State v. Alvarado-Meraz: Proof That a Jury Question Reached the Court Is Required to Trigger Right-to-Be-Present Protections; Wide Latitude in Closing and Robust Gatekeeping on Voluntary Manslaughter Instructions Reaffirmed

Introduction

In State v. Alvarado-Meraz, No. 126,870 (Kan. Aug. 1, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a capital murder conviction arising from the shooting deaths of the defendant’s twin brother, Manuel, and Manuel’s wife, Lucero Rodriguez. Chief Justice Luckert, writing for the Court, addressed three appellate issues:

Whether the defendant’s statutory and constitutional right to be present at critical stages was violated by off-record handling of jury questions during deliberations;
Whether the prosecutor committed reversible error in closing argument by drawing inferences from cartridge casing patterns, characterizing the killings as an “ambush,” discussing the likely location of the murder weapons, and explaining premeditation; and
Whether the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter (sudden quarrel/heat of passion) as a lesser-included offense.

The Court’s opinion clarifies an important threshold rule: to establish a violation of the right to be present under K.S.A. 22-3420(d) and constitutional guarantees in the context of jury questions, a defendant must first show that a question was actually asked during deliberations and communicated to the court. Mere speculation or inconsistent posttrial juror recollections do not suffice. The Court also reaffirms the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence and underscores the trial court’s gatekeeping role and objective standard in determining whether a voluntary manslaughter instruction is factually appropriate.

Case Background

The record reflected that Luis Alvarado-Meraz shared an apartment in Wichita with his twin brother, Manuel (“Manny”), and Manny’s wife, Lucero. Friends reported occasional arguments but no known history of physical fights. On the evening in question, neighbors heard a burst of noises resembling hammering or “pings,” a short pause, then another burst; no shouting was heard. A slim person was seen running from the building.

Around the time of the shootings, Alvarado-Meraz exchanged unusual calls and texts:

He phoned a friend sounding anxious; later texted “Goodbye, Pelao” to two friends;
Texted, “Bro, I shot Many [sic]. Where you at? I need you, B.”;
Texted his mother: “Stay strong, Mom. Don’t be weak. I love you a lot, you and my dad.”

He told one friend he “had a fight” with Manny after Manny called him a “bitch” and did not respect him. He also suggested Lucero “was gone too.” Police later arrested him near a friend’s apartment the next morning.

Crime scene investigators recovered 21 spent casings (15 from a Glock pistol; 6 from an AK-style rifle), two firearms (a .40-caliber Glock between Lucero’s legs; an AK-style rifle near a rear sliding door), and bullet fragments. Evidence indicated shots traveled from south to north inside the apartment, with casings concentrated from the vicinity of the defendant’s southeast bedroom toward the dining and kitchen areas. Lucero was first struck in the left shoulder while seated at the dining table, then repeatedly shot in the back. Manuel fell in the kitchen and was shot at least 11 times, many in his back and shoulder. The medical examiner found no contact or near-contact wounds; Manuel’s incidental blunt-force injuries were consistent with falling against a surface after being shot.

After approximately 90 minutes of deliberations, the jury convicted Alvarado-Meraz of capital murder. On appeal, he challenged the handling of alleged jury questions, the prosecution’s closing argument, and the refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

Summary of the Opinion

Right to be present / jury questions: The Court affirmed denial of a motion for new trial. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, it held the defendant failed to show that any jury question was asked during deliberations and delivered to the court. Inconsistent juror memories—many hedged and uncertain—contrasted with testimony about the court’s established, statutorily compliant protocol for handling jury questions. Speculation could not carry the defendant’s burden.
Prosecutorial error: No error occurred. The State permissibly argued reasonable inferences from the evidence: that casing patterns and bullet trajectories suggested the shooter’s general location and movement; that the guns were likely obtained from the defendant’s bedroom; that the killings were an “ambush” in the sense of a surprise attack; and that premeditation was correctly defined and applied.
Voluntary manslaughter instruction: The instruction was legally but not factually appropriate. Under the objective standard and the court’s gatekeeping function, “mere words” (e.g., insults) and the absence of evidence tying any quarrel to sufficiently provocative circumstances at the time of the killings foreclosed the instruction.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Standard of Review / New Trial Motions: Abuse of discretion governs denials of new-trial motions in the “interest of justice” under K.S.A. 22-3501(1). The burden is on the appellant to show the decision was arbitrary, based on legal error, or factually unsupported. See State v. Peters, 319 Kan. 492, 497-98, 555 P.3d 1134 (2024).
Appellate Deference to Fact-Finding: Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility, especially where the district court heard live testimony. See State v. Hinostroza, 319 Kan. 129, 133-34, 552 P.3d 1202 (2024).
Right to be Present / Jury Questions: Constitutional bases include the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Statutory procedure is set out in K.S.A. 22-3420(d), requiring written, signed questions; notice to parties; on-the-record discussion; and the defendant’s presence (absent waiver). See State v. Harrison, 311 Kan. 848, 855-57, 467 P.3d 477 (2020); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). Contrast Euceda v. United States, 66 A.3d 994, 1001-05 (D.C. 2013) (relief where a documented, time-stamped jury note enabled identification and review of the error).
Prosecutorial Error Framework: Kansas uses a two-step analysis: (1) determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks exceeded the “wide latitude” to argue reasonable inferences consistent with the evidence; (2) if error, assess prejudice under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Coleman, 318 Kan. 296, 302, 543 P.3d 61 (2024); State v. Brown, 316 Kan. 154, 164 (2022); State v. Waldschmidt, 318 Kan. 633, 655 (2024); State v. Z.M., 319 Kan. 297, 317 (2024); State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109 (2016); State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6 (2011).
Premeditation: Approved instruction: “Premeditation means to have thought the matter over beforehand… more than the instantaneous, intentional act.” See State v. Barnes, 320 Kan. 147, 174, 563 P.3d 1255 (2025). Kansas has emphasized that premeditation requires more than impulse; it includes cognitive reflection sufficient to allow a change of mind. See State v. Dotson, 319 Kan. 32, Syl. ¶ 1, 551 P.3d 1272 (2024); State v. Stanley, 312 Kan. 557, 573-74 (2020).
Jury Instructions / Lesser Included: Three-step review: preservation/jurisdiction, legal and factual appropriateness, and—if error—prejudice. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 266-67, 485 P.3d 622 (2021); State v. Becker, 311 Kan. 176, 184 (2020); State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, 277-78 (2004).
Voluntary Manslaughter (Sudden Quarrel/Heat of Passion): Core elements are an intentional killing and legally sufficient provocation that would deprive a reasonable person of self-control. “Mere words or gestures, however offensive,” are insufficient. Courts apply an objective standard and act as gatekeepers. See Gallegos, 313 Kan. at 267; State v. Stafford, 312 Kan. 577, 584 (2020); State v. Bernhardt, 304 Kan. 460 (2016); State v. Uk, 311 Kan. 393, 397-98 (2020); State v. Hayes, 299 Kan. 861, 866 (2014); State v. Wade, 295 Kan. 916, 925 (2012); State v. Parker, 311 Kan. 255, 265 (2020); State v. Gulley, 315 Kan. 86, 92-94 (2022).

Legal Reasoning and Holdings

1) Right to be Present During Jury-Question Handling

The defendant argued, based on posttrial juror interviews, that the jury asked a question about premeditation during deliberations that was answered by the judge or staff without notifying defense counsel or the defendant, violating K.S.A. 22-3420(d) and constitutional rights. Recognizing a potential conflict, a senior judge heard testimony from the trial judge and the presiding juror and reviewed transcripts from other jurors and the bailiff.

The senior judge found that the evidence did not establish what, if anything, occurred: jurors’ recollections were inconsistent, tentative, and at times contradictory; several jurors thought no one spoke to them during deliberations and that premeditation was resolved by consulting written instructions. Both the trial judge and the bailiff testified to longstanding, uniform district practices that strictly follow K.S.A. 22-3420(d). No written, signed jury note existed in the record.

The Supreme Court held:

Standard of review: Denial of a new trial “in the interest of justice” is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Peters). The Court rejected the defendant’s bid for de novo review, noting the senior judge heard live testimony and that appellate courts do not reweigh credibility (Hinostroza).
Threshold showing: To invoke the defendant’s statutory and constitutional presence rights in this setting, the defendant must show that a jury question was asked during deliberations and “delivered to the court.” On this record—absent a written note and amid inconsistent juror memories—no such predicate showing was made. “Speculation is not the court’s function.”
No legal error in evaluating evidence: The senior judge’s reference to a lack of “consensus” did not impose an improper burden of proof; it described the credibility problems that undermined the claim. Given the district’s standard protocol and the testimony supporting it, the judge reasonably concluded no violation occurred.

This analysis clarifies that a defendant cannot prevail on a right-to-be-present claim premised on alleged jury questions without concrete proof that a question existed and reached the court—such as a written, signed note per K.S.A. 22-3420(d) or reliable, consistent testimony. Ambiguity in the record cuts against relief.

2) Prosecutorial Error in Closing Argument

Applying the familiar two-step framework, the Court concluded the prosecutor’s arguments stayed within the wide latitude to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and did not misstate law or facts.

Inferring shooter’s location from casing patterns: Although the crime scene investigator acknowledged variables in casing ejection, she identified a south-to-north trajectory, casing concentrations from near the defendant’s bedroom to the kitchen, and wound paths consistent with continuous movement toward the victims. From this, it was reasonable to argue the shooter fired from the general area of the southeast bedroom and advanced toward the dining and kitchen areas. The State did not claim certainty or sequence; it argued a fair inference supported by the expert’s testimony.
Inferring where the guns were obtained: The prosecutor suggested the shooter “had to get” two guns and that the weapons were likely in the defendant’s bedroom, citing photos of the defendant in that room with firearms resembling the murder weapons and the south-to-north firing pattern originating near his bedroom. While no witness saw where the guns were stored, the inference was consistent with the exhibits and trajectory evidence and was properly presented as a question for the jury.
Use of “ambush”: In context, “ambush” conveyed a surprise attack—not necessarily lying in wait. The victims were engaged in routine dinner activities, fell quickly, and were repeatedly shot in the back with no evidence either had time to assist the other. That characterization was a permissible inference to support premeditation and the “same act or transaction” element, not a legal misstatement.
Premeditation definition: The prosecutor largely tracked the approved instruction and reinforced both the cognitive and temporal elements of premeditation as requiring more than an instantaneous intent. The argument did not dilute the cognitive component recognized in Dotson and Stanley and comported with Barnes.

Because no error was found under step one, the Court did not reach harmlessness under Chapman.

3) Refusal to Instruct on Voluntary Manslaughter (Sudden Quarrel / Heat of Passion)

The instruction was legally appropriate as a lesser-included of premeditated murder (and thus of capital murder premised on two homicides), but the Court held it was not factually appropriate under the objective standard and the trial court’s gatekeeping role.

Mere words are insufficient: Evidence that Manny called the defendant a “bitch” during a “little argument,” without more, cannot legally qualify as sufficient provocation. Kansas precedent consistently holds that “mere words or gestures, however offensive,” do not meet the threshold (Stafford; Bernhardt; Gallegos).
Lack of contemporaneity and context: The record did not establish when the argument occurred relative to the shootings, whether it was ongoing at the time, or how it deprived a reasonable person of self-control. The crime scene suggested a sudden, one-sided assault on two unsuspecting victims; neither appeared to move, react, or intervene before collapsing.
Countervailing physical evidence: The medical examiner’s description of minor blunt force injuries on Manny was consistent with falling after being shot; no evidence supported a physical brawl. Reports that the defendant later seemed distraught or incoherent lacked temporal tethering to the moment of the killings.
Gatekeeping function applied: The district court properly screened the record for legally sufficient provocation; sending the issue to the jury would have invited speculation. See Uk; Gulley; Gallegos.

Having found the instruction factually inappropriate, the Court did not undertake a prejudice analysis.

Impact and Practical Implications

Right-to-be-present claims require a concrete record: Defense counsel should ensure strict adherence to K.S.A. 22-3420(d). If a jury note is received, insist it be marked, filed, and handled on the record with the defendant present (absent waiver). Posttrial juror interviews are a weak substitute; inconsistent recollections may doom the claim.
Trial courts and staff should institutionalize best practices: This opinion effectively “credits” courts that demonstrate uniform, statutorily compliant protocols for handling jury notes. Maintaining written, signed, time-stamped notes, docket entries, and on-the-record colloquies protects both the parties and the verdict.
Prosecutorial closing argument latitude reaffirmed: Prosecutors may:
- Argue trajectories and shooter position from casing patterns and bullet paths, with appropriate caution about variables;
- Use ordinary-language descriptors (e.g., “ambush”) when supported by the circumstances;
- Invite jurors to infer where weapons likely were obtained, if supported by exhibits and spatial evidence; and
- Track approved instructions when defining premeditation and emphasize both cognitive reflection and more-than-instantaneous timing.
Voluntary manslaughter instructions remain narrow: Kansas continues to apply a rigorous, objective gatekeeping screen. Insults or taunts—even hurtful ones—do not suffice without additional facts showing legally sufficient provocation that would deprive a reasonable person of self-control at the time of the killing.
Appellate posture matters: Parties challenging new-trial denials must grapple with abuse-of-discretion review and deference to trial-level credibility findings. Building a clear contemporaneous record is critical.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse of discretion: An appellate court will not reverse unless the decision was arbitrary, legally incorrect, or factually unsupported. It’s a deferential standard, especially where the judge evaluated live testimony.
Critical stage / right to be present: A defendant has the right to be present at stages of the trial that bear a reasonably substantial relation to the opportunity to defend, including when the court discusses and answers jury questions. But the defendant must first show that a question existed and reached the court.
K.S.A. 22-3420(d) protocol: Jury questions must be in writing, signed, dated, submitted through the bailiff, shared with counsel, and addressed in open court with the defendant present (unless waived). The response should be on the record.
Prosecutorial “wide latitude” in closing: Prosecutors can argue reasonable inferences grounded in the evidence; they cannot misstate the law or facts, vouch for credibility, or shift the burden of proof.
Premeditation: Requires more than a split-second impulse; it entails thinking the matter over beforehand—some period, however brief, of conscious reflection sufficient to allow a change of mind.
Voluntary manslaughter (sudden quarrel/heat of passion): A mitigated form of intentional homicide available only when provocation would cause a reasonable person to lose self-control. Verbal insults alone are insufficient; courts screen the evidence objectively before instructing the jury.

Conclusion

State v. Alvarado-Meraz provides clear, practical guidance on three recurring criminal procedure and trial issues in Kansas:

For right-to-be-present claims premised on jury questions, defendants must provide concrete proof that a question existed and reached the court. Absent a written note or credible, consistent testimony, speculation will not warrant a new trial. Abuse-of-discretion review and deference to trial-level credibility findings will frequently be outcome-determinative.
On closing argument, the decision reassures prosecutors and trial judges that robust, fact-grounded inferential advocacy—regarding shooter positioning, weapon retrieval, and descriptors like “ambush”—falls within the State’s wide latitude when tethered to the evidentiary record and correct legal standards.
With respect to lesser-included instructions, the Court again underscores the objective, gatekeeping role: “mere words or gestures” cannot support a voluntary manslaughter instruction without additional facts demonstrating legally sufficient provocation at the time of the killing.

The opinion’s most salient contribution is its threshold clarification for right-to-be-present claims: the protections in K.S.A. 22-3420(d) and the Constitution are activated by an actual jury question that reaches the court; conjecture and inconsistent post hoc accounts are insufficient. Coupled with its reaffirmation of prosecutorial latitude and instruction gatekeeping, Alvarado-Meraz will guide Kansas trial practice and appellate review in capital and non-capital homicide cases alike.