State v. Blue and the “Genuine Question” Threshold Under Oregon’s Best Evidence Rule

State v. Blue and the “Genuine Question” Threshold Under Oregon’s Best Evidence Rule

I. Introduction

In State v. Blue, 374 Or 439 (2025), the Oregon Supreme Court squarely addressed, for the first time, what it means under the Oregon Evidence Code for a party to raise a “genuine question” as to the authenticity of an original document, thereby blocking admission of a duplicate under the best evidence rule.

The defendant, Vanessa Rochelle Blue, was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV) after she rented a U-Haul truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico, paid cash, and then drove the truck to Oregon and kept it for several weeks. The state’s theory hinged on a one-day rental agreement that supposedly bore Blue’s signature. Blue consistently denied that she ever signed such a contract; she claimed she had arranged a 30-day rental and never been shown a written agreement.

At the retrial that led to this appeal, the state did not produce the original contract. Instead, it offered a photograph of a signed contract that had been taken at the New Mexico Chevron station and sent to Oregon prosecutors. Blue objected under Oregon’s best evidence rule, arguing that she had raised a “genuine question” as to the authenticity of the original contract. The trial court ruled against her and admitted the photo as a “duplicate” under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 1003. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:

  • The phrase “genuine question as to the authenticity of the original” in OEC 1003(1) is satisfied when there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original is not what the proponent claims it to be.
  • Blue’s sworn testimony that she never signed the contract, together with corroborating circumstances, met that standard.
  • The trial court therefore erred in admitting the photograph under OEC 1003, and the error was not harmless.

The decision significantly clarifies Oregon’s best evidence framework, the role of authentication disputes under OEC 901, and the standard of appellate review for such rulings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Chief Justice Flynn, writing for a unanimous en banc court, reversed Blue’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The Court’s key holdings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Definition of “genuine question” under OEC 1003(1)
    A party opposing admission of a duplicate raises a “genuine question” as to the authenticity of the original when that party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the original is not what the proponent claims it is. This standard parallels the familiar “sufficient evidence for a jury to decide” threshold seen in summary judgment and directed verdict contexts.
  2. Relationship between OEC 1002 and OEC 1003
    OEC 1002 codifies the best evidence rule: to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original is required unless an exception applies. OEC 1003 provides a default exception—duplicates are admissible to the same extent as originals—unless (a) there is a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original or (b) it would be unfair to substitute the duplicate. When a genuine authenticity question is raised, the general preference for the original prevails, and OEC 1003’s “duplicate” shortcut is unavailable.
  3. Authenticity is a jury issue if supported by evidence
    Under OEC 901, authenticity is a factual question for the factfinder whenever there is “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” That framework informs OEC 1003(1): if there is evidence from which a jury could find the original inauthentic, OEC 1003’s duplicate exception drops out.
  4. Standard of review
    Whether a party has raised a “genuine question as to the authenticity of the original” under OEC 1003(1) is reviewed as a question of law, not for abuse of discretion. Either there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the original inauthentic, or there is not; there is only one legally correct answer to that question in any given record.
  5. Application to Blue’s case
    Blue’s sworn testimony that she never signed the contract, coupled with evidence that the U-Haul database contained only an unsigned version of the contract, and her plausible account of the rental transaction, constituted sufficient evidence to allow a juror to find that the original signed contract was a forgery. That evidence raised a genuine question as to authenticity. The trial court erred in admitting the photograph as a duplicate under OEC 1003(1).
  6. Harmless error
    The photograph purportedly showing Blue’s signature on a one-day rental was central, noncumulative evidence of the “knowing” element of both UUV counts. It was qualitatively different from the unsigned contract in U-Haul’s database and from other circumstantial evidence. The error had more than a “little likelihood” of affecting the verdict and was therefore not harmless.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedential and Statutory Framework

1. The pre-OEC best evidence rule: preventing fraud and mistransmission

Before the Oregon Evidence Code was adopted in 1981, the best evidence rule was codified in former ORS 41.610 and 41.640. This Court had long treated those provisions as embodying the common-law best evidence rule:

  • Lumbermens Mut. Cas. v. Jamieson, 251 Or 608 (1968) – recognized former ORS 41.610 as a codification of the common-law best evidence rule.
  • Dean Vincent, Inc. v. Stearns, 276 Or 533 (1976) – emphasized that the rule’s purpose is “to secure the most reliable information as to the contents of documents when those contents are disputed” (quoting the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. White).
  • State v. Nano, 273 Or 366 (1975) – stressed that the rule helps prevent fraud and “wilful or unintentional mistransmission of the contents of the writing,” especially for “operative or dispositive instruments.”
  • State v. White, 4 Or App 151 (1970) – observed that where there is no good-faith dispute over the accuracy of the secondary evidence and fraud is not reasonably feared, the “mystical ideal” of always requiring the original need not be pursued.

These cases together established two themes the Court recurs to in Blue:

  • The best evidence rule is fundamentally about accuracy and anti-fraud.
  • When the authenticity or accuracy of the original is genuinely in dispute, the original is the preferred, and often necessary, evidence.

2. The Oregon Evidence Code: OEC 1002–1008 and OEC 901

The 1981 Oregon Evidence Code reorganized and restated the best evidence doctrine:

  • OEC 1002 (“best evidence” rule): To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original is required, subject to exceptions in OEC 1001–1008 or other law.
  • OEC 1001:
    • Defines “original.”
    • Defines “duplicate” broadly as a “counterpart” produced by photography, mechanical or electronic re-recording, optical imaging, or other equivalent methods that “accurately reproduce the original.”
  • OEC 1003:
    • Baseline rule: A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original.
    • Exceptions:
      1. Where a “genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original,” or
      2. Where the circumstances make it “unfair” to admit the duplicate instead of the original.
  • OEC 901(1):
    • Defines “authentication” as requiring “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”
    • Clarifies that authenticity is a question of fact; the judge’s gatekeeping role is limited to determining whether the proponent has met a minimal evidentiary threshold (“sufficient to support a finding”).
  • OEC 901(2)(a):
    • One method of authentication is testimony from a witness with knowledge that a matter “is what it is claimed to be.”
  • OEC 104(2):
    • When relevance depends on a factual condition (such as authenticity), the court admits the evidence upon or subject to sufficient evidence to support a finding that the condition is fulfilled.

In Blue, the Court reads OEC 1003(1) in light of these surrounding rules: authenticity is a factual issue for the jury, and the best evidence rule exists to ensure the jury has the most reliable evidence—especially the original—when authenticity is contested.

3. Context: Statutory interpretation principles

The Court employs its usual method for interpreting statutes:

  • State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (2009) – directs courts to look at text, context, and legislative history.
  • Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333 (2015) – emphasizes that preexisting law provides important context for interpreting new statutory language.

This methodology leads the Court to:

  • Consider ordinary dictionary definitions of “genuine” and “question.”
  • Set OEC 1003 against the backdrop of the older Oregon cases (e.g., Nano, White) and the general preference for originals when authenticity is at stake.
  • Examine the legislative history of both the Oregon Evidence Code and its federal model, Federal Rule of Evidence 1003.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. “Authenticity of the original” and its link to OEC 901

The phrase “authenticity of the original” in OEC 1003(1) is not defined in that rule, but it is directly tied to OEC 901’s concept of authenticity. In this context:

  • The “original” is whatever document the proponent claims is the operative writing (here, a rental contract allegedly signed by Blue in New Mexico).
  • “Authenticity” asks whether that original is indeed what it purports to be: a contract actually signed by the defendant, at the relevant time, under the claimed terms.

Since OEC 901 makes clear that authenticity turns on whether there is evidence “sufficient to support a finding” that the exhibit is what the proponent claims, the Court logically construes OEC 1003(1) through the same lens, but from the other side of the coin: can the opponent point to evidence sufficient to support a finding that the original is not authentic?

2. What is a “genuine question”? Text and analogy to “genuine issue”

The Court first parses the words “genuine” and “question” in their ordinary sense:

  • “Genuine” – having real existence; not abstract or frivolous.
  • “Question” – a subject in dispute, open for discussion, or whose correctness or existence is open to doubt.

Used together, “genuine question as to the authenticity of the original” naturally refers to a non-frivolous, evidence-based basis to doubt that the original is what it purports to be.

The Court then draws an instructive analogy to the summary judgment standard. Under former ORS 18.105 and current ORCP 47 C:

  • A party defeats summary judgment if there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact.”
  • In Seeborg v. General Motors Corp., 284 Or 695 (1978), this Court explained that a “genuine issue” means a “triable issue,” and that there must be “sufficient evidence to be entitled to a jury determination.”
  • Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404 (1997), later emphasized that this focus on “sufficient evidence” aligns summary judgment with the standard for directed verdict.

Although the Court stops short of saying the legislature deliberately imported summary judgment doctrine into OEC 1003, it finds the analogy persuasive: both settings use the word “genuine” to describe when an issue of fact must be left to the jury. Thus, for OEC 1003(1):

A “genuine question” exists when there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original document is not what the proponent claims it to be.

3. Context and purpose: preserving the best evidence preference

The Court rejects the State’s argument that a “genuine question” requires such strong evidence that the factfinder would be essentially compelled to conclude that the original is inauthentic. That high threshold would:

  • Make OEC 1003(1) almost redundant; if the original were conclusively inauthentic, it and any duplicate would simply be inadmissible as irrelevant, without any need to invoke OEC 1003(1).
  • Undermine the best evidence rule’s function by allowing disputes over content and authenticity to be resolved using something other than the best available proof—the original document—despite genuine doubt.

By contrast, reading “genuine question” as requiring only enough evidence to give the jury a real choice between authenticity and inauthenticity harmonizes OEC 1002 and OEC 1003:

  • OEC 1002 sets the default: use the original.
  • OEC 1003 relaxes that default only when: (a) the original’s authenticity is not genuinely contested, and (b) it is not unfair to use a duplicate.

Thus, when there is enough evidence that the jury could find the original forged or otherwise inauthentic, the code’s preference for the original reasserts itself, and the duplicate shortcut is unavailable under OEC 1003(1).

4. Legislative history: fraud prevention and the federal model

The legislative history of OEC 1003 supports the Court’s reading.

a. Oregon Evidence Code drafting process

The Court recounts how the Oregon Evidence Code emerged from:

  • The Advisory Committee on Evidence Law Revision (submitted a draft code and commentary in 1979);
  • The 1979–81 Interim Joint Committee on the Judiciary (chaired by then-Judge Richard Unis);
  • House Bill 2030 in the 1981 legislature;
  • The 1981 Conference Committee’s commentary, often treated as the “official commentary” to the code (see State v. Jancsek, 302 Or 270 (1986), and State v. Carr, 302 Or 20 (1986)).

The commentary to OEC 1003 describes it as “consistent with current Oregon law” and specifically cites Nano and White. Those cases stress fraud-prevention and the need for the original where fraud or inaccuracy is reasonably feared. Judge Unis’s testimony to the legislative committees likewise indicated that the original is required when there is a genuine issue of material fact—his example was a question of fraud.

b. Federal Rule of Evidence 1003

OEC 1003’s wording was taken verbatim from the 1975 version of Federal Rule of Evidence 1003. That invites consideration of the federal history and pre-1981 federal cases:

  • The Advisory Committee Note to proposed FRE 1003 simply reiterated that, absent any “genuine issue” of authenticity or other reason for insisting on the original, a duplicate is admissible.
  • Cases such as United States v. Georgalis, 631 F2d 1199 (5th Cir 1980), and United States v. Enstam, 622 F2d 857 (5th Cir 1980), do not demand conclusive evidence of inauthenticity; they require only that an opponent show either a genuine issue as to authenticity or some other reason (such as trustworthiness) why the original should be produced.

The State chiefly relied on a 1981 edition of the Federal Evidence treatise by Louisell and Mueller, which suggested that FRE 1003 required “cogent and compelling evidence” that would force a reasonable person to find the original inauthentic. The Court gives that gloss little weight:

  • The treatise cited no supporting case law.
  • It appears to have been published too late (November 1981) to influence the Oregon legislature that adopted the code earlier that year.

In combination, the Oregon and federal histories reinforce the Court’s conclusion: OEC 1003(1) is meant to protect the jury from resolving authenticity disputes based solely on secondary evidence when there is a real, evidence-based reason to doubt the original.

5. Standard of review: legal error vs. abuse of discretion

The parties also disputed how appellate courts should review trial court rulings under OEC 1003(1). The State argued for abuse-of-discretion review, referencing federal practice (e.g., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 US 136 (1997)) and analogies to chain-of-custody rulings like:

  • Vander Veer v. Toyota Motor Distributors, 282 Or 135 (1978); and
  • American Recip. Insurers v. Bessonette, 241 Or 500 (1965).

The Court rejected that approach and held:

  • Oregon distinguishes between evidentiary questions that allow for multiple legally permissible outcomes (reviewed for abuse of discretion) and questions whose correct answer is singular (reviewed for legal error). See State v. Cunningham, 337 Or 528 (2004); State v. Titus, 328 Or 475 (1999).
  • Whether an opponent has raised a “genuine question as to authenticity” is evaluated under an objective threshold: is there evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the original inauthentic? That yields only one legally correct result for a given record—yes or no.
  • Therefore, rulings under OEC 1003(1) are reviewed for legal error, not for abuse of discretion.

The Court also notes that, even in the federal system, where evidentiary rulings are nominally reviewed for abuse of discretion, a mistake of law is always an abuse of discretion. See Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Fasching, 369 Or 214 (2022) (quoting Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F3d 1087 (9th Cir 2010)). Thus, adopting a legal-error standard is functionally consistent with core federal principles while maintaining Oregon’s own doctrinal approach.

6. Applying the rule to Blue’s case

a. Evidence raising a genuine question

At the pretrial hearing, Blue’s counsel objected to admission of the photograph under OEC 1003 and pointed to Blue’s testimony from the first trial, where she had:

  • Explicitly denied signing any contract at the New Mexico Chevron station (“I didn't sign no contract.” “That's not my signature.”).
  • Explained that she had requested a 30-day rental to move to Oregon, paid a cash deposit, and left without a printed contract because the dealer’s printer was allegedly broken.
  • Described communication difficulties with the dealer (language barriers) that explained how a misunderstanding could arise.

In addition, defense counsel pointed to:

  • Evidence from the U-Haul field manager that the company’s database contained only an unsigned version of the contract shown in the photograph.
  • The fact that no witness from the Chevron station testified to actually seeing Blue sign the contract.

The Court treated counsel’s reference to prior sworn testimony as an offer of proof that Blue would repeat the same testimony at the retrial—which she did. That sworn denial, combined with the absence of a signed contract in U-Haul’s own system and Blue’s plausible account of the transaction, was exactly the sort of “evidence sufficient to support a finding” that the original contract’s signature was forged or otherwise inauthentic.

That is enough to create a triable issue—hence, a “genuine question”—as to authenticity under OEC 1003(1). The trial court therefore erred in allowing the photograph to substitute for the original under that rule.

b. Harmless error analysis

Even when a trial court errs in admitting evidence, reversal is required only if the error was not harmless—that is, if the error had more than a “little likelihood” of affecting the verdict. The Court relies on several recent cases:

  • State v. Bowman, 373 Or 213 (2025) – articulates the “little likelihood of affecting the verdict” standard.
  • State v. Bement, 363 Or 760 (2018) – notes that errors are more likely harmful when they concern central factual issues rather than tangential ones.
  • State v. Edmonds, 364 Or 410 (2019) – stresses that harmful evidence is usually “qualitatively different” rather than merely cumulative.
  • State v. Davis, 336 Or 19 (2003), and State v. Sanchez-Alfonso, 352 Or 790 (2012) – caution courts not to speculate about hypothetical retrials or alternative prosecution strategies; harmlessness must be evaluated against what actually happened in the trial.

Applying these principles:

  • The supposed signed one-day rental contract was central to the state’s theory on both UUV counts:
    • Count 1: Defendant “knowingly” exercised control over another’s vehicle without the owner’s consent (ORS 164.135(1)(a) (2017)).
    • Count 2: Defendant, having lawful custody pursuant to an agreement to return the vehicle at a specified time, “knowingly” retained possession without consent for so long as to be a gross deviation from the agreement (ORS 164.135(1)(c) (2017)).
  • The state’s strongest, most direct evidence that Blue knew she had only a one-day, in-town rental was the signed contract itself.
  • The unsigned version of the contract from U-Haul’s database actually supported Blue’s theory that she never signed such an agreement.
  • No one with first-hand knowledge from the Chevron station testified; the duplicate contract thus became the linchpin for the state’s proof of knowledge and consent boundaries.

Given that:

  • The duplicate was not cumulative of other evidence; it was qualitatively different and more powerful.
  • The defense squarely contested whether Blue ever signed or saw such a contract.

The Court concluded the error was not harmless. It refused to indulge the State’s suggestion that it might, on remand, either obtain the original or use different exceptions to admit the contents. The question is how the actual, flawed trial unfolded—not what might happen in an alternative universe.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarified standard for challenging duplicates under OEC 1003

Blue establishes a clear, defendant-friendly (and more generally, party-friendly) standard:

  • To block admission of a duplicate under OEC 1003, the opponent need not prove the original is inauthentic.
  • The opponent must point to evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original is not what the proponent claims it is (e.g., forged signature, altered terms, misdated document).
  • Once that threshold is met, the duplicate exception in OEC 1003 is disabled; the proponent must either:
    • Produce the original (if available), or
    • Fit within some other exception to the best evidence rule (e.g., original lost or destroyed without bad faith under OEC 1004, or admissible as a business record duplicate under OEC 1003-1 if the foundation can be laid).

This standard is likely to have real operational consequences in both criminal and civil practice, especially in an era where scanned or photographed copies dominate actual courtroom proof.

2. Reinforcing the primacy of original documents in authenticity disputes

The decision reaffirms a core premise of the best evidence rule: where authenticity is genuinely disputed, courts and juries should, if at all possible, work from the original document, not a copy.

This has particular importance:

  • In criminal cases involving:
    • Alleged consent or lack thereof (e.g., consents to search, waivers of rights);
    • Written agreements central to charged conduct (e.g., leases in landlord-tenant theft, rental car agreements, employment documents in theft-of-services cases);
    • Signatures purportedly made by defendants (e.g., checks, contracts, plea forms).
  • In civil cases involving:
    • Questioned contract signatures (e.g., guaranties, loan documents, arbitration agreements);
    • Alleged document alterations (e.g., added clauses, changed dates);
    • Disputes about what version of a policy or agreement was operative at a given time.

After Blue, parties who have maintained original documents—or truly original digital artifacts—will be strongly advantaged whenever authenticity is contested.

3. Empowering party testimony as a basis to contest authenticity

A striking practical consequence of Blue is its explicit recognition that a party’s own sworn testimony denying a signature or recounting an alternative version of events can, standing alone (especially with some corroborating circumstances), suffice to raise a genuine question under OEC 1003(1). That is important because:

  • It prevents trial courts from dismissing such denials as mere “self-serving” assertions that do not trigger the best evidence protections.
  • It aligns the threshold for challenging authenticity with the threshold for establishing it under OEC 901(2)(a), which allows authentication through testimony of a witness with knowledge.
  • It means that, in many cases, questions of forgery or alteration will necessarily go to the jury, and the jury should, when reasonably feasible, see the original document to make that determination.

4. Clarifying the separation between authentication and best evidence

Blue also helps distinguish two related but distinct evidentiary concepts:

  • Authentication (OEC 901):
    • Threshold: is there evidence sufficient to support a finding that this item is what it purports to be?
    • Applies to both originals and duplicates.
    • Is generally a jury issue, once the minimal threshold is met.
  • Best evidence (OEC 1002–1008):
    • Threshold: what form of evidence (original vs duplicate vs secondary) may be used to prove the content of a writing?
    • OEC 1003 assumes that the duplicate accurately reproduces the original; it asks whether there is a genuine question about the original’s authenticity that should force reliance on the original instead.

By reading OEC 1003(1) to protect jury resolution of authenticity disputes using originals when those disputes are genuinely supported by evidence, the Court keeps authentication and best evidence in a coherent, mutually reinforcing relationship.

5. Appellate practice: legal-error review of OEC 1003 rulings

For appellate lawyers and trial judges, Blue settles an important procedural question: rulings under OEC 1003(1) are reviewed for legal error, not for abuse of discretion. That means:

  • On appeal, the reviewing court independently assesses whether, on the record, there was evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the original inauthentic.
  • The trial court’s subjective weighing of the credibility or persuasiveness of the opponent’s authenticity challenge is not entitled to deference at the OEC 1003(1) stage.

Practically, this:

  • Encourages trial courts to err on the side of requiring originals where there is any reasonable evidentiary basis for doubt.
  • Gives appellate courts a sharper tool to correct misapplications of the best evidence rule—especially in criminal cases, where documentary evidence is often pivotal.

6. Limits and responsibilities

Blue does not mean that any bare, unsupported objection can block duplicates. The opponent must still:

  • Point to some evidence—which may be testimony, circumstantial evidence, or contradictions in documentary records—that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the original is inauthentic.
  • Avoid purely speculative or conclusory claims.

And it remains open for proponents to:

  • Bolster authenticity with stronger foundational evidence (e.g., testimony from the person who witnessed or recorded the signature, chain-of-custody proof, metadata or log records in digital cases).
  • Rely on other best-evidence exceptions (e.g., original lost or destroyed without bad faith, voluminous writings, etc.) where properly supported under OEC 1004–1007.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. The best evidence rule in plain terms

The best evidence rule is about using the most reliable proof when you are asking a jury to decide what a document says or whether it is genuine. In simple terms:

  • If you want to prove what a contract, letter, photo, or recording says, you normally must bring the original to court.
  • A copy is usually okay—if no one has a good reason to think the original is fake or tampered with, and if it would not be unfair to use the copy instead.
  • But if there is a real, evidence-based reason to doubt that the original is genuine, then the law insists that the jury see and evaluate the original whenever possible.

2. What is a “duplicate”?

Under OEC 1001, a “duplicate” is not just a photocopy. It includes:

  • Photographs of a document (as in Blue);
  • Scans, printouts, and electronically stored copies that accurately reproduce the original;
  • Any counterpart produced by mechanical, electronic, chemical, or optical means that accurately replicates the original.

If there is no genuine dispute about authenticity, and no unfairness, such duplicates are treated the same as originals for proving the content of the document.

3. What is a “genuine question” as to authenticity?

In everyday language, a “genuine question” is a real question, not a pretend one. Legally, after Blue, it means:

  • There is some evidence that the original document may not be what it is claimed to be.
  • This evidence is enough that a reasonable jury could decide the original is inauthentic (for example, that a signature was forged or that the document was altered).

It does not mean:

  • That the opponent has already proved the original is fake, or
  • That the evidence rules favor one side’s story over the other’s.

It simply means: there is enough to justify a jury looking at the original rather than a copy when deciding whether the document is real and what its contents are.

4. Standard of review simplified

“Standard of review” describes how much deference an appellate court gives to the trial judge’s decision. In this context:

  • Abuse of discretion would mean: the appellate court overturns the trial judge only if their decision was clearly unreasonable.
  • Legal error (what the Court applies in Blue) means: the appellate court independently decides whether the law was applied correctly to the undisputed facts in the record.

For OEC 1003(1), the Supreme Court says: either the record contains some evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to find the original inauthentic, or it does not. Because that is an objective and binary question, appellate courts will now review such rulings without deference and correct any misapplications.

V. Conclusion

State v. Blue is now the leading Oregon authority on the interplay between the best evidence rule and questions of document authenticity. The decision:

  • Defines “genuine question as to the authenticity of the original” in OEC 1003(1) as existing whenever there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the original inauthentic.
  • Reaffirms the primacy of the original document when authenticity is genuinely disputed, thereby reinforcing the anti-fraud purposes of the best evidence rule.
  • Clarifies that trial court rulings under OEC 1003(1) are reviewed for legal error, not for abuse of discretion.
  • Holds that a defendant’s sworn denial of a signature, backed by plausible circumstances and documentary inconsistencies (such as an unsigned version in a database), is enough to raise a genuine question under OEC 1003(1).
  • Emphasizes that improperly admitted duplicates can constitute reversible error where they supply central, noncumulative proof on contested elements of an offense.

More broadly, Blue illustrates how Oregon’s evidence law—while borrowing language from federal rules—remains grounded in its own statutory history, judicial precedents, and legislative commentary. For practitioners, the case is a critical reminder that when authenticity is in dispute and some evidentiary basis supports that dispute, the law will often insist on the original document, not a copy, as the best and most reliable evidence.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Oregon

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