Standard for Virtual Jury Selection and County‐Based Venire Limits under State v. Richins (2025 UT 10)

Standard for Virtual Jury Selection and County‐Based Venire Limits under State v. Richins (2025 UT 10)

Introduction

In State v. Richins, 2025 UT 10, the Utah Supreme Court resolved two interlocutory questions in a high‐profile criminal case: (1) whether the Third District’s presiding judge properly declined to permit in-person jury selection despite intense media attention, and (2) whether the trial judge could expand the jury venire to draw jurors from two counties by stipulation. The parties—State of Utah (appellant) and Kouri Darden Richins (appellant)—had jointly requested in-person voir dire and a multi‐county venire in advance of Richins’s scheduled four-week aggravated murder trial in April 2025. The Third District had adopted a standing order mandating virtual jury selection unless the presiding judge found “extraordinary circumstances,” and Utah’s Jury and Witness Act appeared to require jurors to be drawn from the county where the trial would occur. The Supreme Court affirmed both denials, defining the scope of district‐wide procedural rules and reaffirming that jurors must be summoned from a single county.

Summary of the Judgment

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously held that:

  1. The presiding judge of the Third Judicial District did not abuse her discretion under the district’s standing order when she denied the parties’ stipulation for in-person jury selection. The standing order vests sole authority in the presiding judge to grant a variance from virtual voir dire, and the judge reasonably concluded that media scrutiny alone did not amount to “extraordinary circumstances.”
  2. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to expand the jury venire to include jurors from Summit and Salt Lake counties. Under the Jury and Witness Act, jurors must be randomly selected from the single county where the trial will be held, and parties may not waive that statutory requirement by stipulation.

The Court rejected challenges to its jurisdiction over the presiding judge’s administrative order, concluding that once entered in the case, the order is appealable under Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(h).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

  • Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagley & Co. 2000 UT 27. Held that administrative decisions of a presiding judge, when entered as orders, may be appealed; established that “order” includes minute entries and administrative rulings made in-case.
  • State v. Green 2023 UT 10. Defines abuse of discretion as either applying the wrong legal standard or reaching a decision beyond reason.
  • State v. Montiel 2005 UT 48. Clarifies that a decision is “beyond the limits of reasonability” if no reasonable person would adopt the court’s view.
  • State v. Nielsen 2014 UT 10. Upheld a single-county venire even when security concerns required holding the trial in a neighboring county; later legislative amendment reinforced single-county requirement.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Jurisdiction over the Presiding Judge’s Order. The Court determined that the presiding judge’s denial of in-person jury selection, though administrative in nature, became a reviewable order when entered in the case. Citing Hi-Country, the Court held that Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(h) grants first-degree and capital felony defendants interlocutory-appeal rights over any order in their case.

b. Authority to Grant “Extraordinary Circumstances.” The Third District’s Standing Order mandates virtual selection and vests exclusive variance authority in the presiding judge. The Supreme Court interpreted the order’s conjunctive phrasing—“absent extraordinary circumstances and prior approval from the presiding judge”—to mean that both findings reside with the presiding judge. The trial judge’s preliminary finding of extraordinary circumstances carried no deference; the presiding judge independently assessed the same record.

c. Defining “Extraordinary Circumstances.” The presiding judge acknowledged the case’s high profile and intense media coverage but explained that existing tools—case‐specific questionnaires, decorum orders, voir dire instructions—can fairly screen for bias without in-person proceedings. She cited commentary recognizing virtual voir dire’s growing acceptance and its ability to expand the juror pool and reduce public exposure. The Court found her judgment within reason.

d. County‐Based Venire Requirement. Utah’s Jury and Witness Act repeatedly directs that jurors be “randomly selected from the county in which the trial will be held” (Utah Code § 78B-1-107(2)) and defines a “jury” as drawn from a “particular county.” The Supreme Court rejected the idea that general rules (Utah Code § 68-3-12) or waiver could override these specific mandates. Although parties may move under rule 29 to transfer a case to another county’s jury, no statutory provision allows selecting jurors from more than one county for a single trial.

e. Harmlessness of Presiding Judge Error. Even though the trial judge misread the presiding judge’s order as rejecting the expanded venire, this mistake was harmless—he lacked statutory authority to craft a two-county jury regardless of any stipulation or higher-court suggestion.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision clarifies two key procedural rules in Utah criminal practice:

  1. District-wide standing orders may prescribe virtual voir dire as the norm and assign variance authority to a presiding judge. Trial courts must comply unless “extraordinary circumstances” warrant in-person proceedings.
  2. The Jury and Witness Act’s single-county selection requirement is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by stipulation. Parties wishing a venire from a different county must seek a formal change of venue under rule 29.

Going forward, trial courts will rely on published criteria for “extraordinary circumstances” and ensure meticulous virtual voir dire procedures in high-profile matters. Courts and parties will also respect the statutory county boundary when composing juries.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse of Discretion
A judicial decision that either applies the wrong legal standard or is so unreasonable that no fair-minded judge could adopt it.
Interlocutory Appeal
An immediate appeal of a trial court’s ruling before the final judgment. Here, felony cases may appeal certain orders mid-trial under Utah law.
Venire
The pool of prospective jurors called to court for jury selection (voir dire).
Voir Dire
The process of questioning prospective jurors to identify bias or inability to serve impartially.
Standing Order
A district-wide administrative directive binding all judges in that district unless varied by the presiding judge.

Conclusion

State v. Richins establishes that Utah trial courts may adopt procedural standing orders requiring virtual jury selection and entrust variance decisions to the district’s presiding judge. It also reaffirms the Jury and Witness Act’s mandate that all jurors be randomly summoned from the single county where the trial occurs. Together, these holdings promote uniformity, preserve juror privacy and safety, and ensure that high-profile cases proceed fairly—whether online or in the courtroom.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Utah

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