Staged Automobile Collisions Trigger the § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) “Inherent Risk” Enhancement; Upward Variances May Rest on Underrepresented Criminal History and Uncharged Sophistication

I. Introduction

United States v. Brown (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) concerns sentencing for a multi-year fraud scheme involving odometer tampering and staged automobile collisions used to inflate insurance payouts. The United States prosecuted Sebron Dejuan Brown, who entered a blind guilty plea to conspiracy to commit odometer tampering, two counts of odometer fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

On appeal, Brown challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 48-month sentence that included: (1) a two-level Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) for “the conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury,” and (2) an upward variance of 11 months above the top of the resulting advisory range. The core issues were whether the staged-collision conduct inherently supports the § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement without case-specific proof of near-catastrophic risk, and whether the district court adequately justified—and permissibly based—an upward variance on factors including criminal history, danger to the public, and the scheme’s sophistication.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not err in applying § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) because staged automobile collisions carry an inherent risk of death or serious bodily injury; the sentencing court was not required to make granular findings distinguishing “bodily injury” from “serious bodily injury” in the manner Brown demanded. The panel also found no plain error in the district court’s explanation for applying the enhancement.

Regarding the upward variance, the court concluded the district court provided a sufficiently reasoned explanation tied to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the repetitive, multi-part nature of the fraud over years, the danger posed by staged wrecks, the scheme’s sophistication (even though the court did not apply a formal “sophisticated means” enhancement), and a finding that Brown’s criminal history category understated the seriousness and persistence of his criminal conduct. The 11-month variance was also held substantively reasonable.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

United States v. Rocha, 145 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2025): The court used Rocha to frame the standard of review for sentencing appeals—abuse of discretion overall, de novo for Guidelines legal conclusions, and clear error for factual findings— and to reiterate the two-step procedural/substantive reasonableness framework. Rocha also supports “due deference” to a district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors when reviewing the extent of a variance.
United States v. Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th 1174 (10th Cir. 2025): Cited for the distinction between procedural and substantive reasonableness and for the principle that sentences outside the Guidelines range are not presumed unreasonable. The opinion also invokes Guevara-Lopez for the idea that a cogent sentencing explanation tends to place a sentence within the realm of reasonable choice.
United States v. Maestas, 642 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2011): Maestas appears twice with two related roles: (1) the burden rule that the government must prove enhancement facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and (2) support for treating certain conduct as creating an inherent risk sufficient for applying § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A)-type enhancements (i.e., the enhancement can rest on the nature of the conduct, not only on near-miss evidence).
United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003): The Second Circuit’s reasoning is used as persuasive authority: staged collisions inherently involve a serious risk of bodily injury, and the risk “inheres” in deliberately caused accidents. Brown adopts this logic to rebut the argument that the district court needed individualized proof that a particular staged crash was especially severe.
United States v. Hoffman, 9 F.3d 49 (8th Cir. 1993): Like Lucien, Hoffman is invoked for the proposition that arranged automobile accidents inherently present a risk of serious bodily injury supporting the enhancement. The Tenth Circuit uses Hoffman to reinforce a cross-circuit consensus about the inherent dangerousness of staged crashes.
United States v. Wireman, 849 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2017): Wireman supplies the four-part plain-error framework applied to Brown’s unpreserved objection that the district court insufficiently explained the enhancement. The panel concluded the first prong (error) was not met.
United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2008): Central to the variance discussion. The court relied on Alapizco-Valenzuela for the rule that a district court may rely on facts already reflected in the Guidelines to justify a variance, so long as it specifically articulates why the defendant’s situation differs from the typical Guidelines case; the explanation need not be overly detailed.
United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2008): Cited to validate the district court’s approach: a variance is upheld when the court carefully, reasonably considers the § 3553(a) factors and provides a reasoned basis.
United States v. Lawless, 979 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2020): Used to focus substantive reasonableness review on the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis and the sufficiency of the justifications supporting the chosen sentence.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A): “Conscious or Reckless Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury”

The panel treated the enhancement as turning on the inherent nature of staged automobile collisions. Brown argued the district court did not identify evidence that anyone faced a risk of death or “serious bodily injury,” and faulted the court for discussing “injury” without repeatedly using the qualifier “serious.” The Tenth Circuit rejected this as a semantic and evidentiary over-demand.

The district court’s factual premise—that staged collisions “can certainly hurt other people” because cars are large machines traveling at speed—was deemed sufficient to capture the qualifying risk. By citing United States v. Lucien and United States v. Hoffman, the panel situated the enhancement within a broader judicial understanding: deliberately causing crashes inherently and predictably creates the sort of risk the enhancement targets, even if no one is actually gravely injured in a particular incident.

Importantly, the opinion signals that for staged-collision schemes, the enhancement does not require the sentencing court to quantify the “degree” of risk created by each collision or to show a close call with death; it is enough that the criminal method (deliberately causing wrecks) is the kind of conduct that foreseeably risks death or serious bodily injury.

2. Adequacy of Explanation and Plain-Error Review

Because Brown did not object at sentencing to the adequacy of the explanation for the enhancement, review was for plain error under United States v. Wireman. The panel found no error at all: the court explained the enhancement by linking it to Brown’s admitted conduct (staging wrecks) and the inherent dangers of that conduct.

3. Upward Variance: Multiple § 3553(a) Grounds and Permissible Overlap with the Guidelines

Brown attempted to characterize the upward variance as resting solely on the judge’s view that he had never had a sustained period of lawful behavior. The Tenth Circuit rejected that framing, pointing to a multi-factor explanation: repetitive and consistent fraud over a long period; many moving parts and recruitment of others; danger to co-conspirators and potentially innocent third parties; the scheme’s sophistication (even though not charged as a Guidelines enhancement); and an underappreciated criminal history.

The opinion is especially instructive in its treatment of “double counting” concerns. Relying on United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, it reiterates that facts already captured by the Guidelines may still support a variance if the court explains why the Guidelines treatment under-describes the defendant’s circumstances. Here, even though Brown’s criminal history category was II, the court articulated that his “life-long and consistent criminal conduct” was not fully reflected.

4. Substantive Reasonableness: Deference to District Court’s Weighing

On the extent of the variance (11 months above the top of the advisory range), the panel applied the deferential approach described in United States v. Rocha and United States v. Guevara-Lopez. It held the district court’s justification was sufficiently connected to § 3553(a) and not irrational or arbitrary. It also rejected the argument that dangerousness was fully accounted for by the § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement, explaining the variance reflected broader concerns (public protection, persistent conduct, scope and sophistication, underrepresented criminal history) rather than merely repeating the enhancement’s rationale.

C. Impact

Although the disposition is labeled nonprecedential, its reasoning is likely to be persuasive in future Tenth Circuit sentencing disputes involving staged collisions or similarly dangerous fraud methods. Key practical effects include:

Enhancement applicability in staged-collision fraud: The opinion reinforces that deliberately caused crashes are categorically risky enough to support § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) without a requirement for incident-by-incident proof of near-fatal outcomes.
Variance justification can include “uncharged” sophistication: Even where a court does not apply U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), it may still consider the scheme’s multi-step complexity under § 3553(a) when deciding whether and how far to vary.
Criminal history underrepresentation remains a robust variance ground: The opinion endorses upward variances when a defendant’s formal criminal history category fails to reflect persistent criminal conduct, so long as the court explains the mismatch.
Preservation matters: Challenges to the sufficiency of the sentencing court’s explanation, if not raised contemporaneously, face the steep barrier of plain-error review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court properly calculated the Guidelines and adequately explained the sentence. Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence makes sense in light of the statutory goals in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Guidelines “enhancement”: An enhancement increases the offense level (and usually the advisory range) when certain facts are found—here, that the offense involved a “conscious or reckless risk” of death or serious bodily injury.
“Inherent risk”: Some conduct is considered dangerous by its nature. Staging car crashes is dangerous even if no one ends up seriously hurt in a particular crash, because crashes predictably can cause grave harm.
Upward “variance”: A variance is a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range based on the court’s assessment of the broader statutory factors in § 3553(a). It is distinct from an “upward departure,” which is a Guidelines-authorized adjustment within the Guidelines framework.
“Sophisticated means”: In the Guidelines, this term generally refers to especially complex or intricate offense conduct. In Brown, the district court did not apply the formal sophisticated-means enhancement, but treated the multi-step planning (odometer procurement/installation, staged wrecks, false claims) as a reason supporting a higher sentence under § 3553(a).
Plain error: If a defendant fails to object in the district court, the appellate court will reverse only for a clear, obvious mistake that affected the outcome and seriously undermined the proceeding’s fairness.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Brown affirms a sentencing approach in staged-collision insurance fraud cases that treats the risk of death or serious bodily injury as inherent in deliberately caused crashes, supporting the U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement without demanding collision-specific proof of extreme peril. It also underscores the breadth of district-court discretion to impose upward variances grounded in a well-articulated § 3553(a) analysis—including the scheme’s multi-step sophistication, public-danger concerns, and criminal history underrepresentation— and it illustrates how unpreserved objections to sentencing explanations are difficult to win on appeal under plain-error review.