State v. Boatwright: When Accomplice Instructions Are Unnecessary and Prosecutorial Remarks Must Be Read in Context

Introduction

In State v. Boatwright, No. 125,851 (Kan. May 23, 2025), the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, criminal discharge of a firearm, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The case centers on a fatal drive-by shooting in Topeka and a trial that turned on the credibility of a key State witness, KeShawn Ivy, who drove the vehicle from which shots were fired and who placed the defendant, James D. Boatwright, in the front passenger seat at the time of the shooting.

On appeal, Boatwright raised two principal issues:

• Whether the district court erred by failing to give, sua sponte, a cautionary accomplice instruction regarding Ivy’s testimony.
• Whether the prosecutor committed multiple instances of error in closing argument that denied Boatwright a fair trial.

The opinion—authored by Justice Rosen—reaffirms and clarifies Kansas law on two fronts. First, it articulates that an accomplice instruction is not an absolute necessity when jurors receive a general credibility instruction and the record makes it obvious that witness credibility is the central issue. Second, it reiterates that courts assess claimed prosecutorial error by viewing the challenged remarks in context, not in isolation. Both holdings consolidate and apply prior Kansas precedent to a fact-intensive record.

Summary of the Opinion

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed all convictions. On the accomplice-instruction issue, the Court assumed without deciding that Ivy could be considered an accomplice but held that the omission of a specific accomplice cautionary instruction was not clearly erroneous where:

• The jury received a general credibility instruction.
• Ivy’s testimony was thoroughly cross-examined and contradicted by Boatwright’s testimony, making credibility patently central to the case.
• Substantial corroborating evidence supported the State’s theory beyond Ivy’s account (ballistic matches, phone records, “factory reset” phones, and Boatwright’s jail call acknowledging Ivy “told everything”).

On prosecutorial error, the Court rejected five asserted errors, each time reading the remarks in context and holding that the prosecutor operated within the wide latitude allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. Specifically, the Court found no Doyle violation; no improper accusation of lying; no impermissible vouching; no burden-shifting; and no improper appeal to community interests. Because the Court found no error, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court situated its analysis within a well-developed line of Kansas and federal authority:

• Accomplice instruction and jury guidance:
  • State v. Goens, 317 Kan. 616, 535 P.3d 1116 (2023): When no accomplice instruction is requested, reversal requires clear error; assess whether a juror of average intelligence would recognize that credibility is at issue and whether cross-examination was thorough.
  • State v. Simmons, 282 Kan. 728, 148 P.3d 525 (2006): Supports the “juror of average intelligence” framing regarding obvious credibility disputes.
  • State v. Crume, 271 Kan. 87, 22 P.3d 1057 (2001): Absence of accomplice instruction is not error if a general credibility instruction adequately cautions jurors on weighing testimony.
  • State v. DePriest, 258 Kan. 596, 907 P.2d 868 (1995): Accomplice instructions are not an absolute necessity; their administration falls within trial management discretion.
  • State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 (2006): Defines “accomplice” for purposes of jury instructions.
  • State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249, 485 P.3d 614 (2021); State v. Z.M., 319 Kan. 297, 555 P.3d 190 (2024): Reinforce the “legally and factually appropriate” standard and the principle that correct and non-misleading instructions suffice even if alternatives might be clearer.
  • K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Crosby, 312 Kan. 630, 479 P.3d 167 (2021): Clear error standard where no instruction was requested; appellant bears burden to show both error and prejudice.
• Prosecutorial error framework:
  • State v. Sieg, 315 Kan. 526, 509 P.3d 535 (2022): Two-step analysis—error and prejudice; prosecutors have “wide latitude” consistent with fair trial rights.
  • Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 559 P.3d 792 (2024): Constitutional harmless error standard; no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict.
  • State v. Brown, 316 Kan. 154, 513 P.3d 1207 (2022): Courts examine challenged remarks in context, not in isolation.
• Specific closing-argument doctrines:
  • Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); State v. Fisher, 304 Kan. 242, 373 P.3d 781 (2016); State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 887 P.2d 88 (1994); State v. Heath, 222 Kan. 50, 563 P.2d 418 (1977): Prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s post-arrest silence to impeach exculpatory trial testimony.
  • State v. Liles, 313 Kan. 772, 490 P.3d 1206 (2021); State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, 315 P.3d 868 (2014); State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005); State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 44 P.3d 466 (2002); Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475, 146 P.3d 187 (2006); State v. Brown, 300 Kan. 542, 331 P.3d 781 (2014): Prosecutors cannot assert personal opinions about truthfulness but may argue credibility based on evidence and inconsistencies.
  • State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 996 P.2d 321 (2000); State v. McHenry, 276 Kan. 513, 78 P.3d 403 (2003): Improper to “vouch” for a witness with personal assurances or references to facts outside the record.
  • State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 329 P.3d 400 (2014); State v. Wilson, 295 Kan. 605, 289 P.3d 1082 (2012): The State may highlight the lack of evidence supporting the defense’s theory without shifting the burden of proof.
  • State v. Buck-Schrag, 312 Kan. 540, 477 P.3d 1013 (2020); State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 485 P.3d 622 (2021); State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 985, 336 P.3d 312 (2014); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 257 P.3d 272 (2011): Appeals to community conscience or passion are improper, but context may show remarks are legitimate argument about motive or legal standards.

These authorities provided the scaffolding for the Court’s holdings: (1) a general credibility instruction and a record replete with credibility signposts can obviate the need for an unrequested accomplice instruction; and (2) prosecutorial remarks must be evaluated holistically, considering the evidence and the defense’s arguments.

Legal Reasoning

1) Accomplice Instruction: Not an Absolute Necessity When Credibility Is Obviously at Issue

Standard of review was clear error because Boatwright neither requested an accomplice instruction nor objected to its omission. The Court assumed Ivy could qualify as an accomplice for instruction purposes (PIK Crim. 4th 51.090) but held there was no error because:

• The jury received a general credibility instruction authorizing use of common knowledge and experience to weigh testimony.
• Ivy was vigorously cross-examined, admitted to prior inconsistencies, and was directly contradicted by Boatwright’s testimony—making credibility unmistakably central to the case for any “juror of average intelligence” (Goens; Simmons).
• Independent corroboration supported Ivy’s account: the fully automatic-modified Glock found concealed at Boatwright’s residence matched casings at both the prior “bridge” practice-shooting and the crime scene; immediate pre- and post-homicide calls and texts among the core players; the “Job done” message reported by a witness; and Boatwright’s jail call stating Ivy “told everything.”

The Court emphasized that accomplice instructions are “never an absolute necessity” (DePriest), can be encompassed in general credibility instructions (Crume), and that the core inquiry is whether the actual instructions fairly stated the law and were unlikely to mislead (Holley; Z.M.). Under these standards, there was no instructional error, let alone clear error.

2) Prosecutorial Error: Remarks Must Be Read in Context

Applying the two-step prosecutorial error framework (Sieg; Chapman; Mendez), and the directive to read statements in context (Brown), the Court rejected each of Boatwright’s five claims:

A. Alleged Doyle Violation

The challenged remark contrasted Ivy—“grabbed off the street” and interviewed for hours—with Boatwright, who had “months to prepare his testimony” and to “look at all of the State’s evidence.” The Court held:

• No impermissible comment on post-arrest silence. Boatwright himself told the jury he invoked his right to remain silent; the prosecutor did not exploit that invocation to impeach him.
• In context, the remark explained inconsistent statements by Ivy (panic under interrogation) and argued that Boatwright’s story appeared crafted in light of the evidence—an inference grounded in the record, not an attack on constitutional silence (distinguishing Doyle; Fisher; Heath).

B. Calling the Defendant a Liar

Prosecutors cannot express personal opinions about credibility, but they may argue that the evidence demonstrates untruthfulness. The prosecutor argued that Boatwright’s testimony “bobs and weaves” around the State’s evidence and is “flatly contradicted” by other proof. The Court viewed this as permissible evidence-based credibility argument (Liles; Akins), particularly given:

• The defense’s own frontal assault on Ivy’s credibility in closing.
• Specific, record-based reasons to doubt Boatwright (e.g., the erased phone contrasted with testimony he sold it to someone who denied buying it; the hidden modified Glock; phone records; and the jail call).

C. Vouching for Ivy

The Court found no vouching. The prosecutor did not assert personal knowledge, place the State’s prestige behind Ivy, or refer to facts outside the record (Pabst; McHenry). Instead, he argued that Ivy’s eventual admissions were corroborated (ballistics, phone records, hidden weapon, factory resets) and that some of Ivy’s statements were self-incriminatory—common-sense reasons a juror might find Ivy more credible than the defendant, especially after robust cross-examination.

D. Shifting the Burden of Proof

The prosecutor emphasized that the contents of certain text messages could not be recovered because Boatwright and Alston “factory reset” their phones shortly after the shooting. The Court held:

• This did not shift the burden to the defense. Rather, the State permissibly argued reasonable inferences from the evidence about why messages were missing and why the timing and surrounding facts suggested they were incriminating (Williams; Wilson).
• The prosecutor pointed to affirmative evidence—ballistics, witness testimony, phone logs, and timing—to support the State’s theory, not a demand that the defense prove innocence.

E. Improper Appeal to Community Interests

The prosecutor characterized the motive as “senseless violence” while arguing there was, in fact, a motive rooted in disrespect and relationship conflict. In context (Buck-Schrag; Gallegos), the Court read this not as an appeal to passion or community fears but as a motive argument based on the evidence (door-kicking incident, romantic tensions, animosity, contemporaneous messages).

Impact and Future Implications

• Trial judges and accomplice instructions:
  • Boatwright solidifies a practical safe harbor: where the jury receives a robust general credibility instruction and the record unmistakably spotlights credibility (via cross-examination and competing testimony), the omission of an unrequested accomplice instruction will generally not be clear error.
  • Trial courts should still consider giving PIK Crim. 4th 51.090 when requested and legally/factually appropriate, but Boatwright reduces the risk of reversal when it is omitted absent a request and the record powerfully cues jurors to credibility concerns.
• Appellate preservation:
  • Defense counsel should affirmatively request an accomplice instruction when strategic, to avoid the heightened “clear error” hurdle on appeal. Boatwright demonstrates how difficult it is to satisfy that standard when credibility has been fully joined at trial under a general credibility charge.
• Closing arguments:
  • Boatwright underscores that Kansas courts will continue to read challenged remarks in context, considering defense arguments, the evidentiary record, and the prosecutor’s articulation of reasonable inferences.
  • Prosecutors retain wide latitude to compare competing credibility narratives, highlight self-inculpatory statements, and infer consciousness of guilt from actions like erasing digital data—so long as they do not assert personal beliefs, shift burdens, or punish constitutional silence.
• Digital evidence and inference:
  • While the Court did not fashion a “spoliation” doctrine for criminal cases, it expressly permitted argument that factory resets soon after a homicide, combined with corroborating proof, can support an inference of incriminating communications. Expect more focused litigation on the permissible scope of such inferences in the age of ephemeral and resettable devices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Accomplice instruction (PIK Crim. 4th 51.090): A caution that jurors should view an accomplice’s testimony “with caution.” It is not mandatory in every case. If not requested, an appellate court will reverse only if the omission was “clearly erroneous”—a very demanding standard.
• General credibility instruction: A standard instruction telling jurors they alone assess witness credibility using common sense and experience. In Boatwright, this sufficed because credibility was obviously central and thoroughly tested through cross-examination.
• Clear error review: Applies when a party fails to request or object to an instruction. The appellant must show both that the court erred and that the error affected the verdict—i.e., a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error.
• Prosecutorial error framework: Two steps—(1) did the prosecutor exceed the wide latitude afforded in argument; and if so, (2) was the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman? Statements are evaluated in the full context of the trial.
• Doyle violation: It is improper for the State to impeach a defendant by pointing to his post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings. In Boatwright, the prosecutor’s remarks referenced preparation time and were used to explain Ivy’s inconsistencies, not to punish constitutional silence.
• Vouching: A prosecutor may not assert personal beliefs about a witness’s truthfulness or suggest knowledge outside the record. They may, however, argue that the evidence corroborates one witness and contradicts another.
• Burden shifting: The State cannot imply the defendant has to prove innocence. It may argue that missing evidence is consistent with guilt if supported by record facts (e.g., factory resets) and correlated evidence.
• Appeals to community conscience: Prosecutors should not inflame jurors or ask them to convict to protect the community. Context matters: discussing motive—even calling it “senseless”—can be permissible if tied to evidence rather than fear or passion.

Conclusion

State v. Boatwright reinforces two pragmatic pillars of Kansas criminal practice. First, trial courts are not required to deliver an accomplice cautionary instruction sua sponte where the jury is properly instructed on credibility and the trial record unmistakably places credibility at the forefront through rigorous cross-examination and competing testimony. Second, allegations of prosecutorial error must be assessed in the lived context of trial—what the evidence showed, how the defense argued, and whether the prosecutor’s remarks fairly drew reasoned inferences or impermissibly crossed constitutional boundaries.

Doctrinally, the opinion synthesizes and applies established Kansas law: clear error review for unrequested instructions; the wide-latitude but context-driven evaluation of closing argument; and careful separation of evidence-based credibility commentary from outright vouching, burden shifting, or Doyle-type infringements. Practically, Boatwright counsels defense counsel to request tailored cautionary instructions when strategic and reminds prosecutors that strong, record-anchored argument will withstand appellate scrutiny even when rhetoric is robust. With no error found—and thus no cumulative error—the convictions and sentences, including the hard 50 life term, were affirmed.