Standing in Declaratory Judgment Actions: United Daughters of the Confederacy v. City of Winston-Salem

Standing in Declaratory Judgment Actions: United Daughters of the Confederacy v. City of Winston-Salem

Introduction

The case of United Daughters of the Confederacy, North Carolina Division, Inc., and James B. Gordon Chapter #211 versus the City of Winston-Salem and associated defendants, adjudicated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on December 16, 2022, centers on the legal challenges surrounding the removal of a Confederate monument. The plaintiffs, representing the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), contested the city's decision to relocate the monument from the Forsyth County Courthouse grounds, a property recently sold to a private entity. The core dispute revolves around whether the plaintiffs possessed the necessary legal standing to challenge the city's actions within the framework of North Carolina law.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed an appeal from the Court of Appeals, which had upheld a trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. The trial court had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, primarily focusing on the plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate standing. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the plaintiffs did not establish standing to challenge the removal of the Confederate monument. However, the Court reversed the dismissal with prejudice, remanding the case for further proceedings without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to address procedural errors in their initial filings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key cases and statutory provisions that influence the court’s interpretation of standing and declaratory judgments:

  • Committee to Elect Dan Forest v. Employee Political Action Committee: Established that North Carolina does not require an "injury in fact" for standing under its constitutional provisions.
  • River Birch Associations v. City of Raleigh: Outlined the criteria for associational standing, emphasizing the need for the organization's purpose to align with the interests it seeks to protect.
  • GOLDSTON v. STATE: Affirmed that standing must be established before considering the form of relief in declaratory judgment actions.
  • Flast v. Cohen: Provided foundational principles on standing related to constitutional claims.
  • Various North Carolina General Statutes (G.S.) such as § 100-2.1 (Protection of Monuments) and § 160A-193 (Abatement of Nuisances) were scrutinized.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s legal reasoning centered on the plaintiffs' failure to establish standing, a fundamental requirement for any legal action. Standing in North Carolina necessitates demonstrating an infringement of a legal right, tracing the injury to the defendant's actions, and showing that a favorable court decision could redress the injury. The plaintiffs attempted to assert both taxpayer and associational standing but fell short on the necessary criteria:

  • Taxpayer Standing: The UDC, being a nonprofit organization, did not allege that it was a taxpayer of the City or County, a requirement for taxpayer standing.
  • Associational Standing: The plaintiffs did not sufficiently demonstrate that its members would have standing individually or that the organization's purpose directly related to the preservation of the monument.

The Court also addressed statutory claims, particularly under N.C. G.S. § 100-2.1, finding that the statute did not explicitly or implicitly grant a private right of action to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the monument was located on property that had been privately sold to Winston Courthouse LLC, negating the applicability of state statutes intended to protect public monuments.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the stringent requirements for establishing standing in North Carolina, especially for organizations seeking declaratory judgments. It underscores the necessity for plaintiffs to clearly demonstrate a direct and vested interest in the subject matter. Additionally, the case highlights the limitations of associational and taxpayer standing, setting a precedent that mere historical or organizational affiliations are insufficient without concrete legal claims tied to specific rights or interests.

For future cases involving the removal or relocation of monuments, this decision clarifies that organizations must explicitly establish ownership or a direct legal interest in the monument to have standing. It also indicates a judicial reluctance to extend standing based on generalized public-interest grievances without specific legal or property claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing

Standing is a legal concept that determines whether a party has the right to bring a lawsuit. To establish standing in North Carolina, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

  • Injury in Fact: A concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.
  • Traceability: The injury is directly linked to the defendant's actions.
  • Redressability: It is likely that a favorable court decision will remedy the injury.

In this case, the United Daughters of the Confederacy failed to show that the removal of the monument directly infringed upon a specific legal right of the organization or its members.

Declaratory Judgment

A declaratory judgment is a court judgment that clarifies the legal relationships and obligations between parties without ordering any specific action or awarding damages. For a declaratory judgment to be granted, the plaintiff must have standing to seek such relief by demonstrating a legal interest in the outcome.

Associational Standing

This form of standing allows an association to sue on behalf of its members if:

  • The members have standing individually.
  • The claims are germane to the organization's purpose.
  • The organization does not require individual member participation in the lawsuit.

The UDC failed to meet these criteria as it did not establish that its members had individual standing or that their interests aligned directly with the preservation of the monument.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in United Daughters of the Confederacy v. City of Winston-Salem serves as a pivotal reference for understanding the application of standing in declaratory judgment actions within the state. By affirming the necessity of a demonstrable legal or property interest, the Court emphasized that historical or organizational purposes alone do not suffice to confer standing. This ruling not only shapes the landscape for future litigation involving public monuments but also reinforces the judiciary's gatekeeping role in ensuring that only parties with genuine legal stakes can seek declaratory relief.

For organizations and individuals alike, this case underscores the importance of clearly establishing legal rights and interests when challenging governmental actions, particularly in contexts involving public symbols and historical commemorations.

Case Details

Year: 2022
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina

Judge(s)

ERVIN, JUSTICE

Attorney(S)

James A. Davis for plaintiff-appellants. Anargiros N. Kontos, Deputy City Attorney, and Angela I. Carmon, City Attorney, for defendant-appellee City of Winston-Salem. B. Gordon Watkins III, County Attorney, for defendant-appellee Forsyth County. Allman Spry Davis Leggett & Crumpler, P.A., by Jodi D. Hildebran; and Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Lorin J. Lapidu,s for defendantappellee Winston Courthouse, LLC. Mark Dorosin and Elizabeth Haddix for Chatham for All, North Carolina Commission on Racial & Ethnic Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, Dr. Joyce Blackwell, Dr. Phillip A. Clay, Algin Holloway, Patrice High, Edith A. Hubbard, Walter Jackson, Bradley Johnson, Philip McAlpin, Angelia Euba McKoy, Henry Clay McKoy, Lisa V. Moore, Moses G. Parker, Melvin L. Watt, Melvin L. Williams, Camille Z. Roddy, and Jimmy Barnes, amici curiae. Matthew R. Joyner and H. Edward Phillips for Sons of Confederate Veterans, amicus curiae.

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