Speculative “Diversion of Resources” Is Not Enough: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms “Certainly Impending” Injury Requirement for Organizational Standing in NVRA Injunction Suits

Introduction

In RNC v. Jocelyn Benson (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (No. 24-1985) (per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) suit brought by the Republican National Committee (RNC) against Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and the state Bureau of Elections Director. The RNC alleged that Michigan failed to make a “reasonable effort” to remove ineligible nonresidents from the voter rolls, pointing especially to counties where active registered voters allegedly exceeded the voting-age population.

The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing, and the Sixth Circuit agreed. The panel held that the RNC’s organizational-standing theory—predicated on alleged future “diversion-of-resources” to address purportedly inaccurate voter lists—was too speculative to establish injury in fact for forward-looking injunctive relief. In doing so, the court leaned heavily on the Supreme Court’s recent standing decisions and the Sixth Circuit’s own NVRA jurisprudence, clarifying that allegations couched in terms of what an organization “may” spend do not satisfy the “certainly impending” injury requirement. The court also rejected the RNC’s request for leave to amend, noting the absence of prejudice because a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is without prejudice.

Although “not recommended for publication,” the opinion offers a detailed, up-to-date synthesis of Article III’s imminence requirement for organizational plaintiffs seeking injunctions—particularly in NVRA litigation.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding: The RNC lacked Article III standing. Its diversion-of-resources theory did not allege a non-speculative, “certainly impending” injury necessary to pursue injunctive relief.
Abandoned theory: The RNC’s voter-fraud harm theory was not meaningfully advanced on appeal and was deemed waived.
Havens Realty limits: The court rejected reliance on Havens Realty where the alleged harms were speculative predictions of future spending rather than concrete, direct, and imminent operational costs.
Prior expenditures insufficient: Vague references to having spent “time and resources” in the past were too conclusory and did not establish imminent future injury.
Amendment: The district court did not abuse its discretion by not granting leave to amend post-dismissal; the RNC had an earlier opportunity to amend and, in any event, a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is without prejudice, allowing refiling.
Merits not reached: The court did not address whether Michigan’s list-maintenance practices complied with the NVRA.

Factual and Procedural Background

The NVRA requires each State to “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters,” including those who have moved. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4); § 20507(d)(1) (establishing procedural safeguards before removal). Enforcement is via a private right of action for declaratory or injunctive relief, generally preceded by written notice and an opportunity to cure, with a limited exception within thirty days of a federal election. See 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b).

The RNC filed suit in March 2024 claiming that Michigan’s voter rolls retained ineligible nonresidents, citing county data where active registrations purportedly exceeded the voting-age population. State officials disputed the data and explained that any delay in removals stemmed from complying with the NVRA’s procedural requirements. The district court dismissed for lack of standing; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): Framed the tripartite test for standing (injury in fact, causation, redressability) and the plaintiff’s burden. The panel relied on Lujan for the baseline standing principles and the pleading-stage burden.
FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024): Cited for organizational standing principles—organizations may sue for injuries they themselves sustain—and for clarifying the proper reading of Havens Realty. The Sixth Circuit used this case to underscore that mission-based objections or abstract conflicts with a policy do not suffice; the organization must show concrete, non-speculative harm to its operations.
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), and Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013): Provided the “certainly impending” standard for imminence in forward-looking suits and the admonition that “allegations of possible future injury” are insufficient. The court deployed this standard to evaluate the RNC’s “may spend” allegations and found them wanting.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982): Recognized organizational standing where a housing counseling service incurred tangible costs in response to discriminatory practices. The panel, guided by Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, distinguished Havens because the RNC’s alleged harms were indirect and speculative rather than concrete operational costs akin to the counseling services in Havens.
Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613 (6th Cir. 2025): A closely related Sixth Circuit decision (also involving Secretary Benson) rejecting an NVRA plaintiff’s organizational standing where the organization failed to identify specific projects or outputs directly affected. The panel analogized that the RNC likewise did not plead concrete, imminent impacts on identifiable projects or expenditures.
Tennessee Conference of the NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557 (6th Cir. 2025), and Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024): Emphasized that past harm alone does not confer standing to seek prospective injunctive relief; plaintiffs must show a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. The RNC’s generic claims of prior spending could serve only as a “launching pad” for a showing of imminent future injury—one it did not make.
Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2013): Applied to hold that arguments not developed in the opening brief on appeal (here, the voter-fraud theory) are waived.
Mellentine v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 515 F. App’x 419 (6th Cir. 2013): Supported the conclusion that there is no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when the plaintiff had an earlier opportunity to amend but did not.
Bowles v. Whitmer, 120 F.4th 1304 (6th Cir. 2024): Confirmed that a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is necessarily without prejudice, mitigating prejudice from denial of post-dismissal amendment.
Statutes: 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4) and § 20507(d)(1) (NVRA’s “reasonable effort” mandate and procedural safeguards for removals); 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b) (NVRA’s notice-and-wait enforcement mechanism, with a narrow pre-election exception).

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel expressly limited its analysis to the injury-in-fact element of standing because the RNC sought injunctive relief. It rehearsed a key distinction: while monetary losses are classic injuries for damages actions, a plaintiff seeking an injunction must show an imminent injury—one that is “certainly impending.”

The complaint, however, alleged only that the RNC “may spend more on resources” and “may misallocate its scarce resources” if the voter rolls include ineligible registrants. The court treated those allegations as paradigmatic “possible future injury,” insufficient under Clapper and Driehaus. The RNC’s references to past expenditures of “time and resources” were described as “conclusory,” failing to link those prior outlays to a “certainly impending” future harm. A general, closing assertion that the RNC “will continue to be injured” until relief is granted was characterized as a bare legal conclusion rather than a factual allegation.

Turning to organizational standing doctrine, the court explained that Havens Realty remains viable but is inapposite where an organization’s claimed harm is indirect and speculative. In Havens, the housing counseling service suffered immediate, concrete operational costs. By contrast, the RNC’s alleged harm was a potential reallocation of resources at some future point if the lists remained inaccurate—precisely the type of “conjectural or hypothetical” injury Article III forbids.

The court’s reliance on Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson further grounded its analysis in the Sixth Circuit’s NVRA context: organizational plaintiffs must identify specific projects or activities directly impaired by the defendant’s conduct. The RNC identified none. And under Lee and Murthy, even a showing of past resource drains cannot substitute for a clear demonstration of imminent repetition when the relief sought is prospective.

Finally, on the procedural question of amendment, the panel held there was no abuse of discretion in denying post-dismissal leave. The RNC had an earlier opportunity to amend but did not. Moreover, because the dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), it was without prejudice, preserving the RNC’s ability to refile with properly pled allegations.

Impact and Practical Implications

This opinion meaningfully sharpens, in the NVRA setting, what organizational plaintiffs must plead to obtain injunctive relief:

Specificity in pleading is critical. Plaintiffs should identify concrete, scheduled, and budgeted activities (e.g., imminent mailings, canvassing, or data operations) that will be directly and imminently misdirected or wasted because of the challenged conduct, along with estimated costs and timelines.
“Mission impairment” and abstract “diversion-of-resources” rhetoric are insufficient. Plaintiffs must tether alleged future harm to real-world, near-term operational consequences. “May spend more” will not do.
Past harm alone is not enough for an injunction. To bridge from past expenditures to future relief, plaintiffs must plausibly allege a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”
NVRA plaintiffs should align timing and allegations. Because NVRA enforcement has notice prerequisites (with a narrow pre-election exception), litigants should ensure their pleadings plausibly show imminent injury within the relevant election cycle, consistent with § 20510(b).
Unpublished but persuasive. Although designated “not recommended for publication,” the decision synthesizes recent Supreme Court guidance (Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Murthy) and the Sixth Circuit’s own NVRA standing framework (PILF v. Benson, Lee). It will likely be cited for its clear application of the “certainly impending” standard to organizational plaintiffs in election-related injunction suits.
Procedural posture matters. Litigants should seize opportunities to amend at the district court. If a standing dismissal occurs under Rule 12(b)(1), refiling remains available—but only if the organization can cure the deficiencies with concrete, imminent harms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III standing: A federal court can decide only actual disputes. Plaintiffs must show (1) a concrete injury, (2) caused by the defendant, (3) that the court can fix. Without all three, the court has no power to hear the case.
Organizational standing: An organization can sue based on injuries to itself (not just its members), but the injury must be real and concrete—for example, immediate operational costs—not just disagreement with a policy.
Diversion-of-resources theory: An organization claims it had to spend money or staff time to counteract the defendant’s unlawful conduct. To work in an injunction case, the organization must plausibly allege imminent, not speculative, resource drains tied to specific activities.
“Certainly impending” injury: For injunctions, the harm cannot be “maybe.” It must be realistically on the doorstep, not conjectural. Words like “may” or “might” typically indicate speculation.
Past vs. future harm: Past injuries can support damages, but to get an injunction, a plaintiff must show a risk of the harm happening again soon.
NVRA framework: States must reasonably keep rolls accurate but must follow federal procedural safeguards before removing registrants. Private enforcement usually requires giving notice and time to cure, unless very close to a federal election.
Without prejudice: A jurisdictional dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) does not decide the merits and allows the plaintiff to refile, potentially with better allegations.
Waiver on appeal: Arguments not meaningfully developed in the opening appellate brief are treated as waived and will not be considered.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in RNC v. Benson reinforces a demanding, but well-settled, principle: organizational plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must plead a “certainly impending” injury anchored in specific, imminent operational harms. Generalized claims that an organization “may” spend more or “may” misallocate resources, along with conclusory references to past outlays, will not satisfy Article III. Nor does merely invoking an organization’s “core mission” suffice under Havens Realty as read by the Supreme Court in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.

For NVRA litigants, the opinion underscores the need to connect list-maintenance allegations to near-term, concrete expenditures or project-level impacts, and to articulate those harms with precision at the pleading stage. Procedurally, it also reminds plaintiffs to amend when given the chance and notes that standing dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1) leave the door open to refiling with adequately specific allegations.

Bottom line: in election-related injunction suits, speculative “diversion-of-resources” theories will not open the courthouse door. Plaintiffs must show—not merely predict—how and when their operations will imminently be harmed.