State ex rel. OBA v. Durbin: Clarifying First Amendment Limits on Lawyers’ Speech and Rejecting Anti‑SLAPP Defenses in Bar Discipline

I. Introduction

The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Durbin, 2025 OK 77, is one of the most extensive modern disciplinary opinions in Oklahoma. It addresses twenty counts of alleged misconduct, a parallel Rule 7 summary proceeding based on a criminal conviction, an attempted resignation from the Bar pending discipline, and multiple constitutional and procedural challenges.

The case centers on attorney Ronald Edward Durbin II, formerly a member of the Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA) and prominent in the medical marijuana regulatory space. Durbin engaged in a pattern of:

• Abusive and profane confrontations with public officials and court staff, often livestreamed on social media;
• False or reckless accusations of criminality and corruption against judges and legal officers;
• Frivolous or retaliatory lawsuits and recusal motions whose purpose was to inflict financial harm or gain tactical advantage rather than vindicate legitimate rights;
• Serious neglect and mishandling of client matters, including conflicts of interest and trust‑account violations; and
• Retaliatory threats of litigation against individuals who filed OBA grievances.

Against this backdrop, Durbin mounted a broad defense grounded in the First Amendment, the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA, the state anti‑SLAPP statute), due process, and claims that his speech was protected political commentary. He also tendered a conditional resignation from the Bar, attempted to withdraw it, and argued he had a constitutional right to “disassociate” from the OBA without Supreme Court approval.

The Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) recommended disbarment. The Supreme Court conducted the required de novo review, rejected Durbin’s constitutional and procedural arguments, declined to accept his non‑compliant resignation, found 115 rule violations across the twenty counts, and ordered disbarment effective as of his prior interim suspension. In doing so, the Court significantly clarified:

• The limits of a lawyer’s First Amendment defenses in disciplinary matters, especially when attacking judges and legal officers;
• The inapplicability of the OCPA to lawyer disciplinary proceedings;
• The strict requirements for resignations pending discipline under RGDP Rule 8;
• The procedural obligations of respondents to use the prescribed mechanisms for disqualification, discovery, and record development; and
• The scope of duties under various Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC) and the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP) in the modern social‑media era.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s principal holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Resignation Pending Discipline Rejected. Durbin’s “affidavit of resignation” under RGDP Rule 8 was not accepted because it:
   • Was expressly conditioned on the OBA not seeking reimbursement of costs;
   • Denied all misconduct while simultaneously seeking to circumvent the disciplinary process; and
   • Asserted a supposed constitutional right to resign from the OBA without Supreme Court approval, contrary to established precedent.
   The Court denied approval and treated the resignation as ineffective.
2. All Pending Motions by Durbin Denied; OBA Motion to Strike Brief Denied. The Court rejected Durbin’s numerous motions (to disqualify OBA counsel and PRT members, for additional discovery, to testify post‑hearing, to vacate proceedings, and to lift his interim suspension) as procedurally improper and/or substantively unsupported. It denied the OBA’s motion to strike his oversized post‑hearing brief, but treated the brief as incapable of adding new facts to the record.
3. Extensive Misconduct Found Across Twenty Counts. The Court found clear and convincing evidence that Durbin violated a wide range of ORPC and RGDP provisions, including (but not limited to) Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.15, 1.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 4.4, 5.4, 5.5, 8.2, 8.4, and RGDP Rules 1.3, 5.2, 5.4, and 6.16. A few counts (XI, XIII, parts of others) resulted in no violations where the OBA’s proof was insufficient or speech was deemed protected.
4. Disbarment Effective as of Interim Suspension. Finding Durbin’s misconduct “almost in a class by itself” due to its breadth and seriousness, the Court ordered disbarment effective from the date of his interim suspension (April 8, 2024). His name “remains, and shall be, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.”
5. Rule 7 Criminal‑Conviction Proceeding Produced No Additional Sanction. Durbin’s nolo contendere plea to disturbing the peace (21 O.S. § 136) supported a separate Rule 7, RGDP proceeding, but the Court imposed no additional sanction beyond disbarment.
6. MCLE and Dues Suspensions Recognized but Superseded by Disbarment. The Court noted Durbin’s separate suspensions for failure to comply with Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirements and for non‑payment of dues. Those suspensions are effectively overtaken by disbarment, though his name remains stricken from the Roll in any event.
7. Costs Assessed. The Court assessed costs of $22,152.14 against Durbin under RGDP Rule 6.16, to be paid within ninety days after the opinion becomes final.

III. Analysis

A. Procedural Framework: Rules 6, 7, and 8 and the Court’s Constitutional Authority

Oklahoma lawyer discipline is governed by the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), adopted under the Supreme Court’s constitutional and inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. The Court reiterates (citing cases like Tweedy and Minter) that:

“The responsibility for legislation, prosecution, and adjudication on the subject of professional discipline of legal practitioners is constitutionally reposed in the judicial department.”

The key rules implicated are:

• Rule 6 – Governs ordinary disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct. Here, the OBA filed a Rule 6 complaint and subsequent amended complaints alleging twenty counts of misconduct.
• Rule 7 – Provides for summary discipline based on a lawyer’s criminal conviction. A separate Rule 7 proceeding was opened after Durbin’s plea to disturbing the peace, then consolidated with the Rule 6 proceeding.
• Rule 8 – Governs resignations pending disciplinary investigation or proceedings. It requires a specific form of affidavit and Supreme Court approval, and controls the availability and conditions of resignation as an alternative to adjudication.

The Court emphasizes that its jurisdiction over these matters is “original, exclusive, and nondelegable.” That foundation underlies the Court’s later refusal to apply the OCPA and its insistence that resignations and procedural motions strictly follow the RGDP and PRT rules.

B. Refusal to Accept Durbin’s Conditional Resignation and Treatment of Costs

1. RGDP Rule 8 Requirements

Under RGDP Rule 8.1, a lawyer under investigation or with pending proceedings may resign from the OBA only by delivering an affidavit to the Professional Responsibility Commission, stating:

• The resignation is freely and voluntarily rendered, without coercion or duress, and with full awareness of consequences;
• The lawyer is aware of the particular alleged misconduct under investigation or in pending proceedings; and
• The lawyer agrees that reinstatement can occur only via the prescribed procedures, with a five‑year waiting period.

Rule 8.2 makes clear that the resignation is effective only upon approval by the Supreme Court. The Court has previously refused to accept non‑compliant resignations (Gasaway, Perkins, Knight).

2. Durbin’s Non‑Conforming Resignation

Durbin’s “Affidavit of Resignation and Request for Approval” was filed after the PRT hearing but before the PRT’s report. It was defective for several reasons:

• He denied all allegations in the second amended complaint and “expressly disclaim[ed]” any rule violations warranting discipline, undermining the Rule 8 requirement to acknowledge the pendency and nature of misconduct allegations.
• He attempted to make the resignation conditional, declaring that he “withdraws and revokes” the resignation if the OBA seeks reimbursement of costs.
• He claimed a constitutional right to disassociate from the OBA without Court approval, directly contrary to longstanding case law.

The Court held that:

• Lawyers must comply with Rule 8 and relevant precedent unless they offer “legally cogent reasons” for a departure — which Durbin did not.
• Rule 8 resignations cannot be unilaterally conditioned upon the outcome of cost assessments or other collateral matters.
• Because the resignation was invalid ab initio (for non‑compliance), the Court did not need to decide what legal effect, if any, a subsequent “withdrawal of resignation” would have.

3. Costs upon Resignation

Citing State ex rel. OBA v. Claborn, 2019 OK 4, the Court re‑affirmed that when:

• Investigative or prosecutorial costs have been incurred by the OBA; and
• The Supreme Court approves a Rule 8 resignation,

the Court may nonetheless assess costs against the resigning lawyer. Professional discipline occurs both through sanction (such as resignation pending discipline) and cost‑shifting. Durbin’s attempt to reserve a unilateral right to disavow his resignation if costs were imposed was therefore incompatible with Rule 8 and Claborn.

C. Due Process, Disqualification, and Use of Prescribed Procedures

1. No Right to Publicly Funded Counsel or “Parity of Funding”

Durbin argued that due process entitled him to publicly funded legal representation or at least equal resources to those available to OBA counsel, analogizing to civil proceedings where counsel is sometimes constitutionally required (e.g., parental‑rights terminations).

The Court rejected this claim, emphasizing:

• RGDP Rule 6.12(a) grants a right to be represented by counsel, but not at public expense.
• While due process can require appointed counsel in “civil” cases functionally akin to criminal trials, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not fit that category.
• Using the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, Durbin had not shown that denial of publicly funded counsel created an intolerable risk of erroneous deprivation, especially in light of the procedural safeguards available.

2. Disqualification of OBA Counsel and PRT Members

Durbin sought to disqualify OBA General Counsel and members of the PRT multiple times, but failed to use the specific procedures mandated by the RGDP and the PRT’s own rules.

Key points:

• RGDP Rule 3.4(b), (c) set out processes for disqualifying OBA General Counsel:
  • At the investigation stage, such a request must be submitted in writing to the Professional Responsibility Commission, which decides whether disqualification is required.
  • After a formal complaint is filed, any disqualification motion must be addressed to the PRT, which then hears and decides the issue.
• PRT Procedural Rule 1 provides a three‑step method for disqualifying trial panel members:
  1. A confidential, written motion to the panel member at least 20 days before hearing;
  2. If denied, a renewed confidential motion to the PRT Chief Master within 5 days;
  3. If again denied, a motion to the Supreme Court as soon as practicable, with the PRT presiding master authorized to postpone the hearing pending a ruling.

The Court’s April 8, 2024 order explicitly directed Durbin to these procedures. He then did not use them. Instead, he:

• Filed premature motions directly in the Supreme Court;
• Left a letter on the trial panel’s chairs on the first day of hearing demanding recusal, which was untimely under PR 1(b); and
• Filed a late, post‑hearing motion seeking generalized equitable relief, including wholesale vacatur of the proceedings, disqualification of counsel, and public funding for his defense.

The Court held that when disciplinary rules prescribe specific procedures for raising disqualification and due‑process concerns, respondents bear an “adversarial procedural burden” to present their arguments at the proper time and before the proper tribunal (citing Mothershed). Durbin failed to do so, and his due‑process challenges were rejected on both procedural and substantive grounds.

3. No Showing of Constitutionally Intolerable Bias

Relying on Rippo v. Baker and Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Court analyzed whether the circumstances created a “constitutionally intolerable” risk of bias. It concluded:

• Adverse rulings and firm enforcement of deadlines do not, without more, show unconstitutional bias.
• Referrals of possible contempt to a district judge, while the PRT focused on substantive misconduct, did not show improper convergence of adjudicatory and prosecutorial roles.
• Durbin’s discovery‑related complaints lacked a showing of prejudice: he had more than a year between the original complaint and hearing, and the amendments did not radically alter the factual landscape.

The Court emphasized that due process required “notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” and that Durbin was afforded — but chose not to use — the opportunity to present a case in chief. His voluntary absence from all eight hearing days did not convert valid procedures into a due‑process violation.

D. The Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA) Does Not Apply to Bar Discipline

Durbin sought to invoke the OCPA, 12 O.S. §§ 1430–1440, arguing that the OBA’s complaint was a “legal action” targeting his exercise of free speech and petition rights, and should therefore be subject to a special motion to dismiss with burden‑shifting protections.

The Court firmly rejected this, holding that the OCPA:

• Applies to “legal actions” in ordinary civil litigation, not to disciplinary proceedings brought in the Supreme Court under its constitutional authority; and
• Cannot limit or displace the Court’s original, exclusive jurisdiction over attorney licensing, discipline, and ethics (citing Shields and R.J. Edwards v. Hert).

This is a significant clarification: anti‑SLAPP protections do not shield Oklahoma lawyers from bar discipline, even when the conduct at issue consists largely of expressive activity.

E. First Amendment, Political Speech, and Attorney Discipline

1. General Framework: Criticism vs. Falsehood and the Role of Lawyers

The Court walks through the doctrinal landscape regarding:

• Protected criticism of judges and public officials. Citing Porter, Wagner, and U.S. Supreme Court precedents (New York Times v. Sullivan, Garrison v. Louisiana, Watts v. United States), the Court acknowledges that “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks” on public officials are often constitutionally protected.
• False statements of fact. There is “no constitutional value in false statements of fact,” especially when made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Attorneys, as officers of the court, are expected to speak truthfully when criticizing the judiciary and legal system.
• Different standard in discipline vs. defamation. Drawing on other jurisdictions (e.g., Frost, Davidson, Graham), the Court emphasizes that “reckless disregard” in attorney discipline is not identical to the defamation “actual malice” standard:
  • In defamation, the focus is on protecting public debate unless a public official proves knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.
  • In discipline, courts ask whether a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances, with professional responsibilities, would have a factual basis for the statements.

Accordingly, while Durbin’s rights as a citizen were respected, his additional duties as an attorney — to be honest, to avoid misrepresentation, and to respect the administration of justice — supplied a stricter standard than ordinary defamation law.

2. Courthouse Hallways as Non‑Public Fora

Relying on Sefick v. Gardner, the Court held that courthouse lobbies and hallways adjacent to courtrooms are nonpublic fora, not places “open to the public for the presentation of views.” Thus:

• Attorneys may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in those spaces.
• Shouting accusations about a judge’s intoxication in a hallway while court is in session, with media present, is not insulated by First Amendment protections.

3. When Speech Was Not Sanctioned

The Court carefully exempted several categories of Durbin’s speech from discipline where the OBA’s proof did not satisfy rule elements or where speech was deemed political:

• Count I (Malone). Although Durbin’s Facebook tirades and calls for a boycott against a dispensary owner were coarse and aggressive, the Court declined to find a violation of ORPC 4.4(a) and 8.4(a)/RGDP 1.3 as to those threats, in part because:
  • Rule 4.4(a) applies only “in representing a client” and requires proof that the means used had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden a third person; and
  • The OBA did not sufficiently address these elements or rebut Durbin’s argument that his actions were political protest regarding an initiative petition.
  However, the Court did find a violation of RGDP Rule 5.4 when Durbin threatened Malone with a libel suit because she filed, or threatened to file, an OBA grievance.
• Counts XI & XIII. Durbin’s crude denunciations of certain legislators and a district attorney, including references to alleged sexual liaisons and political corruption, were deemed part of the rough‑and‑tumble of political discourse at the State Capitol and in the context of a criminal defense. The OBA failed to prove the elements of Rules 3.6, 4.4(a), 8.2(a), or 8.4 with clear and convincing evidence.

These portions of the opinion underscore that the Court is not criminalizing or disciplining all offensive rhetoric by lawyers. Rather, the Court demands:

• Proof of the specific rule elements (e.g., “no substantial purpose” under Rule 4.4(a), “imminent and materially prejudicial effect” under Rule 3.6); and
• A tighter nexus between the speech and the lawyer’s professional role or impairment of the justice system.

4. When Speech Was Sanctioned

In contrast, the Court imposed discipline where:

• Durbin made factually unsupported accusations of criminal conduct (e.g., drunk driving with a minor, destruction of court records, judicial bribery) against specific judges, and did not introduce any evidence despite repeated claims that “videos” existed (Counts IV, IX, XIV, XVI, XVII).
• He engaged in coordinated online campaigns to vilify judges (e.g., “stopsharonholmes.com,” cards stating a judge “Drives Drunk with a Minor,” videos using deceptive “jump cuts”) and published identifying information about a judge’s child and vehicle.
• He harassed public employees (e.g., Open Records Act “audits” in multiple counties, calling officers and clerks “scumbags,” “motherf-----s,” accusing them of misdemeanors on the spot, attempting “citizen’s arrests”) where the record showed:
  • Employees were actually attempting to comply with the Open Records Act, which expressly allows reasonable time to assemble records; and
  • Durbin’s conduct served mainly to intimidate and to generate inflammatory content for his social‑media channels.

In those contexts, the Court found violations of:

• ORPC 8.2(a): false or recklessly false statements about the integrity or qualifications of judges and public legal officers;
• ORPC 8.4(c): conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation;
• ORPC 8.4(d): conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and
• ORPC 4.4(a): use of means with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden third persons.

F. Substantive Misconduct Across the Twenty Counts

Given the sheer size of the opinion, it is helpful to group the misconduct thematically rather than re‑summarize each count in full.

1. Client‑Related Misconduct (Counts II, XVIII, XIX)

These counts involved Durbin’s handling of individual client matters and illustrate classic violations:

• Competence and Diligence (ORPC 1.1, 1.3).
  • Milstead (Count II): Durbin allowed a personal‑injury suit to be dismissed and re‑filed without communicating with the clients; he used incorrect addresses, failed to inform them of withdrawals and substitutions of counsel, and never discussed damages in depth. The Court rejected his attempt to characterize delays as “beneficial” for limitations purposes.
  • Hirstov (Count XVIII): Durbin accepted a $7,500 check, advised the client to leave the state and “lay low” while warrants were pending, failed to secure a bondsman, and then fired the client. The Court credited the client’s testimony and found an attorney‑client relationship existed despite Durbin’s contrary assertions.
  • Brixey/Lantz (TJB) (Count XIX): Durbin filed an OMMA challenge in the wrong county (Delaware) despite prior experience with venue transfers to Oklahoma County, failed to present evidence at the administrative hearing, and caused a substantial fee award ($31,734.67) against his client and himself.
• Communication and Termination (ORPC 1.4, 1.16(d)).
  • Across these counts, Durbin failed to keep clients reasonably informed, failed to return files, did not provide billing statements or accountings, and did not withdraw promptly when clients terminated him.
• Fees, Conflicts, and Trust Accounts (ORPC 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.15).
  • Durbin accepted large retainers, did not deposit into his IOLTA account, did not earn the fees, and attempted to represent multiple criminal co‑defendants without adequately addressing conflicts.

Taken together, these counts demonstrate serious harm to clients’ legal interests and financial positions, independent of Durbin’s public‑facing speech.

2. Abuse of Litigation and Legal Process (Counts III, V, VI, IX, XII, XIV, XIX)

These counts show Durbin using the legal system as a weapon rather than a forum for good‑faith dispute resolution:

• Frivolous/Vexatious Suits (Count III).
  • Durbin sued his ex‑wife, her family, and neighbors in a civil “conspiracy” action that he privately described as a way to cost them “30 or $40,000” and to “teach them a lesson.” The Court found violations of ORPC 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) and RGDP 1.3, recognizing this as malicious use of the courts.
• Misuse of Recusal and Ex Parte Procedures (Counts V, VI, IX, XII, XIV, XIX).
  • Durbin repeatedly sought recusal of judges without adequate factual or legal basis, sometimes entering an appearance solely to move for recusal, or misrepresenting that recusal motions were pending when they had been withdrawn or denied.
  • He obtained an ex parte TRO in Delaware County by misrepresenting notice to OMMA counsel and then misled the Supreme Court in a petition in error by omitting the fact that he had withdrawn a recusal request.
• Discovery and Subpoena Abuse (Counts V, VI, XIX).
  • Durbin refused to cooperate with legitimate witness interviews in an election contest, issued overbroad subpoenas not signed by the Clerk of Court, and demanded vast troves of records (e.g., from City of Tulsa, state agencies) on compressed timelines, leading to motions to quash that were properly granted.

3. Harassment and Retaliation Related to Grievances (Counts I, IV, V, IX, XV)

Durbin’s pattern of attacking those who filed or might file grievances is central to the Court’s concern about chilling participation in the disciplinary process:

• Rule 5.4 (Retaliation Against Grievance Filers).
  • In Count I, Durbin threatened to bring a libel suit against Malone “by reason of” her grievance and publicly urged people to target her business. The Court invoked RGDP 5.4, designed precisely to protect grievance filers from retaliatory litigation or threats.
  • In other counts, Durbin threatened to file grievances against opposing counsel as a tactical device.
• Rule 5.2 (Duty to Provide Full and Fair Response).
  • On multiple grievances (e.g., Counts IV, V, IX, X, VII, VIII), Durbin responded with generalized assertions of First Amendment and § 1983 rights while refusing to address the specific factual allegations. The Court held this fell short of the requirement of a “full and fair disclosure of all the facts and circumstances” under RGDP Rule 5.2.

4. Disrespect for Courts and Public Institutions (Counts IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XX)

Many counts document a consistent pattern of contemptuous treatment of the judiciary and public institutions:

• Courthouse Misconduct and Disorderly Conduct (Counts IV, V, XV, XX).
  • Yelling accusations at judges in hallways, prompting judges to leave the bench to restore order;
  • Bellowing profanity in court clerk offices and passport areas, in front of families and children;
  • A criminal conviction for disturbing the peace based on an incident at the Tulsa County Court Clerk’s office, leading to the separate Rule 7 proceeding.
• Harassment During “Audits” and Open Records Requests (Counts VII, VIII, X, XX).
  • Durbin conducted “First Amendment” and Open‑Records “audits” at state agencies, city halls, county courthouses, and DA offices; when employees followed lawful procedures or asked him to wait, he responded with obscene insults, accusations of misdemeanors, and threats of “citizens’ arrests.”
  • These activities forced institutions to alter security procedures, consume law‑enforcement resources, and endure waves of harassment from Durbin’s online followers.
• False Attacks on Judicial Integrity (Counts IV, IX, XIV, XVI, XVII, XIX).
  • Durbin’s repeated claims that judges were “corrupt,” “felons,” “bought off,” destroying court records, driving drunk with minors, or taking bribes were completely unsupported in the record.
  • He did not present any of the supposed “videos” to the PRT, and his attempts to rely on confidential submissions to the Council on Judicial Complaints were rejected as improper and non‑record material.

5. Practicing or Holding Himself Out While Suspended (Count XX)

After his interim suspension, Durbin continued to hold himself out on YouTube as an attorney, listing his bar status and admissions to federal courts while conducting public “audits.” The Court found this violated ORPC Rule 5.5(b)(2), which forbids a lawyer who is not admitted or who is suspended from holding himself out as authorized to practice law.

G. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. ORPC vs. RGDP: Two Overlapping Regulatory Schemes

• Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC). Substantive ethical rules governing how lawyers must act in representing clients, dealing with courts, and interacting with others (e.g., competence, confidentiality, honesty, trial publicity).
• Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP). Procedural rules governing how grievances are processed, how complaints are investigated and tried, and what sanctions and cost allocations apply. They also contain a few substantive duties (e.g., RGDP 1.3 on acts “bringing discredit” to the profession, 5.2 on duty to respond to grievances, 5.4 on retaliation against grievance filers, 6.16 on costs, 8 on resignations).

2. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

The OBA bears the burden to prove misconduct by “clear and convincing evidence” — a standard higher than “preponderance” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It means the evidence must produce a firm belief or conviction that the alleged misconduct occurred.

3. “Actual Malice” vs. “Reckless Disregard” in Discipline

• In defamation cases involving public officials, “actual malice” means the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth, and the burden rests on the plaintiff official.
• In attorney discipline, courts ask whether a reasonable attorney, in light of professional duties and access to information, had any adequate factual basis for statements about judges or legal officers. The focus is on protecting the justice system, not on compensating an individual for reputational harm.

4. Anti‑SLAPP/OCPA

Anti‑SLAPP statutes like the OCPA protect individuals from retaliatory lawsuits filed to chill speech or petitioning activity. They typically apply to “legal actions” in civil courts, enabling early dismissal and fee‑shifting. The Court made clear that such statutes do not constrain the Supreme Court’s constitutional disciplinary jurisdiction over lawyers.

5. Rule 5.2 and 5.4: Responding to Grievances

• Rule 5.2. A lawyer must file a written response to a grievance containing “a full and fair disclosure of all the facts and circumstances” of the alleged misconduct, unless withholding information is based on explicit constitutional grounds. Evasive, conclusory, or purely rhetorical responses can themselves be grounds for discipline.
• Rule 5.4. Protects those who file grievances by making it misconduct for a lawyer to file or threaten lawsuits “by reason of” such filings. This prevents chilling the reporting of professional misconduct.

6. Non‑Public Forums and Time, Place, Manner Restrictions

Courthouses, clerk offices, and similar government buildings are often “nonpublic forums.” Government can impose reasonable, viewpoint‑neutral rules there (e.g., no recording devices, no loud demonstrations) to protect proceedings and public access. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must respect those rules even while asserting robust free‑speech rights in more appropriate venues.

H. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Oklahoma Lawyers

The decision is a strong signal that:

• First Amendment arguments will not insulate attorneys who:
  • Knowingly or recklessly broadcast false accusations of criminality or corruption against judges and legal officers;
  • Harass public employees while misusing the Open Records Act or citizen’s arrest concepts; or
  • Exploit litigation tools (recusal motions, ex parte TROs, vexatious suits) primarily to inflict harm or gain leverage.
• Attorneys engaging in “activist” or “audit”‑style social‑media campaigns must calibrate their conduct to professional standards of honesty, civility, and respect for legal processes.
• Failure to participate in the PRT hearing — as Durbin did by walking out and then abstaining from all eight days — virtually forecloses factual defenses later; new facts cannot be introduced for the first time in Supreme Court briefs.

2. For Bar Counsel and the PRT

The opinion provides practical guidance on charging and proving disciplinary violations:

• Where speech is at issue, the OBA must:
  • Identify the exact statements and context;
  • Plead and prove the precise rule elements (e.g., “no substantial purpose” under Rule 4.4(a), “imminent and materially prejudicial effect” under Rule 3.6); and
  • Distinguish political rhetoric from factual assertions.
• Simply labeling conduct “defamatory” or “harassing” is insufficient; the Court expects detailed evidentiary records (videos, transcripts, dockets, orders) to support each alleged violation.

3. For Judges and Public Officials

The ruling reassures judges and public servants that:

• They need not tolerate baseless public accusations of criminality or corruption from members of the Bar; such conduct can and will be disciplined.
• However, legitimate and even rough‑edged criticism of public policy, legislation, or prosecutorial decisions remains protected.
• Courts may enforce no‑recording rules and decorum standards in and near courtrooms, and may rely on the OBA to address lawyers who undermine those rules through social‑media grandstanding.

4. On Anti‑SLAPP and Regulatory Immunity

By holding that the OCPA does not apply to disciplinary proceedings, the Court ensures that:

• Lawyers cannot recast bar prosecutions as “legal actions” designed to chill their speech;
• The Court’s constitutional role in regulating the profession remains unimpaired by later‑enacted procedural statutes.

This may be a persuasive model for other jurisdictions grappling with the relationship between anti‑SLAPP laws and professional regulation.

IV. Conclusion

State ex rel. OBA v. Durbin is a comprehensive reaffirmation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s authority over the legal profession and a detailed roadmap for the intersection of attorney speech, activism, and ethical duties in the digital age.

The decision establishes — or clarifies — several important principles:

• Resignations pending discipline under RGDP Rule 8 must strictly comply with rule requirements; conditional, self‑protective resignations are ineffective absent Court approval.
• The OCPA (anti‑SLAPP statute) does not apply to bar disciplinary proceedings; such proceedings are governed exclusively by the Supreme Court’s constitutional authority and the RGDP.
• Attorneys retain substantial free‑speech rights, including the right to harshly criticize government and the judiciary, but those rights are limited by:
  • Duties not to knowingly or recklessly make false statements about judges and legal officers;
  • Duties to avoid conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and
  • Respect for the rights and dignity of third persons.
• Respondents bear a procedural burden to assert defenses and due‑process objections in the manner and at the time prescribed by the RGDP and PRT rules; failure to do so will often bar later consideration.
• Persistent misuse of lawsuits, recusal motions, and public “audits” as tools of intimidation or personal vendetta, combined with neglect of client matters, may warrant the profession’s ultimate sanction: disbarment.

In the end, the Court’s message is that the privileges of law practice — including the megaphone lawyers often wield in public debate — come with corresponding responsibilities. When those responsibilities are repeatedly and flagrantly breached, especially in ways that undermine public confidence in the courts and endanger clients and public servants, the disciplinary system will respond decisively. Durbin thus stands as a leading Oklahoma precedent on the modern boundaries of attorney speech and the robust reach of professional discipline.