errors. But Brown shows that when a journal entry already matches the law, appellate courts may obviate remand by vacating the oral misstep.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Off-grid indeterminate life sentence: A life sentence not governed by the sentencing grid; for first-degree murder, the person is ineligible for parole for a fixed minimum (“hard 20/40/50”), after which parole may be considered. “Off-grid” means the grid-based postrelease provisions do not apply.
Parole vs. postrelease supervision:
- Parole: For indeterminate sentences; release decisions are made by the parole authority. Parole is not part of the determinate sentence’s grid-based postrelease scheme.
- Postrelease supervision: Follows determinate, grid-based sentences; imposed by the court as part of the sentence. It does not attach to off-grid life sentences.
Illegal sentence (K.S.A. 22-3504): Narrowly defined. It is illegal only if imposed without jurisdiction, fails to conform to the applicable statute in character or punishment, or is ambiguous at pronouncement. Constitutional defects are not “illegal sentence” defects under this statute.
K.S.A. 60-1507: Kansas’s principal postconviction remedy for constitutional and jurisdictional claims. It has a strict one-year filing limit, extendable only to avoid manifest injustice.
Apprendi/Alleyne: U.S. Supreme Court cases requiring jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt for facts that increase the statutory maximum (Apprendi) or mandatory minimum (Alleyne). In Kansas, such constitutional claims are not reachable via a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion.
Oral pronouncement vs. journal entry: The sentence takes effect when orally pronounced from the bench. The written journal entry is intended to memorialize the pronouncement; it does not independently correct oral errors.

Conclusion

State v. Brown is an important reaffirmation and practical clarification of Kansas sentencing and postconviction doctrine. The Court underscores the narrow scope of K.S.A. 22-3504: it does not permit litigation of constitutional claims, which must instead proceed under K.S.A. 60-1507 subject to its procedural constraints. The decision also strengthens a well-settled sentencing rule: postrelease supervision cannot be attached to off-grid indeterminate life sentences. Where a sentencing judge orally imposes postrelease supervision contrary to statute, that portion is illegal and may be vacated on appeal without resentencing—especially when the journal entry already reflects the correct parole regime.

Practitioners should heed the case’s dual message: choose the correct procedural vehicle for constitutional claims and ensure that oral pronouncements in off-grid life cases do not include postrelease supervision. Brown streamlines future litigation by clarifying both the limits of 22-3504 motions and the appropriate remedy for an erroneously pronounced postrelease term in an off-grid life sentence.