Speculation Is Not Enough: Seventh Circuit Reaffirms Evidence-Heavy Burden for Monell Failure-to-Train Claims Alleging Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops

Case: Devonte Abbas v. City of Hobart, Indiana

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Nonprecedential Disposition)

Date: October 17, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Scudder, St. Eve, and Maldonado

Docket No.: 24-2464

Introduction

This nonprecedential Seventh Circuit order addresses a Monell claim premised on alleged municipal failure to train officers to avoid racial profiling and implicit bias during traffic stops. Plaintiff-Appellant Devonte Abbas, a Black motorist, was stopped by Hobart, Indiana police, subjected to a dog sniff, and searched, with no contraband found and no citation issued. Rather than sue the individual officers, Abbas sued the City of Hobart under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City’s training program was constitutionally deficient and caused violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding no underlying constitutional violation and, independently, no triable evidence of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the Monell ground alone, assuming without deciding that a constitutional violation occurred. The central holding is evidentiary: a plaintiff must present concrete, non-speculative evidence of (1) a municipal policy or custom of deliberate indifference (either via a widespread pattern or an “obvious need” for training) and (2) a close causal connection between an identified training deficiency and the alleged constitutional injury. A single prior incident and generalized assertions about the benefits of implicit-bias training are insufficient.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City of Hobart. The court did not resolve whether Abbas’s stop and search violated the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, it held that, even assuming an underlying violation, Abbas’s claim fails because he did not produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Hobart’s policies or customs—specifically, a failure to train officers on racial profiling and implicit bias—caused the alleged violations.

Key points from the court’s reasoning include:

No pattern or practice shown: Abbas’s reliance on a single earlier incident—another stop four months prior in which he alleges officers beat him—was insufficient to establish a widespread practice or municipal knowledge of racialized unconstitutional stops. One incident cannot establish a pattern under Monell.
No “obvious need” single-incident liability: The “obvious need” exception, contemplated in City of Canton v. Harris, applies only in rare circumstances (e.g., training on deadly force for armed officers). Abbas did not show that Hobart’s training was so obviously deficient that constitutional violations were highly predictable.
No evidence of a training deficiency: The record showed officers received basic recruit and continuing education and field training. The mere absence of specialized implicit-bias training is not, by itself, a constitutional deficiency.
No causation evidence: Monell requires a tight causal link between an identified training gap and the injury. Abbas offered no statistics, expert testimony, curriculum analysis, or other evidence showing that the absence of implicit-bias training caused the stop or search at issue.

Factual and Procedural Background

The stop: Officer Brandon Kissee stopped Abbas while he was driving to his mother’s house. Kissee said the stop was for a turn-signal violation; Abbas contested this in an affidavit, asserting compliance with all traffic laws.
On-scene observations: Kissee reported seeing “specks” of marijuana. Abbas denied there was marijuana in the car.
Dog sniff and search: Officer Kevin Garber arrived with a drug-detection dog, which alerted near the driver’s door. Officers searched Abbas and his vehicle, found nothing, and neither arrested him nor issued a citation.
The claim: Abbas sued the City under § 1983, alleging failure to train officers to avoid racial profiling and implicit bias, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
District court: Granted summary judgment to the City, concluding no constitutional violation occurred and, regardless, Abbas produced no evidence of a municipal policy or custom causing any violation.
Appeal: The Seventh Circuit assumed an underlying violation arguendo but affirmed because the Monell showing failed as a matter of law and evidence.

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1) Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

Monell established that municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions. Instead, a plaintiff must show that a municipal “policy or custom” caused the constitutional injury. This case frames the entire analysis: the City can only be liable if a training policy or custom amounts to deliberate indifference and causes the injury.

2) City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)

City of Canton is the seminal failure-to-train case. It set three core principles:

Deliberate indifference: A municipality is liable only if its failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.
Obvious need exception: In rare situations, liability can arise without a pattern if the need for training is “so obvious” and the risk “so likely” that failing to train amounts to deliberate indifference (illustrated by training armed officers on limits of deadly force).
Causation: The identified training deficiency must be closely related to the plaintiff’s ultimate injury; it is not enough to speculate that “more or better training” might have avoided harm.

The Seventh Circuit repeatedly invokes Canton’s limits, emphasizing both the rarity of single-incident liability and the tight causation requirement.

3) City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)

Tuttle held that proof of a single incident of excessive force does not, by itself, establish a municipal policy of inadequate training. The court relied on Tuttle to reject Abbas’s effort to draw a municipal pattern or policy from one prior incident.

4) Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)

Connick narrowed the “obvious need” exception, stressing that single-incident liability is “rare.” It requires an unmistakably obvious deficiency that makes violations highly predictable. The panel used Connick to underscore that generalized assertions about the desirability of training (e.g., implicit bias) do not satisfy the exacting standard absent concrete proof of obvious need.

5) Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2021)

Flores clarifies that a municipality may be liable for failure to train only if it has actual knowledge of a pattern of criminally reckless conduct and an obvious need to train to avert harm. The court cited Flores to emphasize the necessity of pattern evidence in all but the rare “obvious need” cases.

6) J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc)

J.K.J. affirmed a jury verdict against a county for failure to train in the face of sexual assaults in a jail. Crucially, plaintiffs there presented robust evidence, including expert testimony, establishing both deliberate indifference and causation. The court distinguished J.K.J., noting Abbas produced no analogous expert or structural proof of training deficiencies or causal connection.

7) Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521 (7th Cir. 2023) and Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2017)

These cases reinforce that a plaintiff must demonstrate a widespread practice and that the alleged violations were not isolated incidents. The court used them to confirm that one prior encounter is not enough to infer a municipal custom.

8) Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997) and Lapre v. City of Chicago, 911 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 2018)

Palmquist cautions that the lack of specialized training is not per se constitutional deficiency; the training given must be considered. Lapre reiterates Canton’s warning that it is insufficient to prove an injury could have been avoided with “better or more training.” Both cases buttress the court’s rejection of Abbas’s generalized training critique.

9) Tapley v. Chambers, 840 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2016)

Cited for the summary judgment standard: viewing conflicts in evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Even under that favorable lens, Abbas’s evidentiary showing was inadequate on the Monell elements.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Monell Framework Applied

To survive summary judgment on a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must offer evidence of: (a) a municipal policy or custom amounting to deliberate indifference (proved through a pattern of similar constitutional violations or, in rare cases, an “obvious need” for training), and (b) a close causal connection between an identified training deficiency and the alleged injury.

The court assumed, without deciding, that Abbas suffered an underlying constitutional violation (either an unreasonable seizure/search under the Fourth Amendment or intentional racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause). Even with that assumption, the claim failed on the municipal-liability elements.

2) No Pattern or Practice

Abbas invoked a single prior stop four months earlier in which he claims he was removed from his car and beaten. Under Tuttle and subsequent Seventh Circuit precedent, one incident—however troubling—cannot establish a widespread practice or municipal knowledge of unconstitutional racial profiling or unlawful traffic stops. The court emphasized that “few sporadic examples” ordinarily do not suffice; plaintiffs must present broader evidence (e.g., statistics, multiple similar complaints, internal affairs findings, DOJ or state AG reports, consent decrees) to show an entrenched custom.

3) No “Obvious Need” Single-Incident Liability

Abbas argued that the City’s need to train officers on racial profiling and implicit bias was self-evident. The court rejected this for two reasons:

Rarity of the exception: As Connick and Canton explain, single-incident liability is the exception, not the rule, generally exemplified by situations like training armed officers on deadly force restraints, where the need is glaring and failures are predictably catastrophic.
No concrete proof of deficiency: Officer Kissee’s testimony showed basic recruit, field, and continuing education training. The absence of specialized implicit-bias training, without more, does not prove constitutional inadequacy.

The panel noted that whether implicit-bias training is prudent policy is for the City to decide; the Constitution does not prescribe specific curricula absent proof of deliberate indifference and causation.

4) No Causation Evidence

Monell requires that the “identified deficiency in the city’s training program” be closely related to the injury. Abbas offered no evidence—such as expert testimony, empirical data demonstrating disparate impact in Hobart’s traffic enforcement, training materials showing gaps, or testimony linking officer decision-making to training deficiencies—to show that the absence of implicit-bias training caused the stop or search. The court underscored that speculation about how additional training might have altered an officer’s conduct cannot defeat summary judgment.

Impact and Implications

1) Evidentiary Gatekeeping for Bias-Training Monell Claims

This decision reinforces a high evidentiary bar for municipal liability claims predicated on alleged failures to provide implicit-bias or anti-profiling training. Plaintiffs must marshal concrete proof of both (a) deliberate indifference (pattern or obvious need) and (b) causation. Bare allegations, a single prior incident, or general assertions that “more training would help” are insufficient.

2) Litigation Strategy: What Plaintiffs Need

Future plaintiffs pressing similar claims will likely need:

Stop-and-search data showing racial disparities, ideally controlled for relevant variables;
Multiple prior complaints or incidents demonstrating a pattern, plus municipal awareness (e.g., internal reviews, civil claims, news coverage);
Expert testimony on policing practices, training standards, implicit bias, and causal pathways between training content and officer behavior;
Discovery of training curricula, frequency, attendance, assessments, supervision protocols, and any remedial measures;
Evidence of ignored red flags: audits, recommendations, or known incidents that should have prompted training reforms.

3) Municipal Risk Management

For municipalities, the order signals that courts will not constitutionalize best practices in training. However, it also flags the types of evidence that could expose liability: known patterns unattended by training, documented curricular gaps tied to foreseeable violations, and ignored warnings. Proactive data collection, periodic training audits, and policy updates can mitigate legal risk and improve practice.

4) Equal Protection vs. Fourth Amendment Framing

Although the panel did not resolve the underlying constitutional questions, the case illustrates strategic pleading choices. Fourth Amendment challenges to pretextual stops often turn on objective reasonableness; Equal Protection claims require proof of discriminatory intent. Either way, Monell adds a separate evidentiary layer: plaintiffs must prove the City’s policy or custom caused the violation.

5) Nonprecedential but Persuasive

As a nonprecedential disposition, this order is not binding, but it is consistent with Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit law. It is likely to be cited for persuasive value in district courts within the Circuit on summary judgment motions in Monell failure-to-train cases involving alleged racial profiling.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Monell liability: Cities are not automatically liable for officers’ actions. Plaintiffs must show a municipal “policy or custom” caused the violation, such as a failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference.
Deliberate indifference (training): The City knew (or should have known) of a substantial risk of constitutional violations and consciously disregarded it by failing to train. Typically shown by a pattern of similar violations; rarely by an “obvious need.”
“Obvious need” single-incident liability: An exception for scenarios where the lack of training is so obvious (e.g., deadly force limitations for armed officers) that constitutional violations are highly predictable even without a pattern.
Causation under Monell: There must be a close link between the specific training deficiency and the injury. General claims that more training would be helpful are not enough.
Summary judgment: The court decides if, taking the nonmovant’s evidence as true and drawing reasonable inferences in their favor, a reasonable jury could find for that party. If not, the movant wins without trial.
Equal Protection claim (traffic stop): Requires proof that race was a motivating factor for the stop or search; statistical and comparative evidence can be important.
Fourth Amendment claim (traffic stop): Focuses on whether the stop and search were objectively reasonable; a dog sniff outside a car, for example, has distinct doctrinal treatment, but causation to training is still required for Monell liability.

What Evidence Might Have Changed the Outcome?

Multiple documented incidents of similar race-based stops by Hobart officers within a relevant timeframe;
Evidence the City knew of these incidents (complaints, lawsuits, media, internal memos) and failed to act;
Training records showing absence of any anti-profiling or bias training, coupled with expert testimony that such a deficit is a known driver of unconstitutional stops;
Statistical analysis of Hobart traffic stops indicating significant racial disparities unexplained by nonracial factors;
Expert testimony explaining how identified training gaps lead to decision-making errors in traffic stops and how appropriate training reduces such errors.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s order in Abbas v. City of Hobart underscores a familiar but stringent Monell principle: municipal failure-to-train liability demands evidence, not conjecture. Plaintiffs must either show a widespread pattern of similar constitutional violations or satisfy the narrow “obvious need” exception, and in all events must tie a specific training deficiency closely to the injury. A single prior incident, combined with generalized assertions about the desirability of implicit-bias training, will not carry a Monell claim past summary judgment.

While nonprecedential, this decision aligns with Supreme Court doctrine in City of Canton, Connick, and Tuttle, and with Seventh Circuit cases like Flores, J.K.J., Palmquist, and Lapre. Its practical message is clear: to hold a city liable for alleged racially biased policing through a failure-to-train theory, plaintiffs must build a record—statistical, expert, curricular, and historical—showing deliberate indifference and causal linkage. Absent that, speculation is not enough.