Standards for Prior-Authorization and Monitoring-Software Conditions on Internet-Capable Devices in Supervised Release

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kornacki (No. 24-1071 & 24-1073, 10th Cir. May 8, 2025), which affirms district court special conditions of supervised release requiring prior authorization for internet-capable devices and installation of monitoring software. Nathaniel Kornacki, a repeat sex-offender registrant who twice escaped a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) and repeatedly violated sex-offender and reporting conditions, challenged these computer-related restrictions as overbroad, insufficiently tailored, and not reasonably related to his offenses or supervision goals.

Key issues:

Whether the special conditions comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)’s requirements (relation to § 3553(a) factors; no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary; consistency with Commission policy).
Whether the district court made the required individualized assessment and provided adequate reasoning for imposing them.
Whether the conditions unduly infringe fundamental rights or exceed the district court’s supervisory authority.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed. Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court concluded:

The challenged “prior-authorization” (Special Condition No. 3) and “monitoring-software” (Special Condition No. 4) conditions mirror the framework set out in United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019), and do not unreasonably chill defendant’s internet use.
The district court’s findings—focusing on Kornacki’s prolonged, repeated noncompliance with standard and special conditions over three revocations—were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.
The conditions were reasonably related to: (a) the nature and circumstances of his underlying sexual-battery and escape offenses; (b) his history and characteristics (stubborn, repeated violations); (c) deterrence; (d) public protection (particularly minors exposed online); and (e) his rehabilitative needs.
The restrictions impose no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary to achieve sentencing goals.
The district court adequately tailored conditions to this defendant without imposing a blanket prohibition or implicating fundamental rights.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019): Established that computer and internet restrictions must be no broader than necessary, ensure legitimate access, and afford monitoring tools to probation—while respecting First Amendment limits.
United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014): Permitted looking “through” a SORNA conviction to the underlying sexual offense in tailoring special conditions.
United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015): Held that special conditions implicating fundamental rights (e.g., adult pornography bans) demand more detailed justification, but less so where First Amendment issues are not directly – implicated.
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011) & United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719 (10th Cir. 2020): Articulated the standard of review and that only “generalized reasons” suffice for special conditions.
United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008): Confirmed that compliance history and offense characteristics drive the § 3583(d) analysis.
United States v. Englehart, 22 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2022): Clarified that a special condition need only be linked to at least one § 3553(a) factor.
United States v. Francis, 891 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2018): Reinforced that the district court need not explain each condition in detail, only enough to permit appellate review.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court applied 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which requires special conditions to be:

Reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors: nature and circumstances of the offense, defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation;
No greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve those purposes;
Consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.

Key points in the district court’s reasoning upheld on appeal:

Individualized Assessment: The court recited Kornacki’s multiple revocation hearings, admissions to repeated violations (failure to register, escape, failure to report housing/employment) and defiance of prior special conditions.
Tailoring & Breadth: Mirroring Blair, the prior-authorization condition restricts only device types authorized by probation and any broader prohibition is disallowed. The monitoring-software requirement allows reasonable supervision (keystroke capture, e-mail logs, browsing history) without a total bar on internet access.
First Amendment Guardrails: By requiring prior authorization rather than an outright ban, the condition preserves lawful speech and information access under Blair’s framework.
Risk & Public Safety: The probation officer testified that minors are accessible online and that unsupervised internet use poses a real risk given Kornacki’s sexual-battery history.
Proportionality: The court found no greater liberty deprivation than necessary because defendant retains moderate internet access subject to review and can petition to modify once he demonstrates compliance.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

This decision provides a clear endorsement for district courts to use tailored internet-access and monitoring-software conditions in supervising sex-offender and other recidivist populations. It:

Reinforces Blair as the controlling framework for technology-related restrictions;
Confirms that probation offices may demand passwords and install monitoring software where necessary to protect public safety, so long as conditions are reasonably tailored and justified;
Limits defendant arguments that mere potential for overreach or duplication (e.g., warrantless search conditions) defeats a supervisory tool—provided the court finds a rational basis in defendant’s noncompliance history;
Clarifies that appellate review focuses on abuse of discretion, not reweighing, and demands only “generalized” reasoning from the district court when fundamental rights are not directly implicated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release vs. Probation: Both follow imprisonment; supervised release is court-ordered oversight after federal prison, while probation can replace incarceration.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): Statutory provision requiring special supervised-release conditions to be (1) reasonably related to § 3553(a) goals, (2) no more restrictive than necessary, (3) consistent with federal sentencing policies.
Prior-Authorization Condition: Defendant must request and probation must approve each internet-capable device before use; preserves lawful access while enabling targeted oversight.
Monitoring-Software Condition: Defendant must allow installation of software/hardware that logs keystrokes, websites, emails, chats—deterring illicit activity and providing real-time supervision data.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors: Statutory sentencing factors: offense seriousness, criminal history, deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation, consistency with guidelines, and minimizing disparity.
Abuse-of-Discretion Standard: Appellate review standard for sentencing issues: reversal only if the district court’s decision rests on clear error of fact, error of law, or a judgment outside reasonable limits.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kornacki confirms that district courts may impose carefully tailored internet-use and monitoring-software conditions on federal supervised release when supported by a defendant’s recidivism risk, history of noncompliance, and public safety concerns. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and § 3553(a), such conditions need not be hyper-detailed so long as they:

Are reasonably related to one or more sentencing factors;
Don’t restrict more liberty than necessary;
Preserve lawful access and avoid constitutional overreach;
Are justified by individualized findings of noncompliance and risk.

This ruling strengthens district courts’ supervisory toolkit in the digital age while reaffirming important constitutional guardrails. It underscores that technology-based controls—when modestly and purposefully deployed—are a permissible, sometimes essential, component of federal supervised release in cases involving repeat or high-risk offenders.