Stagnation, Child-Centric Timing, and Appellate Civility Reaffirmed in Vermont TPR Appeals: In re A.C. (Vt. 2025)

Note on precedential value: This is an entry order of a three-justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court. As the order itself notes, decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered precedent before any tribunal. Even so, the order offers a clear reaffirmation of settled Vermont law on “stagnation,” the best-interests standard, and appellate advocacy norms.

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In re A.C., Juvenile (J.C., Father), Case No. 25-AP-178 (Oct. 3, 2025), affirming the family division’s termination of a father’s residual parental rights to his daughter, A.C. The case centers on whether the trial court properly found a material change in circumstances based on “stagnation” in the father’s ability to parent, and whether termination was in A.C.’s best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114.

Beyond reapplying familiar principles of juvenile and termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) law, the Supreme Court used the occasion to address two notable points: first, the limits of attributing parental stagnation to factors “beyond the parent’s control,” and second, the professional obligations of appellate counsel to maintain civility and accuracy. The Court also denied an amicus request by Disability Rights Vermont and granted the State’s motion to strike the amicus brief.

Parties: The State (through DCF) and A.C. as the subject child; J.C. (Father) as appellant; Mother’s parental rights had been terminated earlier and affirmed on appeal.
Posture: Appeal from a May 2025 family division order terminating father’s residual parental rights.
Core issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in finding changed circumstances via parental stagnation; (2) whether termination was in A.C.’s best interests; (3) challenges regarding purported discrimination and mischaracterization of father’s mental illness (deemed inadequately briefed); and (4) admonishment regarding appellate counsel’s hyperbolic rhetoric.

Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the termination of the father’s residual parental rights. The Court held:

Changed circumstances/stagnation: The trial court’s finding that father stagnated in his ability to parent after the initial disposition order was supported by the record—continued substance use, housing instability and removal due to aggression, failure to engage in required services (mental health, domestic violence programming, parenting classes), criminal conduct leading to incarceration, and lack of insight into the impact of his actions on A.C. The father’s recent five months of sobriety and mental health treatment did not preclude a finding of stagnation.
Best interests: The trial court correctly focused on whether the father could resume parenting within a reasonable time from the child’s perspective, and reasonably found termination was in A.C.’s best interests given her progress, stability in her school/community, ties to grandparents and a sibling, and distress after contact with father.
Appellate review: The Supreme Court declined to reweigh evidence, emphasizing the deferential standard of review of family court findings and conclusions.
Counsel conduct: The Court cautioned father’s counsel against hyperbolic, disparaging, and inflammatory assertions about the trial court and DCF, citing the importance of civility and professionalism.
Other claims: Allegations of discrimination and constitutional error were deemed inadequately briefed and inconsistent with the record. An evidentiary challenge raised for the first time in reply was not addressed.
Amicus: Disability Rights Vermont’s request to file an amicus brief was denied, and the State’s motion to strike the amicus brief was granted.

Factual and Procedural Background

Child: A.C., born September 2019.
CHINS petition: June 2021, citing parental substance use, domestic violence, unsanitary home conditions, lack of supervision, and unmet medical needs. Mother later stipulated to CHINS, and A.C. entered DCF custody.
Disposition (Feb. 2022): Plan aimed at reunification with either parent; father to engage in substance use, mental health, and domestic violence treatment; remain law-abiding; secure stable housing; complete parenting classes; attend team meetings.
Pre-TPR trajectory: Father made some initial progress but continued substance use; left multiple housing placements (one due to an altercation); did not complete required services.
TPR motion: Filed December 2022. Father was incarcerated in New Hampshire in January 2023; had supervised phone/video contact but no in-person contact thereafter. A.C. developed nightmares following video visits; such visits were stopped.
Placement: A.C. initially resided with maternal grandparents (strong bonds and stability), who addressed her medical needs and education. In January 2025, she transitioned smoothly to a new foster home in the same school district, maintaining contact with grandparents and a half-brother, J.C.
Father’s status pre-hearing: Released from incarceration in December 2024; received a schizophrenia diagnosis; was taking suboxone and antipsychotic medication; recently begun therapy; had a guardian assisting with daily needs, benefits, and housing; had unresolved criminal charges. He proposed reunification within several months and downplayed the reasons for DCF custody and the impact of prior drug use.
Trial ruling (May 2025): The family division found stagnation and concluded termination was in A.C.’s best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114.
Appeal: Father challenged the change-of-circumstances finding, the best-interests analysis, asserted inconsistency with the goals of 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a), and raised underdeveloped claims of discrimination and constitutional violation.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

33 V.S.A. § 5113(b): Modification of disposition requires a change in circumstances that makes modification necessary to serve the child’s best interests.
In re M.M., 159 Vt. 517, 521 (1993): “Changed circumstances” is often established through parental stagnation or deterioration.
In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 336 (1996): Some parental progress does not preclude a finding of changed circumstances.
33 V.S.A. § 5114: Best-interests factors; the “critical factor” is whether the parent can assume parental duties within a reasonable time.
In re G.S., 153 Vt. 651, 652 (1990) (mem.): Appellate deference: factual findings upheld unless clearly erroneous; conclusions affirmed if supported by findings.
In re S.B., 174 Vt. 427, 429 (2002) (mem.): The Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence; reviews for abuse of discretion.
In re S.R., 157 Vt. 417, 421-22 (1991): Stagnation caused by factors beyond the parent’s control cannot support TPR; however, claims that the State caused stagnation were rejected in that case.
In re J.M., 2015 VT 94, ¶ 12, 199 Vt. 627: Best interests of the child remain the touchstone and paramount concern in TPR.
In re B.S., 166 Vt. 345, 352 (1997): Juvenile court’s primary concern is the child’s welfare.
V.R.A.P. 28(a); Johnson v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 160, 164 n.* (1992): Issues must be adequately briefed with record and legal support; inadequately briefed claims are not addressed.
Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 2005 VT 83, ¶ 52, 178 Vt. 244: Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered.
In re S.C., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 468, 475 (App. 2006): Cited for the importance of appellate civility and professionalism; hyperbolic or disparaging rhetoric is improper and ineffective.

Legal Reasoning

1) Change in Circumstances via Parental Stagnation

The Court affirmed the family division’s finding of stagnation since the February 2022 disposition order. Although father showed recent progress—five months of sobriety, initiation of mental health treatment, medication adherence, and assistance from a guardian—those were new and relatively brief developments against years of noncompliance and instability.

Key facts supporting stagnation included:

Continued substance use after disposition;
Housing instability and removal from a placement due to aggression;
Failure to engage in mental health counseling, domestic-violence programming, and parenting classes;
Criminal conduct leading to incarceration;
Lack of insight into A.C.’s needs and the impact of father’s behavior.

By invoking In re M.M. and In re B.M., the Court restated that “some progress” does not defeat a finding of changed circumstances when the overall trajectory shows stagnation. It also addressed and rejected father’s claim that the stagnation finding rested on factors beyond his control, citing In re S.R. While mental illness itself may be beyond a parent’s control, the Court focused on the parent’s overall ability to meet case-plan requirements and to safely resume parenting—finding the lack of compliance and the arrest/incarceration to be within the parent’s control and adequately supported by the record.

2) Best Interests Analysis and the Child’s Perspective

Applying 33 V.S.A. § 5114 and aligning with In re J.M. and In re B.S., the Court emphasized the centrality of the child’s welfare and the timeframe measured from the child’s perspective. The trial court’s findings reflected A.C.’s substantial progress in stable, nurturing placements, continuity in schooling and activities, and consistent contact with grandparents and a sibling. The court also credited evidence that A.C. experienced nightmares following video contact with father, and that she had become uninterested in further contact, noting this as one piece within a broader best-interests analysis.

The father’s position—that A.C. could be transitioned to his care in “several months”—was weighed against A.C.’s nearly four years in DCF custody, her past trauma, and the father’s limited understanding of her needs and the difficulty of disrupting her present stability. On those facts, the trial court reasonably concluded father could not resume parenting within a reasonable time as seen through the child’s eyes.

3) Appellate Deference and Evidentiary Arguments

Reiterating In re G.S. and In re S.B., the Supreme Court declined to reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the family division’s. It held that the findings were supported by the record and the conclusions followed from the findings. An evidentiary challenge raised for the first time in the reply brief was not considered, consistent with Gallipo.

4) Civility and Adequate Briefing

The Court included a pointed admonition to father’s appellate counsel for the use of hyperbolic and disparaging rhetoric toward DCF and the trial judge. Drawing on In re S.C. (Cal. App. 2006), the Court underscored that exaggerated claims and disparagement are inappropriate and counterproductive. Relatedly, father’s constitutional and discrimination claims were deemed inadequately briefed under V.R.A.P. 28(a) and were inconsistent with the record.

5) Amicus Filing

Finally, the order notes that the Court denied Disability Rights Vermont’s request to file an amicus brief and granted the State’s motion to strike that brief. The order does not elaborate on the reasoning. The disposition signals the Court’s control over its docket and adherence to procedural rules governing amicus participation, particularly where issues were not adequately preserved or developed.

Impact and Practical Implications

Reaffirmation of Stagnation Principles: Even nonprecedential, the decision reflects the Court’s consistent application of stagnation doctrine. Short-term improvements, while laudable, do not erase a long-term pattern of noncompliance and instability when measured against the child’s need for timely permanency.
Child-Centered Timing: The reasonableness of time is measured “from the child’s perspective.” Where a child has spent years in care and is thriving in a stable placement, a parent’s prospective readiness “in several months” may be legally insufficient.
Evidence of Child Distress from Contact: The Court accepted the trial court’s reliance on evidence that contact with father caused the child distress (nightmares). Such evidence can be probative of the best-interests factors concerning the child’s relationships and emotional needs.
Mental Health Considerations: The Court did not penalize the parent for having a mental illness; rather, it evaluated whether, despite recent diagnosis and treatment, the parent could meet the child’s needs within a reasonable timeframe. Claims that the court “blamed” the parent for illness were rejected as mischaracterizations.
Appellate Advocacy: The civility admonition is an important reminder: arguments must be grounded in the record and law. Hyperbole and disparagement risk undermining credibility and may distract from substantive claims.
Briefing Standards and Preservation: Constitutional or discrimination claims must be adequately briefed and preserved. Raising new issues in reply is improper.
Amicus Practice: The Court’s summary denial/strike of an amicus brief emphasizes strict adherence to procedural norms. Proposed amici should ensure their participation comports with Vermont appellate rules and adds value to properly preserved issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Residual parental rights: The rights remaining to a parent after the State (DCF) has custody of the child, such as some decision-making and contact rights, unless and until the court terminates them. Termination severs these remaining rights and typically clears a path to adoption or other permanent guardianship.
CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision): A legal status for a child who requires court intervention due to abuse, neglect, lack of proper parental care, or other specified reasons.
Stagnation: A parent’s capacity to care for the child has not improved sufficiently since the disposition order. It can exist even where there is “some progress” if the parent remains unable to meet the child’s needs within a timeframe that is reasonable for the child.
Best interests factors (33 V.S.A. § 5114): Statutory considerations including the child’s relationship with parents and caregivers, adjustment to home/school/community, the parent’s ability to resume parental duties within a reasonable time, and the quality of the parent-child interaction.
Reasonable time from the child’s perspective: Courts consider the child’s developmental needs and the length of time already spent in care. What may feel like “soon” to an adult can be too long for a young child needing stability.
Standard of review on appeal: The Supreme Court gives deference to the family court’s factual findings (clearly erroneous standard) and does not reweigh evidence. It affirms if conclusions are supported by findings.
Factors beyond parental control: Stagnation cannot be premised on circumstances entirely outside a parent’s control; however, the parent’s conduct and compliance with services remain central, even when mental health issues are present.
Nonprecedential entry order: Signals the Court’s resolution of a case without creating binding precedent for future cases, though it often reflects how the Court applies established law.

How the Court Applied the Best-Interests Factors

While the entry order does not march through § 5114 factor by factor, the findings and discussion align with them:

Quality of the child’s relationship with the parent: A.C. initially enjoyed contact but grew less interested; nightmares occurred after video visits; A.C. had not mentioned father since the new placement.
Adjustment to home, school, and community: A.C. made “tremendous progress,” transitioned smoothly to a new foster family in the same school district, and maintained ties with grandparents and a sibling.
Parent’s role and constructive involvement: Father’s involvement was limited by substance use, mental health struggles, and incarceration; the court found he had not played a constructive role and lacked insight into the child’s needs and the harm caused.
Ability to resume parental duties within a reasonable time: The court concluded father could not resume within a timeframe reasonable for A.C., given her prolonged time in care and need for stability.

Addressing Father’s Specific Appellate Arguments

Schizophrenia and “factors beyond control”: The Court acknowledged father’s recent diagnosis and treatment progress but concluded the stagnation finding rested on a multi-year record of noncompliance and instability largely within his control. The record contradicted the claim that external forces or the State caused stagnation.
Allegations of bias/discrimination: Deemed inadequately briefed under V.R.A.P. 28(a) and inconsistent with the record, which showed the trial court credited father’s recent improvements but found them insufficient and too new to change the outcome.
Claim of inconsistency with 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a) goals: Rejected; the Court reaffirmed that the child’s best interests are paramount in TPR cases.
Challenge to child-distress finding: The Supreme Court held the trial court did not err in considering A.C.’s nightmares after video contact as part of a broader best-interests analysis.

Practice Pointers

For parents and counsel: Document sustained, not just recent, compliance and insight into the child’s needs; connect improvements to concrete parenting capacities and timelines that are realistic from the child’s perspective.
For DCF and GALs: Develop detailed records on the child’s adjustment, educational/medical progress, relational stability, and reactions to contact; provide evidence connecting parental behavior to the child’s well-being.
For appellate advocates: Maintain civility; avoid hyperbole and disparagement; ensure that constitutional or discrimination claims are preserved and thoroughly briefed with record citations and legal authority.
For proposed amici: Confirm compliance with Vermont appellate rules and that the proposed brief addresses properly preserved and developed issues in a way that assists the Court.

Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In re A.C. reinforces core principles of TPR jurisprudence in Vermont: parental “stagnation” can constitute a change in circumstances even where there is some recent progress; the best-interests inquiry is centered on the child’s welfare and timing; and appellate courts will not reweigh the family court’s evidence-based findings. The decision also underscores professional norms—civility and precise, supported argumentation—in appellate briefing. While nonprecedential, the order is instructive in illustrating how Vermont courts continue to balance parental progress against the child’s pressing need for stability, and how they assess claims that external factors explain or excuse longstanding noncompliance.

In the end, the Court affirmed the termination, finding that the father’s recent improvements—though meaningful—were too new and too limited to meet A.C.’s needs within a reasonable time measured from her perspective, after nearly four years in care and significant strides in a stable environment.

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.