Standing in SB 202 Preenforcement Challenges: “General Enforcement Authority” Is Insufficient at Summary Judgment

I. Introduction

In Coalition for Good Governance v. Secretary of State for the State of Georgia (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (unpublished), a coalition of election-integrity advocates, individual voters/participants, and Democratic Party-affiliated entities (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sought declaratory and injunctive relief against multiple Georgia officials and political organizations (collectively, “Defendants”) challenging five provisions of Georgia Senate Bill 202 (“SB 202”).

The appeal turned not on the constitutionality of SB 202, but on Article III standing at the summary judgment stage. The central issues were: (1) whether Plaintiffs had a sufficiently imminent injury to challenge SB 202’s “Suspension Rule,” and (2) whether Plaintiffs’ claimed risk of criminal enforcement under four other SB 202 rules was fairly traceable to, and redressable by, the Governor and the State Election Board (“SEB”)—the principal state defendants targeted for injunctive relief.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Defendants on standing grounds. It held that Plaintiffs lacked an injury in fact for the “Suspension Rule” because removal of election officials depended on an “attenuated chain of possibilities.” As to the “Observation Rule,” “Photography Rules,” “Communication Rule,” and “Tally Rules” (each carrying criminal penalties), the court held Plaintiffs failed at summary judgment to produce evidence establishing traceability and redressability as to the Governor or the SEB—particularly because general enforcement authority, without a specific enforcement connection to SB 202, is inadequate.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standing framework and burdens across litigation stages

• BBX Cap. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 956 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2020): Cited for the standard of review—standing is reviewed de novo. This frames the appellate posture: the Eleventh Circuit independently reassessed the jurisdictional record.
• Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016): Provided the three-part test (injury in fact, traceability, redressability), anchoring the court’s method and underscoring that all three elements are separately required.
• Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): Did the heaviest doctrinal work. The opinion invoked Lujan both for the plaintiff’s burden of proof and for the critical point that evidentiary demands escalate: at summary judgment, plaintiffs cannot rest on allegations and must produce “affidavit or other evidence” of specific facts. This principle drove the affirmance because Plaintiffs’ earlier pleading-stage success did not carry forward once discovery closed.
• Tsao v. Captiva MVP Rest. Partners, LLC, 986 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2021): Appeared in a footnote to contrast pleading-stage assumptions (allegations taken as true) with summary-judgment proof requirements; it supported the panel’s insistence on record evidence rather than inference.
• Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013): Supplied the “certainly impending” imminence requirement and the “attenuated chain of possibilities” concept. The court used Clapper to reject speculative future harms—especially decisive for the Suspension Rule challenge.

2. Preenforcement challenges (when prosecution has not yet occurred)

• Georgia Latino All. for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (hereinafter GLAHR): Set the Eleventh Circuit’s preenforcement injury standard (“realistic danger” and ways to show it—threatened application, likely application, or credible threat). The panel acknowledged GLAHR but effectively limited its reach in this case by insisting on proof of traceability/redressability to the named defendants at summary judgment.
• Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974): Cited to define the classic preenforcement posture: a plaintiff challenges a law that proscribes arguably protected conduct without first violating it and suffering prosecution. The panel used Steffel to explain why the Suspension Rule did not fit the preenforcement mold—because it does not itself “forbid” conduct but instead sets conditions for administrative removal based on other violations.
• Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2011): Reinforced Steffel in the Eleventh Circuit’s own terms, supporting the line between (a) laws that directly proscribe conduct (amenable to preenforcement challenges) and (b) regimes whose alleged harms require multiple intervening steps.

3. Traceability/redressability in suits to enjoin government officials

• Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Fla., 8 F.4th 1198 (11th Cir. 2021): The key citation on the “special relationship” requirement in injunctive suits against officials. The court quoted it for the proposition that, at minimum, the sued official must have authority to enforce the particular provision challenged such that an injunction would be effectual—directly underpinning the panel’s conclusion that generalized executive power is insufficient.
• City of S. Miami v. Governor, 65 F.4th 631 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited to support the evidentiary expectation that plaintiffs show more than abstract power—some demonstrated connection to enforcement or threatened enforcement of the specific statute at issue.
• Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 974 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2020): Used (in a footnote) to emphasize that traceability fails where injury flows from independent decisions of third parties not before the court (here, potentially independent prosecutors). This reinforced the redressability holding: enjoining the Governor would not prevent nonparty district attorneys from prosecuting.

4. Courts’ continuing obligation to ensure jurisdiction

• Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994): Cited for the proposition that federal courts must ensure standing “at every juncture.” This addressed Plaintiffs’ reliance on the district court’s earlier motion-to-dismiss order: even if standing was assumed or waived then, it must be proven later when the record is developed.

5. District court decisions in the same litigation

• Coal. for Good Governance v. Kemp, 558 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2021): Provided procedural background: the district court found preenforcement injury allegations sufficient for certain provisions and preliminarily enjoined part of the “Photography Rules” as likely overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit’s later affirmance on summary-judgment standing shows how early-stage injunctive litigation can narrow or dissolve when plaintiffs cannot substantiate traceability/redressability with evidence.
• Coal. for Good Governance v. Kemp, No. 1:21-CV-02070-JPB, 2021 WL 12299010 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2021): The district court had earlier found standing allegations sufficient (and noted waiver of traceability/redressability arguments). The Eleventh Circuit treated that as non-dispositive given the changed procedural posture and evidentiary burdens after discovery.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Suspension Rule: no preenforcement fit; injury too speculative

Plaintiffs challenged SB 202’s “Suspension Rule” (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33.2(c), (f)), which authorizes the SEB to suspend local election officials under specified conditions. Plaintiffs attempted to place this provision into the preenforcement framework. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that framing because the Suspension Rule does not itself criminalize or proscribe constitutionally protected activity; instead, it establishes a potential administrative consequence after multiple procedural and evidentiary steps.

Applying Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, the panel held the alleged harm depended on a multi-step process—violations, petition, investigation, hearings, and supermajority findings under defined burdens of proof—making the risk of suspension not “certainly impending.” The opinion also emphasized undisputed evidence that no official had ever been suspended under the section and no board had been subject to a performance review, which further weakened imminence.

2. The criminal-penalty rules: traceability and redressability must be proven against the named defendants

Plaintiffs also challenged four provisions with criminal penalties: the “Observation Rule” (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-568.1), “Photography Rules” (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-568.2), “Communication Rule” (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(2)(B)(vii)), and “Tally Rules” (O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-386(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)(vi)).

Even assuming a credible threat of enforcement could satisfy injury in fact under GLAHR, the panel focused on the distinct and independent requirements of traceability and redressability—especially acute where the requested relief is an injunction against an official. Quoting Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Fla., the court required evidence that the Governor (or SEB) had authority to enforce the specific provisions such that an injunction would be effectual.

The panel accepted the district court’s determination that the Governor’s general criminal enforcement power was not enough at summary judgment. Plaintiffs did not produce evidence that the Governor enforced, threatened to enforce, or had a specific role in criminal proceedings under SB 202. The opinion cited City of S. Miami v. Governor to reinforce that plaintiffs must show a concrete enforcement connection, not merely general supervisory authority.

On redressability, the court agreed that enjoining the Governor would not prevent criminal prosecutions by nonparty district attorneys. The opinion referenced Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State to underscore the third-party causation problem: injuries attributable to independent decisions of nonparties are not fairly traceable to the named defendant and are not redressable by an injunction against that defendant alone.

The same logic applied to the SEB. Plaintiffs argued an injunction could block civil proceedings, fines, and referrals for prosecution. But the court held Plaintiffs produced no evidence of SEB referrals to the Attorney General related to the challenged provisions, and that “general authority” to refer matters was insufficient to establish traceability/redressability on this record.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces a practical and recurring rule in election-law and constitutional litigation: preenforcement plaintiffs must do more than identify a statute and name high-level officials. At the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must produce evidence tying enforcement risk to the specific defendant(s) they seek to enjoin and must show that the requested injunction would actually prevent the feared enforcement.

The opinion also illustrates a strategic pleading and proof constraint in challenges to election administration statutes: (1) provisions creating contingent administrative consequences (like SB 202’s Suspension Rule) may be especially difficult to challenge without a developed record showing imminent application; and (2) when criminal penalties are involved, suing an official with only generalized enforcement power may fail for lack of traceability/redressability if prosecutorial authority is exercised by independent actors not before the court.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III standing: A federal court can only decide a case if the plaintiff shows (1) a real or imminent harm, (2) caused by the defendant, and (3) fixable by the court’s order.
• Injury in fact (“certainly impending”): Fear of harm is not enough if it depends on many uncertain steps. Courts reject injuries that require speculation about multiple future decisions.
• Preenforcement challenge: A lawsuit filed before someone is prosecuted or penalized, typically because the plaintiff claims the law chills constitutionally protected conduct and there is a realistic threat of enforcement.
• Traceability and redressability (the “right defendant” problem): Even if a law is arguably unconstitutional, the plaintiff must sue an official who actually enforces that law in a way the court can stop. If the real enforcement power sits with independent prosecutors who are not parties, an injunction against a different official may not solve the problem.
• Summary judgment evidentiary burden: After discovery, allegations are not enough; plaintiffs must present evidence (e.g., affidavits, documents, admissions) establishing each standing element.

V. Conclusion

Coalition for Good Governance v. Secretary of State for the State of Georgia is a standing-focused decision emphasizing that constitutional challenges—especially preenforcement challenges to election laws—rise or fall on proof that the threatened harm is imminent and that the named defendants are proper enforcement targets. The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance underscores that general executive or agency authority is inadequate at summary judgment without evidence of a specific enforcement connection and a showing that the requested injunction would meaningfully prevent the alleged harm.