State of the Art Defense Invalidated in Strict Liability Failure to Warn: New Precedent by New Jersey Supreme Court

State of the Art Defense Invalidated in Strict Liability Failure to Warn: New Precedent by New Jersey Supreme Court

Introduction

The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its landmark decision on July 7, 1982, addressed a pivotal issue in product liability law: the admissibility of the "state of the art" defense in strict liability cases concerning failure to warn. The cases consolidated under Jarusewicz et al. v. Johns-Manville Products Corporation et al. involved numerous plaintiffs who alleged that prolonged exposure to asbestos-containing products led to severe health conditions, including asbestosis and mesothelioma. The central controversy revolved around whether defendants could evade liability by claiming that the dangers of asbestos were undiscoverable given the existing scientific knowledge at the time their products were marketed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court's decision, which had denied plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' state of the art defense. The Court held that, in strict liability cases based on failure to warn, defendants cannot rely on the state of the art defense to absolve themselves of responsibility for product dangers that were undiscovered and unknowable at the time of distribution. The judgment emphasized that strict liability focuses on the product's safety rather than the manufacturer's knowledge or negligence, thereby ensuring that victims are compensated without imposing the burden of proving technological impossibilities on them.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court's decision extensively referenced several key cases to bolster its ruling:

  • FREUND v. CELLOFILM PROPERTIES, INC. (1981): This case clarified the distinction between negligence and strict liability in failure to warn scenarios. It established that in strict liability, the manufacturer’s knowledge of the product’s dangers is presumed, eliminating the need for plaintiffs to prove actual knowledge.
  • SUTER v. SAN ANGELO FOUNDRY MACHINE COMPANY (1979): It outlined the principles of strict liability, emphasizing that a product must be reasonably safe for its intended use, balancing its utility against inherent risks.
  • TORSIELLO v. WHITEHALL LABORATORIES (1979): This case further developed the framework for strict liability, focusing on the foreseeability of product dangers.
  • CEPEDA v. CUMBERLAND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC. (1978): It equated strict liability with negligence in design defect cases, underlining that foreseeability is imputed to the manufacturer.
  • Keeton’s Writings: Quoted extensively, Dean Keeton’s perspectives on the inappropriateness of negligence concepts within strict liability frameworks influenced the Court’s rationale against the state of the art defense.
  • Marcucci v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1982): Although pending, Judge Ackerman's application of New Jersey law to strike the state of the art defense in a similar context supported the Supreme Court's stance.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's reasoning hinged on several foundational principles:

  • Nature of Strict Liability: Unlike negligence, strict liability is product-oriented and does not consider the manufacturer’s conduct or knowledge. The focus is solely on whether the product was reasonably safe for its intended use.
  • Rejection of State of the Art Defense: The Court posited that introducing a state of the art defense conflates strict liability with negligence, which is inappropriate. They argued that allowing such a defense would complicate the legal process, introduce uncertainty, and undermine the very purpose of strict liability—efficient risk distribution.
  • Policy Considerations: The decision emphasized that strict liability aims to spread the costs of injuries from defective products among those who profit from their sale, including manufacturers and consumers, rather than placing the burden solely on victims.
  • Practical Implications: The Court recognized that assessing scientific unknowability would be impractical in a trial setting, potentially leading to confusion and increased litigation costs. This impracticality justified the outright rejection of the state of the art defense.

Furthermore, the Court argued that imposing liability regardless of the manufacturer’s ability to foresee dangers aligns with societal interests in promoting product safety and accountability. This approach ensures that manufacturers maintain rigorous safety standards and invest adequately in safety research.

Impact

This judgment has profound implications for product liability law:

  • Strengthening Victims’ Positions: Plaintiffs no longer need to disprove a state of the art defense, simplifying the path to compensation in strict liability cases.
  • Manufacturer Accountability: Manufacturers are held strictly liable for the safety of their products, irrespective of the scientific knowledge available at the time of distribution. This increases the impetus on manufacturers to ensure product safety proactively.
  • Legal Consistency: By rejecting the state of the art defense, the decision reinforces the distinction between negligence and strict liability, promoting clarity in legal proceedings.
  • Encouraging Safety Research: Manufacturers are incentivized to invest in safety research, as failing to do so cannot shield them from liability, even if the dangers are later discovered.
  • Economic Implications: While some defendants argue that this may lead to higher product prices due to increased liability costs, the Court maintained that the benefits of risk spreading and victim compensation outweigh these concerns.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strict Liability

Definition: A legal doctrine holding manufacturers or sellers liable for defective products, regardless of fault or negligence.

In this context, if a product is found to be unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, the manufacturer is liable for any resulting injuries, without the need for the injured party to prove negligence.

State of the Art Defense

Definition: A defense wherein defendants argue that the dangers associated with a product were not known and could not have been known based on the existing scientific and technological knowledge at the time the product was marketed.

Essentially, defendants claim that they cannot be held liable for risks that were not discoverable with the technology and knowledge available during the product’s distribution.

Risk-Utility Equation

Definition: A legal standard used to determine if a product is reasonably safe by balancing its benefits (utility) against its inherent risks.

If the utility of the product outweighs its risks, and the risks have been minimized as much as possible without compromising the product’s usefulness, the product is deemed safe. This equation guides assessments in strict liability cases.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Jarusewicz et al. v. Johns-Manville Products Corporation et al. marks a significant advancement in product liability law. By invalidating the state of the art defense in strict liability failure to warn cases, the Court reinforces the principle that product safety is paramount and that manufacturers must bear the responsibility for ensuring their products do not pose unreasonable risks to consumers. This ruling not only simplifies the legal process for victims seeking compensation but also incentivizes manufacturers to prioritize safety and invest in research to prevent future hazards. Ultimately, this decision upholds the foundational goals of strict liability: to protect consumers, distribute the costs of product-related injuries fairly, and promote a safer marketplace.

Case Details

EDWARD J. BESHADA, BY HIS ADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM, ELEANOR BESHADA;ELEANOR BESHADA, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF EDWARD J. BESHADA, DECEASED;GEORGE J. BURDAK AND ROSE BURDAK, HIS WIFE; JAMES D. CANNON AND BERTHACANNON, HIS WIFE; RAYMOND D. CREED AND MARY CREED, HIS WIFE; STANLEY J.DROZD AND ROSE DROZD, HIS WIFE; HENRY J. GROBELNY AND PEARL GROBELNY, HISWIFE; THADDEUS KASUBINSKI AND AGNES KASUBINSKI, HIS WIFE; MICHAEL KRUK;STEPHEN KUZMACK AND AMELIA KUZMACK, HIS WIFE; JOHN G. ORSAG AND SUSAN ORSAG,HIS WIFE; JOHN PLEVA AND ANN PLEVA, HIS WIFE; PAUL RARUS; STANLEY F.SAKOWSKI AND FLORENCE SAKOWSKI, HIS WIFE; BERNARD SCULLY AND MARCELLASCULLY, HIS WIFE; JOSEPH P. SLEZAK AND JOSEPHINE SLEZAK, HIS WIFE; ARTHUR J.WALCZAK AND CATHERINE WALCZAK, HIS WIFE; DOUGLAS WHITAKER AND ELEANORWHITAKER, HIS WIFE; HENRY WONDOWSKY AND HELEN WONDOWSKY, HIS WIFE; ALBERT F.SZCZEPANIK AND SOPHIE B. SZCZEPANIK, HIS WIFE; STANLEY GOLEMBIESKI, EXECUTOROF THE ESTATE OF WALTER GOLEMBIESKI; AND HENRY V. KOWALESKI AND JANEKOWALESKI (FIRST NAME BEING FICTITIOUS), HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. JOHNS-MANVILLE PRODUCTS CORPORATION; EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES, INC.;MADSEN-HOWELL, INC.; RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN, INC.; GAF CORPORATION AND UNARCOINDUSTRIES, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND STATE INSULATION CORP., ET AL.,DEFENDANTS.FRANK J. JARUSEWICZ AND MARY JARUSEWICZ, HIS WIFE; ROBERT J. RUTKOWSKI ANDCAROLINE S. RUTKOWSKI, HIS WIFE; MICHAEL J. LEONARD AND ALFONSINA J.LEONARD, HIS WIFE; RUSSELL J. HAHN, AND JEAN HAHN, HIS WIFE; JERRY E. COVELLAND ALICE COVELL, HIS WIFE; HENRY J. KELEHER; HARRISON LARSEN; GEORGE W.OGBORNE AND JOAN OGBORNE, HIS WIFE; STANLEY R. PIATEK AND GLORIA J. PIATEK,HIS WIFE; MARTIN ROSENTHAL AND HELEN ROSENTHAL, HIS WIFE; JOHN O'BRIEN ANDMARIJANE O'BRIEN, HIS WIFE; JOSEPH ZAKRZEWSKI AND IRENE A. ZAKRZEWSKI, HISWIFE; ERNEST C. WEIBRECHT AND GAIL M. WEIBRECHT, HIS WIFE; WILLIAM MADELINEAND CHRISTINE T. MADELINE, HIS WIFE; CARLTON HOLTSLANDER AND JANE D.HOLTSLANDER, HIS WIFE; ALEXANDER HARANSKY AND DOROTHY HARANSKY, HIS WIFE;LAWRENCE A. MIZAK AND ANNA H. MIZAK, HIS WIFE; WARREN H. RAPPLEYEA, BY HISADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM, KATHLEEN J. RAPPLEYEA; AND KATHLEEN J.RAPPLEYEA, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF WARREN H. RAPPLEYEA, DECEASED,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
Year: 1982
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Judge(s)

The Opinion of the Court was delivered by PASHMAN, J.

Attorney(S)

Alan M. Darnell argued the cause for appellants Beshada, et al. ( Wilentz, Goldman Spitzer, attorneys; Alan M. Darnell, Karen Ann Kubulak and Christopher M. Placitella, on brief). Bryan D. Garruto argued the cause for appellant Beckwith ( Heilbrunn, Finkelstein, Heilbrunn, Garruto Galex, attorneys). Ronald B. Grayzel argued the cause for appellants Crilley ( Levinson, Conover, Axelrod Wheaton, attorneys). David R. Gross argued the cause for respondents Johns-Manville Products Corporation, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, successor to and in lieu of Johns-Manville Products Corporation and Johns-Manville Canada, Inc., formerly known as Canadian Johns-Manville Co. Ltd., Canadian Johns-Manville Amiante Ltd., formerly Canadian Johns-Manville Asbestos Ltd., Johns-Manville Corporation ( Budd, Larner, Kent, Gross, Picillo Rosenbaum, attorneys; David J. Novack and Sebastian P. Lombardi, on the brief). Kathleen F. Moran argued the cause for respondent Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. ( Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan Spielvogel, attorneys). Andrew T. Berry argued the cause for respondent Owens-Illinois, Inc. ( McCarter English, attorneys; Andrew T. Berry and Michael A. Tanenbaum, on the brief). Philip V. Lago submitted a brief on behalf of respondent GAF Corporation ( Hannoch, Weisman, Stern, Besser, Berkowitz Kinney, attorneys; Anthony J. Marchetta, of counsel). William R. Connelly submitted a brief on behalf of respondent Quigley Co., Inc., subsidiary of Pfizer, Inc. ( Ravin, Davis Sweet, attorneys). Dennis F. Carey submitted a brief on behalf of respondent Unarco Industries, Inc., also referred to as Unarco Industries, formerly known as Union Asbestos Rubber Company ( Dwyer, Connell Lisbona, attorneys). Peter W. Sachs submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondents A.P. Green Refractories Co. and Metropolitan Refractories, Division of A.P. Green Refractories Co. ( Sachs Sachs, attorneys). James F. McNaboe submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. ( Schwartz and Andolino, attorneys). William J. Gannon submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Madsen Howell, Inc. ( Ryan and Gannon, attorneys). Ronald S. Suss submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Karl Asch, Esq. ( Karl Asch, attorney; Ronald S. Suss and Karl Asch, on the brief).

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