State v. Breer, Jr.: Plea Agreements Cannot Bind Non-Party Agencies—Clarifying Enforcement Limits and Standards of Review

1. Introduction

In State v. Harley Breer, Jr., 2025 VT ___ (No. 24-AP-308), the Vermont Supreme Court confronted the perennial tension between contractual expectations embedded in plea agreements and the statutory autonomy of correctional authorities over parole. Facing a mosaic of felony and misdemeanor charges across four dockets, defendant Harley Breer negotiated a global plea in March 2023. Central to his bargain was “Condition E,” which contemplated interstate relocation should the Department of Corrections (DOC) recommend him for parole. When DOC later declined to recommend presumptive parole, Breer filed a “motion to enforce” seeking judicial compulsion of DOC action. The criminal division denied relief without hearing, prompting this appeal.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that:

Plea agreements are enforceable only between the contracting parties; they neither create obligations for non-party executive agencies nor guarantee discretionary benefits, such as parole, unless such promises are expressly and unambiguously stated.

2. Summary of the Judgment

No Breach Identified: The plea agreement contained no explicit promise by the State to secure a DOC parole recommendation; therefore, the State had performed every express obligation.
Standard of Review: Interpretation of an unambiguous plea agreement is a question of law reviewed de novo.
No Hearing Required: Where a motion identifies no cognizable breach, a trial court may summarily deny it without an evidentiary hearing.
Proper Remedy Channel: Disputes over DOC parole decisions must proceed under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 in the civil division, not through criminal post-conviction or plea-enforcement motions.
Judgment: Denial of the motion to enforce is affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) – Foundation for specific performance or withdrawal as remedies when the prosecution breaches a plea agreement.
State v. Careau, 2016 VT 18 – Reiterated that plea agreements are interpreted according to ordinary contract principles.
In re Meunier, 145 Vt. 414 (1985) – Courts must hold the State to “meticulous standards of both promise and performance.”
In re Blow, 2013 VT 75 – No specific performance where the agreement contained no express promise of parole or timely programming; DOC’s discretion insulated.
B & C Mgmt. Vt., Inc. v. John, 2015 VT 61 – Unambiguous contracts are construed de novo.
Other supportive citations: State v. Roberts, 2024 VT 32; State v. Johnstone, 2013 VT 57; State v. Coleman, 160 Vt. 638 (1993).

Collectively, these cases sculpt the doctrinal landscape: (1) plea bargains are contracts; (2) ambiguity is construed against the drafter; (3) promises must be explicit; (4) executive agencies cannot be conscripted via plea bargains unless they join the contract.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

Contractual Nature: The Court reiterated that plea agreements are construed like civil contracts. The panel found Condition E a contingent clause—operative only if parole were granted. No language obliged the State to secure a DOC recommendation.
DOC as Non-Party: Because DOC was not a signatory, it could not be bound. Imposing performance on DOC would offend separation-of-powers principles by subjecting executive discretion to judicially-imposed contracts.
Express Waiver and Addendum: The addendum expressly warned the defendant that parole decisions belong solely to DOC, reviewable only under Rule 75. This written notice undercut any claim of contrary implicit promises.
Standard of Review Application: Issues of law—unambiguous contract interpretation—require no deference to the trial court. Even so reviewed, no error was apparent.
Procedural Posture: Because no breach existed, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 47 permits summary disposition of motions when issues are purely legal.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases and the Law

Plea Drafting: Prosecutors and defense counsel must explicitly state any promises regarding parole recommendations, programming, or DOC action. Vague “understandings” will not survive appellate scrutiny.
Litigation Strategy: Defendants alleging non-performance must (i) identify a clear promise and (ii) target the correct party. Challenges to DOC decisions must be filed under Rule 75, not by “motion to enforce” in the criminal docket.
Agency Autonomy: The decision fortifies DOC’s discretionary domain, dissuading courts from indirectly compelling parole recommendations through contract enforcement.
Appellate Review: The Court’s emphasis on de novo review for unambiguous plea terms offers clarity for litigants tailoring arguments on appeal.
Broader Constitutional Principle: Separation of powers is tacitly reinforced—judiciary may not bind executive agencies absent legislative authorization or agency consent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Plea Agreement: A negotiated contract where the defendant agrees to plead guilty/no-contest to specified charges in exchange for concessions (e.g., sentence caps, dismissals) from the State.
Specific Performance: A remedy compelling a party to fulfill its contractual promise instead of (or in addition to) awarding damages.
Presumptive Parole: A statutory mechanism that presumes release after minimum terms if certain criteria are met; DOC typically submits a recommendation to the parole board.
Rule 75 Petition: Vermont’s procedural vehicle for civil review of governmental action—analogous to “certiorari”—used to challenge agency decisions.
Standard of Review De Novo: The appellate court re-examines the legal question without deference to the lower tribunal’s conclusion.

5. Conclusion

State v. Breer, Jr. crystallizes an important boundary in Vermont criminal practice: a plea bargain, no matter how comprehensive, binds only its signatories. Absent an explicit and unambiguous promise by the State to secure parole-related outcomes—and absent DOC’s assent—defendants cannot compel DOC action through criminal-case motions. The decision counsels meticulous drafting, accurate client advisories, and correct procedural channels when contesting parole decisions. It simultaneously fortifies separation-of-powers doctrine and provides a clear, de novo standard of review for future litigants challenging the interpretation of plea agreements. Ultimately, Breer underscores that the criminal courtroom is not the arena to litigate executive-branch discretion; that battle must be waged, if at all, in the civil division under Rule 75.