Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Plain-Error and Sentencing Framework

• Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018) and Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016): These decisions articulate the modern plain-error framework. The Fifth Circuit applied the three-prong test (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights) and the discretionary fourth step to evaluate unpreserved claims—here, the asserted reliance on erroneous facts and alleged prejudice from prosecutorial rhetoric.
• United States v. Castro, 843 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2016): “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” This deferential standard guided the court in rejecting defendant’s arguments that the district court clearly erred in its factfinding.
• United States v. Diaz Sanchez, 714 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th 477 (5th Cir. 2022): Establish and apply the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences and the abuse-of-discretion standard for preserved substantive reasonableness claims.
• Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020): A request for a lower sentence preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge, obviating the need for a formal legal objection.
• United States v. Fatani, 125 F.4th 755 (5th Cir. 2025): Identifies how a defendant may rebut the within-Guidelines presumption—by showing omitted weight for important factors, undue weight for improper factors, or clear error in weighing §3553(a) factors. The court used this framework to conclude the presumption was not rebutted.
• United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2017): Reaffirm that appellate courts do not reweigh §3553(a) factors and that district courts have discretion to assign different weights to different factors.
• United States v. Bolton, 908 F.3d 75 (5th Cir. 2018): Supports the district court’s prerogative to give more weight to some §3553(a) factors over others and provides the two-part test for prosecutorial misconduct (improper comment plus effect on substantial rights).
• United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2010): Set the standard for when prosecutorial rhetoric warrants reversal; Davis upheld strong rhetoric (“evil,” “murderous rampage”) when tethered to the record and non-prejudicial.

Supervised Release Conditions and Oral Pronouncement Doctrine

• United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc): The cornerstone. Non-mandatory supervised-release conditions must be orally pronounced to allow objections. Standing orders give notice of possibilities, but the court must still pronounce the conditions it imposes.
• United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023): Clarifies standard-of-review nuances. A court’s shorthand adoption of “standard and mandatory conditions” tied to a standing order can suffice for those conditions (plain-error review applies), but special conditions that appear for the first time in the written judgment (with no opportunity to object) are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526 (5th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2020): A shorthand reference to standard conditions can adopt them if the standing order provides notice; this does not, without more, sweep in special conditions.
• United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2006): The oral sentence controls when a written judgment conflicts. The court distinguishes “conflict” from “ambiguity”—conflict exists where the written judgment broadens supervised-release restrictions beyond the oral pronouncement.
• Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant, 937 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2019): Provides plain-error review for unpreserved claims generally; employed here regarding prosecutorial comments.

Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural Reasonableness: No Clear Error in Factfinding

Because the defendant did not preserve the “erroneous facts” claim, plain-error doctrine governed. Applying Castro’s deferential standard, the Fifth Circuit held that two contested inferences were “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” First, the district court’s view that Osorio-Avelar had manipulated his family was reasonable given his pattern of escalating criminality, concealment of stolen firearms in the family home, evasion of arrest, and simultaneous sex trafficking while building a family with his girlfriend. Second, the court’s determination that his youth did not mitigate culpability was also plausible: the offense’s gravity and explicit threats, coupled with the defendant’s prior juvenile-justice exposure and failures to reform, justified the conclusion that he “knew exactly the consequences” and chose to persist. The district court acknowledged youth-related neuroscience but weighed other §3553(a) factors more heavily, which is permitted.

B. Substantive Reasonableness: Presumption Not Rebutted

The within-Guidelines sentence carried a presumption of reasonableness (Diaz Sanchez). The defendant preserved his challenge by seeking a lower sentence (Holguin-Hernandez). Applying Fatani’s pathways to rebuttal, the court rejected the claim that the district court undervalued youth and family ties. The record showed the court considered those points but, in light of the seriousness of the conduct, the need for just punishment, and protection of the public (§3553(a)(2)(A), (C)), assigned them less weight. The panel refused to reweigh the factors (Hernandez 2011, 2017) and found no clear error of judgment.

C. Prosecutorial Rhetoric: Assumed Improper, Not Prejudicial

Reviewing for plain error, the court assumed arguendo that the prosecutor’s references to “evil,” “depravity,” and refusal to “acquiesce to societal norms” were improper. But the defendant failed to show prejudice affecting substantial rights. The district court’s comments—e.g., calling the defendant “every parent’s nightmare”—were independently supported by the record of escalating, violent conduct and did not reflect improper reliance on prosecutorial rhetoric. As in Davis, forceful characterization aligned with evidence does not by itself render a proceeding fundamentally unfair. Drake v. Kemp (11th Cir. 1985), involving capital-sentencing jury misconduct, was distinguishable and unpersuasive in this bench-sentencing context.

D. Special Conditions of Supervised Release: Oral Pronouncement Required

This is the decision’s most practically significant holding. Under Diggles, a district court must orally pronounce all non-mandatory conditions, including special conditions, so the defendant can object. The Government conceded that ten special conditions appearing in the written judgment were never orally pronounced and should be excised. It argued, however, that six others survived because they mirrored the court’s standing order and were supposedly adopted at sentencing.

The Fifth Circuit disagreed, carefully parsing Baez-Adriano, Grogan, and Vargas. While a “shorthand” adoption of “standard and mandatory conditions” can validly impose those conditions by reference to a standing order (triggering plain-error review), that logic does not extend to special conditions unless they are expressly adopted or otherwise clearly pronounced. Here, the district court said only that it was imposing the “standard conditions” under General Order No. 2017-1; it never mentioned special conditions. Because none were orally pronounced, all special conditions appearing solely in the written judgment conflict with the oral sentence. Under Mireles, the oral sentence controls. The panel therefore held it was an abuse of discretion to impose unpronounced special conditions in the written judgment and remanded with instructions to conform the judgment to the oral pronouncement by removing them.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Supervised Release Practice in the Fifth Circuit

• Pronounce special conditions explicitly: District judges cannot rely on standing orders or a generic reference to “standard conditions” to impose special conditions. They must say the special conditions aloud at sentencing.
• Record clarity controls the written judgment: If a written judgment includes supervised-release terms not pronounced in open court, those terms will be vacated as conflicting with the oral sentence.
• Standard-of-review stakes: When a district court clearly adopts standard conditions tied to a standing order, challenges are often reviewed for plain error. But when special conditions first appear in the written judgment, the defendant has had no chance to object, and abuse-of-discretion review applies—an important procedural advantage for defendants.

Sentencing Advocacy

• Defense counsel: Prompt the court to specify all supervised-release conditions on the record; if special conditions are not pronounced, object and request clarification. Also, develop a robust record on youth and mitigation, recognizing the court’s discretion to weigh §3553(a) factors.
• Prosecutors: Avoid gratuitous rhetoric. Even if strong language may be non-prejudicial in context, needless hyperbole risks appellate scrutiny. Anchor arguments in the record and the §3553(a) factors.
• District courts: When referencing a standing order, state clearly whether you are imposing “standard and mandatory conditions” and then separately and explicitly pronounce any special conditions.

Substantive Reasonableness and Youth

The decision underscores that youth-related neuroscience and immaturity can be relevant but do not compel a variance. District courts may give greater weight to offense seriousness, specific deterrence, and public protection when the record shows escalating violence and sustained criminal behavior despite earlier system contact.

Unpublished but Persuasive

The opinion is unpublished and thus not binding precedent under Fifth Cir. R. 47.5. Nonetheless, it is a cogent application of Diggles and Baez-Adriano and will likely guide district courts and counsel in the circuit on supervised-release pronouncement practices.