StandWithUs v. MIT: First Circuit Harmonizes Title VI with the First Amendment and Rejects a Per Se Equation of Anti‑Zionism with Antisemitism

Introduction

In StandWithUs Center for Legal Justice v. MIT, No. 24‑1800 (1st Cir. Oct. 21, 2025), the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of a high‑profile Title VI suit brought by two MIT students and an advocacy organization alleging that MIT permitted antisemitic harassment by failing to shut down pro‑Palestinian campus protests following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks and throughout the 2023–24 academic year. The plaintiffs also pressed claims under the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 U.S.C. § 1986 via § 1985(3)) and Massachusetts common law.

The decision is a significant articulation of how federal anti‑discrimination law interacts with free‑speech principles in the university setting, especially at private universities. The court:

Reaffirmed that Title VI hostile‑environment liability is constrained by the First Amendment and cannot be used to compel suppression of protected political speech on matters of public concern.
Rejected the theory that anti‑Zionism is, as a matter of law, inherently antisemitic for purposes of Title VI.
Clarified that Title VI requires harassment to be severe, pervasive, objectively offensive, and to cause a systemic deprivation of access to education, with actual knowledge by an appropriate official and deliberate indifference by the institution.
Held that MIT’s graduated response to protests—including policy changes, suspensions, police presence, fencing, warnings, and arrests—was not “clearly unreasonable.”
Rejected § 1985(3)/§ 1986 conspiracy liability because the alleged purpose of the student groups’ coordination was political (divestment/ceasefire) rather than to deprive Jewish or Israeli students of their rights.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit (Judge Kayatta, joined by Judge Gelpí and District Judge Smith) affirmed dismissal on all counts:

Title VI: Most alleged conduct was protected political speech. The limited incidents that were plausibly antisemitic were not severe, pervasive, and systemic; plaintiffs did not allege actual notice to an “appropriate person.” Independently, MIT’s response was not deliberately indifferent.
Ku Klux Klan Act (§ 1986/§ 1985(3)): Plaintiffs failed to plead a conspiracy whose purpose was to deprive Jewish/Israeli students of civil rights; the alleged aims were political (divestment/ceasefire).
State‑law claims: Dismissed without prejudice following dismissal of federal claims.
Leave to amend: No abuse of discretion in denying a one‑sentence, non‑motion request embedded in an opposition brief.

Detailed Analysis

I. Factual background

The complaint alleged a months‑long sequence of campus activism by student groups (including the MIT Coalition Against Apartheid and Palestine@MIT), such as rallies, walkouts, a “die‑in,” hallway disruptions, a targeted protest near offices associated with Israel programs, and a three‑week encampment on Kresge Lawn across from Hillel. Chants included “From the river to the sea” and “intifada,” and social media posts criticized Zionism and Israel’s military actions. Plaintiffs identified a few discrete incidents involving confrontations with Jewish students, doxxing allegations, and one shove of a student recording video.

MIT responded with revised protest policies, warnings and interim suspensions, meeting with Jewish community leaders, a 24‑hour police presence at the encampment, containment fencing, and ultimately arrests when the encampment persisted and vehicular access was blocked. MIT also suspended the Coalition Against Apartheid as a student group after additional violations.

II. The Title VI framework and thresholds

The court applied the well‑established Title IX hostile‑environment standard to Title VI claims (as many circuits do): to recover damages, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that the school was deliberately indifferent to harassment that was “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” and that “effectively barred” access to an educational opportunity. The conduct must be on the basis of race, color, or national origin; the institution must have actual knowledge via an “appropriate person”; and its response must be clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances.

III. First Amendment overlay: Why Title VI cannot compel suppression of protected campus speech

A core feature of the decision is its extended First Amendment analysis. Because plaintiffs’ claims targeted what students said (chants, signs, emails, posts), the court emphasized:

Public‑concern speech receives “special protection” and cannot be suppressed merely because others find it offensive or upsetting (Snyder v. Phelps; Boos v. Barry; Cohen; Street).
Universities occupy a constitutionally salient role in fostering debate (Sweezy; Bakke; Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard), and private schools have First Amendment academic freedom (Asociación de Educación Privada v. García‑Padilla).
Using a federal statute to force suppression of viewpoint‑based political expression would raise acute constitutional problems; the government cannot outsource viewpoint discrimination to private lawsuits or funding conditions (Rosenberger; R.A.V.; Matal; Cox; NRA v. Vullo; Sullivan; Hepps; Gertz; Agency for Int’l Development v. AOSI).
There is no general “harassment exception” to the First Amendment (Rodriguez v. Maricopa; Saxe), and “true threats” were neither alleged nor plausibly pled here (Virginia v. Black).

The court thus framed the dispositive question as whether the alleged conduct was either unprotected speech (e.g., true threats, targeted harassment meeting Title VI’s standard) or sufficiently severe, pervasive, and systemic, coupled with actual knowledge and deliberate indifference. Title VI, the court stressed, cannot be wielded to compel a private university to extinguish protected speech simply because it is political, divisive, or offensive.

IV. Anti‑Zionism is not per se antisemitism for Title VI purposes

Plaintiffs’ central theory was categorical: anti‑Zionist expression is inherently antisemitic and therefore unprotected. The First Circuit rejected that premise. Observing the absence of definitional consensus in dictionaries and scholarship, and noting ongoing public debate (including formal debates) about the relationship between anti‑Zionism and antisemitism, the court declined to interpret Title VI as “arming either side of that debate with the powers of a censor.”

The court also refused to treat the State Department’s definitional guidance as controlling for what speech falls outside First Amendment protection, reiterating that legislatures and agencies cannot create new categories of unprotected speech by definition alone (Brown v. EMA; Stevens). While acknowledging that anti‑Zionism can sometimes be a vehicle for antisemitism, the court rejected any rule that treats all criticism of Israel or Zionism as discriminatory animus.

Importantly, the court would not recharacterize slogans such as “From the river to the sea” or “intifada” as calls for genocide in the absence of factual allegations that the protestors used them with such meaning. Nor would it treat the choice to focus on Israel—rather than other global conflicts—as proof of discriminatory motive; selective political focus is inherent to advocacy (Tinker).

V. Speech versus conduct: Crowd size, disruption, encampment, and location

Plaintiffs also pointed to disruption: chanting in prohibited areas, blocking, and the encampment opposite Hillel. The court viewed these as classic time‑place‑manner issues that do not transform protected political expression into antisemitic harassment. The encampment’s proximity to Hillel did not plausibly show it was chosen because of Hillel rather than because Kresge Lawn is central and suitable for tents. The fact that protestors assembled, held signs, and chanted did not strip their speech of protection (Boos; Claiborne Hardware).

VI. Isolated antisemitic incidents: Short of Title VI’s “systemic” threshold and actual notice

The court acknowledged a handful of troubling, plausibly antisemitic incidents (e.g., blocking a student “because she was Jewish,” a confrontational remark tying a Jewish student to Israel’s actions, heckling someone “visibly Jewish”). But spread over seven months and mostly not directed at the named plaintiffs, these incidents were not “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” so as to “effectively bar” access to education in a “systemic” sense (Davis). Peer harassment is less likely than teacher‑student harassment to meet that threshold.

Equally critical, plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that an “appropriate person” at MIT had actual knowledge of these specific incidents as required for institutional liability (Davis; Grace v. Board of Trustees).

VII. Deliberate indifference: MIT’s response was not “clearly unreasonable”

Even assuming actionable harassment, MIT’s response was not deliberately indifferent. Across months, MIT incrementally tightened policies, met with stakeholders, issued warnings, imposed interim suspensions and group suspension, added a 24‑hour police presence, installed fencing, and ultimately cleared the encampment with arrests after protestors blocked a garage and street. Title VI does not demand perfect results or complainants’ preferred remedies; the question is whether the response was “clearly unreasonable” in light of known circumstances (D.L.; Fitzgerald; Davis). It was not.

VIII. Ku Klux Klan Act (§ 1986 via § 1985(3)): No conspiracy “for the purpose” of rights deprivation

Section 1986 liability is derivative of § 1985(3) conspiracy. The latter requires, among other elements, a conspiratorial purpose to deprive a protected class of equal protection or equal privileges, propelled by class‑based animus (Bray; Aulson). The court assumed arguendo that §§ 1981/1982 rights might be predicates, but found plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that student groups’ “conscious objective” was to impair Jewish or Israeli students’ property or contract rights, or to engage in “racial violence” under the Thirteenth Amendment.

The alleged aims, as reflected in the groups’ own joint statements—divestment, ceasefire, expressing solidarity—were political, not conspiracies to deprive civil rights. Two isolated scuffles were insufficient to infer that violence against Jews was the purpose of the protests.

IX. State‑law claims and leave to amend

After dismissing the federal claims, the court affirmed dismissal without prejudice of the state‑law claims under the usual supplemental‑jurisdiction principles. As to amendment, a one‑line, informal request in an opposition brief is not a Rule 15 motion, and a district court need not address it expressly (Gray v. Evercore; Abiomed). No abuse of discretion occurred.

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education (Title IX hostile environment): supplied the “severe, pervasive, objectively offensive,” “systemic deprivation,” actual knowledge, and deliberate indifference standards that the First Circuit applied by analogy to Title VI.
Porto; D.L. v. Concord (1st Cir.): reinforced the Davis framework and “clearly unreasonable” standard in the school context.
Snyder; Boos; Cohen; Street: anchored the “special protection” for public‑concern speech that is offensive or upsetting.
Sweezy; Bakke; SFFA v. Harvard; García‑Padilla: emphasized academic freedom, including for private educational institutions.
Rosenberger; R.A.V.; Matal; Cox; NRA v. Vullo: condemned viewpoint discrimination and government coercion via private intermediaries; relevant to why Title VI cannot be used to force suppression of disfavored opinions.
Sullivan; Hepps; Gertz: limited civil liability mechanisms that punish unpopular speech, even outside criminal law.
Brown v. EMA; Stevens: rejected legislative creation of new unprotected speech categories; pertinent to agency definitions of antisemitism.
Agency for Int’l Development v. AOSI; Rust: anti‑compelled‑speech principles limit conditions on federal funding that reach outside the funded program.
Claiborne Hardware: protected collective advocacy notwithstanding some members’ excesses; relevant to not imputing unlawful purpose to a political movement writ large.
Virginia v. Black: distinguished intimidation/true threats from core political expression.
Tinker: protected student political expression.
Goodman v. Bowdoin; Doe v. Brown (1st Cir.): underscored need for discriminatory intent for race‑based claims.
Grace v. Board of Trustees (1st Cir.): actual knowledge by an “appropriate person.”
Fitzgerald (1st Cir. 2007); Vance (6th Cir.): reasonableness of school responses; no guarantee of success.
Aulson; Bray; Gattineri: § 1985(3) pleading requirements; “purpose” element; class‑based animus.
Saint Francis; Shaare Tefila; Sinai: Jewish identity as “race” in analogous civil rights statutes; court assumed arguendo similar treatment for Title VI.
Gray v. Evercore; Abiomed: amendment practice; informal requests insufficient.
Rodriguez v. Maricopa; Saxe: no harassment exception to the First Amendment.
Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y. 2025): acknowledged that anti‑Zionist slogans may be probative of antisemitic intent in specific contexts—showing the issue is fact‑sensitive, not categorical.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Got There

Filter one—protected political speech: The court first asked whether the bulk of the challenged conduct was protected expression on a matter of public concern. It was. Title VI cannot be read to compel suppression of such speech without violating core First Amendment and academic freedom principles.
Filter two—antisemitic motive and content: Plaintiffs’ attempt to recharacterize anti‑Zionist speech as inherently antisemitic failed; absent facts showing antisemitic intent or usage, slogans like “From the river to the sea” are not unprotected on their face.
Filter three—Title VI severity, pervasiveness, and systemic deprivation: The few plausibly antisemitic incidents were too isolated to amount to a systemic denial of equal access to education, particularly given their peer‑to‑peer nature.
Filter four—actual knowledge and deliberate indifference: Plaintiffs did not allege that an “appropriate person” at MIT knew of the specific antisemitic incidents; regardless, MIT’s response to the broader unrest was not clearly unreasonable.
§ 1986/§ 1985(3): The complaint failed to plausibly allege a conspiratorial purpose to deprive Jewish/Israeli students of rights; the protestors’ stated goals were political (divestment/ceasefire), not rights‑deprivation.
Supplemental jurisdiction and amendment: With federal claims gone, state claims fell without prejudice; the perfunctory “request to amend” in an opposition brief did not preserve a right to replead.

Impact and Implications

A. For universities (especially private institutions in the First Circuit)

Title VI cannot be used as a blunt instrument to shut down protected political speech—even highly offensive speech—absent unprotected threats or targeted, systemic harassment.
Content‑neutral time, place, and manner rules remain critical. The court endorsed graduated responses that emphasize safety, de‑escalation, and neutral enforcement (warnings, policy revisions, police presence, fencing, targeted discipline, arrests when laws are broken).
Do not equate anti‑Zionist speech with antisemitism as a categorical policy. Treat allegations of antisemitism with individualized, evidence‑based assessment of motive, context, and effect.
Documentation matters: ensure that “appropriate persons” receive and log reports of specific incidents, perpetrators (if known), and steps taken.

B. For students and complainants

To state a Title VI hostile‑environment claim, identify specific incidents targeted “on the ground” of your protected status, show they were severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and explain how they systemically impeded your educational access.
Report incidents to an official with authority to take corrective action; institutional liability hinges on “actual knowledge” by an “appropriate person.”
Political speech that is anti‑Zionist or pro‑Palestinian is not, without more, antisemitic under Title VI.

C. For activists and campus groups

Core political expression—including strong criticism of Israel or advocacy for Palestinian rights—is protected. Avoid true threats, targeted harassment, doxxing, or physically blocking individuals based on protected traits.
Compliance with neutral protest rules reduces institutional justification for intervention and potential discipline.

D. For government regulators and OCR

The decision underscores that federal enforcement of Title VI must respect First Amendment limits; agency definitions of antisemitism cannot expand what constitutes unprotected speech.
OCR investigations should carefully separate protected political expression from actionable harassment and focus on institutional knowledge and response.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hostile environment (Title VI/IX): Liability arises only where harassment based on a protected trait is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a student equal access to education, the institution knows about it, and responds with deliberate indifference.
Deliberate indifference: Not every imperfect response qualifies. The question is whether the school’s actions were “clearly unreasonable” given what it knew at the time. Schools need not adopt complainants’ preferred remedies or guarantee success.
Appropriate person/actual knowledge: Institutional liability requires that an official with authority to correct the harassment actually knew about it—general awareness of unrest is not enough.
Viewpoint discrimination: The government (and by extension a federal statute like Title VI) cannot target speech because of the speaker’s opinion, even if the opinion is offensive.
True threats vs. offensive speech: A true threat is a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence; it is unprotected. Offensive or upsetting political slogans generally remain protected.
§ 1985(3) conspiracy purpose: The “purpose” element requires that depriving a protected class of rights be a conscious objective of the conspiracy, not merely an effect of political advocacy.

Unresolved Questions and Limits

The court did not decide the broader constitutional question of when, if ever, racist speech alone can be punished under Title VI consistent with the First Amendment; it resolved the case on narrower grounds.
The court assumed, without deciding, that violations of §§ 1981 or 1982 could serve as predicates for § 1985(3). Other circuits have expressed skepticism.
The decision does not bar universities from adopting their own (constitutionally and contractually compliant) policies that restrict certain speech; it holds only that Title VI cannot compel suppression of protected speech.
Anti‑Zionist expression can still be evidence of antisemitic intent in a particular context; the court rejected a per se rule but acknowledged context matters.

Practice Pointers

For universities

Calibrate neutral time‑place‑manner rules and enforce them consistently.
Create clear reporting channels to “appropriate persons” and train staff on when knowledge triggers duties.
Document stepwise responses and rationales to show reasonableness.
Separate political content from conduct; discipline conduct violations, not viewpoints.

For complainants

Chronicle dates, places, perpetrators, and how the incidents impeded classes, labs, exams, or campus access.
Give formal notice to officials with corrective authority (e.g., Title VI/IDHR office, deans), and keep records.

For student groups

State political objectives clearly; disclaim violence; avoid targeting individuals by protected traits.
Work within registration and space‑reservation systems to reduce conflict over time and place.

Conclusion

StandWithUs v. MIT is a carefully reasoned blueprint for reconciling Title VI with free‑speech and academic‑freedom principles in the private university setting. The First Circuit held that hostile‑environment liability cannot be built on protected political speech—even when heated, upsetting, or deeply divisive—and it refused to equate anti‑Zionism with antisemitism as a matter of law. While acknowledging isolated, plausibly antisemitic incidents, the court found they fell short of Title VI’s systemic threshold and that plaintiffs failed to plead actual institutional knowledge or deliberate indifference.

On the conspiracy claims, the court insisted on a stringent “purpose” requirement: political coordination around divestment and ceasefire demands is not plausibly a conspiracy to deprive Jewish students of civil rights absent facts showing that as a conscious objective. The decision thus offers universities, students, and regulators a pragmatic path forward: protect robust debate; address conduct neutrally; respond reasonably to specific, targeted harassment; and avoid turning federal civil rights statutes into tools for viewpoint suppression.