Introduction

In State v. Bradshaw, the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed, for the first time, the meaning and operation of SDCL 23A-44-3, the State’s “unnecessary delay” dismissal statute. The case arose from a routine drug prosecution that became procedurally unusual when the circuit court dismissed an indictment because state laboratory testing had not yet been returned by the time of a change-of-plea hearing—nearly seven months after the sample was submitted. The dismissal was entered without prejudice under SDCL 23A-44-3. The State appealed.

The core issues were: (1) what constitutes “unnecessary delay” within the meaning of SDCL 23A-44-3; (2) the proper standard of review; (3) how SDCL 23A-44-3 relates to South Dakota’s 180-day speedy trial rule (SDCL 23A-44-5.1); and (4) whether the record supported the circuit court’s exercise of discretion to dismiss for delay. The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying the legal framework governing discretionary dismissals for delay, aligning the statute with the federal analogue (Rule 48(b)), and emphasizing the statute’s focus on bringing a defendant to trial—not policing plea-offer scheduling.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of review: Because SDCL 23A-44-3 uses the permissive “may,” dismissal is discretionary and reviewed for abuse of discretion. A decision based on an error of law is an abuse of discretion.
• Scope of SDCL 23A-44-3: The statute is akin to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) and recognizes the court’s inherent authority to dismiss for want of prosecution in cases of “unnecessary delay.” It is not a supervisory tool for enforcing plea-offer deadlines.
• Guiding considerations: Courts may, where appropriate, look to the Barker v. Wingo factors (length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice) and must ensure the delay is attributable to the State (bad faith is not required).
• Relationship to the 180-day rule: SDCL 23A-44-3 and SDCL 23A-44-5.1 coexist. The 180-day rule is structured and mandatory as to timing for trial and can require dismissal with prejudice; SDCL 23A-44-3 is broader, discretionary, and permits dismissal without prejudice.
• Application: On this record, dismissal was not justified. The State promptly submitted the sample for testing; trial remained six weeks away; the court did not inquire into the State’s efforts to obtain results; and missed plea-offer deadlines are not grounds for dismissal under SDCL 23A-44-3.
• Holding: The circuit court abused its discretion. Reversed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Center of Life Church v. Nelson, 2018 S.D. 42, ¶ 38, 913 N.W.2d 105: The Court relied on the general statutory principle that “may” confers discretion, anchoring the abuse-of-discretion standard for SDCL 23A-44-3 dismissals.
• United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2007); State v. Nordstrom, 529 A.2d 107 (R.I. 1987): These authorities apply abuse-of-discretion review to dismissals under Rule 48(b) or similar provisions, reinforcing South Dakota’s chosen standard.
• State v. Carter, 2023 S.D. 67, ¶ 24, 1 N.W.3d 674: Defines abuse of discretion as a decision clearly against reason and evidence—used to evaluate the circuit court’s ruling.
• State v. Vento, 1999 S.D. 158, ¶ 5, 604 N.W.2d 468: Establishes that an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion, relevant to the circuit court’s misapplication of SDCL 23A-44-3.
• United States v. Begay, 602 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2010): Explains Rule 48(b) as a restatement of courts’ inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution; the Court aligns SDCL 23A-44-3 with this conception.
• Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996): Cited to underscore limits on inherent authority; supports the view that Rule 48(b)/SDCL 23A-44-3 is not an open-ended supervisory power over prosecution.
• United States v. Ward, 211 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2000); City of Grand Forks v. Gale, 876 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 2016): Recognize that analysis of “unnecessary delay” can be informed by the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial framework, particularly the Barker factors.
• Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): Supplies four factors—length, reason, assertion of right, prejudice—that can guide the “unnecessary delay” inquiry.
• United States v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1978); State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d 154 (Del. 1989): Emphasize that delay must be attributable to the prosecution; bad faith is unnecessary but state action or inaction is required.
• Fast Horse v. Weber, 2013 S.D. 74, ¶ 28, 838 N.W.2d 831; Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012): Establish that a defendant has no right to a plea offer; used to reject plea-offer timing as a proper ground for dismissal under SDCL 23A-44-3.
• Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.: Cited by analogy to explain how structured timing rules (like SDCL 23A-44-5.1) relate to discretionary dismissal authority (SDCL 23A-44-3/Rule 48(b)).

Legal Reasoning

1. Textual focus on “may” and the abuse-of-discretion lens: The Court begins with statutory text. SDCL 23A-44-3 states a court “may dismiss” for unnecessary delay. In South Dakota jurisprudence, “may” ordinarily confers discretion. That frames appellate review and signals that dismissal is not automatic simply because there is delay.
2. What “unnecessary delay” means—and does not mean: The statute does not define “unnecessary delay.” The Court turned to federal Rule 48(b), whose near-identical language has been interpreted as recognizing a court’s inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution. That power is not a roving supervisory authority to micromanage prosecutorial choices (cf. Carlisle), but a measured tool against stagnation or neglect by the State. The analysis may, where appropriate, be informed by the Barker factors used in Sixth Amendment speedy-trial doctrine, and must consider whether the delay is attributable to the State’s actions or inactions (even absent bad faith).
3. Orientation to trial, not plea bargaining: The statute’s tripartite phrasing covers (a) presenting charges to a grand jury, (b) filing an information after a defendant is held to answer, and (c) bringing a defendant to trial. The Court emphasized that SDCL 23A-44-3 is aimed at moving cases to charging/trial milestones—not enforcing plea-offer deadlines or facilitating a defendant’s desire for pre-plea laboratory confirmation. A defendant has no right to a plea offer at all. Thus, missed plea-offer deadlines are not a proper ground for dismissal under this statute.
4. Coexistence with the 180-day rule (SDCL 23A-44-5.1): The Court rejected the State’s argument that the 180-day rule effectively displaced SDCL 23A-44-3. The 180-day rule is a judicially promulgated, structured, mandatory rule focused exclusively on time-to-trial and can require dismissal with prejudice with presumed prejudice after 180 days. SDCL 23A-44-3, by contrast, is a legislative enactment that is broader in stage coverage, less rigid, and discretionary; it authorizes dismissals without prejudice for delays not confined to the trial setting (see SDCL 23A-44-5). The two regimes are complementary, similar to the relationship in federal practice between the Speedy Trial Act and Rule 48(b).
5. Application to the facts: The State submitted the suspected substance to the state lab within two days of charging, and the case did not lie dormant. When the July change-of-plea date arrived, trial was still six weeks away (September 9). The circuit court did not develop a record regarding what efforts the State undertook to expedite testing, even though the State requested time to accelerate results and noted its lack of control over the lab’s processes. Without such a record, the Court found no basis to conclude the delay was “unnecessary” or attributable to prosecutorial neglect. Further, the inability to honor a court’s plea-offer deadline and the desire for lab results to support a plea’s factual basis do not transform this into a Rule 48(b)/SDCL 23A-44-3 “unnecessary delay” scenario. On these facts, dismissal was not a reasoned exercise of discretion.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

• Framework established: South Dakota now has clear guidance that SDCL 23A-44-3 mirrors federal Rule 48(b). Trial courts should:
  • Evaluate whether the prosecution truly failed to advance the case toward required milestones (indictment/information/trial).
  • Consider the Barker factors where appropriate, particularly the reasons for delay and whether the delay is fairly attributable to the State.
  • Develop a factual record on the State’s diligence (e.g., requests to expedite lab work, follow-up communications, resource constraints) before dismissing.
• Lab-backlog cases: Routine forensic testing delays, without more, will rarely justify dismissal. Courts should inquire into the State’s efforts and consider less drastic alternatives (e.g., short continuances) when trial is imminent and the prosecution has acted diligently.
• Plea-offer timelines vs. trial rights: SDCL 23A-44-3 is not an enforcement mechanism for plea-offer scheduling orders. Sanctions for missed plea deadlines, if any, must derive from other authorities; dismissal for “unnecessary delay” is not a fit when the delay concerns plea bargaining rather than progression to trial.
• Complement to the 180-day rule: Defendants alleging delay should choose their theory carefully:
  • Use SDCL 23A-44-5.1 for structured speedy-trial timing claims (with mandatory consequences and a presumption of prejudice after 180 days).
  • Use SDCL 23A-44-3 for broader, discretionary relief based on prosecutorial inaction affecting charging or trial progression, recognizing that dismissal will ordinarily be without prejudice.
• Record-building imperative: Prosecutors should document efforts to move forensic and other third-party-dependent steps forward. Defense counsel moving for dismissal should develop proof that the State’s inaction, not external constraints, caused the delay.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Unnecessary delay” (SDCL 23A-44-3): A flexible standard allowing courts to dismiss when the State, through its own actions or inaction, fails to timely move a case forward to key milestones (charging or trial). It is not limited to violations of a fixed deadline and is distinct from constitutional speedy-trial claims.
• Rule 48(b) analogue: Federal rule that similarly allows dismissal for unnecessary delay; it reflects courts’ inherent power to prevent prosecutions from languishing for want of prosecution.
• Barker v. Wingo factors: Four considerations—length of delay, reasons for delay, whether the defendant asserted the right to speedy trial, and prejudice—that guide analysis in speedy-trial contexts and can inform whether delay is “unnecessary.”
• “Attributable to the State”: The delay must be traceable to prosecutorial decisions or omissions. Bad faith isn’t required, but the State must be responsible for the delay; neutral causes (e.g., independent lab backlogs) may not qualify if the State acted diligently.
• 180-day rule (SDCL 23A-44-5.1): A structured, mandatory timeline to bring a case to trial. After 180 days (excluding stipulated periods), prejudice is presumed and dismissal can be required with prejudice unless the State rebuts.
• With vs. without prejudice: Dismissal “with prejudice” permanently bars refiling; “without prejudice” allows the State to recharge. SDCL 23A-44-3 dismissals are typically without prejudice (SDCL 23A-44-5).
• “Held to answer”: A defendant has been bound over to circuit court—typically after a preliminary hearing—where an information must then be filed without unnecessary delay.
• Plea-offer vs. open plea: A plea offer is a negotiated agreement; an “open plea” is a plea without an agreement, often after a scheduling deadline. There is no constitutional or statutory right to receive a plea offer.
• Abuse of discretion: Appellate standard asking whether the decision was clearly against reason and evidence; an error of law is, by definition, an abuse of discretion.

Applying the Court’s Framework to Bradshaw

The Court’s analysis hinged on several concrete features of the record:

• Prompt submission to the state lab: The State sent the sample for testing two days after charging, which cuts against a finding of prosecutorial neglect or dormancy.
• Proximity of trial: Even at the July plea hearing, trial was six weeks away; the defendant was seeking to plead, not setting up for trial. The lack of lab results at that moment did not prove the State could not try the case in September or obtain a short continuance if needed.
• State’s request to expedite: The prosecutor sought time to expedite testing and noted the State’s lack of control over lab workflows. The circuit court did not probe the State’s diligence, leaving the record undeveloped.
• Plea offer deadlines: The missed plea-offer deadlines—while relevant to case management—do not bear on whether the State unnecessarily delayed bringing the defendant to trial, especially given the absence of a right to a plea offer.

On this composite, the dismissal did not rest on reasoned fact-finding that the State caused an “unnecessary delay.” The Court therefore reversed.

Conclusion

State v. Bradshaw supplies a much-needed blueprint for SDCL 23A-44-3. The Supreme Court confirms that “unnecessary delay” dismissals are discretionary, modeled on Rule 48(b), and focused on whether the State has failed to move a case toward legally required milestones. The Court clarifies that plea-offer schedules are not policed by this statute, and that SDCL 23A-44-3 coexists with—rather than is displaced by—the 180-day rule.

Practically, the decision will temper motions to dismiss premised on laboratory backlog or similar third-party delays absent a record of prosecutorial neglect. It also encourages trial courts to build a factual record on the State’s diligence and to consider proportionate alternatives before invoking the drastic remedy of dismissal. For prosecutors, the opinion underscores the importance of documenting efforts to expedite testing and to keep cases moving. For defense counsel, it clarifies the evidentiary showing necessary to prove that delay is both unnecessary and chargeable to the State.

The key takeaway is that “unnecessary delay” under SDCL 23A-44-3 is a targeted, fact-intensive inquiry anchored in prosecutorial responsibility for advancing the case—not a generalized sanction for missed plea deadlines or routine testing delays. Bradshaw thus aligns South Dakota practice with federal principles while preserving the distinct role of the 180-day rule in protecting speedy-trial rights.