Stagnation Reaffirmed: Partial Case‑Plan Compliance Does Not Bar Termination Where Domestic‑Violence Accountability and Consistent Contact Are Lacking

Case: In re K.L., Juvenile (J.G., Father), No. 25-AP-171 (Vt. Oct. 3, 2025) (entry order; three-justice panel)

Court: Supreme Court of Vermont

Disposition: Affirmed (termination of father’s residual parental rights)

Note: The decision is an entry order of a three‑justice panel and is not precedential before any tribunal. Even so, it illustrates and applies settled Vermont termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) doctrine.

Introduction

This entry order from the Vermont Supreme Court affirms the termination of a father’s parental rights to his three‑year‑old daughter, K.L. The case arose from a care-and-supervision proceeding initiated shortly after K.L.’s birth because of the mother’s prenatal substance use and concerns about the father’s violence toward the mother. Over approximately two and a half years, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) facilitated services and visitation, including a period of unsupervised overnights. The family division ultimately concluded that the father had “stagnated” in his ability to assume a parental role, particularly due to unresolved domestic-violence accountability, dishonesty about contact with the mother during unsupervised visits, and a decline in visitation and engagement with the child.

On appeal, the father challenged the stagnation finding, asserted that he had substantially complied with the case plan (especially in relation to substance use and parenting supports), and argued that DCF’s suspension of unsupervised visits was either erroneous or based on a misunderstanding of his criminal-justice conditions. The Vermont Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence and that, given the best-interest factors under 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a), termination was warranted.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the evidence supported the family division’s finding of changed circumstances based on stagnation, despite the father’s completion of some case-plan steps (substance-use screening and Family Time Coaching).
Unresolved domestic-violence concerns—noncompletion of DV programming, continuing denial of violence, dysregulated behavior, and inappropriate interactions with K.L.—were central to the stagnation determination.
After unsupervised visits were suspended because the father allowed the mother access to K.L. and was not honest with DCF about it, the father’s in-person visitation and video contact became inconsistent; he had not seen K.L. in person for five months before the final hearing.
The Court emphasized that a case plan is not a checklist; partial compliance does not defeat a stagnation finding where critical safety and parenting capacities remain unmet.
Arguments that DCF’s actions or misunderstandings caused the stagnation failed: the suspension of unsupervised visits was by court order; the father did not oppose that order or move to resume; and he did not avail himself of subsequent supervised and virtual contact opportunities.
Considering the best-interest factors, the family division reasonably found that K.L. was bonded to her foster family, did not seek the father’s company, and that the father was unlikely to resume parental duties within a reasonable time.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994): Establishes that in a post-disposition TPR, the court first asks whether there has been a change in circumstances since disposition; if so, it then considers whether termination is in the child’s best interests under § 5114(a).
In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504, 515 (1990): Defines “change in circumstances” as most often reflected by stagnation or deterioration in the parent’s ability to care for the child over time.
In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.): Reiterates that the most important best-interest factor is the likelihood that the parent will be able to resume parental duties within a reasonable time.
In re N.L., 2019 VT 10, ¶ 9, 209 Vt. 450: Clarifies the appellate standard of review—trial courts’ findings stand unless clearly erroneous, and conclusions are affirmed if supported by findings, provided the proper legal standards were applied.
In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 181 (1993): “The mere fact that a parent has shown some progress in some aspects of his or her life does not preclude a finding of changed circumstances.” This is directly invoked to reject the father’s “partial compliance” argument.
In re D.M., 2004 VT 41, ¶ 7, 176 Vt. 639 (mem.): A case plan is not a checklist whose completion guarantees reunification; courts examine whether core parenting capacities, safety, and insight have emerged. Also cited for the principle that changing one’s behavior is within a parent’s control (¶ 6).
In re S.R., 157 Vt. 417, 421–22 (1991): Recognizes that stagnation attributable to factors beyond the parent’s control cannot support termination. The Court explains why that principle does not aid the father on these facts.
In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, ¶ 17, 191 Vt. 108: Harmless-error principle in TPR cases—reversal requires error affecting a substantial right. This addresses the father’s claim that agency shortcomings (e.g., housing verification, probation misunderstanding) drove the outcome.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Framework: The family division appropriately followed the two-step TPR analysis after initial disposition. First, it found a change in circumstances based on stagnation. Second, it concluded that termination was in K.L.’s best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). On appeal, the Supreme Court applied a deferential standard to the trial court’s factfinding and affirmed.

Stagnation Finding: The Court acknowledged the father’s progress on certain tasks—completing a substance-use assessment with no concerns and finishing Family Time Coaching, which led to several months of unsupervised overnight visits. But the Court stressed that partial compliance does not negate stagnation where critical issues remain unresolved. The trial court credited evidence that the father:

Did not complete domestic-violence accountability programming in Vermont and rarely attended the equivalent program in New York.
Denied having a domestic-violence problem, showed dysregulated behavior at meetings and hearings, and told K.L. to “shut up” during a visit—demonstrating a lack of nonviolent coping strategies and insight into the impact of violence on the child.
Allowed the mother access to K.L. during unsupervised visits despite the mother’s untreated substance use and the parents’ history of violence, and was not honest with DCF when confronted.
After unsupervised visits were suspended, became inconsistent, missing supervised visits and calling only once a week despite authorization for twice-weekly video contact; he had not seen K.L. in person for five months by the final hearing.

On these facts, stagnation was well supported: the father did not demonstrate the ability or willingness to address the core safety concerns (domestic violence and honesty with the agency), and he failed to sustain contact necessary to maintain or build a parental bond.

Best-Interests Analysis (33 V.S.A. § 5114(a)): The family division’s findings addressed the statutory factors:

Relationship with the parent: The child “did not talk about father at all,” was often upset after visits, and did not miss or seek his company.
Adjustment to home/school/community: K.L. was strongly bonded to her foster family and well-adjusted to daycare and peers.
Likelihood parent can assume parental duties in a reasonable time: Negative, given the father’s inability to maintain unsupervised visitation, failure to attend visits generally, lack of knowledge about K.L.’s needs and routines, and lack of insight into her emotional and developmental needs. This is the most important factor under Vermont law.
Constructive role: The court found the father did not play a constructive role in K.L.’s life.

Rejecting Father’s Appellate Arguments:

Partial compliance and “checklist” theory: The Court reiterated that progress in some areas (e.g., substance use, coaching) does not preclude a stagnation finding where central safety and parenting deficits persist (A.F.; D.M.).
Burdens of proof/“inference” critique: The father contended the court inferred noncompliance and shifted the burden to him to prove fitness. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting the trial court did not rely on disputed action steps (e.g., sobriety, criminal activity) but instead on supported findings central to safety and engagement (DV accountability, honesty, visitation consistency).
Housing suitability (factor beyond control): The father argued DCF’s inability to verify his housing rendered stagnation beyond his control (citing S.R.). The Court held he failed to show prejudice: for much of the case, he lived with his mother, who refused to cooperate with DCF, blocking assessment. Later, when he obtained his own housing, unsupervised visitation had already been suspended, rendering home suitability minimally relevant to stagnation. Under R.W., any agency lapse would not warrant reversal absent impact on a substantial right—which was not shown.
Suspension of unsupervised visits and probation conditions: The record showed the suspension was not unilateral; DCF sought and obtained a court order. The father did not oppose the motion, did not contest key factual assertions at the subsequent hearing, and never moved to resume unsupervised visits. Even if his probation permitted certain contact with the mother, the core concern was child safety given the mother’s ongoing substance use and the parents’ violent history, compounded by the father’s dishonesty about the contact. Crucially, after suspension, he did not take advantage of available supervised or virtual contact, which independently supported stagnation.

3) Likely Impact and Practical Implications

Although nonprecedential, this entry order faithfully applies long-established Vermont TPR principles and provides useful guidance for practice:

Partial case-plan completion will not forestall TPR if the parent does not address core safety concerns (especially domestic-violence accountability and insight) and maintain consistent, quality contact with the child.
Honesty and cooperation with DCF are material. Misrepresentation about risky contacts and resistance to accountability can be powerful stagnation evidence.
Preservation matters: Parents should timely oppose visitation modifications, contest agency assertions in court, and move to resume contact when appropriate. Failure to do so weakens “beyond my control” arguments later.
Harmless-error lens: Even if an agency misapprehends some collateral condition (e.g., probation terms), reversal requires showing that the mistake affected a substantial right and the outcome.
Interstate logistics and housing verification: When parents live out of state or with uncooperative relatives, they should proactively facilitate access for home studies. Once unsupervised visitation is removed, however, housing suitability tends to recede in importance unless and until unsupervised contact is reestablished.
Domestic violence remains central in CHINS/TPR cases: Completion of DV programs, demonstrated insight, and behavioral change are often determinative. Denial and dysregulation are counterindicators.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Residual parental rights: The rights that remain after a child is placed in state custody (e.g., visitation, consent to adoption) unless and until terminated by court order.
Stagnation: Little or no improvement over time in a parent’s ability to provide safe, appropriate care. It can warrant modifying a disposition to termination when combined with a best-interests showing.
Best-interests factors (33 V.S.A. § 5114(a)):
- Quality of the child’s relationship with the parent and current caregivers.
- Child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
- Likelihood the parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time (most important).
- Whether the parent plays a constructive role in the child’s life.
“Case plan is not a checklist”: Courts look beyond box-checking to whether the parent has actually developed the ability and insight to keep the child safe and meet developmental needs.
Factors beyond the parent’s control: If stagnation is caused by circumstances the parent cannot control (e.g., systemic barriers), those cannot alone justify termination. The parent must show both lack of control and that it materially affected the outcome.
Standard of appellate review: Trial-court findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous; legal conclusions are affirmed if supported by those findings and correct standards were applied.

Key Takeaways

Completing some services is insufficient where a parent fails to resolve central safety risks (here, domestic violence) and does not maintain consistent, positive contact with the child.
Dishonesty about unsafe contact and subsequent disengagement from even supervised/virtual visits support a stagnation finding independent of any earlier visitation suspension.
Arguments premised on agency shortcomings require a showing of prejudice to a substantial right; otherwise, they will not undo a TPR judgment.
In best‑interests assessments, the child’s need for stability and the foreseeability of a parent assuming duties in a reasonable time weigh heavily, especially for very young children.

Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In re K.L. reaffirms core TPR principles: stagnation may be found despite partial progress, and the case plan cannot be reduced to a checklist. Where a parent does not internalize domestic‑violence accountability, is dishonest with the agency about risky contacts, and fails to sustain engagement with the child, a finding of stagnation is supported. Best‑interests analysis then turns on the child’s bonds, stability, and the realistic timeline for parental rehabilitation—considerations that favored permanency with the foster family here. While nonprecedential, the decision offers a clear, practical roadmap for trial courts and practitioners on the interplay between safety, insight, consistency of contact, and the statutory best‑interests framework.