State Sentencing Caps Preempt Harsher Home-Rule Municipal Penalties for Identical Conduct

Case: In re People v. Camp; In re People v. Simons  |  Citation: 2025 CO 64  |  Court: Colorado Supreme Court (en banc)  |  Date: December 22, 2025

1. Introduction

These consolidated original proceedings under C.A.R. 21 asked whether Colorado’s post–Senate Bill 21-271 (“Misdemeanor Reform Act”) statewide sentencing caps for misdemeanors and petty offenses limit the punishment a home-rule municipality may impose for a municipal ordinance violation that mirrors a state crime.

The petitioners, Aleah Michelle Camp (charged by the City of Westminster for low-level theft) and Danielle Ashley Simons (charged by the City of Aurora for motor-vehicle trespass and trespass), argued that municipal maximum penalties of up to 364 days and $2,650 unlawfully exceeded the lower state maximums for the same conduct. The Westminster and Aurora municipal courts rejected preemption challenges, relying primarily on home-rule authority and older precedent stating that penalty differences do not necessarily create conflict.

The Colorado Supreme Court accepted C.A.R. 21 jurisdiction because any municipal sentences might be served before appellate review could provide meaningful relief and because the issue is novel, recurring, and statewide in effect.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court classified “the establishment of penalties for low-level criminal conduct” as a matter of mixed statewide and local concern. In mixed-concern cases, state law preempts conflicting local law. Here, the conflict was “operational”: municipal sentencing provisions authorizing harsher punishment for identical conduct “authorize what state law forbids,” materially impeding the state’s interest in consistent statewide maximum penalties after the Misdemeanor Reform Act.

The Court expressly did not reach equal protection arguments because it resolved the cases on preemption grounds.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the result)

• City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2016 CO 29:
  This case supplied the modern framework for mixed-concern conflicts. The Court relied on it for (i) the mixed-concern preemption inquiry focusing on a law’s “operational effect,” and (ii) the standard that preemption occurs when local effectuation “materially impedes or destroys” a state interest. Critically, it reiterated the bright-line formulation: a local law that “authorizes what state law forbids or forbids what state law authorizes” necessarily creates an operational conflict.
• Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 2013 CO 9:
  Webb provided both the de novo standard of review and the four-factor test for categorizing an issue as statewide, local, or mixed. The Court also used Webb’s discussion of extraterritorial “ripple effects” and “patchwork” regulation to support treating sentencing maximums as implicating statewide concerns when municipalities could impose drastically different punishments on nonresidents.
• Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1992):
  Bowen/Edwards anchored the doctrine of express, implied, and operational conflict preemption, and it supported the remedial concept of partial preemption—local ordinances may be preempted only “to the extent” they conflict with state interests. That principle allowed the Court to preserve municipal prosecution authority while trimming only the excessive penalty provisions.
• City of Aurora v. Martin, 507 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1973):
  The municipal courts relied on Martin’s statement that penalty differences do not necessarily establish conflict. The Supreme Court distinguished Martin: it involved a municipal ordinance imposing a lesser penalty than the state; here, municipalities imposed harsher penalties than the state’s newly lowered maximums. The Court used Martin’s own conflict test (“authorize what the state forbids”) to find operational conflict where municipal penalties exceeded state caps.
• Quintana v. Edgewater Municipal Court, 498 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1972):
  Quintana recognized municipal power to regulate non-felony theft and invalidated an ordinance only to the extent it encroached on felony jurisdiction. The Court treated Quintana as affirming concurrent regulation of low-level crimes, not as authorizing municipalities to exceed state sentencing limits for identical conduct.
• People v. Wade, 757 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1988):
  Wade was invoked for strong home-rule language about a city’s ability to choose a different sentencing scheme. The Court limited Wade: it concerned probation structure rather than imposing higher maximum penalties than the state permits for identical conduct, and it did not address operational conflict with state maximum caps.
• Vela v. People, 484 P.2d 1204 (Colo. 1971):
  Vela reinforced the general proposition that municipalities may enact and enforce ordinances prohibiting the same conduct as state law absent conflict—supporting the Court’s choice of partial, not total, preemption.
• City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003); Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1991); City of Com. City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273 (Colo. 2002):
  These cases informed the “mixed concern” categorization, particularly extraterritorial impact and resident expectations, and rejected the idea that extraterritorial effect disappears simply because someone enters municipal jurisdiction.
• People v. Subjack, 2021 CO 10; People v. Rowell, 2019 CO 104; In re People in Int. of S.G.H., 2025 CO 59:
  These cases were used to justify exercising C.A.R. 21 jurisdiction where ordinary appellate review is inadequate and potential incarceration could be served before an appeal is resolved.
• City of Rifle v. Mobley, (Colo. No. 23SA289, Dec. 14, 2023) (unpublished order):
  Cited as evidence the Court had previously granted review on the same question but dismissed as moot—underscoring the issue’s recurrence and importance.
• Martinez v. Kirbens, 710 P.2d 1138 (Colo. App. 1985):
  Mentioned only to describe (and reject in Wade) the “philosophy in sentencing” constraint. The Court’s use here was contextual, distinguishing philosophy-based constraints from the concrete statutory caps at issue.
• City of Canon City v. Merris, 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958); City of Greeley v. Hamman, 20 P. 1 (Colo. 1888); Hughes v. People, 9 P. 50 (Colo. 1885):
  Historical authorities illustrating the longstanding overlap of state and municipal regulation and the evolution toward treating ordinance incarceration as criminal punishment—supporting the Court’s conclusion that sentencing is not purely local nor purely statewide.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Step 1: Categorize the subject as statewide, local, or mixed.
   Applying the Webb factors, the Court held that setting penalties for low-level criminal conduct is mixed:
   • Uniformity: not inherently required, but state caps show a statewide interest in consistent maximum penalties.
   • Extraterritorial impact:
   • Historical regulation:
   • Constitutional commitment:
2. Step 2: In mixed-concern cases, test for preemption.
   The Court addressed the three preemption types from Bowen/Edwards and City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n:
   • No express preemption: the Misdemeanor Reform Act did not clearly and unequivocally bar municipal regulation.
   • No implied field preemption: the Act did not evince intent to occupy the entire field of low-level sentencing (and the parties did not press it).
   • Operational conflict preemption applies: municipal penalties exceeding state caps “authorize what state law forbids.”
3. Step 3: Define the conflict trigger—“identical conduct.”
   The Court’s rule turns on whether the municipal ordinance and state statute prohibit the same conduct (as with Westminster theft vs. § 18-4-401, and Aurora trespass ordinances vs. § 18-4-503 and § 18-4-504). Where identical, the municipality cannot set a higher maximum than the state permits for the corresponding classification (class 2 misdemeanor or petty offense).
4. Step 4: Preserve municipal authority via partial preemption.
   Relying on Bowen/Edwards, the Court did not invalidate municipal prosecution authority. It invalidated only the excessive penalty authorization “to the extent” it exceeded state caps, leaving the ordinances enforceable within state maximums.
5. Step 5: Reconcile “general” municipal sentencing statutes.
   Aurora and Westminster emphasized § 13-10-113(1)(a) and § 31-16-101(1)(a) (general municipal maximums of 364 days and $2,650). The Court treated these as default ceilings for municipal offenses that do not correspond to identical state petty offenses/misdemeanors; they cannot be used to exceed specific state caps where an identical state offense exists.
6. Step 6: Address Westminster’s theft “concurrent power” statute.
   The Court read § 18-4-401(8) (“concurrent power to prohibit theft…less than [$1,000]”) as confirming municipalities may regulate non-felony theft—not as permission to exceed state maximum punishment for identical conduct after the Misdemeanor Reform Act.

3.3 Impact

• Uniform statewide ceilings for identical offenses: Home-rule cities may still prosecute local versions of theft/trespass-like conduct, but must sentence within state maximums when the conduct is identical to a state petty offense or misdemeanor.
• Charging decisions shift in practice: If a municipality (or prosecutor acting “by and through” the city) seeks penalties above state caps, it cannot obtain them via an identical municipal ordinance; higher punishment must come (if available) through state charging paths for non-identical or more serious offenses.
• Municipal code revisions likely: Cities may (i) revise penalty provisions, (ii) revise ordinance elements to avoid “identical conduct” overlap (though that may raise other legal/policy issues), or (iii) align ordinance classifications with state tiers created by the Misdemeanor Reform Act.
• Litigation focus narrows to “identity” of conduct: Future disputes will likely center on whether ordinance elements truly match the state statute (including mental state, actus reus, and any defined terms such as “unlawfully”).
• Preserves home-rule enforcement role: The remedy is not dismissal of municipal cases; it is a sentencing limitation—important for municipal courts and municipal policing priorities while enforcing statewide sentencing policy.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Home-rule municipality: A city with constitutional authority (Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6) to govern “local and municipal matters,” including creating ordinances and enforcing them in municipal court.
• Preemption: When a higher authority’s law (state) overrides a lower authority’s law (city) in a conflict.
  • Express preemption: the legislature says, clearly, “cities may not regulate this.”
  • Implied preemption: the legislature builds such a comprehensive scheme that it “occupies the field.”
  • Operational conflict preemption: even without explicit intent, the local law’s real-world legal effect clashes with the state law—especially if it authorizes what the state forbids.
• Mixed local and statewide concern: A subject where both city and state have legitimate interests; cities may regulate, but not in a way that conflicts with state law.
• “Identical conduct” test (as used here): If the ordinance and statute prohibit the same behavior, the city cannot impose a higher maximum penalty than the state’s maximum for that behavior.
• Partial preemption: Only the conflicting part of a local law is invalid. Here, the Court left municipal offenses intact but capped sentencing at the state maximums.

5. Conclusion

2025 CO 64 establishes a clear sentencing-limitation rule for home-rule municipalities: where a municipal ordinance criminalizes the same conduct as a state petty offense or misdemeanor, municipal courts may not impose penalties exceeding the state’s statutory sentencing caps. The decision modernizes Colorado’s home-rule preemption analysis in the wake of the Misdemeanor Reform Act by treating excessive municipal maximums as an operational conflict that materially impedes the state’s interest in consistent statewide sentencing ceilings—while preserving municipal authority to prosecute and punish within those limits.