Speculation Is Not a Prima Facie “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Showing in Motions to Reopen for Non-LPR Cancellation

I. Introduction

In Angel Cifuentes-Mendoza v. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of a motion to reopen. The petitioner, a Guatemalan national who entered without authorization in 2005, sought reopening after a final removal order to pursue non-LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), arguing that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his four U.S.-citizen children.

The key issues were: (1) the scope of judicial review over hardship determinations after recent Supreme Court guidance; and (2) whether the petitioner’s evidence satisfied the threshold prima facie showing required to reopen proceedings to seek cancellation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s hardship determination because, under Supreme Court precedent, the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” inquiry is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact. However, the court emphasized it could not reweigh or dispute the BIA’s factual findings.

On the merits, the court concluded the BIA did not err in finding that Cifuentes-Mendoza failed to establish a prima facie case—i.e., a “reasonable likelihood”—that he could meet the exceptionally demanding hardship standard. The petitioner’s claims (wife’s illness limiting childcare and work, a child’s vision issues, and generalized conditions in Guatemala) were found either not legally cognizable (as to hardship to the wife), insufficiently supported by evidence, or not “substantially beyond” ordinary removal-related hardship. The petition for review was therefore denied.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020). The court used Barton for a basic description of cancellation of removal as relief allowing a removable noncitizen to remain, and for the broader acknowledgment that removal is often “a wrenching process.” This framed the equities but reinforced that statutory limits control.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020). This decision supplied the jurisdictional bridge: “questions of law” in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) include mixed questions—applications of law to established facts. The Fourth Circuit relied on it to explain why review is not categorically barred even where cancellation is involved.
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024). The court treated Wilkinson as dispositive on the nature of the hardship inquiry: whether facts satisfy “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question and thus reviewable. The opinion also highlighted Wilkinson’s instruction that appellate review should be “deferential” to the agency on this mixed question, even though the Fourth Circuit noted it had not yet pinned down the precise doctrinal standard of review in the wake of Wilkinson.
Cortes v. Garland, 105 F.4th 124 (4th Cir. 2024). The court relied on Cortes for the Fourth Circuit’s post- Wilkinson framework: the court may review whether the BIA’s found facts are “sufficient as a matter of law” to satisfy the hardship standard, but may not “contest” factual findings or find facts itself. The court also repeated Cortes’ articulation (quoting earlier precedent) that qualifying hardship must be “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship” expected from removal.
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992). Cited for the proposition that the BIA may deny reopening when the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought.
Mouns v. Garland, 113 F.4th 399 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing In re L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413 (BIA 1996)). These authorities supplied the operational definition of “prima facie” in this context as a “reasonable likelihood” of eligibility. That standard mattered because the petitioner was not yet proving hardship definitively—he needed enough, supported by evidence, to warrant reopening.
Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland, 6 F.4th 552 (4th Cir. 2021), abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkinson. The opinion drew from Gonzalez Galvan for the “very high” burden inherent in the hardship standard, while acknowledging that Wilkinson altered parts of the earlier jurisdiction/standard-of-review landscape.
In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001). Used to support the BIA’s recurring principle that a “lower standard of living” in the country of removal is generally insufficient, by itself, to establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” This precedent anchored the BIA’s treatment of generalized claims about Guatemala’s poverty and danger.
Williams v. Garland, 59 F.4th 620 (4th Cir. 2023). Cited to underscore that motions to reopen have their own review complexities; here, the court did not resolve the exact standard because the outcome was the same under any plausible standard.
Solelo v. Garland, No. 22-1263, 2024 WL 3409831 (4th Cir. July 15, 2024), and Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi, No. 24-1464, 2025 WL 3084717 (4th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025). These were cited to illustrate the Fourth Circuit’s ongoing effort to “sort out” how to operationalize Wilkinson’s deference instruction, and to support the court’s decision to avoid choosing among standards where it would not affect the result.
Garcia Ramos v. Bondi, No. 25-1313, 2025 WL 2506096 (4th Cir. Sep. 2, 2025); Trejo-Juarez v. Bondi, No. 24-1605, 2025 WL 1564342 (4th Cir. June 3, 2025); Ramirez v. Garland, No. 22-2039, 2023 WL 4418227 (4th Cir. July 10, 2023). These were invoked to emphasize that the circumstances presented—financial strain, lack of work authorization for a spouse, and generalized country conditions—are common in removal cases and therefore typically do not meet the “substantially beyond” benchmark.

B. Legal Reasoning

Jurisdiction and the reviewable “mixed question”. The INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), generally bars review of orders “regarding” cancellation. But the saving clause, § 1252(a)(2)(D), preserves review of constitutional claims and questions of law. Reading these together through Guerrero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson, the court held it could review whether the BIA’s found facts legally satisfy the hardship standard—while remaining forbidden to revisit factfinding.
The procedural posture mattered: a motion to reopen. Because Cifuentes-Mendoza sought cancellation through reopening, he had to meet the statutory requirement that reopening be supported by “affidavits and other evidentiary material,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). The governing question was not whether hardship was ultimately proven, but whether the submission established a prima facie case—a “reasonable likelihood” of eligibility—under INS v. Doherty and Mouns.
Hardship must be to a qualifying relative, and must be extraordinary. The court emphasized two statutory constraints: (a) hardship must be to a qualifying relative (here, U.S.-citizen children), not to the noncitizen or non-qualifying relatives (here, the wife, who lacked U.S. citizenship/LPR status); and (b) the hardship must be “exceptional and extremely unusual,” a “very high” bar meaning “substantially beyond” ordinary removal consequences.
Application to the evidence submitted.
- Wife’s illness: hardship to the wife was not cognizable under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Any derivative hardship to the children was deemed speculative and under-supported, because the only documentation was a hospital admission record for surgery more than three years earlier and the affidavit conceded uncertainty about the condition and lacked evidence of ongoing treatment.
- Daughter’s vision problems: the claim was not supported by medical evidence, and the petitioner did not explain why treatment could not be obtained in Guatemala or why the U.S.-citizen child could not return to the United States if surgery were needed.
- Economic and country-conditions claims: allegations about lack of work authorization, inability of relatives to help, and Guatemala’s poverty/danger were treated as typical consequences of removal and insufficient under In re Monreal and the Fourth Circuit’s “substantially beyond ordinary hardship” line of cases.

C. Impact

Reopening requires concrete, corroborated hardship evidence. The decision reinforces that cancellation-based reopening is not a vehicle for undeveloped or speculative hardship narratives. Without medical records, treatment histories, expert declarations, school/therapy documentation, or country-specific proof tied to the child’s individualized needs, the BIA can find no “reasonable likelihood” and deny reopening.
Post-Wilkinson review: jurisdiction exists, but factual reweighing does not. Even though hardship is reviewable as a mixed question, petitioners should expect appellate courts to uphold denials where the challenge implicitly disputes the BIA’s view of the underlying facts (e.g., severity of illness, availability of treatment abroad) rather than identifying legal error.
Non-qualifying-relative hardship remains a recurring trap. The opinion underscores that hardship to a spouse without U.S. citizenship/LPR status cannot itself satisfy § 1229b(b)(1)(D), and only matters insofar as it is reliably shown to cause extraordinary hardship to the qualifying children.
Practical signaling within the Fourth Circuit. Although unpublished and nonprecedential, the decision aligns with a series of Fourth Circuit dispositions treating generalized economic hardship and generalized country conditions as inadequate absent a strong, individualized evidentiary record.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of removal (non-LPR): A discretionary immigration benefit allowing certain noncitizens to remain despite removability, if they meet statutory prerequisites including continuous presence, good moral character, and—most litigated here—extraordinary hardship to specified relatives.
Motion to reopen: A request to restart concluded immigration proceedings to present new claims or evidence. The motion must be supported by evidence (“affidavits and other evidentiary material”) and can be denied if it does not show a sufficient likelihood of success.
Prima facie case / “reasonable likelihood”: Not final proof, but enough credible, supported evidence to show the applicant has a realistic chance of meeting the legal standard if proceedings are reopened.
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A statutorily heightened hardship threshold. Ordinary consequences of removal—financial strain, family separation, reduced living standards, and generalized insecurity—usually do not qualify unless tied to extraordinary, individualized impacts on qualifying relatives.
Mixed question of law and fact: A question asking whether established facts satisfy a legal standard. After Guerrero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson, courts may review such applications of law to fact in cancellation cases, but may not redo factfinding.

V. Conclusion

Cifuentes-Mendoza illustrates the interaction of two demanding filters in cancellation-based reopening: (1) the substantive hardship bar is “very high,” and (2) the procedural vehicle of reopening requires a documented, non-speculative prima facie showing. Post-Wilkinson, courts can review the hardship determination as a mixed question, but that review is constrained and deferential, and it will not rescue motions that lack corroborating evidence or that rely on hardships routinely attendant to removal.