I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in Michael Halley v. Danielle Francoeur, No. 25‑AP‑014 (Nov. 7, 2025), a family law appeal arising from a final divorce order of the Windsor Unit, Family Division. Although expressly designated as a non‑precedential three‑justice entry order (“Decisions of a three‑justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.”), the decision is highly instructive on several recurring themes in custody litigation:

• How courts weigh stability and continuity against a parent’s decision to relocate, including relocation to live with online acquaintances.
• The interaction between allegations of abuse, an out‑of‑state protective order, and Vermont’s best‑interest factors under 15 V.S.A. § 665.
• The limits of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) as a vehicle to reopen evidence based on post‑judgment developments or litigation choices a party later regrets.
• The scope of appellate deference to trial courts in allocating parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) and crafting parent‑child contact (PCC) schedules.

The parties—mother (appellant) and father (appellee)—disputed who should have primary physical and legal PRR for their two young sons and what PCC schedule should govern. The family division awarded father primary PRR and granted mother alternating‑weekend contact plus detailed holiday and vacation time. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court misapplied key best‑interest factors, especially the abuse factor and the factor concerning each parent’s ability to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent, and that it erred in adopting father’s proposed PCC schedule. She also challenged the denial of her post‑judgment motion to reopen evidence under Rule 59(e).

The Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the trial court’s broad discretion and underscoring the centrality of stability, evidentiary support, and proper use of post‑judgment motions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

The case comes to the Vermont Supreme Court as an appeal from a final divorce order. The trial court awarded:

• Primary physical and legal PRR of the parties’ two sons (born 2017 and 2019) to father.
• PCC to mother on an alternating‑weekend basis, extended when Monday holidays occur, and a specific schedule for holidays and school vacations.

After judgment, mother filed a Rule 59(e) motion seeking to reopen evidence and amend the decision, claiming she was now extremely likely to move near father and therefore a 50/50 schedule or predetermined future change should be ordered if she returned. She also attacked father’s credibility and stability, particularly regarding his planned move to New Hampshire.

The trial court denied the motion, emphasizing the limited purposes of Rule 59(e) and noting that mother could have presented evidence at trial about any intention to return to Vermont but did not do so.

B. Core Holdings

The Supreme Court’s key determinations are:

1. No error in awarding primary PRR to father. The trial court applied the best‑interest factors in 15 V.S.A. § 665 and reasonably concluded that five of seven applicable factors favored father, especially considering:
   • The children’s longstanding ties and close relationships in the Springfield, Vermont community and with father’s extended family.
   • Mother’s multiple relocations with the children to live with individuals she met online, which the court viewed as showing poor insight into the children’s need for stability.
   • Father’s ability to provide a safe, stable environment and to foster the children’s relationship with mother through regular and generous PCC.
2. No error in the assessment of abuse and the “fostering relationship” factor. The Court rejected mother’s argument that the trial court contradicted itself by:
   • Not finding “abuse” under § 665(b)(9) affecting the children, while
   • Considering her relocations (including seeking a New York protective order) as instability rather than a reasonable escape from abuse.
   The Supreme Court highlighted that the trial court made no finding that mother left to escape abuse and that there was no evidence regarding the impact of father’s disturbing statements on the children themselves.
3. No abuse of discretion in the PCC schedule. The trial court’s adoption of father’s proposed schedule—alternating weekends plus substantial summer time—fell within its broad discretion. There was no basis to craft a 50/50 schedule contingent on a hypothetical future move by mother, because no such intent or plan was presented at trial.
4. Proper denial of Rule 59(e) motion. The trial court correctly refused to reopen the evidence to consider mother’s post‑judgment assertions that she might relocate to Vermont and to re‑litigate father’s stability. Rule 59(e) is not a mechanism for:
   • Raising arguments or evidence that could have been presented before judgment, or
   • Correcting a party’s own strategic or evidentiary omissions.
5. Appellate deference to trial fact‑finding. The Supreme Court reiterated that it does not reweigh evidence or adopt a party’s preferred inferences. It reviews for abuse of discretion and clear error, giving trial courts wide latitude in family matters.

III. Factual and Legal Context

A. Key Factual Background

The Court’s findings present a complex parenting history marked by military service, non‑traditional online activity, alleged emotional abuse, and multiple interstate moves:

• Marriage and roles.
  • Parties married in November 2016; separated in November 2022.
  • Two sons: born 2017 and 2019.
  • Father: primary wage‑earner; stable income; National Guard medic and ambulance worker.
  • Mother: primary caregiver during marriage; nurse; significantly reduced work after first child’s birth.
• Gaming and online activity.
  • Both parents played video games and streamed.
  • Mother often gamed from 5:00 p.m. until as late as 5:00 a.m.
  • She operated a quasi‑BDSM Twitch channel, using a dominatrix persona and provocative language, and posted Instagram photos (some including the children) in fantasy outfits.
• Marital conflict and alleged threats.
  • By 2021–2022, mother was distant and parties argued occasionally.
  • Father, returning from deployments, sometimes displayed less patience, more aggression, dark humor, and talked about killing people.
  • On at least one occasion, he referenced injecting mother with potassium chloride; another time he mentioned leaving her “with a cardboard box.”
  • Mother showed a friend a Snapchat message where father referenced injecting her veins with potassium so she would die in her sleep.
• Mother’s departure and relocations.
  • During Thanksgiving week 2022, while father was at work, mother left Vermont with the children; the joint account was overdrawn by $1800, and she withdrew $19,000 from her own account.
  • She informed father that she had left with the boys but did not disclose destination or return plans, nor did she allege abuse at that time.
  • She went to Orange County, New York, to live on property owned by the Sloanhoffers—people she met through Twitch. She entered into a relationship with their adult son, who lived with her and the children in an in‑law suite.
  • Later, after the son assaulted her (August 2023), she relocated with the children to South Carolina to live with her mother and sister, then had a falling out with her mother, and returned to New York to again live on Sloanhoffer‑provided housing and financial support.
• Protective orders and contact.
  • Shortly after leaving Vermont, mother obtained a temporary New York protective order, preventing father from seeing the children.
  • She did not allege physical abuse. She told the boys that father had kicked her out.
  • The temporary order remained in place for nearly a year. In October 2023, father stipulated to a final protective order without findings in New York, and that court deferred to Vermont on PCC issues.
  • Father had no in‑person contact with the children from November 2022 until he successfully moved for temporary PCC, resuming contact in January 2024.
• Children’s ties and relationships.
  • The children had a “positive and strong relationship” with father’s large family and friends, and with their friends in the Springfield area where they had lived all their lives until mother’s moves.
  • They also made friends in New York.
• Father’s living situation.
  • At the time of the divorce order, father remained in the marital home in Springfield, pending sale.
  • He was in a new relationship, expecting a child with his new partner.
  • He and his partner secured housing in Claremont, New Hampshire, with a bedroom for the boys, and planned to relocate there after sale of the marital home.

B. Legal Framework

1. Parental Rights & Responsibilities and Parent‑Child Contact

Vermont family courts allocate:

• Parental Rights and Responsibilities (PRR) – major decisions and, often, primary physical care.
• Parent‑Child Contact (PCC) – the schedule of time the children spend with each parent.

Under 15 V.S.A. § 665, courts must base these decisions on the “best interests of the child,” using specified statutory factors (discussed in detail below). The court can allocate PRR solely to one parent, or divide responsibilities, and then fashion PCC accordingly.

2. Best‑Interest Factors – 15 V.S.A. § 665

The relevant factors in this case include, among others:

• § 665(b)(5): Each parent’s ability to foster a positive relationship and frequent and continuing contact with the other parent.
• § 665(b)(9): The effect of any abuse, as defined in 15 V.S.A. § 1101, on the child and the child’s relationship with the abusing parent.
• Stability and continuity of the child’s relationships and environment, including community, school, and family ties.
• The child’s relationship with each parent and extended family.

The trial court concluded that five of seven applicable factors favored father, none favored mother, and two were neutral or even.

3. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

Rule 59(e) allows a party to move to “alter or amend” a judgment. It is a narrow remedy, generally limited to:

• Correcting manifest errors of law or fact,
• Considering newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been presented earlier, or
• Accounting for intervening changes in controlling law.

It is not a mechanism to:

• Raise arguments or present evidence that could have been introduced before judgment, or
• Relitigate issues simply because a party is dissatisfied with the outcome.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402 (1995)

Cited for the principle that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence. The trial court is the fact‑finder; it decides credibility and what inferences to draw from the evidence.

“We leave it to the trial court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence.”

In Halley, this principle justified rejecting mother’s attempt to reframe the facts on appeal by referencing her testimony and preferred interpretation of events, especially her portrayal of the relationship as abusive and her relocations as wholly protective and reasonable.

B. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 2014 VT 65, 197 Vt. 17

Cited for the proposition that:

“The family court has broad discretion in determining what allocation of parental rights and responsibilities is in a child’s best interests.”

LeBlanc reinforces that, as long as the trial court:

• Considers the statutory factors, and
• Makes findings reasonably supported by the evidence,

its custodial allocation will rarely be overturned. The Supreme Court invoked this to uphold the decision assigning primary PRR to father.

C. Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc., 2012 VT 28, 191 Vt. 611 (mem.) and N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Elecs., Ltd., 2008 VT 96, 184 Vt. 303

Both are cited to reinforce the strict limits on Rule 59(e). The Court quotes Gregory, which in turn cites Mitec:

“[A]ny supposed mistake in a judgment due to a party’s own fault or neglect is outside the power of Rule 59(e) to correct.”

In Halley, mother’s attempt to reopen the record to introduce:

• Her new plan to move closer to father, and
• More evidence about father’s alleged “machinations” and stability

clearly fell into the category of arguments and evidence that could have been raised prior to judgment. The Court, relying on these precedents, treated such use of Rule 59(e) as improper.

D. Graham v. Adekoya, 2024 VT 36, 219 Vt. 402

Cited for the standard governing appellate review of PCC orders:

“The family division has broad discretion to make decisions regarding PCC, and we will not disturb those decisions unless this discretion was exercised upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable upon the facts presented.”

This authority supports the Court’s refusal to second‑guess the trial court’s adoption of father’s proposed contact schedule, especially where:

• The schedule gave mother routine contact and generous summer time, and
• Mother’s own equal‑time proposal was undisputedly unworkable if she remained in New York.

E. Hoover v. Hoover, 171 Vt. 256 (2000)

Cited for the basic appellate rule that:

“Our review is confined to the record and evidence adduced at trial. On appeal, we cannot consider facts not in the record.”

The Court used Hoover to reject mother’s reliance on:

• A motion she filed after the appealed order, and
• Findings from a prior temporary order that had been superseded by the final divorce order.

This serves as a reminder that appellate review is tied to the trial record and the final judgment, not subsequent developments or earlier interim rulings.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Application of the Best‑Interest Factors

1. Stability and Continuity

The trial court’s central theme—and the Supreme Court’s decisive reason for affirmance—was stability.

The trial court found that the children had:

• Lived in the Springfield, Vermont area all their lives prior to mother’s moves.
• Developed strong connections with father’s extended family and local friends.

Against this backdrop, the court viewed mother’s decisions as destabilizing:

• Leaving Vermont without notice while father was at work.
• Relocating the children to live with the Sloanhoffers—complete strangers to the children—whom mother had met purely through online gaming.
• Entering a relationship with the Sloanhoffers’ son, having him live with her and the children, and then moving again to South Carolina after he assaulted her.
• Returning yet again to New York and resuming reliance on the Sloanhoffers’ housing and financial support.

The Supreme Court characterized the trial court’s inference as reasonable: that these moves reflected “poor insight into the children’s need for stability.” It emphasized that the trial court did not “fault” mother morally for relocating, but rather analyzed the effect of her decisions on the children, which is precisely what § 665 requires.

2. Ability to Foster Relationship – § 665(b)(5)

Mother argued that she was unfairly criticized for restricting father’s contact, given that she believed she was fleeing abuse and needed a protective order. However, the findings showed:

• Mother did not initially allege abuse when she left; she simply disappeared with the children and funds.
• A New York protective order prevented father from any contact for nearly a year, despite the absence of physical abuse allegations.
• Mother suggested to the boys that father had kicked her out, arguably undermining their perception of him.
• After returning to New York from South Carolina, she made it difficult for father to obtain information about the children’s education.

In contrast, the court credited:

• Father’s commitment to fostering the children’s relationship with mother.
• His willingness to provide substantial, routine PCC and a generous summertime schedule (two‑weeks‑on, two‑weeks‑off during summer).

On this record, the Court saw no error in concluding that father was “better able than mother” to foster a positive, ongoing relationship with the other parent, and that § 665(b)(5) weighed in his favor.

3. Abuse and Its Effect on the Children – § 665(b)(9)

Under § 665(b)(9), the court examines:

“The effect of any abuse, as defined in section 1101 of this title, on the child and the child’s relationship with the abusing parent.”

Mother pointed to father’s disturbing statements—particularly references to injecting her with potassium so she would die in her sleep—as evidence of abuse. She argued that the court erred in:

• Not finding abuse that impacted the children, while
• Simultaneously viewing her exit from the relationship as destabilizing.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It stressed that:

• The trial court made no factual finding that father’s behavior toward mother—however inappropriate or alarming—constituted “abuse” with demonstrable effects on the children.
• There was no evidence introduced about:
  • The children’s awareness of the threats; or
  • Any emotional or psychological impact on them.
• Without such evidence, the factor concerning the impact of abuse on the children did not favor either party.

Put differently, marital misconduct or abuse toward a parent is not automatically dispositive under § 665(b)(9). The court must see how, if at all, it affected the children and their relationship with the allegedly abusive parent. In the absence of such proof, the factor may be neutral.

B. Treatment of Mother’s Relocations and the Role of Online Acquaintances

The opinion is notable for how it discusses mother’s:

• Departure from Vermont without notice,
• Immediate move to the home of people she had met online via Twitch, and
• Subsequent re‑engagement with those same individuals after a violent incident involving their son.

The Court did not explicitly condemn mother’s online persona or her quasi‑BDSM channel as a moral failing. Instead, the opinion uses these facts to highlight:

• The nature and depth of mother’s relationship with the Sloanhoffers (purely online, at least initially).
• The fact that the children were moved to live with total strangers and then exposed to relational instability and violence (the assault by the son).

From a doctrinal standpoint, the message is that:

It is not the unconventional lifestyle per se, but the concrete risks and instability to which it exposes the children that matter.

The Supreme Court endorsed the trial court’s view that such moves weighed heavily against mother on the stability and judgment fronts.

C. PCC Schedule and the Rejection of Speculative Future Moves

Mother criticized the PCC schedule on two grounds:

1. That the court simply adopted father’s proposal without explaining why.
2. That the court should have considered a potential future relocation by mother closer to father and tailored the order to that scenario.

The Supreme Court found neither persuasive.

First, the court noted that:

• Father’s proposed schedule gave mother regular, predictable weekends and generous summer time.
• The trial court articulated that it considered these advantages when adopting the schedule.

Second, the Court firmly rejected basing a PCC order on speculation:

• There was no evidence or argument presented at the final hearing that mother intended soon to return to Vermont.
• Mother herself acknowledged that her proposed equal‑time schedule was impossible if she remained in New York.
• Under these circumstances, it would have been improper for the trial court to construct a schedule contingent on a purely hypothetical move that was never placed in evidence.

The Supreme Court also endorsed the trial court’s refusal to fix this through a Rule 59(e) motion. A parent cannot:

withhold evidence about potential relocation at trial, lose on PRR and PCC, and then use a post‑judgment motion to re‑open the record on the basis of “new” intentions that were never presented despite being foreseeable.

D. Denial of the Rule 59(e) Motion

Mother’s Rule 59(e) motion sought, in essence:

• To introduce new evidence of her likely move closer to father.
• To press for a de facto 50/50 contact schedule in that event.
• To attack father’s credibility and stability concerning his announced plan to move to New Hampshire.
• To have the court predetermine that her return to Vermont would constitute a “change in circumstances” warranting future modification and mandatory mediation.

The trial court, and the Supreme Court on review, refused for three central reasons:

1. Evidence was available earlier. Mother could have testified at trial about any plan or intention to relocate back to Vermont but elected not to do so. Rule 59(e) does not rescue such strategic choices.
2. Rule 59(e) is not for relitigation. The motion largely attempted to re‑argue factual disputes already decided and to present new spins on father’s anticipated move to New Hampshire, which had already been addressed at trial.
3. No manifest error identified. Mother did not point to a clear legal or factual error in the existing findings or conclusions; rather, she disputed the trial court’s weighing of evidence, which is not grounds for Rule 59(e) relief.

Relying on Gregory and Mitec, the Court reiterated that a litigant’s own “fault or neglect” in failing to introduce evidence cannot be corrected via Rule 59(e).

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. PRR vs. PCC

• Parental Rights and Responsibilities (PRR): Who has decision‑making authority and, often, primary physical care—e.g., where children live most of the time and who makes major decisions about education, health care, religion, etc.
• Parent‑Child Contact (PCC): The time‑sharing schedule: when and how children spend time with each parent (weekends, holidays, vacations, etc.).

In Halley, father has primary PRR; mother has specified PCC.

B. “Best Interests of the Child” – 15 V.S.A. § 665

Vermont law does not presume that one parent (e.g., primary caregiver, mother, or higher earner) automatically gets custody. Courts must consider statutory factors such as:

• The child’s relationships with each parent and extended family.
• Stability and continuity in the child’s environment.
• Each parent’s ability to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and developmental needs.
• Each parent’s willingness and ability to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent.
• The impact of any abuse on the child.

No single factor is controlling; the court balances them. In Halley, stability and family/community ties were particularly influential.

C. Abuse Factor – § 665(b)(9) and § 1101

“Abuse” is defined in § 1101 (the abuse‑prevention statute) and includes physical violence, threats of serious harm, stalking, etc. Under § 665(b)(9), the court focuses on:

• Whether abuse occurred, and
• What impact it had on the child and the child’s relationship with the abusing parent.

It is not enough that one parent behaved badly toward the other; courts look for evidence of how that behavior affected the children’s safety, well‑being, and relationship with that parent.

D. Abuse of Discretion and Appellate Review

When the Supreme Court reviews custody decisions, it uses a deferential standard:

• It asks whether the trial court relied on evidence in the record and applied the correct legal standards.
• It does not revisit credibility or reweigh evidence (“maybe the other parent’s version is more believable”).
• It will overturn only if the decision was based on “unfounded considerations” or is “clearly unreasonable.”

This is why mother’s attempt to reargue the evidence, or to rely on her own testimony from other hearings, failed on appeal.

E. Rule 59(e) Motions

A Rule 59(e) motion is not a second trial. It is meant to address:

• Obvious errors in the judgment,
• Changes in law, or
• Critical evidence that could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence.

It cannot be used to:

• Introduce evidence that was always available but not presented.
• Change trial strategy after seeing an unfavorable outcome.
• Re‑litigate the same factual disputes.

F. Non‑Precedential Entry Orders

The opinion explicitly states that decisions of a three‑justice panel are not precedential. This means:

• They do not bind lower courts or future panels in the same way as full, published opinions.
• They may still be cited for persuasive reasoning in some contexts, but they do not formally establish new binding law.

Even so, the way the Court applies existing principles in Halley offers practical guidance for similar disputes.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Emphasis on Stability over Parental Narrative

The decision underscores that:

Stability, continuity, and community/family ties often carry significant weight in custody determinations.

A parent who relocates children multiple times, especially to live with individuals met online and in contexts involving subsequent violence, risks being viewed as lacking in judgment regarding the children’s need for a safe, predictable environment.

B. Allegations of Abuse Must Be Tied to Child Impact

Halley illustrates that:

• Even serious and alarming threats between adults do not automatically determine custody unless their effect on the children is shown.
• Protective orders from other states, especially when stipulated to “without findings,” are not in themselves dispositive under § 665(b)(9).

For practitioners and litigants, this stresses the importance of:

• Presenting clear, child‑focused evidence of how abuse has affected the children emotionally, psychologically, or physically.
• Not assuming that the existence of a protective order will, by itself, override other best‑interest factors such as stability and extended‑family ties.

C. Duty to Present All Relevant Evidence at Trial

The treatment of mother’s Rule 59(e) motion and future‑move argument sends a strong message:

• If a parent anticipates moving closer to the other parent or making other major life changes relevant to custody, this must be squarely presented at trial.
• Trying to “fix” an omission in a post‑judgment motion will likely be unsuccessful and may be viewed as an attempt to re‑try the case.

This is practically significant in relocation‑heavy disputes, where parents often have fluid or evolving plans. Counsel must encourage clients to be candid and thorough about all reasonably foreseeable changes that might bear on PRR or PCC.

D. PCC Design and Speculative Future Events

The Court’s refusal to tailor the PCC order to hypothetical future moves reinforces a broader principle:

Custody and contact orders must be based on the evidence and circumstances presented at the time of trial, not on speculation about what might happen later.

Future changes in circumstances—such as a parent actually relocating—are typically addressed through post‑judgment modification proceedings, not built into the original order on speculation.

E. Social Media, Online Communities, and Parenting

While not the focal legal issue, the case also implicitly warns that:

• Online relationships and financial dependence on online acquaintances will be scrutinized for how they affect children’s safety and stability.
• Public online personas (e.g., sexually suggestive gaming streams, inclusion of children in provocative imagery) may become part of the factual record relevant to parenting judgment, even if not dispositive on their own.

Courts are increasingly confronting such fact patterns, and Halley shows how they may be framed: not as moral condemnation of unconventional lifestyles, but as an inquiry into concrete effects on the children’s lives.

VIII. Conclusion

Michael Halley v. Danielle Francoeur is officially non‑precedential, but its reasoning offers a clear and instructive application of Vermont family law to a modern, factually complex dispute involving online relationships, interstate relocations, and allegations of intimate partner mistreatment.

The decision:

• Reaffirms the broad discretion of trial courts in allocating PRR and PCC based on the best interests of the child.
• Highlights stability, continuity, and extended‑family connections as central considerations, especially for young children.
• Clarifies that the abuse factor requires proof of actual impact on the children, not solely evidence of disturbing conduct between adults.
• Emphasizes that Rule 59(e) cannot be used to cure strategic omissions or introduce new post‑judgment arguments about potential relocations.
• Underscores that PCC orders must be based on current, proven facts, not speculative future events.

In practice, the case serves as a cautionary example: parents and counsel must present a full, child‑focused picture at trial—including any credible plans to relocate—while recognizing that courts will carefully examine how unconventional life choices and rapid relocations affect children’s stability and relationships. Even as a non‑precedential entry order, Halley will likely be cited informally for its clear articulation of these themes.