Standing, Taxpayer Suits, and the End of the Public-Right Doctrine: Commentary on State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay, 2025-Ohio-5589

Standing Limits on Taxpayer Mandamus Actions and the Aftermath of Sheward: A Commentary on State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay, 2025-Ohio-5589

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay, 2025-Ohio-5589, continues and consolidates a doctrinal shift in Ohio standing jurisprudence—especially for taxpayer suits framed as mandamus actions. The court reaffirms a strict personal-injury standing requirement, applies its recent abolition of the Sheward public-right doctrine, and underscores important procedural rules governing amended pleadings and supplementation of the appellate record.

At its core, the decision holds that a municipal taxpayer who alleges only generalized illegality in a city’s tax-collection practices—without showing a concrete, personal injury fairly traceable to the city’s conduct—lacks standing to pursue a mandamus action to compel compliance with tax ordinances or to enjoin tax-collection efforts. The court also confirms that litigants may not use motions to supplement the record to add new material not filed below, and that oral argument in appeals of right remains a matter of judicial discretion guided by specific criteria.

This commentary examines the factual and procedural background, summarizes the court’s holdings, analyzes the precedents and reasoning, and explores the broader implications for taxpayer litigation, mandamus practice, and Ohio standing doctrine after the demise of the public-right exception.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties

  • Relator/Appellant: George Martens, a municipal taxpayer in the City of Findlay, proceeding pro se.
  • Respondents/Appellees: The City of Findlay and a broad array of city officials and employees, including the mayor, tax administrator, tax department employees, law director, auditor, treasurer, and city council members (collectively “the city”).

B. Prior Litigation Between Martens and Findlay

This appeal is part of a long-running series of disputes between Martens and the City of Findlay, all arising from Findlay’s efforts to collect unpaid municipal income taxes from Martens for tax years 2013–2015. The opinion cites at least four earlier adverse decisions against Martens:

  • Findlay v. Martens, 2022-Ohio-4146 (3d Dist.) (“Martens I”), tax-collection litigation in small-claims court, appeal not accepted, 2023-Ohio-1326.
  • State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay, 2022-Ohio-4268 (mandamus-related litigation, details not repeated here but treated as part of the same tax-collection controversy).
  • Martens v. Price, 2023-Ohio-4359 (3d Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2024-Ohio-1974 (litigation involving the city’s tax administrator).
  • State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay Mun. Court, 2024-Ohio-5667 (“Martens IV”), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled the Sheward public-right doctrine.

Collectively, these cases show a recurring pattern: Martens, unhappy with the city’s municipal-tax enforcement and related judicial proceedings, repeatedly sought extraordinary relief—often in mandamus—challenging both the city’s compliance with R.C. Chapter 718 and the validity of its tax-collection efforts.

C. The Present Mandamus Action

In March 2024, Martens filed the present original mandamus action in the Third District Court of Appeals. In his second amended complaint, he asserted that:

  • Findlay was not complying with the municipal income-tax statutes in R.C. Chapter 718;
  • The city had filed “fraudulent tax complaints” at unspecified times against unspecified taxpayers; and
  • The court of appeals should:
    • Enjoin Findlay from engaging in allegedly unlawful tax-collection efforts, and
    • Compel the city to comply with its tax ordinances and R.C. Chapter 718.

Crucially, Martens:

  • Did not allege that any tax complaint was currently pending against him at the time he filed this mandamus action; and
  • Did not allege a concrete, particularized injury arising from any specific act directed at him.

Instead, he asserted harm in his capacity as a Findlay taxpayer and expressly invoked the “public right doctrine”, claiming to sue on behalf of “all taxpayers” and asserting a matter of “great public interest” relating to municipal taxation statewide.

D. Disposition in the Court of Appeals

The City of Findlay moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The Third District granted the motion, finding:

  • Martens lacked standing;
  • His claims were not cognizable in mandamus; and
  • He could not demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief.

The court also denied Martens leave to file a third amended complaint.

E. Appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio

Martens appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Ohio. He also:

  • Moved to supplement the record to add his proposed third amended complaint; and
  • Requested oral argument.

In his merit brief, he advanced eight assignments of error and approximately 45 “issues,” with seven assignments focused on standing and one challenging the denial of leave to amend.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, held as follows:

  1. Motion to supplement the record denied (¶¶ 8–10). The proposed third amended complaint was never filed in the court of appeals and therefore is not part of the record; S.Ct.Prac.R. 15.08 does not allow adding new material for the first time on appeal.
  2. Request for oral argument denied (¶ 11). Appeals of right are not automatically set for argument; this case did not present complex issues, a matter of great public importance, a substantial constitutional question, or an inter-district conflict as required for discretionary oral argument under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).
  3. Denial of leave to file a third amended complaint affirmed (¶¶ 13–14). Martens invoked Civ.R. 15(B), but that rule applies only to conform the pleadings to issues actually tried by consent, and no trial occurred. Moreover, a citation to a prior case (Martens I) is not “new evidence.” Thus, the Third District did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend under Civ.R. 15(B).
  4. Mandamus action properly dismissed for lack of standing (¶¶ 15–19). Martens failed to allege:
    • An actual injury fairly traceable to the city’s conduct;
    • An injury that was personal to him, as opposed to a generalized grievance shared by all taxpayers; or
    • Any direct or concrete harm that would be redressed by a writ of mandamus.
    He therefore lacked traditional standing.
  5. No “public-right” standing (¶ 18). Martens also could not invoke the public-right doctrine from State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 1999-Ohio-123, because the Supreme Court had already expressly overruled that doctrine in Martens IV, 2024-Ohio-5667.
  6. Judgment affirmed (¶ 20). Because Martens lacked standing, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third District’s dismissal and declined to address the court of appeals’ other grounds for dismissal.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Rules Applied

1. Standing and Taxpayer Suits

The court’s standing analysis (¶¶ 15–19) rests on a series of leading Ohio decisions requiring a concrete, personal injury:

  • ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 2014-Ohio-2382
    • Articulates Ohio’s basic standing test: a plaintiff must show (1) an actual injury, (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief (¶ 16).
    • Emphasizes that standing turns on whether plaintiffs have a “personal stake” in the outcome, not a generalized interest in lawfulness (¶ 16).
  • State ex rel. Hills & Dales v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2019-Ohio-5160
    • In a mandamus context, the relator must show that he “would be directly benefitted or injured by a judgment in the case” (¶ 16, quoting Sinay).
  • State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders, 1997-Ohio-344
    • Provides the “directly benefitted or injured” formula applied to mandamus relators (¶ 16).
  • State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 162 Ohio St. 366 (1954)
    • Classic taxpayer-standing case: a taxpayer must show “some special interest” that places his “own property rights” in jeopardy, demonstrating damage “different in character from that sustained by the public generally” (¶ 16).
    • Reaffirmed here as the benchmark rule rejecting purely generalized taxpayer grievances.

The court also addresses and distinguishes:

  • Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich
    • Martens cited the Eighth District’s original opinion, which had accepted a minimal-injury standard (¶ 17).
    • The Supreme Court reminds that it reversed that decision, holding the litigant lacked standing because it failed to show direct and concrete injury different from that suffered by the public at large (2018-Ohio-441, ¶¶ 22, 31).
    • Thus, Preterm cannot support Martens’s theory that minimal or diffuse harms suffice for taxpayer standing.

The court’s restatement of these principles sharply limits taxpayer-initiated mandamus actions seeking to police governmental compliance with statutes or ordinances on a generalized, public-interest basis.

2. The Public-Right Doctrine and Its Overruling

Martens expressly invoked the “public right doctrine” described in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 1999-Ohio-123. Under Sheward, in rare circumstances, a relator could assert standing to vindicate a “public right” without demonstrating a traditional, personal injury.

However, the Supreme Court emphasizes that:

“In a previous mandamus action brought by Martens, we expressly overruled the Sheward public-right doctrine as ‘contrary to our deeply rooted standing requirement and the Ohio Constitution.’ Martens IV, 2024-Ohio-5667, at ¶ 3.” (¶ 18)

Accordingly, there is no longer any public-right exception to standing in Ohio mandamus actions. Generalized grievances or purely public-interest claims are insufficient absent traditional injury-in-fact. Martens v. Findlay is significant because it is one of the first published applications of that overruling to reject a taxpayer’s attempt to resurrect the doctrine mere months after Martens IV.

3. Civil Rule 12(B)(6) and Appellate Review

The court confirms that the dismissal was under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and applies a de novo standard of review:

  • State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2021-Ohio-4486 – de novo review of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissals (¶ 15).
  • State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2012-Ohio-1861 – standing is a question of law reviewed de novo (¶ 15).

This reinforces that standing, when challenged on the pleadings, is a threshold legal question suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

4. Record Supplementation and Appellate Practice

Martens sought to “supplement” the record with an 89-page proposed third amended complaint attached to his motion in the Supreme Court. The court relies on:

  • Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 15.08 (¶ 10)
    • Allows supplementation only when part of the record was not transmitted to the Supreme Court but was part of the lower-court record.
    • Here, the Third District’s docket and index showed that the proposed third amended complaint was never filed below.
  • State ex rel. Norman v. Collins, 2023-Ohio-975 (¶¶ 10, 8 n.2)
    • Reiterates that “[a] litigant is not permitted to add evidence to the record for the first time on appeal” (¶ 10).
    • Applied again to disregard post-judgment letters attached to Martens’s brief as “Exhibit S” because they were not part of the record below (n.2 at ¶ 8).

The message: the Supreme Court is a court of review, not a forum for first-time evidentiary submissions. Parties must properly file documents in the lower court to have them considered part of the record on appeal.

5. Leave to Amend and Civ.R. 15(B)

Martens argued that he should have been granted leave to file a third amended complaint under Civ.R. 15(B), claiming the city’s motion to dismiss introduced “new evidence” by citing Martens I. The court rejected this argument:

  • Civ.R. 15(B) – provides for amendment when:
    “issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” (¶ 14)
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Reinheimer, 2020-Ohio-3941, citing State ex rel. Evans v. Bainbridge Twp. Trustees, 5 Ohio St.3d 41 (1983) (¶ 14)
    • Civ.R. 15(B) applies to amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence admitted at trial; it does not apply when there has been no trial.
  • State v. Black, 2023-Ohio-1730 (5th Dist.) (¶ 14)
    • “Neither a case citation nor information contained in the cited opinion constitutes new evidence.”

Thus, the Third District correctly concluded that Civ.R. 15(B) provided no basis for amendment, and its denial of leave was not an abuse of discretion.

6. Interlocutory Orders and the Merger Doctrine

Although Martens’s notice of appeal did not specifically mention the denial of leave to amend, the court treats that order as reviewable because:

  • Navistar, Inc. v. Testa, 2015-Ohio-3283 (¶ 13), quoting Grover v. Bartsch, 2006-Ohio-6115 (2d Dist.)
    • “Interlocutory orders . . . are merged into the final judgment,” and an appeal from the final judgment includes all merged interlocutory rulings.

This confirms that in Ohio practice, procedural rulings (like denial of leave to amend) made before a final judgment are preserved for appellate review even if not individually designated in the notice of appeal.

7. Oral Argument Discretion

Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.01–.02, oral argument is mandatory only in certain types of cases. For appeals of right such as this one, oral argument is discretionary.

  • Boler v. Hill, 2022-Ohio-507 (¶ 11)
    • Lists the factors the court considers: complexity, public importance, substantial constitutional issues, or inter-district conflicts.

The court found that none of these factors were present, and denied oral argument.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standing: Injury, Traceability, and Redressability

The central question was whether Martens, as relator, had standing to seek mandamus relief. The court reiterates the basic Ohio standing elements (¶¶ 15–16):

  • There must be an actual injury;
  • The injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and
  • The injury must be likely to be redressed by the requested relief.

In the mandamus context, the relator must show he “would be directly benefitted or injured by a judgment in the case” (¶ 16).

Applying these standards, the court found:

  • Martens did not allege any pending tax complaint against him (¶ 17);
  • He did not plead any specific injury tied to any specific city action then in effect (¶ 17);
  • He alleged only general wrongdoing by the city (e.g., “fraudulent tax complaints” against “various” unidentified taxpayers) (¶ 4, 17); and
  • His claimed injuries—such as time and cost spent retrieving records and submitting FOIA requests—were not grounded in the complaint, and even as described in his brief, they did not establish a concrete, personal harm distinct from that of any other concerned taxpayer (¶ 17).

The court expressly rejects the idea that such amorphous and indirect burdens satisfy standing:

“Because Martens failed to allege an actual injury fairly traceable to the city's conduct that was personal to him rather than to the taxpaying public in general, he did not show that he would be directly benefitted or injured by a judgment in this case. Therefore, he did not establish individual standing to bring his mandamus action.” (¶ 17)

This is a stringent application of the “personal stake” requirement and underscores that a generalized desire to see laws faithfully enforced does not confer standing, even when a relator has been involved in prior tax-collection disputes with the same municipality.

2. Taxpayer Standing and the Rejection of Generalized Grievances

The court leans heavily on Masterson to emphasize that traditional taxpayer standing is narrow:

“[A] taxpayer must have ‘some special interest . . . by reason of which his own property rights are put in jeopardy. In other words, private citizens may not restrain official acts when they fail to allege and prove damage to themselves different in character from that sustained by the public generally.’” (¶ 16, quoting Masterson)

Martens’s theory—that a taxpayer can sue to compel municipal compliance with R.C. 718 and prevent allegedly unlawful enforcement tactics “on behalf of all taxpayers”—is directly incompatible with this standard. It amounts to a classic generalized grievance: the claim that the government is acting unlawfully in ways that affect the public at large, with no unique injury to the relator.

3. The End of the Public-Right Doctrine

Martens attempted to circumvent the personal-injury requirement by invoking the public-right doctrine articulated in Sheward. Under that doctrine (now overruled), a relator could sometimes pursue mandamus or prohibition to challenge the constitutionality of legislation that affected the public generally, without demonstrating individualized injury.

The court’s answer is unequivocal (¶ 18):

  • The public-right doctrine was an exception to the personal-injury requirement.
  • In Martens IV, the court expressly overruled that doctrine as contrary to Ohio’s “deeply rooted standing requirement” and to the Ohio Constitution.
  • Martens therefore cannot rely on that doctrine here.

This is significant because it confirms that the overruling in Martens IV is not limited to some narrow factual situation; it is a broad doctrinal shift. Relators may no longer frame “public interest” or “public right” assertions as a substitute for concrete injury, even in high-salience areas like taxation or statewide statutory compliance.

4. Procedural Discipline: Record, Amendments, and Oral Argument

Beyond standing, the court’s rulings on record supplementation, leave to amend, and oral argument reflect a strong emphasis on procedural regularity and restraint:

  • Record supplementation: Only items that were actually part of the lower-court record may be transmitted or supplemented under S.Ct.Prac.R. 15.08. Attempts to “add” documents for the first time on appeal are categorically barred (Norman, ¶ 10).
  • Leave to amend: Civ.R. 15(B) is strictly limited to amendments to conform to the evidence at trial. Where there has been no trial, that provision is inapplicable. Merely citing a prior appellate opinion in a motion to dismiss is not “evidence” that triggers the rule.
  • Oral argument: Despite Martens framing the case as one of “great public interest” and statewide implication, the court saw no complexity, constitutional dimension, or inter-district conflict justifying oral argument. This reinforces that not every appeal of right—particularly those turning on straightforward standing issues—will be set for argument.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Areas of Law

1. Taxpayer Mandamus and Municipal Tax Enforcement

For taxpayers challenging municipal tax practices, Martens v. Findlay sends a clear message:

  • It is not enough to allege that a city is violating R.C. 718, filing “fraudulent” tax complaints, or misapplying its ordinances.
  • A taxpayer must show:
    • A specific action directed at the taxpayer (e.g., a pending collection action, a threatened levy, or a concrete administrative decision affecting him); and
    • A specific injury—economic, legal, or otherwise—distinctly tied to that action.
  • A generalized desire to police municipal compliance with state tax law on behalf of “all taxpayers” will not confer standing.

As a practical matter, this will:

  • Limit class-like or broad-based mandamus actions by individual taxpayers challenging systemic municipal practices;
  • Channel most tax disputes into standard remedial mechanisms (administrative appeals, declaratory judgment, defense in collection proceedings) rather than extraordinary writs; and
  • Reduce the courts’ exposure to serial, duplicative mandamus filings by dissatisfied taxpayers who have already litigated individual tax disputes through the ordinary process (as Martens had in Martens I and related cases).

2. Standing Doctrine After Sheward

Together with Martens IV, this decision solidifies a major recalibration of Ohio standing law:

  • The Sheward public-right exception is gone. Litigants may not rely on it to challenge statutes, ordinances, or practices on public-interest grounds alone.
  • Ohio’s standing requirement is stringently tied to:
    • Personal injury (not merely ideological or policy disagreement);
    • Concrete and direct harm (not speculative or highly attenuated burdens); and
    • Distinctness from the general public’s harm (particularly in taxpayer suits).
  • This change will affect:
    • Public-interest organizations seeking broad structural relief;
    • Taxpayer challenges to state and local spending programs; and
    • Efforts to use mandamus/prohibition to attack legislation or administrative frameworks.

Courts can now routinely dispose of such suits at the pleading stage when plaintiffs cannot articulate individualized injury-in-fact.

3. Procedural Rigor in Original Actions in the Courts of Appeals

The opinion also implicitly serves as guidance to both litigants and courts of appeals concerning original actions (like mandamus) initiated in appellate courts:

  • Courts of appeals may—and should—dispose of defective mandamus petitions via Civ.R. 12(B)(6) when standing and cognizability defects are apparent on the face of the complaint.
  • Litigants are expected to:
    • Properly file proposed amendments in a timely manner;
    • Use the correct provisions of Civ.R. 15 (here, Martens improperly relied on 15(B)); and
    • Recognize that appellate courts acting in an original jurisdiction capacity are still bound by orthodox pleading standards.

For persistent pro se litigants, the court’s approach underscores that repeated attempts to relitigate already-lost taxation issues via creative mandamus pleadings or “public-right” theories will be firmly curtailed.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Standing” in Plain Terms

Standing asks a basic question: Are you the right person to bring this case? To answer “yes,” you must show:

  1. You were harmed in a real way (not just upset that the government broke the law);
  2. The defendant caused that harm (or is about to); and
  3. The court can fix it by granting the relief you ask for.

In a mandamus case, you must also show that a court order would directly help or hurt you—not just improve the government’s overall compliance with the law.

2. Taxpayer Standing

Being a taxpayer by itself usually does not give you standing to sue over how the government uses tax money or enforces tax laws. You must show:

  • Some special risk to your own property or legal rights; and
  • A harm that is different from the harm (if any) that all taxpayers experience.

For example, if a city sues you personally for unpaid taxes and violates clear legal requirements in a way that costs you money or legal rights, that might support standing. But saying “the city is not following the statute” in its dealings with “many taxpayers” is usually not enough.

3. The Public-Right Doctrine (and Its Demise)

The public-right doctrine used to let some people sue over purely public issues (like the constitutionality of statewide legislation) without showing personal harm. It was an exception to the normal standing rules. In Martens IV, the Supreme Court of Ohio said this doctrine conflicts with the Ohio Constitution’s limits on judicial power and explicitly abolished it.

Now, everyone must meet the standard standing requirements—even in high-profile public-interest cases.

4. Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary court order compelling a public official or body to perform a clear legal duty. To succeed, a relator must show:

  1. A clear legal right to the relief requested;
  2. A clear legal duty on the respondent’s part to perform the requested act; and
  3. No adequate remedy at law (for example, no suitable ordinary lawsuit or appeal to fix the problem).

In addition, as emphasized in this case, the relator must have standing—that is, a direct personal stake in the enforcement of that duty.

5. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Dismissal

A motion under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) asks the court to dismiss a complaint at the outset for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The court assumes the factual allegations are true but asks:

  • Even if everything alleged is true, does the law allow the court to grant the requested relief?

If the answer is “no”—for example, because the plaintiff lacks standing or the type of claim is unavailable in mandamus—the court can dismiss the case without further proceedings.

6. Civ.R. 15(B) Amendments

Civ.R. 15(B) is a narrow rule about changing pleadings after trial begins. It says that if the parties actually try issues in court that were not mentioned in the pleadings—and both sides effectively accept this—then the pleadings can be changed to match what was tried.

It does not apply:

  • Before trial starts,
  • Just because a party cites a prior court decision, or
  • To completely refashion a complaint in response to a motion to dismiss, when no trial has occurred.

7. Record on Appeal and Supplementation

The record on appeal consists only of the filings and evidence that were before the lower court. If a document was never filed there, it cannot be treated as part of the record on appeal.

  • S.Ct.Prac.R. 15.08 allows the Supreme Court to obtain missing parts of the record that were actually part of the lower court’s record but not transmitted.
  • It does not allow parties to “add” new documents or evidence for the first time on appeal.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay, 2025-Ohio-5589, is an important reinforcement of Ohio’s modern standing doctrine and of procedural discipline in mandamus practice. The opinion establishes or confirms several key points:

  1. Strict personal-injury requirement for standing: A relator must allege a concrete, personal injury that is fairly traceable to the respondent’s conduct and redressable by the requested relief. Generalized grievances about a municipality’s alleged noncompliance with tax laws are insufficient.
  2. Taxpayer status is not enough: To sue as a taxpayer, one must show a “special interest” that puts one’s own property rights at risk—damage “different in character” from that of the taxpayer public generally. Martens’s allegations did not meet that standard.
  3. Public-right doctrine is fully dead: The court unequivocally applies its recent overruling of Sheward (Martens IV) to reject any attempt to avoid the injury requirement by invoking public-right standing.
  4. Mandamus litigation is not a vehicle for broad policy enforcement: Courts will not entertain mandamus claims aimed at compelling general governmental compliance with statutes and ordinances absent a concrete right-duty relationship between relator and respondent.
  5. Procedural rigor matters:
    • Amendments under Civ.R. 15(B) are confined to issues tried by consent; they do not apply pre-trial simply because a party cites another case.
    • The appellate record cannot be supplemented with new materials not filed below.
    • Oral argument in appeals of right remains discretionary and will be denied when issues are straightforward and non-constitutional.

In the broader legal context, Martens v. Findlay should be read together with ProgressOhio, Masterson, Preterm (as reversed), and above all Martens IV. Together, they mark Ohio’s firm return to a traditional, injury-based model of standing, sharply limiting broad-based taxpayer and public-interest challenges in the extraordinary-writ context and reinforcing the role of ordinary statutory and procedural remedies as the primary channels for contesting governmental action.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

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