Introduction

In Maxfield v. Cox, 2025 UT 44 (Utah Oct. 17, 2025) (per curiam), the Utah Supreme Court dismissed a petition for extraordinary relief brought directly to the high court by a group of self-represented initiative sponsors. The petitioners challenged the Lieutenant Governor’s rejection of three statewide initiative applications—labeled the “Tax and Revenue Initiative,” the “Planning and Zoning Initiative,” and the “Save GRAMA Initiative.” The court did not reach the merits of the Lieutenant Governor’s determinations or the facial validity of the proposed measures. Instead, it issued a narrow, procedural holding: petitioners failed to show that it was impractical or inappropriate to seek relief first in the district court as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 for extraordinary writ review.

The decision reinforces a recurring theme in Utah appellate practice: the extraordinary writ is not a shortcut around the ordinary litigation process. Even in time-sensitive election contexts, litigants must demonstrate more than speculative timing concerns to bypass the district court. The court dismissed the petition without prejudice, leaving the petitioners free to pursue relief in the district court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B.

Parties: Petitioners were Steven Maxfield and ten additional self-represented sponsors; Respondents were Governor Spencer J. Cox and Lieutenant Governor Deidre M. Henderson. Associate Chief Justice John Pearce recused; District Judge Kara L. Pettit sat by designation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Lieutenant Governor rejected the initiative applications because they did not include the text of a proposed law as required by Utah Code section 20A-7-202(2)(e)(iii) (as in effect March 5, 2025, later moved to (2)(e)(iv)), and because each application independently failed subsection 20A-7-202(5) for reasons including being “nonsensical,” “could not become law if passed,” having a title that did not clearly express the subject, or being “unconstitutional.” She also directed the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst to cease preparing fiscal impact statements and notified the sponsors of her rejections.

Petitioners sought extraordinary relief directly in the Utah Supreme Court, asking for: rescission of the rejections; extensions of ballot-placement timelines; an order directing fiscal impact analysis to resume; and an injunction against “over 100” session laws related to the targeted code titles.

The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the petition under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 because petitioners had not shown that “no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy” was available and had not adequately explained why it was impractical or inappropriate to file first in the district court. The court emphasized:

• When the rejections issued, more than ten months remained before the February 15, 2026 signature deadline.
• Petitioners identified no persuasive reason why expedited district court proceedings could not be sought and obtained.
• If the dispute truly required factual development and discovery, a Rule 19 petition to an appellate court is a poor vehicle. Conversely, if it is a facial statutory-compliance dispute, discovery is likely unnecessary, further undercutting the bypass.

Disposition: Petition dismissed without prejudice to filing in the district court under Rule 65B. The court expressly limited its decision to the timing/bypass issue and did not address the merits of the Lieutenant Governor’s rejections or the initiatives themselves.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

Petitioners submitted three statewide initiative applications that, rather than proposing codifiable statutory text, proposed the repeal of extensive portions of the Utah Code and directed the Legislature to enact recodifications under specified instructions:

• Tax and Revenue Initiative: “repeal in its entirety Utah Code Title 59 Revenue and taxation” and require a revised Title 59 that funds all state and local agencies solely through:
  • a “5% import tariff on all products imported into the state;”
  • a “5% export tariff on all exports in the state except, if the export is defined as natural AI resources, water, alfalfa, minerals, animals of husband are to a foreign nation the export tax shall be 10,000%.”
• Planning and Zoning Initiative: “repeal in its entirety Utah Code Title 10 Utah municipal code” and require the Legislature to adopt “Title 10 The People’s Municipal code,” including provisions to “enshrine[] the people’s right to use their property for their use and benefit,” subject to limits for substantial impacts on neighbors’ use and enjoyment or community safety, health, or welfare.
• Save GRAMA Initiative: “repeal in its entirety Utah Code Title 63G Chapter 2 Government Records and Management Act (GRAMA)” and require adoption of “The People’s Open Sunshine Laws,” with directives including: all government meetings posted and open to the public; closed sessions “PROHIBITED;” and no restrictions on citizen speech at meetings.

The Lieutenant Governor rejected the applications for failure to include the “text of the proposed law” and for additional defects under section 20A-7-202(5). Petitioners bypassed the district court and sought extraordinary relief in the Utah Supreme Court. The court requested a response, received briefing, and issued a per curiam opinion dismissing the petition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20, ¶ 47, 345 P.3d 689: The court reaffirmed the core threshold for extraordinary writs—available “only when no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.” This case provides the foundational standard the court applied to decide whether to entertain the petition directly.
• Utah R. App. P. 19(a), (e)(6): Rule 19 codifies two critical gatekeeping principles: (a) a petition to an appellate court for extraordinary relief is appropriate only if no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy exists; and (e)(6) requires petitioners, unless directing the petition to a trial court, to explain why filing in the trial court is impractical or inappropriate. The Maxfield court’s analysis turns on the failure to meet (e)(6)’s explanation requirement given the time still available to litigate in the district court.
• Croft v. Morgan County, 2021 UT 46, ¶ 37, 496 P.3d 83: The court “typically limits itself to addressing only those petitions that cannot be decided in another forum.” Croft underscores the institutional preference for initial adjudication in the district courts and was cited to explain the court’s reluctance to exercise original writ jurisdiction where normal channels are available.
• Zonts v. Pleasant Grove City, 2017 UT 71, ¶ 5 n.2, 416 P.3d 360 (per curiam): The court noted that litigants and district courts can collaborate to expedite proceedings. Zonts countered petitioners’ assertion that district court litigation could not be timely, demonstrating an available mechanism to meet election-related deadlines.
• Anderson v. Provo City, 2016 UT 50, ¶ 6, 387 P.3d 1014 (per curiam): Petitioners bear the burden to show it would be impractical or inappropriate to file in district court. Maxfield relied on this to conclude petitioners had not carried their burden—especially given the ten-month window.
• Gricius v. Cox, 2015 UT 86, ¶ 5, 365 P.3d 1198 (per curiam): When an appellate court entertains an extraordinary writ without a prior record, relief is ordinarily limited to allegations supported by affidavits or other reliable documentation. Maxfield’s footnote used Gricius to highlight why fact-intensive disputes are ill-suited to Rule 19 petitions—another reason not to bypass the district court.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three concise steps:

1. Identify the controlling procedural standard: Under Utah R. App. P. 19(a), extraordinary relief is available only when there is no “plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.” Under Rule 19(e)(6), a petitioner who files directly in the appellate court must explain why it is impractical or inappropriate to first file in district court.
2. Evaluate petitioners’ justification: Petitioners argued that given the February 15, 2026 signature deadline for initiatives, district court proceedings could not furnish timely relief. The court labeled this “unfounded speculation.” When the Lieutenant Governor issued the rejections, more than ten months remained—ample time to seek expedited district court review.
3. Explain why the district court route is not only possible, but preferable: If the challenges are facial (as the Lieutenant Governor’s rejections appear to rest on statutory noncompliance apparent from the applications), discovery and trial would not be necessary, which favors quick district court resolution. If, on the other hand, factual development is needed—as petitioners suggested—then Rule 19 writ review is a poor fit, because appellate courts lack a developed record and generally cannot conduct fact-finding. Either way, the district court is the right starting point.

On that basis, the court dismissed the petition without prejudice to refile in the district court under Rule 65B. The court deliberately did not adjudicate the substantive legality or constitutionality of any initiative content, nor the propriety of the Lieutenant Governor’s application of Utah Code section 20A-7-202(2) or (5).

Impact and Prospective Significance

Maxfield crystallizes and applies Utah’s longstanding approach to extraordinary writs in the election and initiative context:

• Elevated threshold to bypass district courts: Mere timing concerns tied to election calendars will not, standing alone, justify original writ proceedings in the Supreme Court. Petitioners must demonstrate concrete, non-speculative barriers to timely district court review.
• Expectation of expedited trial-court processes: The court signaled continued confidence in Utah district courts’ ability to expedite election-related disputes. Litigants should proactively request and help structure accelerated schedules.
• Record-building is essential: Especially in initiative disputes that may entail statutory interpretation, constitutional analysis, and factual development, the court prefers a developed record with findings and legal conclusions from the district court.
• Practical guidance for initiative sponsors: Before challenging administrative rejections, sponsors should (a) ensure statutory compliance on the face of applications—e.g., inclusion of “the text of the proposed law” under section 20A-7-202(2)(e)(iv); and (b) if rejected, promptly pursue district court relief, requesting expedited consideration.
• Institutional boundary-setting: The court’s refusal to enjoin wide swaths of recent legislation via an original writ reinforces judicial restraint and the structured channeling of significant public-law disputes through trial courts in the first instance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Extraordinary Relief (Rule 65B) and Rule 19 Petitions: “Extraordinary writs” (like mandamus or prohibition) provide emergency or exceptional remedies when ordinary appeals are inadequate. Utah appellate courts may entertain original petitions for such relief under Rule 19, but only if petitioners show there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy elsewhere and explain why filing in district court is impractical or inappropriate.
• “Plain, Speedy, or Adequate” Remedy: This phrase asks whether normal litigation channels (here, a Rule 65B petition in district court) can realistically address the dispute in time and with sufficient completeness. The presence of mechanisms for expedited proceedings weighs strongly against bypassing the district court.
• Facial vs. Fact-Intensive Claims: A facial challenge turns on the four corners of the documents and legal standards—often resolvable without discovery. Fact-intensive claims require evidence, witness testimony, and credibility assessments—making them unsuitable for appellate original-jurisdiction review without a record.
• Initiative Application Requirements (Utah Code § 20A-7-202): Among other things, sponsors must include “the text of the proposed law” in the application. Subsection (5) authorizes the Lieutenant Governor to reject applications for defined deficiencies, including if a proposal is “nonsensical,” cannot operate as law, has a title that does not clearly express the subject, or is unconstitutional. Maxfield does not reinterpret these provisions but notes them as the administrative basis for rejection.
• Fiscal Impact Statements: After a compliant initiative application is filed, the Legislative Fiscal Analyst typically prepares a fiscal impact statement. If the Lieutenant Governor rejects the application for noncompliance, the fiscal analysis process can be halted pending further proceedings.
• Per Curiam Decision: An opinion issued in the name of the court rather than a single justice. It often signals a clear application of settled principles without a need for extensive doctrinal elaboration.

What the Court Did Not Decide

The Supreme Court expressly limited its decision to the Rule 19 threshold. It did not:

• Rule on whether any initiative complied with section 20A-7-202(2)(e)(iv) or subsection (5).
• Address whether an initiative can validly require the Legislature to repeal and recodify entire titles or chapters.
• Adjudicate the constitutionality of the “Tax and Revenue Initiative” or the permissibility of its proposed tariffs.
• Determine whether the sponsors are entitled to extensions, resumed fiscal impact analysis, or injunctions against session laws.

These issues remain open for district court litigation if petitioners choose to pursue them under Rule 65B with appropriate requests for expedited handling.

Practical Guidance for Future Litigants

• Build in time and act quickly: Calendar statutory deadlines early. If an application is rejected, file promptly in district court and move for expedited treatment.
• Tailor the record to the relief sought: If raising purely facial defects, present the statutory text, the application, and the rejection decision clearly and completely to facilitate swift judicial review. If factual issues exist, identify them precisely and propose a lean discovery plan consistent with the timeline.
• Satisfy Rule 19 before seeking appellate extraordinary relief: If you later consider a Rule 19 petition, document concrete reasons the district court cannot provide timely relief (e.g., a specific scheduling impossibility despite diligent efforts), not just speculative timing concerns.
• Ensure statutory compliance on the front end: Include the full “text of the proposed law.” Avoid proposals that are directives to the Legislature to recodify without providing operable statutory language capable of immediate enactment if approved by voters.
• Be mindful of scope of requested relief: Requests to enjoin broad swaths of legislation heighten the need for a fulsome record and careful, staged judicial review—further disfavoring appellate original-jurisdiction writs.

Conclusion

Maxfield v. Cox does not change the substantive law of initiatives or election administration. Its contribution is procedural yet consequential: the Utah Supreme Court reiterates that speculative timing pressures do not warrant bypassing the district court under Rule 19. With more than ten months remaining before the signature deadline, and the availability of expedited trial-court procedures, petitioners had a “plain, speedy, and adequate” remedy in the district court. The petition was therefore dismissed without prejudice to a Rule 65B filing.

The decision reinforces Utah’s institutional preference for record development and initial trial-court adjudication, especially in disputes that may implicate statutory interpretation and constitutional claims. For initiative sponsors and election-law litigants, the message is clear: comply meticulously with statutory filing requirements; if rejected, promptly pursue district court relief with a tailored plan for expedition; and reserve original writ petitions in the Supreme Court for genuinely exceptional circumstances where trial-court remedies are demonstrably unavailable or inadequate.