New Idaho Rule: Courts May Not Raise Res Judicata Sua Sponte, and Rule 12(b)(1) “Mootness” Dismissals Cannot Decide Intertwined Merits—Especially Where a Restrictive Easement Leaves Effectual Relief Available

1. Introduction

Case: Stasiewicz v. South Henry’s Lake Outlet Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. (appeal involving Henry’s Lake Village, LLC (“HLV”))
Court: Supreme Court of Idaho
Date: January 6, 2026

The dispute arose among neighboring landowners in Fremont County over access rights along two private roads—Bootjack Drive (connecting to U.S. Highway 20) and its spur, Whitetail Lane—in the Henry’s Lake area. Edward and Barbara Stasiewicz owned an 80-acre landlocked parcel and, along with other HOA-related owners, sued HLV and others seeking declarations of express, implied, and prescriptive easements.

During the conflict, HLV granted the Stasiewiczes easements, including a 2021 Bootjack Drive easement with automatic-termination restrictions (no subdivision; limited use to agricultural/single-family residential). HLV then moved to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the easement claims were moot. The district court ultimately dismissed, finding mootness and also invoking res judicata based on a default judgment in a prior quiet title action against the Stasiewiczes’ predecessors (the “Quiet Title Judgment”)—an issue the district court itself raised and ordered briefed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the dismissal of the Stasiewiczes’ claims, and remanded. It held:

• The district court erred by raising res judicata sua sponte; res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be raised by a party.
• The district court erred by dismissing Bootjack Drive easement claims as moot under Rule 12(b)(1) where doing so required merits determinations and where effectual relief remained possible despite HLV’s restrictive grant.
• The Whitetail Lane access issue was moot because HLV granted an unrestricted Whitetail Lane easement during litigation (the relief sought).
• The court criticized the district court’s handling of evidence: when deciding a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion using declarations, a court must rely on competent, admissible evidence and must address objections rather than “dispensing” with motions to strike to reach the “merits.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Res judicata as an affirmative defense; limits on sua sponte defenses

• First Sec. Corp. v. Belle Ranch, LLC and Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion: reaffirm that res judicata is an affirmative defense and the asserting party bears the burden.
• Monitor Fin., L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Ests., LLC, Elsaesser v. Riverside Farms, Inc., and Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor: supply the framework for claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
• Deon v. H & J, Inc.: the court “takes a dim view” of tribunals raising defenses or theories sua sponte; parties control claims and defenses.
• Van Orden v. Van Orden (citing Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Siler): general rule that a trial court may not raise an unasserted affirmative defense.
• Federal “same-court” exception discussions: Arizona v. California (and cited lower-court examples: Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., Threatt v. Winston, Shurick v. Boeing Co.). Idaho acknowledged the concept but, applying Idaho’s party-presentation principles, refused to let the district court supply the defense for HLV.
• Idaho tort-context parallels: Heitz v. Carroll and Sales v. Peabody reinforced the “party presentation” principle applied in Deon v. H & J, Inc..
• HLV’s attempted support: Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club (quoting Intermountain Food Equip. Co. v. Waller) described the scope of preclusion, but did not authorize courts to raise it sua sponte; the Supreme Court deemed the reliance misplaced.
• “Tried by consent” rejected: I.R.C.P. 15(b)(2) did not apply because an issue is not “tried” by consent absent actual trial litigation; see Fickenwirth v. Lanning and Gestner v. Divine.

B. Justiciability and mootness as jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(1) procedure

• Justiciability baseline: ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Grp., Inc. (citing Davidson v. Wright) and Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd..
• Mootness standard: Frantz v. Osborn and later mootness citations, including Edmondson v. Finco.
• Justiciability challenges proceed via Rule 12(b)(1): Bedke v. Ellsworth (quoting Tucker v. State).
• Facial vs. factual jurisdictional attacks: Emps. Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, Von Lossberg v. State, and persuasive authorities (Davis v. Wells Fargo, Granite Sch. Dist. v. Young, Bleich v. Bleich).
• Courts may consider evidence in factual attacks without converting to summary judgment: Vickers v. Idaho Bd. of Veterinary Med., relying on principles reflected in Titus v. Sullivan and Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co..
• But when jurisdictional questions are intertwined with merits, decision should await merits resolution: Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A. (with Wright & Miller support).
• Burdens: the decision notes both the plaintiff’s burden in factual 12(b)(1) challenges (see Allen v. Campbell) and that the defendant bears the burden to show a once-live case has become moot (see West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency).
• The opinion polices mootness/merits confusion: Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000) and Chafin v. Chafin; plus Dierlam v. Trump and the treatise statement that “moot because plaintiff loses on the merits” is just a merits argument.

C. Evidence and motions to strike in jurisdictional fact-finding

• Evidentiary discretion standard: Herrera v. Estay (citing Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Inv., LLC) and the four-part test from Lunneborg v. My Fun Life.
• Competent/admissible evidence is required for factual 12(b)(1) determinations: cited via Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski.
• Threshold duty to rule on objections: Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc. (in the summary-judgment context) was applied by analogy—objected-to evidence cannot simply be “considered” without addressing admissibility.

D. Easement scope principles relevant to “effectual relief”

• Implied easement by prior use is for “unlimited reasonable use”: Aizpitarte v. Minear (quoting Spectra Site Commc’ns, Inc. v. Lawrence).
• Prescriptive easement scope fixed by historical use: Latvala v. Green Enters., Inc. and Beckstead v. Price, also discussed in Aizpitarte v. Minear.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The district court’s sua sponte res judicata ruling was reversible error

The Supreme Court treated res judicata as what Idaho law says it is: an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the party asserting it. The critical point was not whether res judicata might eventually apply, but who must raise it. By inviting briefing on preclusion after HLV had not asserted it, the district court did what Deon v. H & J, Inc. condemns—supplying a defense for a party and eroding “party presentation.”

The Court acknowledged federal authority recognizing limited circumstances where courts may raise preclusion sua sponte (notably Arizona v. California), but stressed that this initiative is disfavored where the court is effectively substituting itself for the litigant. As in Deon v. H & J, Inc., HLV indisputably knew about the prior judgment (it obtained the default), yet chose not to plead preclusion; it was bound by that choice.

B. Mootness under Rule 12(b)(1) was misapplied to decide merits

The opinion sharply separated mootness (a jurisdictional inquiry into whether the court can still grant effectual relief) from an argument that the plaintiff should lose (a merits determination). The district court’s “mootness” dismissal depended on conclusions about: (i) the effect of the Quiet Title Judgment, (ii) the sufficiency of the record to prove an express easement, and (iii) the supposed inability to obtain broader rights than HLV’s restrictive grant. Those are not jurisdictional facts; they are merits-laden determinations.

The Supreme Court emphasized that, in a factual 12(b)(1) posture, a court may consider evidence, but if resolving jurisdiction requires resolving the substantive merits, the matter should await merits adjudication (the Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A. principle).

C. The district court improperly refused to rule on admissibility objections

The Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion to deny motions to strike simply to “fully consider” all declarations and reach the “merits.” When jurisdictional fact-finding is undertaken under Rule 12(b)(1), it still must be based on competent, admissible evidence; objected-to evidence cannot be treated as usable without ruling on admissibility (citing Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc. by analogy and invoking Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski for the admissibility requirement in jurisdictional fact-finding).

D. Restrictive grants do not moot alternative easement theories where broader relief remains possible

The Court rejected the core practical effect of HLV’s argument: that a defendant can extinguish easement litigation by granting a conditional easement and declaring victory via mootness. The controlling test is whether the court can still grant “any effectual relief whatever.”

• Implied easement (Bootjack Drive): not moot because Idaho law defines the scope of an implied easement by prior use as “unlimited reasonable use” (Aizpitarte v. Minear quoting Spectra Site Commc’ns, Inc. v. Lawrence), and the 2021 Bootjack easement’s automatic-termination provisions could be more restrictive than what a court could decree.
• Prescriptive easement (Bootjack Drive): not moot because, even if its scope were limited to historical uses, it would not include HLV’s “automatic termination” conditions tied to subdivision or use; thus, a judicial decree could still provide meaningful relief by eliminating those conditions.
• Whitetail Lane: moot because the Stasiewiczes already received the relief sought—an unrestricted access easement—so no additional practical relief was available.

3.3 Impact

• Affirmative defenses must be litigant-driven in Idaho: Trial courts are put on notice that res judicata (and by implication other affirmative defenses) generally cannot be introduced by the court to rescue an omitted pleading. This tightens adherence to party presentation, reinforcing Deon v. H & J, Inc. beyond its administrative setting.
• Rule 12(b)(1) becomes a less attractive merits shortcut: Litigants cannot reliably use “mootness” as a vehicle to obtain early merits adjudications on the scope/validity of property rights when effectual relief may still exist.
• Easement litigation strategy shifts: A servient owner’s voluntary grant of an easement during litigation will moot claims only to the extent it actually supplies the relief sought; conditional or narrower grants will not necessarily moot implied/prescriptive theories that could yield broader or more durable rights.
• Evidence policing at the jurisdictional stage: District courts must rule on admissibility challenges when relying on declarations/affidavits to decide factual jurisdictional questions; “considering everything” to reach a result is reversible error.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Subject matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)): the court’s power to hear the type of dispute; if the case is moot, the court lacks power because there is no longer anything meaningful to decide.
• Mootness: the case is over (jurisdictionally) only if the court cannot grant any effective relief. If a ruling could still improve a party’s position (even slightly), it is not moot.
• Facial vs. factual jurisdiction challenges: a facial challenge assumes the complaint’s facts are true; a factual challenge disputes jurisdictional facts and allows limited evidence review—but not to decide merits questions intertwined with the claims.
• Res judicata (claim/issue preclusion): a defense saying “this was already decided” in a prior case; it must be raised by the defendant, not supplied by the judge.
• Express vs. implied vs. prescriptive easements: an express easement is written; an implied easement can arise from prior use when land is divided; a prescriptive easement arises from long, open, adverse use. Their scope rules differ, and they can matter even if some access has been granted.
• Motions to strike declarations: procedural requests to exclude inadmissible statements (e.g., hearsay, conclusory assertions). If the court is relying on declarations to decide a factual jurisdiction issue, it must resolve these objections.

5. Conclusion

Stasiewicz establishes two practical procedural guardrails in Idaho: (1) courts may not sua sponte inject res judicata into a case where the defendant failed to plead it, and (2) “mootness” dismissals under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) cannot be used to decide merits-laden questions—particularly where a defendant’s restrictive, voluntary easement grant still leaves the court able to award broader or more durable relief under implied or prescriptive easement doctrines. The decision reinforces party-driven litigation, tightens jurisdiction-versus-merits boundaries, and demands evidentiary rigor when jurisdictional facts are contested.