Specific Adjudicatory Findings as Statutory, Not Jurisdictional, Requirements in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Law: Commentary on In re R.M., B.M., and H.M.

Specific Adjudicatory Findings as Statutory, Not Jurisdictional, Requirements in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Law

Commentary on In re R.M., B.M., and H.M., Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (Nov. 12, 2025)

I. Introduction

The decision in In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. marks a significant clarification in West Virginia’s child abuse and neglect jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia uses this case not only to resolve a dispute over a mother’s entitlement to a post-adjudicatory improvement period, but to correct and narrow a recent line of cases that had treated certain adjudicatory defects as depriving trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction.

At the heart of the opinion are two intertwined questions:

  • First, whether a circuit court’s failure to make specific written factual findings at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing deprives that court of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition; and
  • Second, whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the mother a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminating her parental rights.

The Court answers the first question with a doctrinally important clarification: specific adjudicatory findings are mandatory statutory prerequisites to moving to disposition, but they are not jurisdictional conditions. The Court expressly overrules the contrary language in Syllabus Point 3 of In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023), and disapproves any reading of In re C.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022), that suggested otherwise.

On the second question, the Court upholds the termination of the mother’s parental rights. It finds no error in the circuit court’s refusal to grant an improvement period given the extreme neglect suffered by the children, the mother’s ongoing substance use, and her refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the children’s condition.

This commentary examines the facts, holdings, and reasoning of the case, situates it within the broader line of West Virginia decisions, and explores its impact on future abuse and neglect proceedings and jurisdictional doctrine.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Background

The petitioner, C.N. (“Mother”), is the biological mother of three children: R.M., B.M., and H.M. The respondent is the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”), formerly part of the Department of Health and Human Resources. A guardian ad litem represented the children. The father’s parental rights were terminated in the same proceeding, but he did not appeal.

In February 2023, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that:

  • Both parents engaged in significant substance abuse (including methamphetamine) that impaired their parenting and employability;
  • The home was unsanitary and unsafe, with clutter and animal feces throughout, inaccessible bedrooms, and an unusable kitchen;
  • The children were not provided appropriate food, clothing, supervision, and housing;
  • H.M., the oldest, frequently appeared at school unbathed and wearing dirty clothes, and largely lived with her grandmother two miles away but was still exposed to the parents’ home conditions; and
  • The younger children, R.M. and B.M., were often in heavily soiled diapers, and Mother refused to participate in recommended “Birth to Three” early intervention services.

Law enforcement officers investigating reports of Mother “nodding off” at school observed severe clutter, animal feces, and bedrooms and a kitchen that were effectively unusable. CPS was called, and the children were removed.

B. Procedural History

The circuit court held:

  • A preliminary hearing (March 2023), where police testified about the home’s state and the parents testified in their own defense.
  • Six adjudicatory hearings between April 27, 2023, and February 14, 2024. These hearings included extensive expert testimony on the children’s:
    • Severe malnutrition and feeding disorders; and
    • Significant developmental and speech delays attributed largely to environmental neglect and lack of interventions.

Expert witnesses (speech-language pathologists and a physical therapist) explained that:

  • B.M. had feeding and speech delays caused not by medical pathology but by “lack of exposure or lack of opportunity,” i.e., environmental neglect.
  • H.M. suffered from chronic feeding disorder, anorexia, and serious dental problems and required strong external prompting and reward to eat.
  • R.M., nearly two years old, was globally delayed—speech, feeding, fine and gross motor—and had recently required insertion of a feeding tube. He had significant oral-motor issues associated with long-term bottle use, and experts opined that proper early intervention services (e.g., Birth to Three and coordinated therapy) could have prevented or substantially reduced these problems.

The foster parent corroborated the gravity of R.M.’s condition when placed in foster care: he could not crawl or hold up his head, and his ribs were prominent, suggesting serious undernourishment.

During the adjudicatory phase, Mother:

  • Conceded use of methamphetamine several times a week prior to the petition (claiming abstinence for six months before the October 2023 hearing, although subsequent testing contradicted this);
  • Minimized the severity of the home’s condition, describing it as “cluttered but clean”; and
  • Asserted that medical care and Birth to Three services were being obtained, contrary to documentary evidence and testimony from providers.

On February 14, 2024, at the close of the sixth adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court stated on the record:

“I find that based upon the evidence in this case these children have been abused and neglected under the meaning of the law. There is substantial evidence to that effect, and so that is my ruling.”

However, the court did not immediately enter a written adjudicatory order with specific factual findings, and no party objected at that time.

On March 27, 2024, the court held the dispositional hearing. Mother, by a one-sentence written motion served that day, requested a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The circuit court:

  • Described the case as “one of the most severe” abuse and neglect matters it had seen;
  • Emphasized that one child required out-of-state treatment to “attempt to save her life” due to malnutrition; and
  • Found that Mother:
    • Continued to use drugs, with multiple positive tests for marijuana and a methamphetamine/amphetamine positive one week before disposition;
    • Refused to engage in drug treatment because she claimed she had stopped using; and
    • Failed to recognize or acknowledge the severity of the children’s condition and her responsibility for it.

On that basis, the court:

  • Denied the request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period; and
  • Terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding:
    • No reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future;
    • Termination was in the children’s best interests; and
    • No reasonable, less restrictive alternatives existed.

After Mother filed her notice of appeal, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory order nunc pro tunc, expressly finding by clear and convincing evidence that:

  • Mother was an abusing and neglectful parent based on conditions at the time of petition; and
  • The children were abused and neglected children, with “substantial evidence of neglect.”

C. Issues on Appeal and Supplemental Briefing

On appeal, Mother raised one assignment of error: the alleged abuse of discretion in denying her a post-adjudicatory improvement period before terminating her rights.

However, DHS, in its response, conceded that the circuit court failed to “make specific factual findings…explaining how each child’s health and welfare is being harmed or threatened” at adjudication, and, relying on the Court’s then-current jurisprudence (especially In re B.V.), argued that this failure deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to proceed to disposition. DHS simultaneously requested that the Supreme Court reconsider whether such findings are truly jurisdictional.

The Court ordered supplemental briefing on:

“whether specific factual findings regarding the abuse and/or neglect at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing are a jurisdictional requirement without which a circuit court may not proceed to disposition under any circumstances.”

D. Holdings

The Supreme Court:

  1. Clarified the nature of adjudicatory findings:
    • Specific factual findings explaining how each child’s health and welfare are harmed or threatened are mandatory statutory prerequisites to proceeding to disposition.
    • However, they are not requirements for establishing or maintaining subject matter jurisdiction.
    • To the extent Syllabus Point 3 of In re B.V. held otherwise, it is expressly overruled.
    • Any contrary reading of In re C.S. is also disapproved.
  2. Applied waiver and Edward B. standards:
    • Because the requirement of specific findings is not jurisdictional, it can be waived if not objected to in the circuit court.
    • Mother did not object to the lack of specific adjudicatory findings and did not assign this as error on appeal; thus, she waived the defect.
    • Nonetheless, under Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B., the Court examined whether the circuit court’s omission “substantially disregarded or frustrated” the statutory and rule-based process so as to require vacatur.
    • Given six extensive adjudicatory hearings, a clear oral adjudicatory ruling, and a later nunc pro tunc order, the Court concluded that the process had not been substantially disregarded or frustrated, and thus no reversal was warranted.
  3. Affirmed denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period:
    • Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a parent bears the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are likely to fully participate in an improvement period.
    • Given:
      • Mother’s continued drug use—including a methamphetamine-positive test one week before disposition;
      • Her refusal to engage in treatment; and
      • Her failure to acknowledge the neglect and the severity of the children’s conditions,
      the Court held the circuit court acted within its discretion in finding that an improvement period would be futile and that the children’s welfare would be seriously threatened by delay.
  4. Affirmed termination of parental rights, concluding that the statutory grounds for termination were satisfied and that it was in the children’s best interests.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Standard of Review: In re Tiffany Marie S. and Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.

Syllabus Point 1 of In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996), provides the baseline standard for reviewing abuse and neglect decisions:

  • Findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference to the circuit court if its account of the evidence is “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”
  • Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This standard is critical here because:

  • The Court’s re-characterization of adjudicatory findings as statutory rather than jurisdictional involves pure legal interpretation, reviewed de novo (per Syllabus Point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995)).
  • The denial of an improvement period and the factual findings concerning abuse and neglect are assessed under the deferential “clearly erroneous” and abuse-of-discretion standards.

2. Adjudication as a Prerequisite: State v. T.C. and In re Willis

Syllabus Point 1 of State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), is foundational:

“In a child abuse and neglect hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives under W. Va. Code [§ 49-4-604], it must hold a hearing under W. Va. Code [§ 49-4-601], and determine ‘whether such child is abused or neglected.’ Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case.”

T.C. drew on In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973), which:

  • Recognized the constitutional protections surrounding permanent removal of children from parents; and
  • Articulated the “polar star” principle: once a court properly finds neglect and parental unfitness, the welfare of the child is the decisive guiding consideration in custody decisions (Syl. Pt. 8, in part).

In T.C., the Court referred to adjudication as justifying the court’s “continued jurisdiction” to move forward to disposition. In In re R.M., B.M., and H.M., the Court revisits that phrase and clarifies that “continued jurisdiction” in this context refers to statutory authority to proceed, not to constitutional subject matter jurisdiction in the strict sense.

3. The Prior Misstep: In re B.V. and Its Aftermath

In In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023), the Court faced abuse/neglect proceedings involving children in a legal guardianship outside the respondent parents’ custody. Concerned that such children might not actually be “abused” or “neglected” within the statutory definitions, the Court held in Syllabus Point 3:

“To exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court must make specific factual findings explaining how each child’s health and welfare are being harmed or threatened by the allegedly abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in the petition. Due to the jurisdictional nature of this question, generalized findings applicable to all children named in the petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make specific findings with regard to each child so named.”

The substantive concern in B.V.—that each child must actually meet the statutory definition of an “abused child” or “neglected child,” particularly where some live in a guardianship or with a non-abusing caregiver—remains intact. But B.V. went further and labeled the requirement of specific child-by-child findings as a condition of subject matter jurisdiction.

Subsequent memorandum decisions applied B.V. to vacate or remand cases where:

  • The circuit court made only generalized findings regarding all children, even though some were:
    • Living with a non-abusing parent; or
    • In a separate legal guardianship.
  • See, for example:
    • In re B.H., No. 23-599, 2024 WL 4382118 (W. Va. Sept. 24, 2024);
    • In re K.R., No. 23-8, 2024 WL 578667 (W. Va. Feb. 13, 2024); and
    • In re A.B., No. 23-301, 2024 WL 3986898 (W. Va. Aug. 27, 2024).

In some of these decisions, the Court stated that the absence of specific findings meant the circuit court “lacked jurisdiction to proceed to disposition,” directly invoking B.V.’s jurisdictional language.

In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. now corrects the doctrinal overreach in B.V.:

  • It emphasizes that Syllabus language must be read in light of the opinion (citing Jones v. Jones and State v. Wallace).
  • It acknowledges that B.V. arose in a specific context—children in legal guardianships away from the respondent parents—where the Court wanted to ensure those children in fact met statutory abuse/neglect definitions.
  • It concludes that, although the specific findings requirement remains valid as a matter of statutory compliance, it should not have been framed as a condition of subject matter jurisdiction.

4. In re C.S.: Jurisdiction and Statutory Definitions

Syllabus Point 8 of In re C.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022), stated:

“For a circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an abuse and neglect case, the child must be an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected child’ as those terms are defined in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018). Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) (2019), a circuit court’s finding that a child is an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected child’ must be based upon the conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and neglect petition.”

In C.S., one child had been in a permanent legal guardianship for five years and the petition contained no allegations of harm or risk to that child. The Court held that such a child did not meet the statutory definitions and thus could not be swept into the abuse/neglect case simply to address other issues.

In In re R.M., B.M., and H.M., the Court distinguishes C.S.:

  • In C.S., the problem was that the petition, on its face and based on actual conditions at filing, described a child who did not qualify as abused or neglected at all; thus, the court had no authority to adjudicate that child under the abuse/neglect statutes.
  • That is different from a case where the child does meet the statutory definition, but the court’s written adjudicatory order is defective or incomplete.

To the extent C.S. has been read to suggest that any defect in adjudicatory findings strips subject matter jurisdiction, it is also effectively curtailed by this new decision.

5. Earlier Treatment of Defective Adjudications: G.M., E.T., and George Glen B.

Before B.V., West Virginia cases treated failures at adjudication as serious statutory and rule violations, not as jurisdictional nullities:

  • In re G.M., No. 15-1015, 2016 WL 2979850 (W. Va. May 23, 2016), vacated a dispositional order because the circuit court had failed to properly adjudicate the petitioner as an abusing parent. The Court did not say the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; it held instead that there had been “substantial disregard” of statutes and rules, warranting vacation.
  • In re E.T., No. 17-1085, 2018 WL 1773180 (W. Va. Apr. 13, 2018), similarly vacated a dispositional order because the court had never held an adjudicatory hearing at all.
  • In re George Glen B., Jr., 205 W. Va. 435, 518 S.E.2d 863 (1999), reversed and remanded where the circuit court failed to hold required hearings, including adjudication, because the process had not complied with statutes, rules, or case law.

These cases track Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001): when the statutory and rule-based process is substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting order must be vacated and the case remanded. In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. aligns with this older line, emphasizing substantial disregard rather than “jurisdictional” invalidity.

6. “Continued Jurisdiction” and A.P.-1, K.H.

In In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 827 S.E.2d 830 (2019), and In re K.H., No. 18-0282, 2018 WL 6016722 (W. Va. Nov. 16, 2018), the Court used “jurisdiction” language when addressing situations where:

  • The circuit court did not find the alleged abuse/neglect (e.g., abandonment) at adjudication, yet later terminated rights at disposition.

Those opinions said the circuit court lacked the “continued jurisdiction” to terminate parental rights under such circumstances. In the present case, the Court reads these as meaning that without a proper adjudication of abuse/neglect, the court lacks statutory authority to proceed—not that subject matter jurisdiction in the strict sense was missing.

7. Persuasive Authority: Montana’s In re Z.N.-M.

The Court draws support from the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in In re Z.N.-M., 538 P.3d 21 (Mont. 2023), which:

  • Clarified the distinction between legislative requirements and jurisdictional limits in termination proceedings; and
  • Held that a failure to comply with statutory requirements for adjudicating a youth in need of care did not affect the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition to terminate parental rights, overruling prior contrary decisions.

While Montana’s statutory scheme differs, the shared concern—preventing overuse of “jurisdictional” labels—is evident.

8. Improvement Period Precedents: In re R.J.M., Doris S., Charity H., Tonjia M.

On the improvement period question, the Court relies on a familiar line of cases:

  • In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (Syl. Pt. 1, in part): courts are not required to “exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement” before terminating parental rights if the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened.
  • W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W. Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996): failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem makes it “untreatable” and renders an improvement period “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.”
  • In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) (per curiam): parents are not unconditionally entitled to an improvement period; the parent bears the burden of proof.
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002) (per curiam): circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely.

These cases support the Court’s conclusion that, given Mother’s ongoing drug use and denial, a post-adjudicatory improvement period was properly denied.

B. Legal Reasoning and Application

1. Statutory Framework: Adjudication vs. Disposition

West Virginia’s abuse and neglect proceedings are structured in two principal stages:

  1. Adjudication (W. Va. Code § 49-4-601; W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 27):
    • The court must hold a hearing to determine whether the child is an “abused child” or “neglected child” and whether the respondent is an abusing or neglecting parent.
    • At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court must:
      • Make findings of fact and conclusions of law (in writing or on the record); and
      • Enter an order of adjudication within 10 days, incorporating those findings and conclusions.
  2. Disposition (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604):
    • Only after a proper adjudication may the court choose a dispositional alternative, including termination of parental rights if statutory criteria are met.

The Court reaffirms that a finding that the child is abused/neglected is a “prerequisite to further continuation of the case” (Syllabus Point 1, T.C.): without it, the court cannot move to the dispositional menu in § 49-4-604.

However, the Court draws a crucial distinction: while an adjudication is an absolute statutory prerequisite for disposition, the presence or absence of detailed, written factual findings supporting that adjudication affects statutory compliance and reviewability, not the existence of subject matter jurisdiction itself.

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Authority

The opinion carefully separates:

  • Subject matter jurisdiction: the court’s power, granted by the Constitution and general statutes, to hear a class of cases (e.g., child abuse and neglect); and
  • Statutory authority or “continued jurisdiction”: the power to take further steps in a particular case only after certain statutory conditions are satisfied (e.g., a proper adjudication before disposition).

Mislabeling statutory preconditions as “jurisdictional” has serious procedural consequences:

  • Jurisdictional defects cannot be waived, can be raised at any time (even sua sponte on appeal or collateral attack), and typically render orders void.
  • Non-jurisdictional statutory defects can be:
    • Waived if not timely raised; and
    • Reviewed under ordinary appellate standards (e.g., harmless error or the Edward B. “substantial disregard” test), rather than automatic nullification.

The Court concludes:

  • The requirement to make specific findings of fact at adjudication is mandatory under § 49-4-601 and Rule 27.
  • But the failure to do so does not negate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over abuse and neglect cases; instead, it is a reviewable procedural and statutory error.

Therefore, the Court holds in new Syllabus Point 4:

“Specific findings of fact explaining how each child’s health and welfare is being harmed or threatened by the abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in the petition are a statutory prerequisite for the circuit court to proceed to the dispositional phase, not a requirement for establishing or maintaining subject matter jurisdiction.”

3. Waiver and the Edward B. “Substantial Disregard” Standard

Because the specific-findings requirement is non-jurisdictional, it is subject to waiver:

  • Mother did not object in the circuit court when no written adjudicatory order with findings was entered immediately after the oral ruling.
  • She did not assign this omission as error in her initial appellate brief.

Under traditional preservation principles, failure to object generally waives the issue on appeal (citing State v. Asbury and In re S.S.). However, the Court recognizes a special rule in abuse/neglect cases: even if parties waive a defect, the Court may still intervene if the statutory/rule process has been seriously compromised.

Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B. provides:

“Where it appears from the record that the process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes…has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting order…will be vacated and the case remanded for compliance with that process.”

Applying this standard, the Court concludes:

  • The circuit court held six adjudicatory hearings with extensive testimony and documentary evidence.
  • It made a clear oral finding that the children were abused and neglected “under the meaning of the law” based on substantial evidence.
  • It later entered a nunc pro tunc adjudicatory order with explicit findings, including that the abuse/neglect was proven by clear and convincing evidence as of the time of the petition.
  • The record shows that Mother understood the allegations and the basis for the court’s adjudication; her own testimony addressed them.

Under these circumstances, the failure to contemporaneously issue a detailed written adjudicatory order did not amount to a “substantial disregard or frustration” of the process. Thus, even if technically erroneous, the omission does not require vacatur of the dispositional order.

4. Application to the Facts: Evidence of Abuse and Neglect

The Court also notes that the evidentiary record overwhelmingly supports the adjudication:

  • Law enforcement testimony about:
    • Severe clutter;
    • Animal feces throughout the home; and
    • Inaccessible bedrooms and kitchen.
  • Expert testimony that the children’s:
    • Feeding disorders;
    • Developmental delays; and
    • Speech impairments
    were largely attributable to environmental neglect and lack of appropriate interventions, rather than unavoidable medical conditions.
  • Foster parent testimony about R.M.’s alarming physical condition (unable to crawl, extremely thin, ribs visible) upon removal.

This evidence satisfies the clear and convincing standard for finding:

  • That the children were “abused” and/or “neglected” as defined in W. Va. Code § 49-1-201; and
  • That Mother was an “abusing” and “neglecting” parent at the time of filing.

Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that the missing written detail at the moment of oral adjudication deprived Mother of due process or rendered the dispositional outcome unreliable.

5. Denial of the Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a circuit court may grant a post-adjudicatory improvement period if the parent:

  • Demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are likely to fully participate.

This is a discretionary decision. The Court emphasizes three critical points:

  1. Burden on the parent: The parent seeking an improvement period must come forward with persuasive evidence that they will comply. There is no entitlement to an improvement period.
  2. No duty to exhaust speculative possibilities: Per R.J.M., courts need not exhaust every speculative possibility of improvement when the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened by delay.
  3. Acknowledgment of the problem: Under Doris S., a parent’s refusal to acknowledge the existence and seriousness of the problem makes it effectively untreatable and renders an improvement period futile.

Applying these principles, the Court highlights:

  • Continued substance abuse:
    • Multiple positive marijuana tests in January and February 2024;
    • A positive methamphetamine/amphetamine test on March 20, 2024, just seven days before the dispositional hearing.
    • Mother’s insistence that she had not used methamphetamine since July 3, 2023 despite this test result.
  • Refusal to engage in treatment: Mother declined drug treatment, claiming she no longer used drugs, which was inconsistent with test results.
  • Denial and minimization:
    • Mother’s description of the case as arising from “miss[ing] one doctor’s appointment.”
    • Her statement that she could not “expect [her] children to be fat,” given her own thin physique, minimizing H.M.’s diagnosed anorexia and malnutrition requiring out-of-state care.
    • Her refusal to admit the severity of the home’s unsafe and unsanitary conditions, despite substantial contrary evidence.

In light of this, the Court agrees with the circuit court that Mother did not carry her burden to show that she was likely to fully participate in and benefit from an improvement period. Given the extreme severity of the children’s conditions—one nearly requiring life-saving intervention and another in profound developmental crisis—the Court finds it was neither required nor prudent for the circuit court to gamble on speculative parental improvement at the children’s expense.

IV. Impact of the Decision

A. Clarifying the Law of Jurisdiction in Abuse and Neglect Cases

This opinion is most significant for its doctrinal clarification regarding subject matter jurisdiction:

  • It reinforces that abuse and neglect courts do have subject matter jurisdiction over such cases under the Constitution and general statutory grants.
  • It limits the notion that failures to comply with specific procedural or statutory steps—such as writing out detailed adjudicatory findings—are “jurisdictional defects” that render everything that follows void.
  • It restores the earlier framework where such failures are:
    • Serious statutory violations that can justify reversal or remand; but
    • Subject to waiver and subject to the Edward B. “substantial disregard or frustration” standard, rather than automatic nullification.

Practically, this:

  • Protects the finality and stability of termination orders and permanency plans for children, avoiding instability years later based on belated jurisdictional attacks;
  • Encourages parties—especially parents and their counsel—to raise procedural defects promptly in the circuit court; and
  • Preserves the Court’s ability to intervene in egregious cases where the adjudicatory process has effectively been bypassed or hollowed out.

B. Continued Importance of Specific Findings and Child-Specific Analysis

Although the Court rejects the “jurisdictional” label, it does not relax the underlying obligation:

  • Circuit courts must still make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law at adjudication (per § 49-4-601 and Rule 27).
  • Especially where some children:
    • Reside in legal guardianships; or
    • Live with non-abusing parents,
    courts must explain why each child qualifies as abused or neglected, as emphasized in B.V. and related cases.

Thus, In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. should be read as:

  • Limiting the jurisdictional rhetoric of B.V., but
  • Confirming the substantive requirement that adjudicatory findings be:
    • Child-specific; and
    • Tied to the statutory definitions and conditions at the time of filing.

C. Guidance for Practitioners

The decision suggests several practice implications:

  • DHS attorneys:
    • Should continue to insist on detailed adjudicatory orders, but now may argue waiver where parents did not object to deficient findings in the trial court.
    • Can rebut jurisdictional challenges by pointing to this opinion: defects in adjudicatory findings are statutory errors, not jurisdictional voids.
  • Parents’ counsel:
    • Must vigilantly object at adjudication to:
      • Failure to enter a written order within 10 days; and
      • Inadequate factual findings or generalized findings that do not address each child.
    • On appeal, should frame such failures as:
      • Violations of § 49-4-601 and Rule 27; and
      • Serious prejudicial errors justifying remand under Edward B., rather than as pure jurisdictional defects.
  • Guardians ad litem:
    • Should insist on child-specific findings tied to the statutory definitions, especially for children not residing with the respondent at petition filing.

D. Reinforcing the High Bar for Improvement Periods in Severe Cases

This case also reinforces:

  • That improvement periods are conditional and discretionary, not automatic;
  • That severe, life-threatening neglect, especially combined with ongoing substance abuse and denial, can justify immediate termination without further delaying permanency; and
  • That courts may rely on expert medical and developmental testimony to assess the harm done and the risks of further delay.

The decision underscores that a few months of partial service compliance or sporadic negative drug screens do not guarantee an improvement period where the overall pattern shows:

  • Relapse;
  • Non-engagement in treatment; and
  • Lack of insight into the underlying problems.

V. Complex Concepts Explained

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Prerequisites

  • Subject matter jurisdiction:
    • The court’s fundamental power to hear and decide a type of case (e.g., criminal, civil, abuse/neglect).
    • Granted by the Constitution and general jurisdiction statutes.
    • Cannot be created by the parties and cannot be waived.
    • If truly lacking, any judgment is void and can be attacked at any time.
  • Statutory prerequisites to further action:
    • Specific steps or findings the legislature requires before a court may take certain actions (e.g., terminate parental rights).
    • Failure to comply is serious and may require reversal; but it does not mean the court lacked power to hear the case at all.
    • Parties can generally waive these defects by not objecting in time.

2. Adjudication vs. Disposition

  • Adjudication:
    • The phase where the court decides whether the child is abused/neglected and the parent is abusing/neglecting, based on evidence.
    • Requires a finding supported by clear and convincing evidence.
    • Must be followed by written findings and conclusions.
  • Disposition:
    • The phase where the court decides what to do in light of the adjudication (e.g., return the child with services, grant an improvement period, or terminate parental rights).
    • Cannot lawfully occur unless a proper adjudication has occurred.

3. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a standard of proof higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not), but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases). It means the evidence must produce a firm belief or conviction in the fact-finder’s mind that the allegations are true.

4. Nunc Pro Tunc Orders

A nunc pro tunc (“now for then”) order is one entered after the fact but given retroactive effect to the date when the court originally announced its ruling. It is used to correct or memorialize a decision the court actually made earlier but did not properly record.

In this case, the adjudicatory order entered after the notice of appeal was labeled nunc pro tunc to reflect the adjudication that was orally made on February 14, 2024.

5. Waiver

“Waiver” in litigation occurs when a party fails to raise an objection or argument in a timely way, thereby giving up the right to rely on that issue on appeal. Because the requirement for specific adjudicatory findings is not jurisdictional, a parent can waive the issue by:

  • Not objecting when the court fails to enter a timely or adequate adjudicatory order; or
  • Not assigning the defect as error in the appellate briefing.

6. Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

An improvement period is a court-ordered time (typically with services and monitoring) during which the parent is given a final opportunity to correct the conditions of abuse/neglect. A post-adjudicatory improvement period occurs after the court has found the child abused/neglected.

  • The parent must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are likely to fully participate.
  • The court weighs factors such as:
    • Past compliance and efforts;
    • Current sobriety and treatment engagement;
    • Insight into the problem;
    • The severity and urgency of the child’s needs.

VI. Conclusion

In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. is a pivotal decision in West Virginia child welfare law. It does three important things:

  1. Clarifies jurisdictional doctrine: Specific adjudicatory findings, while mandatory under statute and rule, are not conditions of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court corrects the overbroad language in In re B.V. and aligns abuse/neglect procedure with a more precise understanding of jurisdiction.
  2. Preserves the integrity of the adjudicatory process: The Court reaffirms that:
    • An adjudication based on clear and convincing evidence is an absolute prerequisite to disposition;
    • Child-specific findings tied to statutory definitions are required; and
    • Serious deviations from this process can still warrant vacatur under Edward B..
  3. Reinforces a child-centered approach to improvement periods and termination: Where children have suffered extreme neglect—with life-threatening malnutrition and profound developmental harm—and the parent continues substance use while denying responsibility, courts are not obliged to grant speculative improvement periods, especially when further delay would threaten the children’s welfare.

As a precedential matter, the opinion sharpens the analytical tools available to courts and litigants in distinguishing between:

  • Defects that go to the court’s very power to act; and
  • Defects that, though serious, are subject to waiver and to ordinary appellate review.

As a practical matter, it emphasizes the imperative of timely, detailed adjudicatory findings and of candid, meaningful parental engagement with the realities of abuse and neglect. The ultimate message is that while procedural rules must be honored, they exist in service of the paramount goal articulated since Willis: the welfare of the child remains the “polar star” guiding judicial discretion in these difficult cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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