State v. Andersen and the Presumption of Prejudice from Court-Staff Comments on Evidence During Jury Deliberations

I. Introduction

In State v. Andersen, 2025 MT 293, the Montana Supreme Court reversed a drug possession conviction and remanded for a new trial after a State legal assistant audibly commented on video evidence while the jury was deliberating. The core issue was not the sufficiency of the evidence of methamphetamine possession, but whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial after this comment.

The decision establishes and clarifies an important procedural rule: when a non-juror, particularly a member of the prosecution’s team or court staff, comments on contested evidence in the presence of a deliberating jury, that conduct is treated as jury misconduct (misconduct affecting jurors), not as prosecutorial misconduct. Once the defendant makes a threshold showing that such conduct tends to prejudice him, prejudice is presumed, and the trial court must either:

declare a mistrial, or
conduct an adequate inquiry (typically by questioning jurors) to determine and demonstrate that no prejudice occurred.

Failure to take either step constitutes an abuse of discretion. This case thus refines Montana law on jury misconduct and the presumption of prejudice, especially in the context of third-party communications with a deliberating jury.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Kum & Go Incident

On September 27, 2021, overnight store clerk Maria Bronson was working at a Kum & Go in Plentywood, Montana. After multiple customers passed through the candy aisle, she later discovered “a little bag” on the aisle floor. Believing it might be contraband, she set a wet floor sign over it to preserve its location and called law enforcement.

Deputy Scott Nelson arrived at approximately 4:30 a.m., observed the baggie, suspected it contained methamphetamine, and secured it in an evidence bag. Maria suggested a woman named Ashley might have dropped it, based on where Ashley had been standing earlier.

Deputy Nelson briefly pursued Ashley as a suspect. Ashley called him and proactively denied dropping anything at the store and denied the item was drugs, though Nelson had not yet told her why he was looking for her—a circumstance he found suspicious. Despite scheduling a follow-up, Nelson never met with Ashley.

B. The Surveillance Video

Deputy Nelson reviewed surveillance video from the Kum & Go. He watched footage backwards from the time he collected the baggie and identified a “very small dark spot” on the floor where the baggie had been. Rewinding to 1:00 a.m., he watched forward and testified that:

the dark spot was not present at 1:00 a.m.,
around 1:15 a.m., he saw defendant Shawn Andersen in the candy aisle,
after Andersen left the aisle, the dark spot appeared where the baggie later was found,
he “spot checked” (did not continuously watch) portions of the video between Andersen’s visit and his own arrival,
other people, including Ashley, were later seen in the same aisle, but according to him the spot did not move.

Nelson testified that the video showed the baggie falling from Andersen’s pocket and that this shifted his investigative focus from Ashley to Andersen.

Maria also watched the video with Nelson. She described seeing, upon zooming in, “a little white square” dropping from Andersen onto the floor.

C. The Jail Search Incident

Months later, on January 13, 2022, Deputy Remington Timothy located Andersen at a house in Plentywood, arrested him, and took him to the Sheridan County Jail. During a search at the jail:

Timothy, wearing thick protective “search gloves,” removed items from Andersen’s jeans pockets (change, small objects, a small wallet, a tire pressure gauge) and gave them to Detention Officer Patrick Gray.
Believing the pockets were empty, Timothy began to leave.
Gray then observed a “small little plastic baggy with white crystal-like substance” in Andersen’s left front pocket.
Timothy seized the baggie, which he suspected was methamphetamine.

Field tests and Montana State Crime Lab testing confirmed that:

the Kum & Go baggie contained approximately 0.1 grams of methamphetamine, and
the jail baggie contained approximately 0.25 grams of methamphetamine.

D. Trial Evidence and Arguments

At trial, the State presented:

testimony from Maria, Deputy Nelson, Deputy Timothy, and Officer Gray;
the Kum & Go surveillance video, with Nelson using a laser pointer in court to show the “black spot” and describe what he said the video depicted; and
laboratory evidence confirming methamphetamine in both baggies.

In closing, the State heavily emphasized the video and the similarities between the Kum & Go and jail incidents. The prosecutor argued that in both episodes Andersen’s wallet and meth were in the same pocket, inviting the jury to infer that Andersen knowingly possessed the methamphetamine on both occasions.

The defense, by contrast, centered its strategy on undermining the video evidence. Andersen’s counsel argued:

the video quality was poor and the “dot” was barely visible;
witnesses disagreed whether the dot was “black” or “white”; and
other people, including Ashley, walked through the candy aisle, so the evidence did not reliably show Andersen dropping the drugs.

Defense counsel urged the jurors to rely on their own perception of the footage: “What did you see?”

E. The Jury’s Request to Re-watch the Video and the Legal Assistant’s Comment

The jury began deliberating around 5:45 p.m. Approximately fifteen minutes later, it sent a note requesting to “review the footage of the Defendant in the candy aisle of the Kum and Go.”

The district court instructed the State’s legal assistant to cue the video “right when he is coming down the candy aisle.” The jury was brought into the courtroom; the court told them to alert the court when they had seen enough.

According to the court reporter’s summary, during the playback:

While the jurors were watching the video, [the State’s legal assistant] said out loud, “There it is” when the item dropped out of Mr. Anderson’s [sic] pocket.

The jurors then returned to the jury room. Three minutes later, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the audible comment, made from the State’s counsel table, would influence the jury. The prosecutor acknowledged the comment (“That’s it”), but argued it did not warrant a mistrial. The judge denied the motion, stating he had thought the comment came from the jurors themselves.

Within minutes of the denial, the jury returned with guilty verdicts on:

two counts of criminal possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine), and
one count of criminal possession of drug paraphernalia.

The district court imposed consecutive and suspended sentences as detailed in ¶15 of the opinion.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial on all counts, holding that:

The State legal assistant’s comment, “There it is,” directed at the video during jury deliberations, constituted improper third-party commentary on evidence in the presence of the jury. Because it was a lay opinion about a critical and contested piece of evidence, offered after deliberations had begun, it fell within the doctrine of jury misconduct (misconduct affecting jurors), not prosecutorial misconduct.
Under Montana’s jury-misconduct jurisprudence, once a defendant makes a threshold showing that such misconduct tended to injure or prejudice him, prejudice is presumed. Here, that threshold was met because:
- the video was of poor quality;
- the “dot” was central to the dispute about who dropped the drugs;
- the assistant’s comment directly linked Andersen to the baggie at the very moment the jury was re-evaluating that evidence.
Once the presumption attached, the district court was required either to declare a mistrial or allow the State to rebut the presumption through an adequate inquiry, typically by questioning jurors to show that prejudice did not or could not occur. The court did neither—it simply denied the mistrial motion without inquiry. That was an abuse of discretion.
Even if the misconduct most directly affected only the Kum & Go count, the taint could not sensibly be compartmentalized. The failure to ensure a fair deliberative process required a mistrial on all counts, because a finding of guilt on one count can affect the jury’s evaluation of others.
A retrial does not violate double-jeopardy protections, because Andersen himself sought the mistrial and there was no indication that the prosecution or legal assistant intentionally goaded him into doing so. Under City of Helena v. Whittinghill, double jeopardy bars retrial only when the State intentionally provokes a mistrial motion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Framing the Legal Question

The case turns on a precise procedural question: how should courts categorize and evaluate a non-witness, non-lawyer member of the prosecution team audibly interpreting evidence to a deliberating jury?

Two doctrinal paths were available:

Prosecutorial misconduct (improper acts by the prosecutor, typically during trial or argument), which requires the defendant to affirmatively show actual prejudice, with no presumption; or
Jury misconduct (including improper outside influences on jurors), where, after a threshold showing that the misconduct tends to prejudice the defendant, prejudice is presumed but rebuttable.

Classifying the conduct in Andersen as jury misconduct rather than prosecutorial misconduct triggers a significantly more defendant-protective framework and drives the outcome.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct Line: Erickson, Krause, Aker, and Criswell

The Court first set out the prosecutorial-misconduct standard:

State v. Erickson, 2021 MT 320, ¶ 19, 406 Mont. 524, 500 P.3d 1243, quoting State v. Krause, 2021 MT 24, articulates a two-step test:
1. Was the prosecutor’s conduct improper?
2. If so, did it prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial?
State v. Aker, 2013 MT 253, ¶ 24, 371 Mont. 491, 310 P.3d 506, emphasizes that in prosecutorial misconduct cases, no presumption of prejudice applies; the defendant bears the burden of showing that the misconduct violated his substantial rights.

The State advocated that framework, relying heavily on State v. Criswell, 2013 MT 177, 370 Mont. 511, 305 P.3d 760. In Criswell, the prosecutor’s closing argument included inflammatory characterizations of the defendants as “professional freeloaders,” having a “squatters camp,” and being “run out” of Idaho. Although the Court agreed these comments were improper, it found no prejudice:

[I]t is more plausible that the jurors saw those remarks for what they were: unprofessional and unnecessary disparagements of the defendants having no bearing on the question of guilt. (Criswell, ¶ 50)

Criswell illustrates a scenario where improper prosecutorial rhetoric did not warrant reversal because the defendants could not demonstrate that the comments actually affected the verdict.

By distinguishing Criswell, the Court in Andersen signals that comments affecting deliberations after the jury retires, and coming from a non-testifying staff member, are not to be analyzed under the prosecutorial-misconduct rubric.

2. Jury Misconduct and Presumption of Prejudice: Eagan, DeGraw, Oliver, McNatt, and Jackson

The Court then turned to its jury-misconduct line of cases, which applies a very different presumption structure.

The general rule is quoted from State v. McNatt, 257 Mont. 468, 472, 849 P.2d 1050, 1052–53 (1993), and recently reaffirmed in State v. Oliver, 2022 MT 104, ¶ 33, 408 Mont. 519, 510 P.3d 1218:

[T]here has been a threshold showing of misconduct which injures or prejudices the defendant. Once a defendant makes a showing of misconduct, prejudice to the defendant is presumed; however, the presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by the use of testimony of the jurors to show facts which prove that prejudice or injury did not or could not occur.

Two foundational cases illustrate this presumption of prejudice in action:

State v. Eagan, 178 Mont. 67, 582 P.2d 1195 (1978):
- A juror told a bar patron, while the trial was ongoing, that the defendant was guilty and that half the jury were friends of the victim.
- Although that juror was removed, the court did not question the remaining jurors about whether the misconduct had affected them.
- This Court held prejudice was presumed and could have been rebutted only by juror testimony showing no prejudice. Because no such evidence was gathered, the presumption stood and the conviction was reversed.
State v. DeGraw, 235 Mont. 53, 764 P.2d 1290 (1988):
- A juror overheard a restaurant cook say the defendant had a criminal record “as long as your arm,” and the juror later alluded to “reliable information” from the sheriff’s department, asking fellow jurors if they wanted to hear it (they declined).
- The Court again found that this misconduct created a presumption of prejudice that the State had not rebutted and reversed for a new trial.

These cases emphasize that once the integrity of deliberations has been compromised by outside information or influence bearing on guilt, the law presumes prejudice unless the record affirmatively dispels it.

The Court in Andersen also cites older authority, State v. Jackson, 9 Mont. 508, 24 P. 213 (1890), as the source of the rule that the presumption can be rebutted through timely juror inquiry—typically after the verdict is reached but before it is announced.

3. Threshold Misconduct vs. Harmless Contacts: Gollehon and Oliver

Andersen also draws on cases where no presumption of prejudice attached because the misconduct did not “tend to injure or prejudice the defendant” in a meaningful way.

State v. Gollehon, 262 Mont. 293, 864 P.2d 1257 (1993):
- One or two jurors casually conversed with a corrections officer (who was also a witness) about the Montana State University football team.
- There was no discussion of the case, no indication of bias or improper influence.
- The Court held that such a “brief, casual interchange” did not show a degree of impropriety sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice or to require juror questioning.
State v. Oliver, 2022 MT 104:
- A juror told a non-victim witness that he was “brave” for testifying.
- The district court responded by making that juror the alternate and choosing not to question her unless she actually deliberated.
- The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that such a “fleeting comment” displayed sympathy for the witness but did not show hostility toward the defendant or a pre-formed opinion of guilt, and thus did not meet the threshold for presuming prejudice.

These cases define the lower boundary of “misconduct” that warrants a presumption. Non-case-related, casual, or emotionally neutral comments that do not touch upon guilt or key evidence will not trigger the presumption; comments that do, will.

4. Double Jeopardy and Mistrials: Whittinghill

Finally, the Court relies on City of Helena v. Whittinghill, 2009 MT 343, 353 Mont. 131, 219 P.3d 1244 to address whether a new trial after a defense-requested mistrial is barred by double jeopardy. Whittinghill adopts the widely accepted principle:

When a defendant consents to termination of the trial—such as by successfully moving for a mistrial—retrial is generally not barred by double jeopardy.
A narrow exception exists if the prosecution, through intentional misconduct, “goads” or provokes the defendant into moving for a mistrial.
The key inquiry is the prosecutor’s intent, assessed from objective facts and circumstances; even severe prosecutorial overreach does not bar retrial absent such intent.

In Andersen, there was no evidence that the legal assistant intended to provoke a mistrial or to subvert double-jeopardy protections, so retrial is permitted.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Characterizing the Legal Assistant’s Conduct as Jury Misconduct

The pivotal analytical move in Andersen is the characterization of the legal assistant’s comment as jury misconduct (more precisely, misconduct affecting the jury) rather than prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court emphasizes several features:

The assistant’s comment—“There it is”—was a lay opinion about the meaning of the surveillance footage. She effectively told the jury that the moment at which the “dot” appeared was when the drugs dropped from Andersen’s pocket.
She was not a sworn witness subject to cross-examination, and she was not making an argument in the context of closing; instead, she supplied unsworn “testimony” during deliberations.
The comment occurred after the jury had retired to deliberate, a phase at which evidence-taking and formal advocacy are supposed to be over and jurors must be left to decide the case based solely on the admitted record and proper instructions.

Because the conduct did not fit the typical pattern of prosecutorial argument or trial behavior, it was not evaluated under the stricter “actual prejudice” requirement of prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, it was treated as analogous to the third-party or juror interactions in Eagan and DeGraw, where outside statements bearing directly on guilt interfered with the jury’s independent fact-finding.

2. Threshold Showing: Why the Comment “Tended to Prejudice” Andersen

The Court next asks whether Andersen made the required threshold showing that the misconduct “tended to injure or prejudice” him.

Key to the Court’s analysis is the centrality and fragility of the surveillance evidence:

The video was of poor quality; the “dot” was difficult to see and was variously described as a “black spot” and a “white square.”
The defense strategy made the video the focal point of reasonable doubt on the Kum & Go count: if jurors could not see a clear object dropping from Andersen, or if they thought someone else could have dropped it, the State’s case would be weakened.
Other individuals, including Ashley, also passed through the same aisle, giving the jury alternative hypotheses for who dropped the baggie.

In that context, the assistant’s “There it is” did more than merely repeat admitted testimony; it:

directed the jurors’ attention to a particular visual moment on the screen,
endorsed a specific interpretation of what they were seeing (that this indistinct mark represented drugs falling from Andersen), and
did so at the precise moment the jury was re-examining that contested evidence during deliberations.

The Court concludes that this was “a direct comment on a critical piece of evidence at a crucial moment in the trial when the jury was deliberating on this exact issue” (¶27). That is sufficient to meet the threshold requirement that the misconduct tended to prejudice the defendant.

3. The Presumption of Prejudice and the Trial Court’s Duty

Having found that the threshold was met, the Court applied the presumption of prejudice. At that point:

The burden shifted to the State (and the trial court) to show that the comment did not in fact prejudice Andersen; and
The usual method for rebutting the presumption, per Eagan, Oliver, and Jackson, is to question the jurors (typically after they have reached a verdict but before it is announced), asking whether they heard the comment, how they understood it, and whether it influenced their deliberations.

The Court cites State v. Holmes, 207 Mont. 176, 183, 674 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1983) for the principle that improper activity must be rendered harmless to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

In Andersen, however:

The district court did not question any juror about what they heard or how it affected them.
The court simply stated that it believed the comment had come from the jurors, not from counsel’s table, and denied the mistrial.

The Supreme Court held that this was not an adequate response. Once misconduct of this type is identified during deliberations, the trial court has only two lawful options:

Declare a mistrial, ending the trial and allowing a new one; or
Conduct an inquiry sufficient to establish that the jurors were not influenced by the improper comment, thereby rebutting the presumption.

Because the district court did neither, it abused its discretion. Notably, the Court recognizes the practical reluctance to declare a mistrial late in proceedings, but underscores that when jurors’ impartiality is compromised, “the process is necessary to ensure a defendant is afforded his constitutional right to a fair trial” (¶29).

4. Scope of the Mistrial: All Counts, Not Just One

The Court also addresses whether the taint could be cabined to the Kum & Go count. It acknowledges that:

The video evidence primarily related to the first meth possession count (the gas station baggie);
The second count (the jail baggie) rested on independent, strong physical evidence: methamphetamine found in Andersen’s pocket at booking.

Nevertheless, the Court declines to “parse the jury’s verdict” (¶30). It reasons that:

Finding guilt on one issue may affect the verdict on other counts. Therefore, by failing to properly consider the motion, the court abused its discretion and mistrial on all counts is warranted. (¶30)

This reflects the reality that verdicts on multiple counts are often interrelated. Once the jury is improperly nudged toward a finding of guilt on one count, that conclusion can shape its evaluation of the defendant’s credibility, propensity, or likelihood of guilt on other charges. Accordingly, the contamination of the deliberative process on any significant count can invalidate the entire verdict.

5. Double Jeopardy and the Remedy of Retrial

Finally, the Court confirms that ordering a new trial does not violate double jeopardy. Applying Whittinghill, the Court notes:

The general rule: when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, retrial is not barred.
The narrow exception: if the prosecution intentionally engages in misconduct designed to provoke the defendant into seeking a mistrial, then double jeopardy may bar retrial.

In Andersen, there is:

no evidence that the legal assistant’s comment was deliberate or strategic,
no indication that the prosecution was attempting to escape an expected acquittal or otherwise subvert the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Thus, the Court holds that a new trial is the appropriate remedy.

D. Likely Impact and Future Implications

1. For Trial Courts

Andersen provides clear guidance to trial judges on managing jury interactions after deliberations have begun:

Any uncontrolled or unsupervised comments by court personnel, counsel, or staff in the jury’s presence that bear on evidence or guilt must be treated as potential jury misconduct.
Once such an incident is credibly alleged and appears to touch on contested evidence, the court must either:
- declare a mistrial, or
- conduct an on-the-record inquiry of jurors sufficient to determine whether they heard and were influenced by the comment, thereby allowing the State to attempt to rebut the presumption.
Simply expressing a personal impression (e.g., “I thought the jurors made the comment”) is not an adequate substitute for making a factual record and does not rebut the presumption.

Practically, this decision will likely prompt courts to:

more carefully control who operates audio-visual equipment when jurors are present;
instruct staff and counsel to remain completely silent when evidence is replayed for the jury during deliberations;
ensure that any communications with deliberating jurors are on the record and under judicial supervision.

2. For Prosecutors and Their Staff

Prosecutors must recognize that their entire team—including legal assistants, investigators, and other staff—can generate reversible error if they communicate with jurors about evidence during deliberations. Andersen effectively treats staff as akin to court officers whose contact with jurors must be strictly limited and neutral.

Given the presumption of prejudice, even seemingly innocuous interpretive comments like “There it is” can jeopardize convictions when made during deliberations about contested evidence. Offices will likely need to:

incorporate explicit training about avoiding any verbal or non-verbal commentary in the jury’s presence;
assign responsibility for operating exhibits during deliberations to neutral court personnel where possible;
take particular care with low-quality or ambiguous visual evidence, where staff “helping” jurors see something may cross the line into improper influence.

3. For Defense Counsel

Defense attorneys can draw several lessons:

They should be vigilant whenever the jury re-views evidence during deliberations and ensure that all conduct in the courtroom is on the record.
If any comment or gesture appears to interpret evidence for the jury, counsel should immediately:
- object,
- request curative measures or a mistrial, and
- ask the court to question jurors on the record.
Andersen supplies a strong doctrinal basis for arguing that such incidents create a presumption of prejudice, shifting the burden to the State.

Importantly, even if the incident seems to touch only one count, defense counsel should insist that the taint requires a mistrial on all counts, citing ¶30 of Andersen.

4. Substantive Criminal Law vs. Procedural Safeguards

Substantively, Andersen does not change the elements of drug possession or paraphernalia offenses. The opinion barely touches the underlying criminal law; instead, it powerfully reinforces the procedural safeguards of the Sixth Amendment and Article II, § 24 of the Montana Constitution: the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury deciding the case solely on admitted evidence and proper instructions.

By policing even relatively brief and subtle influences like “There it is,” the Court underscores that the architecture of a fair trial is as important as the strength of the State’s proof.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct vs. Jury Misconduct

Prosecutorial misconduct refers to improper acts by the prosecutor—such as unfair comments in closing argument, improper questions, or withholding exculpatory evidence—that occur during the presentation or argument of the case.
Jury misconduct refers to:
- improper behavior by jurors themselves (e.g., discussing the case with outsiders, doing their own research), or
- improper outside influences brought to bear on jurors (e.g., comments by third parties, exposure to media, or, as here, unsworn commentary on evidence by a staff member).

Why it matters: in Montana, prosecutorial misconduct generally requires the defendant to prove actual prejudice, whereas jury misconduct, once it meets a threshold, triggers a presumption of prejudice that the State must rebut.

2. Threshold Showing and Presumption of Prejudice

A threshold showing means the defendant must show that the misconduct was serious enough and close enough to the issues in the trial that it could have affected the jury—for example, commenting on who is guilty or interpreting critical evidence.
Once that threshold is met, prejudice is presumed: the law assumes the defendant was harmed, unless the State produces evidence (usually juror testimony) demonstrating that the misconduct did not and could not have influenced the verdict.

This framework exists because it is often impossible to know the exact effect of outside influence on the “black box” of jury deliberations. The presumption protects the integrity of the process by erring on the side of the defendant when the jury room has been compromised.

3. Mistrial

A mistrial is a declaration by the judge that the trial cannot continue because something has occurred that irreparably undermines fairness (e.g., a deadlocked jury, serious procedural error, jury tampering). When a mistrial is declared, the current trial ends without a valid verdict, and the case may be retried, subject to double-jeopardy rules.

4. Abuse of Discretion

An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is:

arbitrary,
without conscientious judgment, or
beyond the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.

Appellate courts give trial judges “significant latitude,” especially on matters involving jury management, but will reverse when a judge fails to apply the correct legal framework or omits essential steps—such as failing to investigate credible claims of jury influence.

5. Double Jeopardy and “Goading”

The Double Jeopardy Clause (U.S. Const. amend. V and Mont. Const. art. II, § 25) generally prevents a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense. However:

If the defendant asks for and obtains a mistrial, a retrial is ordinarily allowed.
Only in the rare circumstance where the State intentionally provokes or “goads” the defendant into moving for a mistrial, to escape a likely acquittal or to gain a tactical advantage, will double jeopardy bar retrial.

In Andersen, there was no evidence of intentional provocation by the State, so a new trial is permitted.

VI. Conclusion

State v. Andersen is an important procedural decision reinforcing the sanctity of jury deliberations and clarifying Montana’s law on misconduct affecting jurors. The Court holds that:

When a non-witness member of the prosecution team audibly interprets key evidence to a deliberating jury, the incident is treated as jury misconduct, not merely prosecutorial misconduct.
Once the defendant shows that this misconduct plausibly tended to prejudice him—particularly when it concerns ambiguous, central evidence—prejudice is presumed.
The trial court must then either:
- declare a mistrial, or
- conduct a meaningful inquiry to rebut the presumption by showing that the jurors were not influenced.
Failure to take either step is an abuse of discretion requiring reversal and a new trial, and the mistrial extends to all counts that may have been affected by the tainted deliberations.
Because the defendant sought the mistrial and there was no evidence of intentional State provocation, double jeopardy does not bar retrial.

In practical terms, Andersen will force tighter control over interactions with deliberating jurors, particularly during the re-play of evidence. It underscores that even a brief, seemingly helpful remark like “There it is” can cross the line when it guides jurors’ interpretation of contested evidence at the decisive stage of a trial. The ruling stands as a strong affirmation that the fairness of the process, and not just the reliability of the outcome, is a constitutional imperative in Montana’s criminal justice system.