State v. Bolton: Neutral Handling of Juror Dissent During a Practice Book § 42-31 Jury Poll; No Per Se Need for a Chip Smith Charge

I. Introduction

State v. Bolton (Supreme Court of Connecticut, officially released July 22, 2025) addresses a recurring and high-stakes trial event: what a trial court should do when a jury poll, conducted under Practice Book § 42-31, reveals that a juror equivocates or disagrees with the announced verdict. The defendant, John Bolton, was convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm arising from the January 8, 2019 shooting death of Carl Spence.

After the foreperson announced guilty verdicts and the jury collectively confirmed them, defense counsel requested an individual poll. During that poll, the sixth juror, S.C., hesitated, asked, “I can't change my mind, right?,” and ultimately said “No” when asked if she was prepared to say “guilty.” The trial court stopped the poll, consulted with counsel, conducted a limited neutral inquiry of S.C. (who said her concern was “Both” about speaking publicly and about the verdict), and directed further deliberations after a lunch break. The jury later returned a unanimous guilty verdict, and a second poll confirmed unanimity.

The appeal raised three central issues: (1) whether denial of a mistrial was an abuse of discretion; (2) whether the ultimate verdict was unconstitutionally coerced; and (3) whether stopping the poll violated Practice Book § 42-31.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. It held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial; the record showed no impermissible coercion of juror S.C.
The defendant’s unpreserved constitutional coercion claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding, as modified by In re Yasiel R., because no constitutional violation occurred and the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.
The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated Practice Book § 42-31 by discontinuing the poll was not reviewed because it was not preserved and, in any event, was not of constitutional magnitude (failing Golding’s second prong), consistent with State v. Pare.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The mistrial standard and appellate deference

The court grounded its abuse-of-discretion review in established mistrial doctrine: mistrial is “not favored,” and is reserved for occurrences that vitiate the proceedings such that a party cannot have a fair trial, with curative measures preferred over the “drastic remedy.” This framework came from State v. Ortiz and was reinforced by State v. Henderson. The court also relied on State v. Gore for the defendant’s burden to show prejudice warranting a mistrial.

2. Purpose and nature of jury polling; the nonconstitutional status of the poll right

The opinion emphasized that a poll tests “uncoerced unanimity” and creates individual responsibility, quoting United States v. Gambino (and citing United States v. Singer similarly). Yet the court reiterated, via State v. Pare, that the right to poll is “substantial” but “not of constitutional dimension,” which later became decisive in rejecting the defendant’s unpreserved rule-violation claim.

3. Connecticut cases on polling breakdowns and neutral inquiry

The court acknowledged that Connecticut criminal precedent is sparse. It relied on:

State v. Gullette: after a dissent during a poll (and after a Chip Smith charge), the jury was reinstructed and returned quickly with unanimity; no abuse of discretion and no coercion shown. Bolton uses Gullette to illustrate that further deliberations after a poll dissent can be permissible, and that the record must show coercion rather than assume it.
Tough v. Ives (civil): a “neutral inquiry” by the judge clarifying a juror’s response is permissible; inquiry becomes objectionable if coercive or probes jury-room motives. Bolton imports Tough’s neutrality boundary into the § 42-31 context.
Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C. (civil): upheld a trial court’s neutral inquiry into whether a juror was confused during polling, and held the juror’s “final answer” controls (also citing Josephson v. Meyers). Bolton treats Hurley as a model of deference to the trial judge’s demeanor-based assessment when resolving ambiguity during a poll.
State v. Bell: the counterexample. There, repeated efforts to extract an answer from a hesitant juror during polling produced a “guilty” response deemed induced by the court’s polling conduct; the Appellate Court required a new trial. Bolton contrasts Bell with the trial court’s immediate cessation of polling and neutral handling, underscoring what trial courts should not do.
Wiseman v. Armstrong: polling serves the same anti-coercion/unanimity function in civil cases, supporting the court’s cross-use of civil polling precedent to inform criminal procedure.

4. The “inherent coercive potential” framework and national authorities

The court adopted, as instructive, a two-part evaluative approach articulated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Harris v. United States: (1) assess the inherent coercive potential of the situation; (2) assess whether the judge’s actions exacerbated, alleviated, or were neutral to that coercive potential. Bolton’s analysis follows that structure.

To demonstrate broad acceptance of this approach under rules analogous to § 42-31, the court cited numerous authorities, including: United States v. Coulter, United States v. Williams, United States v. Fiorilla, Browne v. State, State v. Ware, State v. Frederick, State v. Pyatt, State v. Milton, and State v. Holloway. These citations primarily serve a harmonizing function: Connecticut’s discretionary choices under § 42-31 align with the mainstream interpretation of similar polling rules.

5. Stopping the poll early to reduce coercion

Bolton emphasizes that stopping a poll early—especially when dissent appears early—reduces coercive effect by not revealing the numerical division. The court cited United States v. Banks for this proposition, along with United States v. Thomas and Leake v. United States. It contrasted this with United States v. Williams and Crowder v. United States, where completing the poll risked transforming a dissenter into a publicly identified “lone holdout.” The court also clarified that continuing a poll after dissent is not coercive per se, citing United States v. Carraway, but treated early termination as a prudent anti-coercion measure.

6. Neutral “return to deliberations” instructions

The court found support in D.C. cases approving neutral post-poll directions: Leake v. United States (neutral directive to deliberate further without pressuring unanimity) and Green v. United States (similar neutral handling). It cited Coley v. United States for the principle that the greater the coercion potential, the greater the need for mitigation.

7. Chip Smith, Allen charges, and caution about post-poll antideadlock instructions

The opinion carefully situates State v. Smith (49 Conn. 376) as the origin of the Chip Smith charge and recognizes the federal analogue in Allen v. United States. It cited State v. O'Neil for the acceptability of Chip Smith and State v. Feliciano for its underlying logic.

But Bolton’s key move is to refuse any rule that a Chip Smith charge is required after a poll dissent. It noted that some authorities view deadlock instructions as potentially coercive in the post-poll setting (citing Green v. United States) and discussed the District of Columbia’s “middle ground” Crowder instruction and its later treatment in Callaham v. United States. Bolton highlighted that the court’s original deliberation instructions already contained anti-coercion language functionally similar to Crowder’s core.

8. Constitutional preservation doctrines: Golding and plain error

For the unpreserved constitutional coercion claim, the court applied State v. Golding as modified by In re Yasiel R., rejecting relief under Golding’s third prong. For plain error, it cited State v. Blaine (plain error is extraordinary) and State v. Stephens (claims failing Golding’s third prong are not entitled to plain error relief).

On preservation generally, the court relied on Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction to restate the rule that appellate review is limited to issues distinctly raised at trial. It also cited State v. Samuel U. to reiterate Golding’s constitutional-magnitude gatekeeping.

9. Distinguishing “coercion by circumstance” cases

The defendant invoked United States v. Pleva—where a juror openly agreed to a verdict due to physical misery and inability to hold out further. The court distinguished Pleva as involving record evidence of incapacity-driven capitulation, whereas Bolton contained no comparable on-record indication that S.C.’s eventual vote was compelled. Bolton also cited additional-deliberation-time authorities (United States v. Thomas, United States v. McDonald, and contrastively United States v. Banks) to treat meaningful further deliberations as an indicator against coercion.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s operative framework: coercive potential + judicial response

Bolton’s reasoning effectively adopts the Harris two-part inquiry as the lens through which § 42-31 discretion should be exercised and reviewed: the trial judge must identify the coercive risks created by a dissent during polling and respond in a way that is neutral or mitigative, not escalatory. This method does not constitutionalize polling; it supplies an operational standard for evaluating whether the process produced an uncoerced unanimous verdict.

2. Application to the facts: why no mistrial

The court found the situation’s coercive potential limited because:

The poll was stopped at the first sign of nonconcurrence, avoiding disclosure of the full numerical split (a key pressure amplifier in many cases).
S.C. took a break and deliberations resumed after lunch, a sequence the court treated as tension-relieving and consistent with a free reconsideration process.
There was no evidence of misconduct, intimidation, or negative reaction by other jurors toward S.C.
The jury deliberated for about two additional hours before returning with unanimity, which the court treated as inconsistent with “immediate” capitulation.

Crucially, the trial court’s own conduct was deemed “minimal and neutral”: it excused the jury to consult with counsel; conducted a limited canvass that asked only whether the hesitation concerned public speaking or the verdict itself; and directed the jury back to deliberations while referring them to existing instructions emphasizing that jurors must not surrender honest views merely to reach a verdict. This was presented as the antithesis of the repeated, verdict-extracting questioning condemned in State v. Bell.

3. Why no constitutional violation under Golding’s third prong

The court treated the defendant’s constitutional argument as having two components: (a) the trial court should have given a Chip Smith charge; and (b) S.C. was actually coerced. It rejected both.

On instructions, the court held that neutrality was the touchstone: because the trial court did not issue any “order to decide,” the absence of a Chip Smith charge did not create a coercive regime. Citing State v. Mitchell and State v. Smith (222 Conn. 1), the court reaffirmed that a defendant is entitled to a jury “unfettered by an order to decide,” not to an instruction that the jury may hang.

On actual coercion, the court found no record evidence comparable to United States v. Pleva. S.C. demonstrated willingness to communicate; she dissented openly in the first poll; she later affirmed her verdict during the second poll; and nothing in the record suggested capitulation due to threat, exhaustion, illness, or overt pressure. Accordingly, the asserted constitutional defect “did not occur,” so the claim failed Golding’s third prong (as modified by In re Yasiel R.).

4. The Practice Book claim: why the court refused review

The defendant’s third claim—that stopping the poll violated Practice Book § 42-31—failed for two independent reasons. First, it was not preserved: the defendant did not request completion of the poll and did not frame his mistrial motion as a rules violation. Second, even if reviewed via Golding, the claim was not of constitutional magnitude under State v. Pare, and thus failed Golding’s second prong.

C. Impact

State v. Bolton is significant less for creating a new procedural “requirement” than for consolidating a disciplined best-practices approach to § 42-31 events:

Early cessation of polling upon dissent is an endorsed tool for reducing coercive spillover, particularly by avoiding disclosure of the jury’s precise split.
Trial courts may conduct a narrow, neutral canvass aimed at distinguishing confusion about procedure from disagreement with the verdict—without probing deliberations or motives.
A Chip Smith charge is discretionary, not mandatory, and may not be advisable in every post-poll setting; neutrality and existing anti-coercion instructions can suffice.
Appellate courts will give substantial deference to the trial judge’s on-scene assessment of juror demeanor and courtroom dynamics, absent record evidence of coercion.

For practitioners, Bolton underscores the importance of making an explicit record at the moment a poll breaks down: if counsel believes the court must complete the poll, must discharge the jury, or must issue a specific supplemental instruction, the objection and requested relief must be distinctly raised to preserve meaningful appellate review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Jury poll (Practice Book § 42-31): After the verdict is announced, each juror is asked individually if the announced verdict is his or her verdict. The goal is to confirm unanimity and to detect coercion or misunderstanding.
Unanimity vs. coercion: The law requires all jurors to agree, but it also requires that agreement to be genuine—no juror should vote a certain way just to end deliberations or because of pressure from the judge or other jurors.
Chip Smith charge: A supplemental instruction encouraging jurors to continue deliberating and consider each other’s views while emphasizing that no juror should surrender an honest belief merely to achieve unanimity.
Golding review (unpreserved constitutional claims): A doctrine allowing appellate review of certain constitutional claims not raised at trial, but only if strict criteria are met. Bolton failed at the step requiring an actual constitutional violation that deprived a fair trial.
Plain error: An exceptional appellate remedy for extremely serious unpreserved errors. Bolton reiterates that if a claim fails under Golding’s third prong, it will generally not qualify as plain error either.

V. Conclusion

State v. Bolton affirms that when a juror equivocates or dissents during a Practice Book § 42-31 poll, the trial court’s central obligation is to manage the moment to protect both unanimity and voluntariness. The Supreme Court approved a restrained playbook: stop the poll early, consult counsel, conduct only a limited neutral inquiry if needed, and return the jury to deliberations with noncoercive guidance—without treating a Chip Smith charge as a required ritual.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its practical, court-centered standard: appellate review will focus on (1) the coercive potential created by the polling breakdown and (2) whether the judge’s response was neutral or coercion-enhancing. Bolton thereby clarifies how Connecticut trial courts can preserve verdict integrity in one of the most delicate procedural moments in criminal adjudication.