I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re L.G., A.G.-1, M.G., and N.G., No. 24-14 (Nov. 4, 2025), is a pointed reminder that abuse and neglect cases are governed by strictly enforced procedural and substantive requirements. These requirements protect both the due process rights of parents and the safety and welfare of children.

The case arises from a contentious divorce between the parents of four children. During the divorce, the family court appointed a guardian ad litem, who initiated an abuse and neglect petition. The mother (A.G.-2) successfully completed a pre-adjudicatory improvement period and was dismissed from that initial petition. Later, however, the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an amended petition placing her back in the case, based principally on a single volatile incident at the father’s home.

The circuit court adjudicated the children abused and neglected “at the hands of” the mother, denied her requests for an improvement period and for expert evaluation of the children, and terminated her custodial rights. On appeal, the mother challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting adjudication, (2) the denial of an improvement period, and (3) the denial of leave to obtain an expert evaluation of the children.

The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the mother’s conduct actually constituted abuse or neglect. Instead, it vacated the adjudicatory order, the dispositional order, and the order denying expert evaluation, holding that the circuit court’s findings and conclusions were so deficient that meaningful appellate review was impossible. A separate concurring opinion by Justice Trump goes further, questioning whether the amended petition itself even alleged statutory abuse or neglect with the specificity required by law.

Together, the main opinion and the concurrence reinforce two core principles:

• Circuit courts must enter adjudicatory orders that contain specific, articulated findings of fact and conclusions of law tied to the statutory definitions of “abused child,” “neglected child,” and “abusing parent,” particularly where children’s forensic interviews are dispositive.
• DHS petitions must themselves allege specific conduct which, if true, clearly fits the statutory definitions of abuse, neglect, or imminent danger under West Virginia Code.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Family Context and Initial Abuse/Neglect Case

The parents of L.G., A.G.-1, M.G., and N.G. were in divorce proceedings in family court. A guardian ad litem was appointed in that divorce. In October 2021, the guardian filed an abuse and neglect petition in circuit court, naming both parents as respondents.

The appellate record contains little detail about that initial petition. What is clear is that:

• The mother was granted a pre-adjudicatory improvement period,
• She successfully completed it,
• The children were returned to her custody, and
• She was then dismissed from the abuse and neglect proceedings.

The father remained as the focus of the ongoing case, eventually receiving an improvement period as well. By the time of the events at issue, the father had successfully completed his improvement period and had legal and physical custody of the children returned to him.

B. The April 2023 Incident and the Amended DHS Petition

In April 2023, DHS filed an amended petition that brought the mother back into the case. The amended petition described a single incident:

• The mother learned that the father’s girlfriend, J.C., was present during a visitation between N.G. and the father. Believing this violated a personal safety order involving J.C., the mother became upset.
• According to N.G., the mother pulled her arm back with a fist as if to hit N.G.
• The mother then directed N.G. and M.G. into her vehicle and drove to the father’s home, which he shared with J.C.
• At the home, the mother allegedly “destroyed potted flowers,” backed her vehicle into a tree, removed a piece of bark, and took pictures of the inside of the home. She told M.G. “to go wipe [her] fingerprints off” the front door.
• Both N.G. and M.G. reported feeling “scared” during these events.

Later, when the mother offered to take the children for doughnuts, A.G.-1 joined N.G. and M.G. in the car. As they drove, the mother turned back toward the father’s home, allegedly despite A.G.-1 and M.G. “begging” her not to return. The mother claimed she wanted to “fix the flowers,” but she did not stop because she saw J.C., law enforcement, and Child Protective Services already there.

The amended petition alleged that the mother failed to be “appropriately protective” and put the children “in harm’s way” by going to the father’s home, damaging property, and taking photographs.

C. Pre-Adjudicatory Motions: Forensic Interviews and Expert Evaluation

Before adjudication, DHS moved to present videotaped forensic interviews of three of the children (A.G.-1, M.G., and N.G.). The mother objected, arguing that:

• The interviews were hearsay,
• They lacked sufficient trustworthiness, and
• They were not more probative than other available evidence.

The mother also moved for leave to retain an expert to evaluate the children, asserting that there was “a factual dispute as to the accuracy and reliability” of their disclosures and that expert testimony was necessary for a full and fair defense.

D. The Adjudicatory Hearing and Findings

The adjudicatory hearing occurred over two days, in July and August 2023. Key evidence included:

• The testimony of the forensic interviewer; the court “received and lodged” the forensic interviews as evidence but deferred a ruling on admissibility pending resolution of the hearsay and related motions.
• The mother’s testimony: she believed J.C.’s presence violated a personal safety order. After learning the order had been dismissed, she had an anxiety attack and decided to go to the father’s home to confirm the dismissal order and speak to J.C., but she claimed to have “calmed down” before taking N.G. and M.G. in the car. She described:
  • Accidentally slipping into a succulent flowerpot and dislodging a plant,
  • Accidentally backing her vehicle into a tree and asking M.G. to pick up bark to avoid being accused of greater damage,
  • Taking pictures of the exterior to show she had not stolen anything, and
  • Asking M.G. to make sure no dirt was left on the door, not specifically to “wipe fingerprints.”
• J.C.’s testimony: she saw skid marks, tire tracks, scattered flowers, bark removed from the tree, and dirt and scratches on the front door.
• The mother was cited for striking a fixture (the tree) and ultimately pled guilty.

The circuit court denied the mother’s motion for an expert evaluation, stating that such evaluations would not be useful “as to the issues in this case.” It then announced that the adjudication “rests on” the children’s forensic interviews, contrasting “a minor incident” versus a “major incident” based on conflicting versions of events.

In its written adjudicatory order (October 19, 2023), the court:

• Found that the mother “destroyed potted flowers,” backed into the father’s tree and was cited (and pled guilty) for striking a fixture,
• Found that N.G. and M.G. were “afraid while in the car,”
• Found that the mother “was not appropriately protective” and “put the children in harm’s way” by going to the father’s home, damaging property, and backing into the tree, and
• Declared that the forensic interviews of the three children “were credible.”

Based on these conclusions, the circuit court adjudicated the children abused and neglected “at the hands of” the mother.

E. Disposition: Denial of Improvement Period and Termination

After adjudication, the mother moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and, in the alternative, for a post-dispositional improvement period. She testified in support of these requests.

The circuit court:

• Emphasized the case had been ongoing for two years (though largely due to the father’s earlier conduct),
• Stated that the children’s forensic interviews were “especially concerning” and showed how much the children were affected by the mother’s behavior,
• Denied an improvement period, and
• Terminated the mother’s custodial rights, finding:
  • Continuation in her home was not in the children’s best interests,
  • DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify, and
  • There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.

These findings were memorialized in the November 30, 2023, dispositional order.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the standard of review from syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions de novo.

The Court did not decide whether the evidence was sufficient to support adjudication, nor did it decide whether the mother should have received an improvement period. Instead, it held:

1. The adjudicatory order failed to comply with Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) because it lacked:
   • Findings describing the children’s specific disclosures in their forensic interviews, and
   • Conclusions of law explaining how those disclosures and the other facts satisfied the statutory definitions of “abused child,” “neglected child,” and “abusing parent” in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201.
   Accordingly, meaningful appellate review was impossible.
2. Because “proper adjudication is a prerequisite to disposition,” per In re C.F., 250 W. Va. 664, 907 S.E.2d 176 (2024), the dispositional order terminating the mother’s custodial rights must also be vacated.
3. For the same reason, the order denying the mother’s motion to obtain expert evaluations of the children must be vacated: without knowing what the children actually disclosed, the appellate court cannot review the trial court’s statement that such evaluations would not be useful.

Invoking syllabus point 5 of In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001), the Court held that where the statutory and rule-based process for child abuse and neglect proceedings has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting orders must be vacated and the case remanded for compliance.

The Court therefore:

• Vacated the October 2, 2023, order denying expert evaluation,
• Vacated the October 19, 2023, adjudicatory order,
• Vacated the November 30, 2023, dispositional order terminating custodial rights, and
• Remanded for entry of a new adjudicatory order containing adequate factual findings and legal conclusions, and for further proceedings consistent with the applicable statutes and rules.

The Court also cautioned that, on remand, if an improvement period is later at issue, the circuit court must not hold against the mother any procedural delay not attributable to her, citing State ex rel. L.D. v. Cohee, 247 W. Va. 695, 885 S.E.2d 633 (2022).

Justice Trump concurred in full but wrote separately to stress that the amended petition may not have met the statutory pleading requirements of West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(b), because even if all alleged facts were taken as true, they did not clearly bring the children within the statutory definitions of “abused” or “neglected” children in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, nor did they establish “imminent danger” justifying state intervention.

IV. Analysis

A. Statutory and Rule Framework

1. Adjudication and Disposition

West Virginia’s abuse and neglect regime distinguishes sharply between “adjudication” and “disposition”:

• Adjudication is the stage at which the court determines whether the child is an “abused” or “neglected” child and whether the respondent is an “abusing” or “neglecting” parent, based on evidence. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i).
• Disposition is the stage at which the court, having made that determination, decides what should happen to the child (e.g., reunification, improvement period, termination of parental rights or custodial rights, placement with relatives, etc.).

The Court reaffirmed that a valid adjudication is a legal prerequisite to a valid disposition. Citing In re C.F., it reiterated that if adjudication is flawed or unsupported, any subsequent dispositional decision, including termination, cannot stand.

2. Mandatory Findings Under Rule 27 and § 49-4-601(i)

Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings states:

“At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, in writing or on the record, as to whether the child is abused and/or neglected in accordance with W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i).”

West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) similarly mandates that the court:

“shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the respondent is abusing [or] neglecting… all of which shall be incorporated into the order of the court.”

These provisions are not aspirational; they are mandatory. As In re Edward B. emphasizes, the rules and statutes are written “in mandatory terms” and are designed both to protect due process and to provide a usable record for appellate review.

3. Statutory Definitions: § 49-1-201

The key definitions, all located in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, include:

• “Abused child”: a child whose health or welfare is being harmed or threatened by a parent or custodian who knowingly or intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict physical injury or mental/emotional injury.
• “Neglected child”: a child whose physical or mental health is harmed or threatened by a present refusal, failure, or inability of a parent to supply necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or education.
• “Abusing parent”: a parent whose conduct brings a child within the definition of “abused child” or “neglected child.”
• “Imminent danger” to physical well-being: an emergency situation where the child’s welfare or life is threatened by specified conditions (e.g., severe domestic violence, sexual abuse, chronic drug abuse in the home, etc.).

A lawful adjudication requires that the circuit court’s factual findings match these statutory elements.

B. The Deficiency of the Adjudicatory Order

The Supreme Court’s principal holding is straightforward: the adjudicatory order did not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to satisfy Rule 27 and § 49-4-601(i).

1. Failure to Describe Children’s Disclosures

The record made clear that, in the circuit court’s view, the children’s forensic interviews were dispositive. The court repeatedly said that the case “rests on” those interviews and that they transformed what might otherwise look like “just a nasty divorce case” into an abuse and neglect case.

Yet the adjudicatory order:

• Contained only a single, bare statement that the forensic interviews were “credible,” and
• Failed to set forth any of the children’s actual statements, disclosures, or descriptions of their feelings and experiences in those interviews.

This omission is crucial. The appellate court did not have the forensic interviews in the appendix record. Normally, that might not be fatal if the trial court had included in its order a careful summary of what the children said and how those statements met the statutory definitions. But here, the order was silent on substance.

Without knowing what the children actually disclosed, the Supreme Court could not:

• Evaluate whether their experiences amounted to a “mental or emotional injury” or threatened harm,
• Analyze whether the mother “knowingly or intentionally” inflicted or attempted to inflict such injury, or
• Assess whether the children’s fear in the car, as found by the circuit court, rose to the level of “abuse” or “neglect” as statutorily defined.

2. Failure to Tie Facts to Statutory Definitions

Even as to the facts the court did recite—mother’s trip to the father’s home, damage to property, backing into a tree, children being “afraid”—the order did not explain how those facts constituted abuse or neglect.

The court did not specify, for example:

• Whether it found the mother attempted to inflict physical injury on N.G. when she allegedly pulled her arm back as if to strike, and how this met the “knowingly or intentionally” standard; or
• Whether the children’s fear in the vehicle, without more, was deemed “mental or emotional injury” or a threatened harm qualifying them as abused or neglected children.

Nor did the order address how the two children who were not present in the car (including L.G., later aged out) were abused or neglected by this single incident. This gap becomes especially problematic when viewed against the concurrence’s observation that the amended petition itself did not explain how those children were in any imminent danger.

3. Why a Naked “Credibility” Finding Is Not Enough

The circuit court’s solitary finding that the forensic interviews were “credible” was insufficient standing alone. Credibility is one step; the court must then translate credited testimony into legally relevant findings that satisfy elements of statutory definitions.

Rule 27 and § 49-4-601(i) require more than a global declaration that certain evidence is credible. They require:

• Identification of the specific facts the court finds from that evidence, and
• An explanation of how those facts establish that the child is abused or neglected as defined in § 49-1-201.

Because this did not occur, the Supreme Court concluded that the “process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes [had] been substantially disregarded or frustrated,” triggering the remedy set out in syllabus point 5 of In re Edward B.: vacatur and remand.

C. Forensic Interviews and Appellate Review of Video Evidence

Although the Court did not resolve the hearsay and admissibility issues raised by the mother, it flagged an important, emerging question: how should appellate courts review trial courts’ credibility determinations when the key evidence is a video recording that the appellate court can watch just as easily as the trial court?

In a footnote, the Court cited Tennessee authority, including In re A.H., 2023 WL 4284968 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023), and Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2014), to note that some courts treat findings based on documentary evidence differently from findings based on live testimony:

“When findings are based on documentary evidence [such as a video recording], an appellate court’s ability to assess credibility and to weigh the evidence is the same as the trial court’s ability.”

The West Virginia Court explicitly reserved judgment on this issue for another day, particularly because the trial court had not even articulated what specific statements in the interviews it was crediting.

Nonetheless, the signal is clear: as forensic interviews and other recorded evidence become more central in abuse and neglect cases, West Virginia’s high court may revisit the traditional deference given to trial courts’ credibility assessments when the appellate court has the identical video record.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. In re Cecil T. – Standard of Review

Cecil T. provides the familiar standard for abuse and neglect appeals: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions de novo. The critical point here is that the Supreme Court could not even apply this standard because the required findings were missing.

2. In re Edward B. – Substantial Disregard of Process

In Edward B., the Court held that when the process set out in the abuse and neglect rules and statutes is “substantially disregarded or frustrated,” the final dispositional order must be vacated and the case remanded for compliance. Originally articulated in the context of disposition, that rule is now firmly applied to adjudicatory orders as well, as this case and others (e.g., In re G.N., No. 22-0312, 2023 WL 3973447 (W. Va. June 13, 2023)) demonstrate.

Here, the absence of statutorily required findings at adjudication constituted precisely the kind of substantial disregard that triggers the Edward B. remedy.

3. In re C.F. – Adjudication as Prerequisite to Disposition

In re C.F., 250 W. Va. 664, 907 S.E.2d 176 (2024), clarifies that a valid adjudication is a prerequisite to disposition. Because the Court could not determine from this record whether the children were properly adjudicated abused or neglected, it necessarily had to vacate the termination of custodial rights.

4. In re D.H. – Trial Court Discretion in Evidence

In re D.H., 2024 WL 4763258 (W. Va. 2024), recognizes the broad discretion of trial courts, as factfinders, to determine what evidence or evaluations are necessary. The Supreme Court cited D.H. to acknowledge that such discretion exists, but then held that, in this case, the appellate court could not meaningfully review the exercise of that discretion in denying expert evaluations because it did not know what the children had said.

In other words, trial courts do have broad discretion, but that discretion must be exercised on a transparent factual foundation that an appellate court can see and review.

5. State ex rel. L.D. v. Cohee – Delay Cannot Penalize Parents

The Court highlighted Cohee, 247 W. Va. 695, 885 S.E.2d 633 (2022), where it held that procedural delays caused by the court cannot “work to the detriment” of persons seeking custody. Here, the Supreme Court signaled that any additional delay caused by the remand should not be held against the mother when considering any future improvement period; time attributable to systemic or judicial delay cannot be used to claim that a case has been dragging on too long to allow reunification.

E. The Concurring Opinion: Statutory Sufficiency of the Amended Petition

Justice Trump’s concurrence, while agreeing fully with the majority’s disposition, emphasizes an even more fundamental issue: whether DHS’s amended petition itself was legally sufficient to initiate an abuse or neglect case against the mother.

1. Pleading Requirements Under § 49-4-601(b)

West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(b) requires that an abuse and neglect petition:

“shall allege specific conduct including time and place [and] how the conduct comes within the statutory definition of neglect or abuse with references thereto.” (emphasis added)

The concurrence underscores that this is not a technicality. The purpose of such specificity is to:

• Provide fair notice to parents of the precise allegations against them, and
• Ensure that courts and agencies do not move forward in the absence of a statutorily grounded basis for state intervention.

Justice Trump ties this to State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), where the Court stated that “[t]he State’s right to intervene is predicated upon its initial showing that there has been child abuse or neglect,” which equates to parental unfitness.

2. Why the Amended Petition May Not Allege Abuse, Neglect, or Imminent Danger

Justice Trump reasons that—even if all alleged facts are taken as true—the amended petition does not clearly fit within the statutory definitions:

• It describes one heated incident at the father’s house, involving some property damage, erratic driving, and frightened children. But it does not allege that the mother knowingly or intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict physical injury or mental/emotional injury, or that she refused or failed to provide necessary care.
• It does not allege ongoing patterns of conduct, chronic conditions in the home, or any of the statutory conditions that typically constitute “imminent danger.”
• Two of the four children were not in the vehicle at all, and the petition does not explain how they were abused, neglected, or placed in imminent danger by this single episode.

Accordingly, in Justice Trump’s view, the petition does not “state a statutory basis for adjudication” under § 49-4-601(b) and (i). In his words, DHS’s allegations are “wholly conclusory” as to how the described conduct meets the statutory definitions.

3. Line of Cases on Specificity

The concurrence situates this case within a long line of decisions admonishing courts and DHS to adhere to statutory specificity requirements, including:

• In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001),
• In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013),
• In re S.L., 243 W. Va. 559, 848 S.E.2d 634 (2020),
• In re D.P., 245 W. Va. 791, 865 S.E.2d 812 (2021),
• In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023),
• In re J.W., No. 23-712, 2025 WL 1262342 (W. Va. May 1, 2025),
• In re C.E., 251 W. Va. 342, 913 S.E.2d 366 (2025).

Most of these decisions focused on inadequate orders; Justice Trump extends that logic back to inadequate petitions, reminding DHS that it also bears a duty to link alleged facts to statutory definitions.

While the majority does not expressly adopt Justice Trump’s view as a holding, his concurrence is a clear signal to lower courts and agencies: petitions that merely recite the words “abuse,” “neglect,” or “imminent danger” without factually explaining how are vulnerable to dismissal or reversal.

F. Impact on Future Cases and Practice

1. For Circuit Courts: Drafting Adequate Adjudicatory Orders

This decision will likely cause circuit courts to be more meticulous in drafting adjudicatory orders, especially where the case hinges on forensic interviews or other documentary evidence. Courts will need to:

• Summarize, with reasonable detail, the critical portions of children’s statements or other evidence,
• Make explicit findings as to what they accept as true, and
• Tie those findings to specific elements of the statutory definitions in § 49-1-201.

Generic recitations such as “the children are abused and neglected at the hands of the parent” will no longer suffice. Instead, courts must demonstrate through their written orders that they have followed the statutory framework.

2. For DHS and Guardians ad Litem: Pleading and Record-Building

For DHS:

• Petitions must be drafted with an eye toward § 49-4-601(b) and § 49-1-201: not just “who, what, when, where,” but “why this is abuse, neglect, or imminent danger under the statute.”
• Conclusory allegations such as “the parent’s actions placed the children in imminent danger” are inadequate unless the petition explains what imminent danger means in statutory terms and how the facts meet that standard.

For guardians ad litem and CASA:

• Reports and recommendations will carry more weight when they help the court translate qualitative observations (e.g., children are fearful or anxious) into specific, statutorily relevant findings (e.g., mental or emotional injury, pattern of domestic violence, or chronic unsafe conditions).

3. For Parents and Children: Strengthened Procedural Protections

For parents, this decision reaffirms that:

• They cannot be adjudicated abusive or neglectful on vague or unexplained findings; the order must show why their conduct meets statutory standards.
• Termination of parental or custodial rights must rest on a transparent and reviewable foundation.

For children, the benefits are more subtle but significant:

• Improved factual clarity helps ensure that truly dangerous situations are identified and addressed swiftly and correctly.
• Inadequate or weak cases are less likely to distract agencies and courts from children in genuine need of protection.

4. For Appellate Practice: Record Completeness and Video Evidence

Appellate practitioners should draw at least two lessons:

• Ensuring that forensic interviews and other key exhibits are either incorporated into the appendix record or adequately summarized in the orders is essential. The Court’s observation that the missing interviews “would not have been problematic” if the order had adequately explained the children’s disclosures underscores this point.
• The Court’s reservation of the video-credibility issue suggests that future appeals may see more scrutiny of how trial courts evaluate recorded evidence. Counsel may wish to frame arguments accordingly.

G. Clarifying Complex Concepts and Terminology

1. “Adjudicatory” vs. “Dispositional”

Adjudicatory hearing: the “guilt” phase—did abuse or neglect occur, and is the parent an abusing or neglecting parent?

Dispositional hearing: the “remedy” phase—what happens now? Options range from in-home services and improvement periods to termination of parental rights.

2. Improvement Periods

An improvement period is a court-supervised period during which a parent works on correcting problems (substance abuse, parenting skills, mental health issues, etc.) with service-provider support. There are several types:

• Pre-adjudicatory: before the court decides whether abuse/neglect occurred,
• Post-adjudicatory: after adjudication but before final disposition,
• Post-dispositional: in rare cases, after a disposition has already been entered.

The mother in this case had previously received and successfully completed a pre-adjudicatory improvement period on the initial petition. On remand, if she is adjudicated again, she will need to file a new motion for any improvement period, and the circuit court must not penalize her for delays not of her making.

3. “Imminent Danger”

Imminent danger is not simply a child being scared or upset. It is defined by statute as an emergency situation in which the child’s welfare or life is threatened by specified conditions (e.g., severe violence, untreated severe mental illness, severe substance abuse, etc.) that threaten their health, life, or safety. Justice Trump’s concurrence is a reminder that not every disturbing or inappropriate parental act rises to this level.

4. “Abused Child,” “Neglected Child,” and “Abusing Parent”

In simplified terms:

• An abused child has been, or is being, intentionally harmed (or threatened with such harm) physically or emotionally by a parent.
• A neglected child is one whose health is harmed or at risk because the parent is currently refusing, failing, or unable to provide basic necessities or supervision.
• An abusing parent is a parent whose conduct fits either of the above definitions.

5. Forensic Interviews and Hearsay Concerns

A forensic interview is a structured, recorded interview of a child, typically conducted by a trained professional, designed to obtain reliable, non-leading information in a safe environment.

Such interviews often present hearsay concerns because the child’s out-of-court statements are being offered for their truth. West Virginia has special rules and case law about when such statements can be admitted (e.g., under hearsay exceptions for child statements in abuse cases), but this decision sidestepped those issues because the defective order made appellate review impossible regardless of admissibility.

V. Conclusion

In re L.G., A.G.-1, M.G., and N.G. illustrates a recurring but critical theme in West Virginia child abuse and neglect law: outcomes in these deeply consequential cases must rest on clear, specific, and statutorily grounded findings.

The Supreme Court vacated the adjudicatory and dispositional orders not because it ruled that abuse or neglect did not occur, but because the record and the orders failed to show how the statutory criteria were met. Without that explanation, appellate review cannot function, and the due process rights of both parents and children are at risk.

The concurring opinion presses the analysis one step earlier in time, warning that the petition itself must meet statutory pleading requirements by alleging conduct that, if proven, would actually constitute abuse, neglect, or imminent danger under West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 and § 49-4-601(b).

Going forward, this decision should prompt:

• Circuit courts to draft more detailed, legally grounded adjudicatory orders,
• DHS to file petitions that clearly tie factual allegations to statutory definitions,
• Counsel to ensure the appellate record contains either the actual forensic interviews or sufficiently detailed summaries in the orders, and
• All participants to remember that delay attributable to the system, not the parent, cannot be wielded as a weapon against reunification.

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re L.G. meaningfully develops West Virginia’s insistence on specificity—in pleadings, in orders, and in the articulation of how facts meet the statutory standards of “abuse” and “neglect.” It thus functions as an important guidepost for courts, agencies, and practitioners working in the highly sensitive field of child protection.