State v. Allison: Mandatory Castle Doctrine Instructions and the Exclusivity of Statutory Rebuttal in North Carolina
I. Introduction
State v. Allison, No. 103PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025), is a major North Carolina Supreme Court decision refining—and in some respects hardening—the operation of the state’s statutory “castle doctrine” in criminal cases involving defensive force in the home. The case sits at the intersection of three critical questions: 1. How must juries be instructed when a defendant invokes the statutory castle doctrine under N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.2? 2. When is the statutory presumption that a homeowner acted in reasonable fear of death or serious injury rebutted? 3. What happens on appeal when a trial court, applying pre-Phillips pattern instructions, gives a castle doctrine charge that does not match the statute as later interpreted? The majority opinion (Berger, J.) squarely holds: - The statutory presumption that a lawful occupant had a reasonable fear under § 14‑51.2(b) “may only be rebutted” by the five circumstances listed in § 14‑51.2(c). - That approach is not new—it was already the law under State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513 (2024)—and any contrary Court of Appeals precedent is superseded. - The curtilage of a home (i.e., the area immediately surrounding it) is statutorily part of the “home” for castle doctrine purposes. - Pattern jury instructions used before Phillips were fundamentally flawed in several ways, and in this case those flaws constitute plain error requiring a new trial. A vigorous dissent by Justice Riggs (joined by Justice Earls) sharply contests the majority’s reliance on Phillips, arguing that the key “only rebutted by § 14‑51.2(c)” language in Phillips was nonbinding dicta, that the statute’s text does not limit rebuttal to the five enumerated circumstances, and that the majority’s reading approaches a near-irrebuttable “license to kill” inside the curtilage once an unlawful and forcible entry is shown. This commentary explains the case, its reasoning, and its implications for North Carolina criminal defense, prosecution strategy, and jury instructions in self-defense and defense-of-habitation cases.II. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The Incident
Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant (as required when deciding entitlement to a defensive instruction, see State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339 (1988)), the evidence showed: - Defendant George Lee Allison lived with and cared for his mother, who had Alzheimer’s disease. - The decedent, Brandon Adams, was in a turbulent relationship with his girlfriend, Pamela Rodgers. - After a dispute about alleged infidelity, Adams told Rodgers he was going to Allison’s house. Rodgers later went to Allison’s house, where Allison confirmed that Adams had been there. Rodgers and Allison then drank bourbon, and Rodgers reported that Adams was physically abusive. Allison told her to leave Adams if that were true. Later: - Adams arrived at Allison’s home. Allison invited him in. - Inside, Adams pointed at Rodgers in a manner that caused her to flinch and recoil physically. - Allison asked Adams to leave. As Adams went toward the door, he rammed his shoulder into Allison’s shoulder. - Rodgers remained at the home; over the next two hours Adams sent her multiple texts, including threats such as: - “If I come down there I'm telling you it's going to get bad.” - “I will drag him outside and beat the fuck out of him.” Subsequently: - Rodgers said she needed Allison to drive her back to Adams’ house because she was intoxicated. - Allison left for the grocery store but turned back when he realized he forgot his wallet, then detoured to an ATM and ultimately decided not to go to the store. - Driving home, Allison passed Adams’ residence. Adams followed closely behind Allison and parked directly behind him when they arrived at Allison’s home. - According to Allison, Adams declared: “You are going to have to kill me to keep me from dragging that fucking bitch out of your house.” At the doorway: - Allison ran to his house door; Adams “stuck his hand and his foot” inside the door, preventing it from closing. They pushed against each other; Allison felt he was losing the struggle. - Allison let go of the door, retrieved a shotgun, returned to the front door, and presented the weapon. - Adams stayed on the front porch near the doorway; Allison begged him to go home and offered to put his mother to bed and then allow Adams to come in and speak with Rodgers. - Allison testified that Adams refused to leave. Allison warned he would “count down” and then would act. After a series of countdowns (from seven, five, and three to zero), Allison briefly looked back at his mother and, when he turned again, saw Adams make a forward movement. Feeling a “bolt of lightning” through his body, he “just reacted” and fired, fatally wounding Adams. Rodgers called 911. Adams later died from the gunshot wound. Allison was arrested and indicted for first-degree murder.B. Conflicting Accounts
Rodgers’ trial testimony, introduced by the State, differed materially from Allison’s: - She testified that when they arrived at the home, Allison went inside and told Adams not to cross the threshold. - Adams, she said, agreed not to enter and never attempted to do so. - According to Rodgers, Allison immediately retrieved his shotgun, returned, pointed it at Adams, and conducted multiple countdowns before shooting. - She described Adams as neither aggressive nor violent in that final encounter.C. Trial, Jury Instructions, and Verdict
At trial (October 2022): - Allison asserted a castle doctrine defense under N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.2 (defense of habitation). - The State contended the castle doctrine did not apply because Adams never physically entered Allison’s home. - The trial court denied Allison’s motion to dismiss but agreed to give the pattern instruction on “defense of habitation.” Key features of the instruction: - It told the jury Allison was excused if he killed to prevent a “forcible entry into the defendant’s home” or to terminate an intruder’s unlawful entry, but only if: 1. He reasonably believed Adams would kill or seriously injure him or someone in the home, and 2. He reasonably believed the degree of force used was necessary. - It stated that a person unlawfully and by force entering or attempting to enter a home is “presumed” to be doing so with violent intent and that the occupant is “presumed” to have a reasonable fear—but then effectively told the jury that this presumption could be overcome by “evidence to the contrary” and that the jury must judge the reasonableness of Allison’s belief. - It did not instruct that the “home” includes its curtilage (the area immediately surrounding the dwelling), even though the statute expressly defines “home” to include curtilage. The jury convicted Allison of second-degree murder. He received a sentence of 144–185 months’ imprisonment.D. Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, Allison argued: 1. The trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. 2. The court committed plain error by giving defective castle doctrine instructions. The Court of Appeals (unpublished, March 2024): - Found no error. - Held the State presented “substantial evidence to rebut the presumption created by the castle doctrine.” - Relying on its decision in State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377 (2021), it reasoned that because the State had introduced substantial evidence that Allison did not have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm, the statutory presumption of reasonableness was overcome and the issue became a fact question for the jury.E. Review in the Supreme Court
Allison attempted a direct appeal on constitutional grounds and also filed a petition for discretionary review. The Supreme Court: - Dismissed the appeal ex mero motu (on its own motion). - Allowed discretionary review on a focused statutory question:When the General Assembly enacted the castle doctrine statute, particularly N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c)—which identifies five circumstances where the presumption of reasonableness can be rebutted—whether § 14-51.2(c) contains an unwritten sixth exception that states the reasonableness presumption can also be rebutted if: “The State presents substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that a defendant did not have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm, the State can overcome the presumption and create a fact question for the jury.”In other words: may the statutory presumption of reasonable fear be rebutted simply by general evidence that the defendant’s fear was unreasonable, or only by the five enumerated exceptions in § 14‑51.2(c)?
III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court: - Reversed the Court of Appeals. - Held that under State v. Phillips and N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.2, the presumption that a lawful occupant acted with reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm may only be rebutted by the five specific circumstances listed in § 14‑51.2(c). - Concluded that the trial court’s castle doctrine instructions: - Wrongly required the jury to decide whether Allison’s fear was reasonable despite the statutory presumption, - Wrongly invited the jury to weigh the “necessity” and “degree” of force (i.e., proportionality and “excessive force”) where the presumption had not been rebutted, - Wrongly suggested the presumption of reasonable fear could be rebutted by “any evidence to the contrary,” and - Failed to inform the jury that the curtilage is part of the protected “home.” - Held these instructional errors were: - Fundamental (they deprived Allison of a complete and accurate self-defense instruction and effectively removed an immunity defense), - Prejudicial (a properly instructed jury would almost certainly have acquitted), and - Exceptional (convicting a defendant for conduct the legislature has deemed lawful and immune “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” under the plain-error standard). Remedy: the Court ordered a new trial. Justice Riggs dissented, arguing: - Phillips’ statements about exclusivity of § 14‑51.2(c) were dicta and nonbinding. - The text of § 14‑51.2(c) does not confine rebuttal to the five enumerated scenarios. - On the facts, the State’s evidence both: - Allowed the jury to find that no “unlawful and forcible” entry occurred (so the presumption never attached), and - Even if it did attach, was sufficient to rebut the presumption by showing Allison’s fear was unreasonable. - Accordingly, the trial court’s instruction was not plainly erroneous, and the conviction should be affirmed.IV. Detailed Analysis
A. The Statutory Castle Doctrine Framework in North Carolina
North Carolina’s modern use-of-force scheme was overhauled in 2011. The legislature: - Repealed the prior self-defense statute and adopted: - N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.2 (castle doctrine / defense of habitation), - N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.3 (general self-defense / stand-your-ground), - N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.4 (limitations on justification). - Expanded and clarified the use of force protections for: - Lawful occupants of homes, - Occupants of motor vehicles, - Persons in their workplaces. Key components, as summarized in Allison (building on Phillips): 1. Definition of “home” and curtilage - A “home” includes:“[A] building or conveyance of any kind, to include its curtilage, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed as a temporary or permanent residence.” N.C.G.S. § 14‑51.2(a)(1) (emphasis added).- The curtilage—porches, immediate yard area, etc.—is treated as part of the home for castle doctrine purposes. 2. Non-rebuttable presumption as to the intruder’s intent – § 14‑51.2(d) When a person “unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter” a home: - That person is presumed to be entering with “intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.” - This presumption is non-rebuttable: the jury does not weigh the intruder’s subjective intention once the fact of unlawful and forceful entry or attempt is found. 3. Rebuttable presumption of the occupant’s reasonable fear – § 14‑51.2(b) If: - An intruder is “in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering” (or has so entered) the home/curtilage, and - The lawful occupant knows or has reason to believe this is occurring or occurred, and - The occupant uses defensive force “intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm,” then: - The occupant is presumed to have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to self or another. - This presumption is rebuttable, but—per Allison and Phillips—only by § 14‑51.2(c). 4. Exclusive statutory rebuttal of the fear presumption – § 14‑51.2(c) The presumption of reasonable fear “shall be rebuttable and does not apply” where the person against whom force is used is: 1. A lawful resident with a right to be there (and no domestic-violence/no-contact order), 2. A parent/custodian trying to retrieve a child in lawful custody, 3. A person against whom the defender is using the home/vehicle/workplace to further their own violent criminal conduct, 4. A law enforcement officer or bail bondsman lawfully entering and properly identified, or 5. A person who has ceased all forcible/unlawful entry and exited the home/vehicle/workplace. Allison reaffirms that these five are the only ways to rebut the presumption of reasonable fear once it attaches. 5. Immunity – § 14‑51.2(e) If a lawful occupant uses deadly force in compliance with § 14‑51.2: - The occupant “is justified in using such force” and is immune from both criminal and civil liability, subject to a limited exception not at issue here. 6. Stand-your-ground and proportionality – § 14‑51.3 Outside the castle doctrine, an individual using deadly force must generally show: - A reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, and - Necessity and proportionality of the force used. Under Phillips and Allison: - Those proportionality/“excessive force” questions do not arise under § 14‑51.2 unless the State has first rebutted the presumption of reasonable fear via § 14‑51.2(c).
B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision
The Court builds on, and sometimes corrects, an existing body of case law.1. State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513 (2024)
Phillips is the central precedent. There, the Court: - Interpreted § 14‑51.2 in a case where the trial court instructed the jury it could convict the defendant of manslaughter if it found she used “excessive force,” even after acknowledging that she was within the castle doctrine. - Held that under § 14‑51.2: - Excessive force is a legal impossibility unless the State first rebuts the § 14‑51.2(b) presumption by one of the five § 14‑51.2(c) circumstances. - If the presumption is not rebutted, the defendant must be acquitted and is immune. Phillips articulated the “decision tree” later reiterated and applied in Allison: 1. Step 1 – Entitlement to the presumption - Did the defendant show (or is there some evidence) that: - He was a lawful occupant? - The victim unlawfully and by force entered or attempted to enter the home/curtilage? - He knew or had reason to know of that entry/attempt and used deadly force? → If no, castle doctrine does not apply; the case is governed by § 14‑51.3 (general self-defense). → If yes, go to Step 2. 2. Step 2 – Has the State rebutted the presumption under § 14‑51.2(c)? - The jury must consider whether the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the five circumstances listed in § 14‑51.2(c). → If yes, the presumption is rebutted and the jury then evaluates proportionality under ordinary self-defense rules. → If no, defendant is justified and must be acquitted; excessive force cannot legally exist in that posture. Allison relies on Phillips’ language that the presumption of reasonable fear “may only be rebutted by the circumstances contained in section 14‑51.2(c).” The State argued in Allison that this was dicta. The majority rejects that argument, explaining: - The core issue in Phillips—whether “excessive force” remains a viable limitation within the castle doctrine—could not be resolved without defining when the presumption of reasonable fear may be rebutted. - Therefore, the interpretation of § 14‑51.2(c) was central to the holding, not peripheral commentary.2. State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377 (2021)
Austin, a Court of Appeals decision, had read the 2011 statutes to allow the State to overcome the presumption of reasonable fear by introducing “substantial evidence” that the defendant did not actually or reasonably fear death or serious injury, even if no § 14‑51.2(c) circumstance existed. - Allison notes that the Court of Appeals in this case relied on Austin to reject Allison’s instructional challenge. - The Supreme Court effectively disapproves that line of reasoning, explaining that Phillips now controls and that any contrary Court of Appeals precedent is superseded. The castle doctrine presumption is not rebuttable merely by generic evidence suggesting the defendant’s fear was unreasonable.3. State v. Copley, 386 N.C. 111 (2024)
Cited for: - The standard of review for jury instructions (“de novo”), and - The need for “clear decision tree” instructions where presumptions under § 14‑51.2 are in play. Justice Barringer’s concurrence in Copley (quoted in Allison) emphasizes that juries must intentionally and methodically decide whether statutory presumptions apply and are rebutted.4. State v. Coley, 375 N.C. 156 (2020)
Coley is cited for the proposition that: - “A defendant entitled to any self-defense instruction is entitled to a complete self-defense instruction.” Allison applies this principle to statutory defenses: if a defendant is entitled to a castle doctrine instruction, that instruction must reflect all the protections conferred by § 14‑51.2, including its presumptions and immunity.5. State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339 (1988)
Mash sets the standard for analyzing whether a defense instruction is warranted: - The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. - If there is “some evidence” supporting the defense, the instruction must be given. Allison uses Mash to justify reciting the facts in the light most favorable to Allison when examining his entitlement to castle doctrine instructions.6. State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441 (1979)
Herbin is a pre-statute case cited for a principle the 2011 act did not displace: - When there is “some evidence” that a defendant acted in self-defense, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Allison notes that § 14‑51.2(g) expressly preserves other defenses and does not shift the ultimate burden away from the State.7. State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153 (2024)
Reber provides the modern articulation of the plain error standard: To obtain relief on plain error, a defendant must show: 1. A fundamental error occurred (a “grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right”). 2. The error had a probable impact on the outcome (“significantly more likely than not” to change the verdict; “almost certainly”). 3. The case is exceptional, in that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Allison uses this framework to conclude that the flawed castle doctrine instructions require reversal even absent objection at trial.8. Tirado and Hart: Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting State Law
The majority also invokes: - State v. Tirado, 387 N.C. 104 (2025), and - Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122 (2015), to emphasize: - Only the North Carolina Supreme Court can definitively interpret state law. - Once the Supreme Court has spoken, its interpretation governs, and contrary lower-court precedent is automatically superseded. This undercuts the State’s suggestion that Austin-type reasoning remained viable after Phillips.C. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning in Allison
1. Reaffirming Phillips: Rebuttal Is Limited to § 14‑51.2(c)
The central legal holding is straightforward but powerful: - Question posed: Does § 14‑51.2(c) contain an implied “sixth exception” under which the State can rebut the presumption whenever it presents substantial evidence that the defendant’s fear was unreasonable? - Answer: No. The presumption of reasonable fear “may only be rebutted by the circumstances contained in section 14‑51.2(c).” The Court: - Rejects the State’s characterization of Phillips’ language on this point as dicta. - Explains that to decide whether “excessive force” could be considered within the castle doctrine, the Court had necessarily to determine when the presumption is rebuttable. - Thus, Phillips’ reading of § 14‑51.2(c) was part of its core holding and is binding. This interpretation sharply distinguishes the castle doctrine from ordinary self-defense: - Under § 14‑51.3 (general self-defense), the defendant must show a reasonable belief of imminent death/serious injury and proportionality. - Under § 14‑51.2, once the statutory elements are met, the reasonableness of the fear, and whether the force was “too much,” are legally presumed in the defendant’s favor, and the jury cannot reconsider those matters unless the State proves a § 14‑51.2(c) exception beyond a reasonable doubt.2. Four Fundamental Instructional Errors
The Court identifies multiple ways in which the pre-Phillips pattern instruction given at Allison’s trial conflicted with § 14‑51.2 as now understood.-
Requiring proof of reasonable fear and necessity despite the presumption
The instruction told jurors that Allison’s use of deadly force was lawful only if he:
- Reasonably believed Adams would kill or cause serious bodily harm, and
- Reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry.
- Once an intruder unlawfully and forcibly enters or attempts to enter the home/curtilage, and the occupant knows this, the law presumes both:
- The intruder intends a violent felony (§ 14‑51.2(d)), and
- The occupant’s fear of imminent death/serious injury is reasonable (§ 14‑51.2(b)).
- Those issues are removed from the jury’s consideration unless and until a § 14‑51.2(c) exception is proven.
-
Allowing rebuttal by any contrary evidence instead of only § 14‑51.2(c)
The instruction:
- Stated the defendant was “presumed” to hold a reasonable fear, but
- Told the jury that this could be rebutted by “evidence to the contrary” and left the reasonableness question wholly to the jury.
- Evidence that the defendant’s fear seems unreasonable (e.g., the intruder was unarmed, appeared calm, etc.) by itself does not defeat the presumption.
- Only evidence fitting one of the five § 14‑51.2(c) scenarios can even open the door to reconsidering reasonableness.
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Inviting the jury to assess “excessive force” where excessive force is legally impossible
The instruction asked the jury to consider whether Allison “reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was necessary” to prevent or terminate the entry.
Under Phillips and Allison:
- If the presumption of reasonable fear applies and has not been rebutted by § 14‑51.2(c), “excessive force is impossible” in law under the castle doctrine.
- Thus, proportionality should never have been submitted unless the State first established a § 14‑51.2(c) exception.
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Failure to instruct that curtilage is part of the home
The trial court:
- Never told the jury that the front porch and threshold area—the curtilage—are part of the statutorily protected “home.”
- Allowed the State to argue that the castle doctrine did not apply because Adams did not enter the house itself.
3. Plain Error: Fundamental, Prejudicial, and Exceptional
Because Allison did not object to the instructions at trial, he had to satisfy the demanding plain error standard. (a) Fundamental error The Court deemed the instructional defects “fundamental” because: - They deprived Allison of a “complete self-defense instruction.” - The castle doctrine is not simply a mitigation; it provides immunity from criminal and civil liability where its conditions are met. - Erroneous instructions effectively “foreclosed defendant’s ability to argue, or that the jury could consider, that his actions were legally protected under the statute.” - The jury was never properly invited to decide the critical statutory questions: - Did Adams unlawfully and forcefully enter or attempt to enter the home’s curtilage? - Did Allison know or have reason to know of this? - Did any § 14‑51.2(c) condition apply (none was argued)? - Instead, the case was tried as if § 14‑51.2 were merely a variant of ordinary self-defense requiring proof of reasonable fear and proportionality. This, the Court concluded, amounted to denial of a fundamental statutory right. (b) Prejudice – “Probable impact” on the outcome The majority concluded the error had a “probable impact” (indeed, the Court says the jury would “almost certainly” have acquitted) because: - Even if the jury believed Rodgers’ account (largely favorable to the State), her testimony still supplied “some evidence” that: - Adams reached the threshold, - Allison warned him not to cross, - Adams remained on the porch and did not withdraw, and - There had previously been physical contact at the door (hand and foot wedged, door pushing match) before the shooting. - That sufficed to present a jury issue on whether there was an “unlawful and forcible” entry or attempted entry into the curtilage. - The record contained no evidence of any of the five § 14‑51.2(c) rebuttal scenarios. - Therefore, on a correct instruction: - If the jury found unlawful and forceful entry/attempt and knowledge, the statutory presumptions would attach. - In the absence of a § 14‑51.2(c) exception, the jury would not be allowed to question the reasonableness of Allison’s fear or the “excessiveness” of his force. - Under § 14‑51.2(e), he would be justified and immune, and the verdict would have to be not guilty. In the majority’s words:Such a properly instructed jury would not only probably return a different verdict, it would almost certainly return a different verdict.(c) Exceptional case: fairness and public reputation Finally, the Court determined this was precisely the “exceptional case” for which plain error relief is intended: - The General Assembly has specifically declared that certain defensive conduct in the home, when statutory criteria are met, is lawful and immune. - A conviction “based on conduct the General Assembly deemed justifiable and legal” is “abhorrent to the principles of fairness” of the judicial system. - Allowing such a conviction to stand would “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Therefore, all three prongs of Reber’s plain error test were satisfied.
D. The Dissent: A Competing Reading of § 14‑51.2 and Phillips
Justice Riggs’ dissent (joined by Justice Earls) is a substantial statutory-interpretation opinion that: 1. Challenges the majority’s reading of Phillips and § 14‑51.2(c), and 2. Argues that, even under a strong castle doctrine, there was no plain error on these facts. Key points:1. Phillips’ “only rebutted by § 14‑51.2(c)” language as dicta
The dissent contends: - Much of Phillips’ general discussion of the castle doctrine—its presumptions, decision tree, and related features—was background, not essential to the specific narrow issue there (a misinstruction on proportionality). - Under longstanding law, statements not necessary to the decision are dicta and nonbinding. The dissent draws on: - Washburn v. Washburn, 234 N.C. 370 (1951), - McKinney v. Goins, 387 N.C. 35 (2025), and - The Court’s treatment of similar dicta in Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163 (1933), and Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459 (1965). - Phillips, it argues, resolved the case on the narrow ground that proportionality should not have been submitted once the trial court recognized that the defendant was entitled to the presumption; it did not need to, and therefore did not bindingly, decide that the five § 14‑51.2(c) circumstances are the only way to rebut the presumption.2. Textual reading of § 14‑51.2(b)–(c)
The dissent emphasizes the statutory text: - § 14‑51.2(b) creates the presumption of reasonable fear if its prerequisites are met. - § 14‑51.2(c) states:The presumption set forth in subsection (b) of this section shall be rebuttable and does not apply in any of the following circumstances . . . .- According to the dissent, the conjunction “and” means: - First, the presumption is rebuttable as a general proposition; and - Second, it also fails to apply altogether in the five listed circumstances. - The statute does not say the presumption “may be rebutted only in the following circumstances,” and when the legislature wishes to confine rebuttal to enumerated grounds, it knows how to do so. The dissent bolsters this reading by comparison with other statutes: - N.C.G.S. § 113‑421: contamination presumption in oil and gas operations, where the statute explicitly restricts rebuttal to certain defenses. - N.C.G.S. § 20‑305.1(a1): presumption that certain retail rates are reasonable, where the legislature specifically details how that presumption may be rebutted. These examples show, in the dissent’s view, that the General Assembly can—and sometimes does—explicitly limit rebuttal to specified means. Its failure to do so in § 14‑51.2(c) is telling.
3. In pari materia: reading §§ 14‑51.2, 14‑51.3, and 14‑51.4 together
The dissent invokes the canon that statutes dealing with the same subject matter and enacted together should be harmonized (in pari materia): - §§ 14‑51.2, 14‑51.3, and 14‑51.4 were enacted in the same 2011 session law. - § 14‑51.4 provides that the justifications in §§ 14‑51.2 and 14‑51.3 are not available when the person: - Is committing or attempting to commit a felony, or - Is the initial aggressor, among other conditions. - These disqualifications are not among the five enumerated grounds in § 14‑51.2(c). The dissent therefore argues: - If the presumption could be rebutted only by § 14‑51.2(c), then § 14‑51.4 would be partially redundant. - A harmonious reading suggests that other factual circumstances—not merely those in subsection (c)—can defeat the castle doctrine justifications.4. Comparative law: other states’ handling of presumptions
The dissent cites: - State v. Glenn (S.C.), involving South Carolina’s similar statutory castle doctrine, where the court refused a “hyper-technical” reading that would mechanically defeat justification. - People v. Owen (Cal.), interpreting California’s home-defense presumption as rebuttable based on the totality of circumstances. From these cases, the dissent draws support for a more flexible approach: - Statutory presumptions of reasonable fear do not create an absolute shield. - Courts must retain some ability to weigh whether the circumstances really support a reasonable fear, even when no enumerated exception applies.5. No plain error on these facts
Applying its more flexible reading, the dissent concludes: - The presumption of reasonable fear attaches only if there is an “unlawful and forceful” entry. - Evidence here was conflicting: - Adams was unarmed. - No defensive injuries on Allison. - Allison testified Adams had recent neck surgery (suggesting limited strength). - Rodgers’ testimony suggested no forcible entry and no aggression beyond presence on the porch. - Allison’s multiple countdowns before firing might undercut the imminence of perceived danger. - The State’s evidence thus permitted the jury to find either: - No “unlawful and forceful” entry (so the presumption never attached), or - Even if the presumption attached, that Allison’s fear was not objectively reasonable, thereby rebutting the presumption. The dissent warns that the majority’s approach risks:even the flimsiest bit of conflicting evidence of a unlawful and forceful entry would permit the use of defensive force and automatically give the defendant the mandatory presumption of reasonableness that the State cannot rebut unless the five exceptions in subsection (c) apply.Accordingly, the dissent would affirm the Court of Appeals and uphold the conviction.
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