State of Louisiana v. FCC: JPML Lottery Under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) Is Binding—Once the Record Is Filed, the Designated Circuit Retains Venue for Consolidated Agency-Review Petitions

Introduction

In this consolidated set of petitions for review arising from the Federal Communications Commission’s order reducing rates for incarcerated people’s communications services (IPCS), the First Circuit resolved a threshold but consequential question: which court has venue to hear the challenges after the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) conducted the “venue lottery” under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) and directed that the administrative record be filed in the First Circuit? Petitioners—including state governments (among them the State of Louisiana), sheriffs’ associations, and IPCS providers—argued that venue properly belonged in the Fifth Circuit and that the First Circuit was obliged to transfer the case. The court held that, once the JPML designates a circuit and the agency files the record there, § 2112(a)(5) makes that court the mandatory venue for all petitions regarding the same order, and parties may not collaterally attack the JPML’s lottery in the merits court.

The court also addressed the related argument that some petitions were “incurably premature” because they were filed before Federal Register publication of portions of the FCC’s order. Without deciding that jurisdictional question, the court explained that it had undisputed jurisdiction over later-filed petitions by the same parties challenging the same portions of the order—making any prematurity dispute immaterial to venue. Finally, although the FCC asked the First Circuit to hold the matter in abeyance given a forthcoming rulemaking that could moot parts of the dispute, the court decided to resolve the venue question now because it may determine the forum for any future challenges to a superseding order.

Background and Parties

The FCC’s July 22, 2024 order implemented the Martha Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act of 2022 (MWRA), 47 U.S.C. §§ 152–153, 276, and among other actions, established new rate caps for IPCS and dismissed industry petitions for clarification and waiver as moot. The order was released on the FCC’s website on July 22; portions addressing the dismissals were published in the Federal Register on August 26, 2024, and the remainder was published on September 20, 2024.

Multiple petitions for review were filed across circuits:

• Securus Technologies, LLC and Pay Tel Communications, Inc. (the “Provider Petitioners”) challenged the order, including the dismissals of their FCC petitions and later the rate caps themselves.
• Public Interest Petitioners—Direct Action for Rights and Equality, Pennsylvania Prison Society, and the Criminal Justice Reform Clinic—challenged other portions of the order, filing initial protective petitions and then later-filed petitions after full publication.
• States (including Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and others) and sheriffs’ organizations aligned with the providers argued that venue in the First Circuit was improper and sought transfer to the Fifth Circuit.

Because petitions were filed in multiple circuits within the ten-day period tied to the Federal Register publication of the dismissals, the JPML conducted a random selection under § 2112(a)(3) and chose the First Circuit. The FCC then filed the administrative record in the First Circuit, and all other courts transferred their related petitions here under § 2112(a)(5). The Supreme Court subsequently denied mandamus relief sought by certain petitioners to force a transfer to the Fifth Circuit.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit held:

• Mandatory transfer is not warranted. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(5), once the JPML designates a court and the agency files the record there, “all courts” must transfer related petitions to that court. The First Circuit is therefore the proper venue for these consolidated petitions.
• Parties may not collaterally attack the JPML’s § 2112(a) lottery decision in the merits court. The statute provides no mechanism for such review, distinguishing it from multidistrict litigation practice under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e), which does contain an express review provision.
• Jurisdictional disputes over earlier-filed petitions do not compel a venue transfer. The First Circuit has undisputed jurisdiction over later-filed petitions challenging the same parts of the FCC order, making the prematurity arguments about earlier petitions immaterial to venue.
• The court declines to transfer sua sponte in the interest of justice. No party presently requests discretionary transfer, and judicial economy favors retention because the First Circuit is already deeply familiar with the case.
• The court will hold the petitions in abeyance pending potential FCC action that may moot some issues, but it resolved the venue question now to clarify the appropriate forum for any challenges to subsequent agency action.

Analysis

1. Precedents and Statutes Cited and Their Influence

• 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)
  • Section 2112(a)(3) authorizes the JPML to randomly select a court of appeals when petitions for review are filed in multiple circuits within the statutory ten-day period, and directs the agency to file the record in that court.
  • Section 2112(a)(5) mandates that all other courts “shall transfer” proceedings “with respect to the same order” to the court in which the record is filed, and permits that designated court to re-transfer “for the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice.”
  • These provisions anchored the court’s conclusion that, after the JPML lottery and filing of the record, the First Circuit is the proper venue for all petitions concerning the FCC’s IPCS order.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (Hobbs Act)
  • Provides the 60-day deadline for “aggrieved” parties to petition for review after “entry” of a final order. “Entry” occurs when the agency gives notice “in accordance with its rules.”
  • The Provider Petitioners argued that parts of the FCC’s order were “entered” upon web release (as an adjudication under 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)), making only their Fifth Circuit petition timely and negating the basis for a lottery. The First Circuit found it unnecessary to decide those timing and characterization disputes because venue was already fixed by the JPML’s designation and the record filing.
• 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)
  • FCC rule distinguishing the date of “public notice” for adjudications (date of release) vs. rulemakings (date of Federal Register publication). This rule underpinned the Provider Petitioners’ timeliness theory but did not alter the outcome on venue.
• Blanca Tel. Co. v. FCC, 743 F.3d 860, 866–67 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
  • Discusses “entry” of agency orders for § 2344 purposes. Cited by the Provider Petitioners to support measuring the ten-day period from website release. The First Circuit again did not need to ultimately resolve this point because § 2112(a)(5) controlled venue after the JPML designation and filing.
• CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942)
  • Classic standard distinguishing rulemaking from adjudication (whether an action sets a general standard vs. determines rights of specific parties). The FCC and Public Interest Petitioners invoked CBS to argue the dismissals were rulemaking-like. The First Circuit expressly avoided deciding whether the relevant portion was rulemaking or adjudication.
• 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e)
  • Provides for review of JPML MDL orders. The First Circuit contrasted § 1407(e) with § 2112(a), noting the latter contains no review mechanism for JPML venue selections—supporting the court’s conclusion that parties cannot collaterally attack the JPML’s § 2112 lottery decision in the merits court.
• United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)
  • Stands for the principle that undeveloped arguments are waived. The court cited Zannino to explain that the Provider Petitioners’ assumption of authority to collaterally attack the JPML selection was not supported by analysis or legal authority.
• Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir. 1975)
  • Addresses transfer considerations including judicial economy. The First Circuit relied on PIRG in declining to transfer sua sponte where it had already developed familiarity with the case.
• Buckeye Partners, L.P. v. FERC, No. 22-60100, 2022 WL 1528311 (5th Cir. May 13, 2022) (per curiam)
  • Referenced to underscore practice around transfer in the administrative-review context. The court cited Buckeye to reinforce its discretion to retain a case where it has invested resources and expertise.
• In re Securus Techs., 145 S. Ct. 1223 (2025) (mem.)
  • The Supreme Court’s denial of mandamus seeking to compel transfer to the Fifth Circuit left intact the First Circuit’s management of venue and further undercut any claim of a clear and indisputable right to transfer.
• Martha Wright-Reed Act (MWRA), 47 U.S.C. §§ 152–153, 276
  • The statute under which the FCC promulgated IPCS rate caps. While the merits of the FCC’s implementation are not decided here, MWRA provides the substantive backdrop to the petitions.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The dispositive feature of the court’s analysis is the structure of § 2112(a). The JPML selected the First Circuit pursuant to § 2112(a)(3), and the FCC filed the administrative record here. That filing triggered § 2112(a)(5)’s command that “all courts in which proceedings are instituted with respect to the same order” transfer those proceedings to the court “in which the record is so filed.” On the face of the statute, then, all roads lead to the First Circuit once the record is filed by JPML direction.

The Provider Petitioners sought to unwind the venue lottery by arguing that the statutory trigger for a lottery was not met because only one timely petition existed within the relevant ten-day period, making § 2112(a)(1)—“first instituted” venue—controlling and pointing to the Fifth Circuit. That contention required the First Circuit to treat the JPML’s selection as ultra vires. The court refused, for two reasons:

• Textual and structural considerations: Section 2112(a)(5) fixes venue in the court where the record is filed at the JPML’s direction. The statute contains no provision authorizing a merits court to revisit the JPML’s designation or to re-allocate venue on the ground that the lottery was “improperly” triggered.
• Comparative statutory context and absence of review mechanism: By contrasting § 2112(a) with § 1407(e)’s explicit review path for MDL orders, the court inferred that Congress did not intend collateral review of JPML § 2112(a) selections in the administrative-petition context. The Provider Petitioners offered no legal authority to the contrary.

The court also rejected a second, related argument: that the Public Interest Petitioners’ initial petitions were “incurably premature,” leaving only Securus’s Fifth Circuit petition as a viable within-ten-days petition, which again would preclude a lottery. The First Circuit noted that it undisputedly has jurisdiction over the later-filed petitions—filed after full publication—by the very same Public Interest Petitioners challenging the same parts of the order. Thus, even if earlier petitions were premature (an issue the court expressly did not decide), that would not disturb venue given the valid, later petitions now before the First Circuit.

Finally, the court declined to exercise its discretionary authority under § 2112(a)(5) to transfer “for the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice.” No current motion requested such relief, and judicial economy strongly favored retention: the First Circuit had already navigated a complex procedural posture and invested significant resources; other courts, including the Fifth Circuit, had not.

3. Impact and Prospective Significance

This decision establishes clear guidance on the stability of JPML venue selections in Hobbs Act agency-review cases:

• Binding effect of the § 2112(a) lottery: Once the JPML designates a circuit and the agency files the record there, that circuit is the obligatory venue for all petitions concerning the same order. Parties cannot relitigate the propriety of the lottery in the merits court.
• Limits on forum shopping: The ruling curtails post-lottery attempts to steer the case to a preferred forum by repackaging timeliness or “prematurity” arguments into a mandatory transfer claim.
• Practical handling of multi-part agency orders: Even where an agency issues an order with portions arguably “entered” at different times (e.g., adjudicatory dismissals vs. rulemaking text), the venue will not fragment across circuits once a JPML selection has been made and the record filed.
• Judicial economy and discretionary transfer: The court signaled that familiarity with the record and procedural history weighs heavily against sua sponte transfer, reinforcing that § 2112(a)(5)’s discretionary transfer is an exception—not a backdoor to undo the lottery.
• Downstream effects on emerging rulemakings: By settling venue now, the court clarified that related future petitions attacking a superseding FCC order may likewise be drawn to the same forum, promoting continuity and predictability.

For providers, states, and public-interest groups engaged in nationwide agency litigation, the opinion emphasizes the importance of the initial ten-day filing window and the strategic consequences of where multiple petitions land. After the JPML acts, challenges to the propriety of the lottery belong, if anywhere, in a vehicle expressly authorized by statute (and the Supreme Court’s denial of mandamus underscores how demanding such relief would be).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• JPML “venue lottery” (28 U.S.C. § 2112(a))
  • When two or more petitions for review of the same agency order are filed in different circuits within a defined ten-day window, the JPML randomly selects one circuit. The agency must file the record there. All other courts must transfer related petitions to that circuit.
• “Entry” of an agency order and timeliness (28 U.S.C. § 2344; 47 C.F.R. § 1.4)
  • “Entry” typically turns on the agency’s own rules for giving notice. The FCC treats “adjudications” as “entered” when released on its website, and “rulemakings” as “entered” upon Federal Register publication. The classification can matter for filing deadlines, but here it did not change the venue outcome.
• Collateral attack on the JPML’s selection
  • “Collateral attack” means trying to invalidate a procedural decision (here, the JPML’s lottery) in a forum that is not authorized by statute to review it. The court held § 2112(a) contains no mechanism allowing the merits court to second-guess the JPML’s selection.
• “Incurably premature” petitions
  • If a petition is filed before an order is “entered,” it can be premature. But where later, timely petitions cover the same issues and are pending in the designated venue, any defect in earlier petitions does not force a venue transfer.
• Discretionary transfer “in the interest of justice”
  • The court that holds the record may, for convenience and justice, send the case elsewhere. That is discretionary and rare—especially where the designated court has already developed expertise with the record.
• Abeyance
  • Placing a case “in abeyance” pauses proceedings while a potentially dispositive event (such as a new agency order) occurs. Here, the court paused merits review but decided venue first to clarify the forum going forward.

Conclusion

The First Circuit’s per curiam decision delivers a crisp rule of administrative appellate practice: when the JPML conducts a § 2112(a) lottery and the agency files the record in the designated circuit, that court becomes—and remains—the hub for all petitions concerning the same order. Attempts to reverse-engineer a mandatory transfer by challenging the lottery’s trigger or by citing alleged jurisdictional defects in some petitions do not succeed; § 2112(a)(5) forecloses collateral attacks and mandates transfer to the court with the filed record. Discretionary transfer remains available but will be sparingly used, especially where judicial economy favors retention.

Substantively, the ruling does not address the merits of the FCC’s IPCS rate caps under the MWRA; those issues are held in abeyance in light of expected agency action. Procedurally, however, the opinion sets an important precedent for the stability and finality of JPML venue selections in Hobbs Act litigation, curbing forum-shopping and promoting efficient, centralized review. For future multi-circuit challenges to agency action—particularly where orders combine adjudicatory and rulemaking elements—this decision signals that the JPML’s choice, once acted upon, fixes the forum.