Standing of Individual Legislators in Constitutional Challenges: The Impact of Andy Kerr v. John Hickenlooper

Standing of Individual Legislators in Constitutional Challenges: The Impact of Andy Kerr v. John Hickenlooper

1. Introduction

The case of Andy Kerr, et al. v. John Hickenlooper, et al., decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on June 3, 2016, addresses a pivotal issue in constitutional law: the standing of individual legislators to challenge state constitutional provisions. The plaintiffs, comprising current and former Colorado government officials, parents of school-aged children, and educators, sought to challenge Article X, § 20 of the Colorado Constitution, known as the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR).

The crux of the case centered on whether individual legislators could assert that TABOR impairs their ability to perform core legislative functions, thereby granting them the legal standing to sue the Governor, John Hickenlooper.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's prior decision, which had affirmed that individual legislators possessed standing to challenge TABOR. Central to the appellate court's reasoning was the Supreme Court's intervening opinion in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (Arizona). This precedent established a clearer delineation between individual and institutional injuries in standing analyses.

In this judgment, the appellate court concluded that the individual legislators in the Kerr case lacked standing because their alleged injury was solely institutional, impacting the legislative body as a whole rather than afflicting them individually. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings concerning the standing of non-legislator plaintiffs.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several key Supreme Court cases that shape the doctrine of standing:

  • COLEMAN v. MILLER (1939): Established that individual legislators have standing when their votes are effectively negated, granting them a personal stake.
  • RAINES v. BYRD (1997): Clarified that legislators lack standing to challenge laws that dilute their institutional power, emphasizing the absence of personal injury.
  • Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015): Provided a nuanced approach to legislator standing, distinguishing between individual and institutional injuries.

The Tenth Circuit leveraged these precedents to reassess the standing of the Kerr plaintiffs, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's insights from the Arizona case.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning hinged on the distinction between personal and institutional injuries. Drawing from the Arizona decision, the appellate court emphasized that:

  • Individual vs. Institutional Injury: An individual injury affects a specific legislator personally, whereas an institutional injury impacts the legislative body collectively.
  • Representation: Standing requires that plaintiffs represent their institution, not just act in their individual capacities.

In Kerr, the plaintiffs argued that TABOR hampered their legislative functions, a claim that aligns with institutional injury. However, since they pursued the lawsuit individually without representing the General Assembly as an institution, the court determined they lacked standing.

The court also noted that mere participation in the legislative process does not automatically confer standing, especially when the injury is abstract and affects the institution broadly rather than specific individuals.

3.3. Impact

This judgment has significant implications for future cases involving legislator standing:

  • Clarification of Standing: Reinforces the necessity for plaintiffs to demonstrate personal injury rather than solely institutional harm.
  • Limitation on Legislative Challenges: Individual legislators cannot independently challenge constitutional provisions that they argue impede legislative functions unless they can show personal injury.
  • Institutional Representation: Encourages that any institutional injury claims should be brought forward by the legislative body as a whole rather than dispersed among individual members.

By anchoring the analysis in the Arizona precedent, the Tenth Circuit ensures consistency in how courts evaluate standing, particularly concerning institutional injuries.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1. Legal Standing

Legal standing is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.

4.2. Institutional Injury vs. Personal Injury

Institutional injury refers to harm that affects an entire organization or body, such as a legislative assembly, rather than any individual member. In contrast, a personal injury affects an individual directly and uniquely.

4.3. Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine is a principle in United States constitutional law that holds that certain issues are more appropriately addressed by the executive or legislative branches rather than the judiciary.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Andy Kerr v. John Hickenlooper marks a pivotal moment in the jurisprudence surrounding legislative standing. By aligning its reasoning with the Supreme Court's guidance in Arizona, the court underscored the imperative that individual legislators must demonstrate personal injury to establish standing. This ruling not only clarifies the boundaries between personal and institutional injuries but also sets a definitive precedent that shapes the future landscape of legislative challenges to constitutional provisions. Legislators seeking to assert standing must now navigate these clarified standards, ensuring that their claims are grounded in personal rather than abstract institutional harm.

Case Details

Year: 2016
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Judge(s)

Carlos F. Lucero

Attorney(S)

Frederick R. Yarger (William Allen, Kathleen Spalding, Stephanie Lindquist Scoville, Matthew D. Grove, Megan Paris Rundlet, and Jonathan P. Fero, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, and Daniel D. Domenico, Kittredge LLC, with him on the briefs), Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant. David E. Skaggs (Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov, Dentons US LLP, Denver, Colorado, John A. Herrick, Geoffrey Williamson, Carrie E. Johnson, Sarah M. Clark, Michael F. Feeley, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Denver, Colorado, Michael L. Bender, Perkins Coie, LLP, Denver, Colorado; Herbert Lawrence Fenster, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs), for the Plaintiffs–Appellees. Richard A. Westfall, Hale Westfall, LLP, Denver, Colorado, and Karen R. Harned and Luke A. Wake, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae brief for National Federation of Independent Business; Tabor Foundation; American Legislative Exchange Council; National Taxpayers Union; Americans for Tax Reform; Citizens in Charge; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association; Citizens for Limited Taxation; Goldwater Institute; Freedom Center of Missouri; Cascade Policy Institute; Pelican Institute; Institute for Public Policy; Tax Foundation of Hawaii; Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty; Washington Policy Center on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. Matthew J. Douglas, Holly E. Sterrett, Paul W. Rodney, and Nathaniel J. Hake, Arnold & Porter, LLP, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for the Bell Policy Center and the Colorado Fiscal Institute on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees. Ilya Shapiro, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae brief for Cato Institute on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. Anthony J. Bruno, Milton A. Miller, and Jacquelynn K.M. Levien, Latham & Watkins, LLP, Los Angeles, California, and John C. Eastman, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Orange, California, filed an amicus curiae brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. Andrew M. Low, Emily L. Droll, and John M. Bowlin, Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Colorado Association of School Executives and Colorado Association of School Boards on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees. Harold A. Haddon and Laura G. Kastetter, Haddon Morgan and Foreman, P.C., Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Colorado Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Colorado Nonprofit Association on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees. Stephen G. Masciocchi and Maureen Reidy Witt, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, Colorado, and Greenwood Village, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for the Colorado General Assembly on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees. Catherine C. Engberg, Shute Mihaly & Weinberger, LLP, San Francisco, California, filed an amicus curiae brief for the Colorado Parent Teacher Association on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees. Jeffrey W. McCoy and Steven J. Lechner, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Colorado Union of Taxpayers Foundation, Andy McElhany, Bill Cadman, Bob Gardner, Bob Rankin, Brian DelGrosso, Catherine Roupe, Chris Holbert, Dan Nordberg, Dan Thurlow, David Balmer, Don Coram, Ellen Roberts, Frank McNulty, Gordon Klingenschmitt, J. Paul Brown, James Wilson, Janak Joshi, Jerry Sonnenberg, John Cooke, Jon Becker, Justin Everett, Kathleen Conti, Kent Lambert, Kevin Grantham, Kevin Lundberg, Kevin Priola, Kim Ransom, Laura Woods, Lang Sias, Larry Crowder, Lois Landfraf, Lori Saine, Mark Scheffel, Mike Kopp, Owen Hill, Patrick Neville, Paul Lundeen, Perry Buck, Polly Lawrence, Randy Baumgardner, Ray Scott, Scott Renfroe, Spencer Swalm, Stephen Humphrey, Ted Harvey Tim Dore, Tim Neville, Vicki Marble, Yeulin V. Willett, Beth Martinez Humenik, and JoAnn Windholz, on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. David Kopel, Independence Institute, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Independence Institute on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Charles E. Roy, First Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, J. Campbell Barker, Deputy Solicitor General, Autumn Hamit Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Austin, Texas, and Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana, and Bill Schuette, Attorney General of Michigan, Lansing, Michigan, filed an amicus curiae brief for the State of Idaho, State of Indiana, State of Michigan, and State of Texas on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. Joseph R. Guerra and Kathleen Mueller, Sidley Austin, LLP, Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae brief for The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees. D'Arcy W. Straub, Littleton, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for D'Arcy W. Straub on behalf of Defendant–Appellant. Melissa Hart, University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Erwin Chemerinsky, Gene Nichol, Hans Linde, William Marshall, and William Wiecek on behalf of Plaintiffs–Appellees.

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