State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana County Jail: Clarifying Statutory Damages, Agency, and Contempt in Ohio Public Records Litigation

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana County Jail, 2025-Ohio-5280, is a significant follow-up to its earlier 2024 opinion in the same matter. While the first decision granted a limited writ of mandamus compelling the Columbiana County Sheriff’s Office to obtain certain jail records from private contractors, this second opinion addresses two distinct issues:

• whether the relator, an incarcerated requester, is entitled to statutory damages under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43; and
• whether the sheriff should be held in contempt and sanctioned for alleged noncompliance with the court’s limited writ.

Relator Terry Brown, an inmate at Belmont Correctional Institution, sought records relating to the Columbiana County Jail’s intake and booking policies, personnel, and records-retention policies. The jail is operated under contracts with private administrators—Correctional Solutions Group, L.L.C. (“CSG”) and Community Education Centers, Inc./GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”). Brown initially obtained a limited writ ordering the sheriff to obtain specified records from these private entities and to certify nonexistence if records could not be found.

After the sheriff filed a notice of compliance, Brown moved for contempt and sanctions and also sought statutory damages. The majority opinion (DeWine, J.) denies both statutory damages and contempt. Justice Brunner concurs in part and dissents in part, agreeing that contempt is unwarranted but arguing that Brown should receive statutory damages.

The decision clarifies:

• the evidentiary burden for statutory damages, particularly when requests are transmitted by a third party or by non-qualifying means such as fax;
• the unresolved status of non-attorney “agents” transmitting requests on behalf of others;
• the standards governing contempt for noncompliance with a public-records writ where third-party contractors hold the records; and
• the continuing role of the quasi-agency doctrine in accessing records in the hands of private contractors, even as the court expresses skepticism about suing only the public office rather than the contractor directly.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

In Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail, 2024-Ohio-4969, the court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Corrections Division of the Columbiana County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Brian McLaughlin (“the sheriff”) to:

• produce specific requested records to Brown; or
• certify that such records do not exist.

The court required the sheriff to seek and obtain records from CSG and GEO, the private jail operators, under a quasi-agency theory of public-records jurisdiction. It specifically deferred ruling on statutory damages until the sheriff complied with the writ.

After the sheriff filed a notice of compliance, Brown responded with:

• a motion, later amended, for contempt and sanctions, alleging noncompliance; and
• a request for statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C).

B. Holding

The court holds:

1. Statutory damages denied. Brown failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he transmitted his public-records requests in one of the statutorily qualifying ways (hand delivery, certified mail, or electronic submission) such that statutory damages are available.
2. Contempt and sanctions denied. Brown did not show that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted the court’s limited writ, as required for contempt under R.C. 2705.02(A).

C. Key Doctrinal Points

• Transmission requirement for statutory damages: Even when a requester ultimately receives some records after litigation, statutory damages are not automatic. The requester bears the burden to prove proper transmission by a qualifying method.
• Fax is not a qualifying method: Requests faxed to a public office do not support statutory damages.
• Third-party email and agency: The court declines to decide whether a requester can obtain statutory damages when a non-attorney agent emails the request, but holds that Brown failed to prove that the friend who emailed his request was in fact his authorized agent.
• Contempt standard: A public office is not in contempt where it has made good-faith efforts to comply with a limited writ ordering it to obtain records from private contractors, even if the contractors decline to produce certain categories of records or state that none exist.

III. Legal and Factual Background

A. The Underlying Public-Records Requests

Brown’s August 2023 requests to the sheriff concerned:

1. Policy records – policies on inmate intake and booking procedures, including specific policy-related “information” about:
   • lost, stolen, or misplaced inmate records;
   • drug testing and toxicity testing for impaired inmates; and
   • mental health and psychiatric evaluation processes at booking.
2. Personnel records – records about jail personnel for a specific historical period (January 1, 2017, to July 1, 2018).
3. Retention policies – records-retention schedules and related policies, including for jail activity logs.

He claims that:

• he tried hand delivery but was refused;
• he attempted certified mail, which was returned as undeliverable; and
• he ultimately submitted the requests by fax.

Separately, a third party, Christine Serna, emailed the requests to the sheriff and averred in an affidavit that she acted with “Power of Attorney and ‘Agent Status’ for Terry Brown.”

B. The Private Jail Administrators

Columbiana County contracts with:

• GEO, which operated the jail from 2014 to approximately 2019; and
• CSG, which began operating the jail in January 2022.

In the earlier phase of the case, the sheriff had responded that many of the requested records were not in his possession but instead were maintained by CSG (or, for earlier years, GEO), and thus Brown should direct his requests to those companies. Brown instead filed a mandamus action against the sheriff and the “Columbiana County Jail.” The court dismissed the jail as a non-entity but granted a limited writ against the sheriff.

C. The Limited Writ (2024 Decision) and Quasi-Agency

In Brown, 2024-Ohio-4969, the court declined to treat CSG and GEO as defendants because Brown did not sue them and had not made direct public-records requests to them. The court also found that its functional-equivalency line of cases (making certain private entities directly subject to the Public Records Act) did not apply, because the private contractors were not parties.

Instead, the court invoked a quasi-agency doctrine derived from State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio St.3d 37 (1990), holding that:

Records held by a private entity can be within the “jurisdiction” of a public office when they are created and maintained to carry out the public office’s duties and where the public office can monitor performance and access the records.

On that basis, the court ordered the sheriff to:

• request and obtain relevant records from CSG and GEO; or
• certify that such records do not exist.

Importantly, the court did not require that the sheriff maintain control over CSG or GEO for quasi-agency to apply; it was enough that the entities were performing a “delegated public duty.”

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Public Records Act and Private Entities

• R.C. 149.43 (Ohio Public Records Act): establishes the right of any person to inspect and obtain copies of public records, defines “public record,” and sets forth procedures and remedies, including statutory damages.
• State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 2006-Ohio-4854:
  • Establishes a strong presumption that private entities are not “public offices” subject to the Act.
  • Creates an exception where a private entity is the functional equivalent of a public office.
• State ex rel. Harm Reduction Ohio v. OneOhio Recovery Found., 2023-Ohio-1547:
  • Applies the functional-equivalency test to a private foundation, holding it subject to the Public Records Act.
  • Confirms that when a private entity is a functional equivalent of a public office, a requester may sue it directly in mandamus for access to records.
• State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio St.3d 37 (1990):
  • Articulates the quasi-agency test used in the earlier phase of this case.
  • Holds that records in the possession of a private entity can be deemed public records if:
    1. the private entity prepared the records to carry out the public office’s responsibilities;
    2. the public office can monitor the private entity’s performance; and
    3. the public office has access to the records for that purpose.
  • Also emphasizes, in construing R.C. 149.43(C), that a requester may sue either the public office or the person responsible for the records—a point later stressed in Justice Brunner’s opinion.
• State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2021-Ohio-1176:
  • Confirms and applies the quasi-agency concept, requiring a public office to obtain records held by a private entity performing delegated public functions.
  • Forms the doctrinal backbone for the limited writ issued in the earlier Brown decision.

B. Statutory Damages and Methods of Transmission

• R.C. 149.43(C)(2)–(3) (pre–April 9, 2025 version):
  • A requester may be entitled to statutory damages if a public office fails to comply with its obligations under the Public Records Act.
  • To be eligible, the request must be transmitted by:
    • hand delivery,
    • certified mail, or
    • electronic submission (e.g., email, and in some circumstances, web-based portals) as specified in the statute.
  • Effective April 9, 2025, R.C. 149.43 was amended (2024 Sub.H.B. No. 265) to bar statutory damages for persons committed to the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, but the court applies the pre-amendment version to Brown’s case.
• State ex rel. Grim v. New Holland, 2024-Ohio-4822:
  • Holds that the requester bears the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, entitlement to statutory damages.
• State ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., 2023-Ohio-1177:
  • Holds that faxed public-records requests do not qualify for statutory damages.
• State ex rel. Brinkman v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-5063:
  • Holds that a requester is eligible for statutory damages when his attorney submits public-records requests by email on his behalf.
  • Demonstrates that attorney-transmitted electronic requests are treated as requests by the client for statutory-damages purposes.

C. Scope of Requests: Information vs Records

• State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 2006-Ohio-6365:
  • Clarifies that the Public Records Act provides a right to records, not general “information.”
  • “Requests for information…are improper requests under R.C. 149.43.”
• State ex rel. Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 1997-Ohio-104:
  • Holds that a request framed only as a demand for “information” rather than specific records is not a proper public-records request.

D. Contempt Statute and Agency Law

• R.C. 2705.02(A):
  • Defines contempt to include “[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ.”
  • Provides the statutory basis for sanctions such as fines or imprisonment for contempt of court orders.
• Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (referenced by the majority):
  • Defines “disobedience” as refusal or negligence in obeying a command.
  • Guides the court’s analysis of whether the sheriff’s conduct qualifies as “disobedience.”
• Turner v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2020-Ohio-248 (10th Dist. App.) (cited by Justice Brunner):
  • Notes that an agency relationship can be implied; written documentation is not always required to establish agency authority.
  • Supports Brunner’s criticism of the majority’s apparent insistence on documentary proof of power of attorney or written authorization.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Statutory Damages: Transmission and Proof

1. Brown’s Methods of Transmission

Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2), to even be eligible for statutory damages, a requester must show that his request was transmitted by:

• hand delivery to the public office; or
• certified mail; or
• electronic submission (e.g., email).

Brown relied on three methods:

1. Attempted hand delivery to the sheriff (allegedly refused).
2. Certified mail to the Columbiana County Jail, returned undeliverable.
3. Fax to the sheriff.
4. Email submitted by Serna, claiming to act as Brown’s agent.

2. Hand Delivery and Certified Mail: “Successful” Transmission

The majority holds that Brown did not carry his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, successful transmission by hand delivery or certified mail:

• Brown’s affidavit asserts that he “attempted” hand delivery but was refused. He does not identify:
  • who refused the hand delivery; or
  • how, as an incarcerated person at Belmont Correctional Institution, he could have personally accomplished hand delivery to the sheriff in Columbiana County.
• The certified-mail attempt was provably unsuccessful: the mailing was returned as “not deliverable as addressed.”

Because R.C. 149.43(C) contemplates actual delivery of the request by a specified method, not merely an attempt, the court concludes that Brown fails to prove successful transmission under either hand delivery or certified mail.

3. Faxed Requests: Categorical Exclusion

Brown faxed the requests to the sheriff, but under Sultaana, faxed requests do not qualify for statutory damages. The majority applies this rule directly: fax submission cannot serve as the predicate for statutory damages.

4. Email by a Non-Attorney “Agent”

Serna submitted the public-records requests to the sheriff by email, stating in her affidavit that she acted with “Power of Attorney and ‘Agent Status’ for Terry Brown.” Brown argued that this satisfied the electronic-submission requirement.

The majority’s analysis proceeds in two steps:

1. Unresolved legal question. The court notes it has never squarely addressed whether a requester can obtain statutory damages when his non-attorney agent (rather than the requester himself or his licensed attorney) transmits the email request. By contrast, Brinkman held that an attorney-sent email request qualifies the client for statutory damages.
2. No clear and convincing evidence of agency. The majority finds it unnecessary to answer that broader question because Brown did not sufficiently prove that Serna was in fact his agent:
   • Brown provided no documentation of any executed power of attorney.
   • Serna is not an attorney and does not claim to be licensed to practice law.
   • Her statement that she acted “with Power of Attorney and ‘Agent Status’” is characterized as a conclusory assertion, insufficient to meet the clear-and-convincing standard.

Accordingly, the court holds:

“Serna’s conclusory statement that she was acting ‘with Power of Attorney and “Agent Status” for Terry Brown’ is not clear and convincing evidence that Brown executed a power of attorney authorizing her as his agent.”

Because Brown fails to prove any qualifying transmission method, the court denies statutory damages altogether.

B. Contempt and Sanctions: Disobedience and Resistance

Brown sought to hold the sheriff in contempt under R.C. 2705.02(A) for:

• alleged failures to produce policy records (requests 4, 5, 11, 12);
• incomplete or missing personnel records (requests 1, 2, 6, 7); and
• failure to provide a records-retention schedule specific to the jail.

The court’s contempt analysis emphasizes two key points:

1. The sheriff’s obligation is limited by the court’s writ. The writ required the sheriff to:
   • request records from CSG and GEO; and
   • provide Brown with the records obtained or certify nonexistence.
   It did not empower the sheriff to compel CSG or GEO to maintain or create records, nor to override their determinations about nonexistence or overbreadth.
2. Contempt requires “disobedience” or “resistance.” Relying on dictionary definitions, the court distinguishes:
   • Disobedience – refusal or negligent failure to obey a command.
   • Resistance – active opposition to execution of a command.

The court finds that the sheriff:

• complied with the writ by:
  • promptly requesting records from both CSG and GEO;
  • forwarding whatever records those companies provided; and
  • conveying their representations as to overbreadth or nonexistence.
• did not obstruct or undermine Brown’s ability to narrow or clarify his requests; indeed, the sheriff:
  • transmitted CSG’s invitation to Brown to “be more specific” about the policy requests; and
  • affirmatively invited Brown to “discuss the outstanding records being sought” with the sheriff.

Any alleged gaps in the production stem, in the court’s view, from:

• the vagueness or scope of Brown’s requests; or
• the limitations asserted by CSG and GEO (e.g., that they had no statistical data, that they had no responsive personnel documents, or that no separate jail-specific retention schedule exists).

Because these are not actions of the sheriff in “disobedience” or “resistance” to the writ, the court finds no basis for contempt.

1. Policy-Records Requests (Nos. 4, 5, 11, 12)

• Request No. 5 (“statistics on how often inmate case files or medical records are lost, stolen, or misplaced”):
  • CSG responded that it was “not in possession of any statistical data you have requested.”
  • The majority notes that even if individual incidents of lost or misplaced files occurred, this does not prove the existence of a statistical dataset; thus, the sheriff did not defy the writ by forwarding CSG’s statement of nonexistence.
• Requests Nos. 4, 11, 12 (policy information on lost records; drug testing; mental-health evaluation):
  • CSG labeled these requests “overly broad” and invited Brown to specify more precisely the documents he sought.
  • CSG also stated that it was not required to “create information or documents that do not exist.”
  • The sheriff relayed this to Brown and further invited Brown to refine his requests.
  • Brown did not narrow or clarify, but instead moved for contempt.

The majority underscores that:

“True, CSG didn’t provide records that the sheriff asked it to provide. But any fault for that…lies with CSG, not the sheriff.”

Thus, the sheriff neither disobeyed nor resisted the writ as to policy records.

2. Personnel-Records Requests (Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7)

• Requests Nos. 1, 6, 7:
  • GEO responded that it had no responsive records.
  • The sheriff forwarded GEO’s letter to Brown, thereby complying with the requirement to “obtain records or certify nonexistence” as communicated by the contractor.
• Request No. 2:
  • GEO did provide some personnel records, which the sheriff transmitted to Brown.
  • Brown alleged that some temporary employee names and positions were omitted, suggesting incomplete production.
  • The majority notes:
    • Neither Brown nor the sheriff filed these documents in the Supreme Court record, making it impossible to assess the alleged omissions.
    • Any alleged omission is at best attributable to GEO, not the sheriff.

Again, the sheriff’s actions fit the court’s understanding of full compliance, not contemptuous resistance.

3. Records-Retention Schedule

Brown argued that he did not receive a “records-retention schedule for the Columbiana County Jail,” distinct from the sheriff’s office schedule.

The sheriff replied:

• he has provided the only retention schedule he maintains, a seven-page document covering both sheriff’s office and jail records, including the daily jail activity log; and
• no separate jail-only retention schedule exists.

Finding nothing in the record to contradict this, the court concludes that the sheriff complied with the writ. There is no contempt.

VI. Justice Brunner’s Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part

A. Agreement on Contempt

Justice Brunner agrees that the sheriff complied with the limited writ and that contempt is unwarranted. She sees no basis to revisit the reasoning of the previous decision granting the writ under quasi-agency.

B. Critique of Majority’s Characterization of the Earlier Writ

Brunner resists the majority’s suggestion that Brown could or should have sued CSG and GEO directly:

• She notes that private contractors in correctional settings often resist being characterized as public offices or as subject to the Public Records Act, citing recent litigation where private vendors have moved to dismiss on those grounds (e.g., Ware v. Pierce; pending motions by Aramark, Trinity Services Group, and Securus Technologies).
• Under Mazzaro and R.C. 149.43(C), a mandamus action may be filed against either:
  • the public office (here, the sheriff’s office); or
  • the person responsible for public records (here, arguably CSG and GEO).
• She stresses that Brown’s choice to sue only the sheriff’s office was lawful and effective; indeed, he prevailed in obtaining a limited writ.

In her view, it is "unnecessary and overly critical" for the majority to revisit and implicitly fault Brown’s litigation choices.

C. Statutory Damages: Agency and Evidence

Justice Brunner strongly disagrees with the majority’s denial of statutory damages. Her key points:

1. Delivery by email is established.
   • Brown’s affidavit states that, after other methods failed, the requests were submitted by fax and by email.
   • Serna’s affidavit confirms that she emailed two public-records requests on Brown’s behalf to the sheriff’s office.
   • These sworn statements, taken together, are sufficient to prove that the requests were delivered by email, satisfying the transmission requirement of R.C. 149.43(C)(3).
2. No dispute by the sheriff’s office.
   • The sheriff did not oppose damages on the ground that email transmission was defective or that Serna lacked authority; rather, the sheriff’s argument focused on a purported good-faith belief about not having to obtain records from private contractors.
   • In Brunner’s view, the majority raises an issue—non-attorney agency—that was never argued by the respondents, and then decides it against Brown without necessity.
3. Agency can be implied.
   • Citing Turner v. Univ. of Cincinnati, Brunner notes that an agency relationship does not always require written documentation.
   • Serna and Brown are both laypersons; Serna’s reference to “Power of Attorney and ‘Agent Status’” should be read as a lay description of her authority to send the email at Brown’s request.
   • Requiring formal, documentary proof of a power of attorney in this context is, in her view, an unwarranted evidentiary hurdle not supported by R.C. 149.43.
4. Good-faith reduction of damages rejected.
   • Under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a), statutory damages may be reduced if, based on existing law, a well-informed public office could reasonably believe its conduct complied with the statute.
   • The sheriff’s office claims that it in good faith believed it did not need to obtain records from the private jail administrators and could instead direct Brown to request them directly.
   • Brunner points out that Armatas (2021) had already held that a public office must obtain records from a private contractor in a quasi-agency relationship, and the court awarded damages there. Thus, the sheriff’s position was not “reasonable” under existing law.
   • On that basis, she would award Brown $1,000 in statutory damages, the maximum allowed, without reduction for good faith.

Brunner concludes that the majority’s denial of damages is premised on an “illusory and unnecessary inquiry” into Serna’s agency status and adds a requirement—documentary proof of power of attorney—that is not rooted in statute or precedent.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a government officer or agency to do something the law clearly requires it to do. In the public-records context, mandamus is the primary vehicle for forcing compliance with the Public Records Act when a public office fails to produce requested records.

B. Statutory Damages under the Public Records Act

Statutory damages are a set amount of money made available by statute, not based on actual monetary loss. Under R.C. 149.43(C):

• They are designed to encourage compliance with the Public Records Act and compensate requesters for delay or wrongful denial of records.
• However, they are only available if:
  • the request was delivered via a qualifying method (hand delivery, certified mail, electronic submission); and
  • the public office failed to comply with certain statutory obligations.
• As of April 9, 2025, inmates in state custody are no longer eligible for statutory damages, though this change does not retroactively affect Brown’s case.

C. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a standard of proof higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires evidence that produces a firm belief or conviction in the factfinder’s mind about the facts to be proven.

Here, Brown had to present clear and convincing evidence that he transmitted the request by a qualifying method. The majority found his evidence (particularly regarding hand delivery, certified mail, and Serna’s agency) insufficient at that elevated standard.

D. Quasi-Agency vs. Functional Equivalency

• Functional Equivalency:
  • Asks whether a nominally private entity functions so much like a public office (e.g., in governance, funding, purpose, and level of public control) that it should itself be treated as a “public office” directly subject to the Public Records Act.
  • If so, requesters can sue the private entity directly.
• Quasi-Agency:
  • Does not make the private entity a public office.
  • Instead, treats certain records in the contractor’s possession as being within the “jurisdiction” of the public office for purposes of public-records disclosure when:
    1. they were prepared to carry out the public office’s duties,
    2. the public office can monitor performance, and
    3. the public office has access to the records.
  • The public office remains the mandamus respondent, but must obtain and produce records from the contractor where these elements are met.

E. Contempt of Court

Contempt is a court’s power to punish conduct that disobeys or obstructs its orders. Under R.C. 2705.02(A), contempt includes:

• Disobedience – a refusal or negligent failure to do what a court order requires (e.g., ignoring a court-ordered obligation).
• Resistance – actively opposing or hindering enforcement of the order (e.g., undermining or obstructing compliance).

In this case, the sheriff promptly requested documents from CSG and GEO, forwarded what he received, and transmitted their explanations of nonexistence or overbreadth. The court found no evidence that he refused to comply or actively obstructed compliance with the writ.

F. Requests for “Information” vs. Requests for “Records”

The Public Records Act guarantees access to records, not to general “information.” A proper request should describe records—documents, files, emails, logs, policies—rather than ask generalized questions.

The court notes (in a footnote) that Brown's wording (“policy information” on various topics) might be viewed as an improper request for information rather than records, but it declines to decide the issue because the sheriff did not raise it.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Incarcerated Requesters and Statutory Damages

This case is a transitional decision, important both for how it applies the pre-2025 statutory regime and for what it implies going forward:

• It underscores that imprisoned requesters must strictly satisfy procedural prerequisites to preserve statutory-damages claims, including:
  • ensuring successful delivery by a qualifying method; and
  • maintaining documentary or testimonial proof sufficient to meet the clear-and-convincing standard.
• However, after April 9, 2025, R.C. 149.43 bars statutory damages to persons committed to ODRC custody, making the transmission issues litigated here largely academic for future inmate-requesters (though they can still obtain records and possibly court costs or other relief).

B. For Use of Agents and Third-Party Intermediaries

The decision leaves unresolved but fraught questions about using non-attorney agents to submit requests:

• The majority avoids deciding whether statutory damages are available when a non-attorney agent emails a request on a requester’s behalf.
• It signals that conclusory statements in an affidavit about “Power of Attorney” or “agent status” will not, by themselves, suffice; more concrete evidence of authorization may be needed to meet the clear-and-convincing standard.
• Justice Brunner’s dissent suggests a more flexible, pragmatic approach: testimony that a friend was authorized to send the email may be enough, especially if unchallenged by the public office.

For practitioners and requesters:

• If possible, submit requests personally by email or certified mail, or through a licensed attorney.
• If relying on a non-attorney intermediary, consider:
  • executing a short written authorization; and
  • keeping documentation showing that the intermediary acted at the requester’s direction.

C. For Public Offices Working with Private Contractors

The opinion reinforces and clarifies obligations of public offices that outsource operations:

• Public offices must request records from private contractors when a quasi-agency relationship exists.
• However, they will generally not be held in contempt for the contractor’s refusal or limitations, so long as they:
  • make timely requests to the contractor;
  • forward all responsive records received; and
  • communicate to the requester any statements from the contractor regarding overbreadth or nonexistence.

This creates a practical division of responsibility:

• The public office must act diligently and transparently; and
• The private contractor bears responsibility (doctrinally and practically) for any underproduction, although the contractor may not be directly before the court unless separately sued or deemed a functional equivalent of a public office.

D. Contempt as an Enforcement Tool in Public-Records Cases

The court’s rigorous definition of “disobedience” and “resistance” somewhat narrows the use of contempt as an enforcement mechanism against public offices that rely on private contractors:

• Even where records remain missing or incomplete, contempt will not lie if the public office has:
  • taken reasonable steps to comply;
  • documented those efforts; and
  • not obstructed or delayed production.
• Requesters facing nonresponsive contractors may need to:
  • directly sue the contractor (if it is or may be a functional equivalent of a public office); or
  • seek expansion of the writ to bring the contractor into the case where legally possible.

E. Internal Division on Statutory Damages Standards

The sharp disagreement between the majority and Justice Brunner highlights a doctrinal tension:

• How strictly should courts enforce technical prerequisites (like documentary proof of agency) for statutory damages?
• To what extent should courts infer agency or rely on uncontradicted affidavits from laypersons?

Future cases may need to address squarely:

• whether non-attorney agents can trigger statutory damages when they email a request on another’s behalf; and
• what type and quantum of evidence is necessary to show an agency relationship for this purpose.

IX. Conclusion

State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana County Jail, 2025-Ohio-5280, consolidates and extends several important strands of Ohio public-records law:

• It confirms that statutory damages are never automatic; requesters must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that their requests were delivered by one of the specified methods in R.C. 149.43(C).
• It reiterates that faxed requests do not qualify for statutory damages and emphasizes the need for robust evidentiary support when requests are transmitted via intermediaries.
• It clarifies that public offices that rely on private contractors may be obligated to seek records from those contractors under quasi-agency principles, but will not necessarily face contempt if the contractors do not comply, provided the public office has obeyed the court’s writ in good faith.
• It underscores the ongoing complexity of public-records enforcement in a landscape increasingly populated by private vendors and jail/prison contractors, where lines of responsibility are often contested.

Justice Brunner’s separate opinion underscores a countervailing policy concern: that rigid, technical applications of statutory prerequisites and evidentiary standards may unduly limit the remedial force of the Public Records Act, especially for incarcerated and pro se requesters. She would have awarded Brown $1,000 in statutory damages, finding that existing quasi-agency caselaw gave the sheriff fair notice of his duties and that Brown’s affidavits sufficed to show valid email transmission.

Overall, Brown refines Ohio’s law on statutory damages and contempt in public-records litigation, particularly in the context of privatized correctional operations and third-party intermediaries. For public offices, it highlights the importance of prompt, documented efforts to obtain records from contractors and clear communication with requesters. For requesters and practitioners, it reinforces the need for careful attention to method of delivery, documentation of transmission and agency, and strategic consideration of whether and when to bring private entities directly into public-records litigation.