Specific, Memorable-Detail Inconsistencies and Sparse Corroboration Sustain Adverse Credibility Findings; Nervousness at Credible-Fear Interviews Does Not Undermine Reliability — Singh v. Bondi (2d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Singh v. Bondi, No. 23-6613 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), denying Jasvir Singh’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the decision cogently applies well-settled standards governing adverse credibility determinations post–REAL ID Act, particularly the treatment of inconsistencies across an applicant’s statements, the role of credible-fear interviews, and the weight of corroborative evidence.

The central issue was whether substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility finding. The court concluded that it did, relying on multiple, specific inconsistencies about the nature and circumstances of two alleged attacks and the petitioner’s injuries, coupled with insufficient corroboration. The court rejected the petitioner’s explanations—including his claim of nervousness during the credible-fear interview—and emphasized that such interviews remain a reliable source of statements absent concrete, record-based reasons to discount them.

Parties and attorneys: Petitioner Jasvir Singh was represented by Dalbir Singh (Dalbir Singh & Associates). The Respondent, the United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi, was represented by Brian M. Boynton (Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General), Jennifer R. Khouri (Senior Litigation Counsel), and Robert P. Coleman III (Trial Attorney), Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice. The panel comprised Circuit Judges Richard J. Sullivan, Steven J. Menashi, and Myrna Pérez.

Summary of the Opinion

The court reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions for completeness and applied the substantial evidence standard to the adverse credibility ruling.
It identified multiple inconsistencies between Singh’s credible-fear interview and his later application and testimony:
- What he was doing during the first attack (riding his bike home vs. putting up posters in another village),
- Which attack caused hospitalization, loss of consciousness, and a broken shoulder (first attack vs. second attack on December 5, 2015), and
- Which shoulder was broken (left vs. right).
Additional tension in the documentary record existed regarding hospital x-rays dated March 10, 2015, which conflicted with prior claims that he left the hospital on March 3 due to cost and received only home treatment thereafter.
The agency reasonably declined to credit Singh’s explanations, including nervousness and fatigue at the credible-fear interview, and accorded limited weight to letters from interested parties who were unavailable for cross-examination.
Given the adverse credibility determination, all claims—asylum, withholding, and CAT—failed because they shared the same factual predicate.
The petition for review was denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2006): The court reviewed both IJ and BIA decisions “for the sake of completeness,” reinforcing a common appellate practice ensuring comprehensive review when the BIA affirms while adding its own reasoning.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B): The “substantial evidence” standard anchors review of agency fact-finding. The court reiterated that factual determinations are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (REAL ID Act): Authorizes credibility determinations based on totality of the circumstances, including internal and external inconsistencies, regardless of whether discrepancies “go to the heart” of the claim. The panel explicitly invoked this framework to treat inconsistencies across statements as probative.
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008): The court reiterated deference to adverse credibility determinations absent a showing that “no reasonable fact-finder” could reach that conclusion.
Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018):
- Set out the substantial evidence standard for credibility;
- Explained that omissions are generally less probative than direct contradictions but remain relevant under the totality test; and
- Established that an adverse credibility finding can dispose of asylum, withholding, and CAT claims when they share the same factual predicate.
Singh v. Garland, 6 F.4th 418 (2d Cir. 2021): Emphasized that reasons for finding an applicant not credible must be supported by substantial evidence and logically tied to credibility; also cautioned against relying on “trivial” inconsistencies and discussed when discrepancies are not “innocently explained.” This decision guided the panel’s assessment that conflicting accounts about the attacks and which shoulder was broken were neither trivial nor innocently explained.
Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2020): Clarified that even a single inconsistency may suffice for an adverse credibility finding, and multiple inconsistencies strengthen the case; also endorsed assigning limited weight to affidavits from interested parties not available for cross-examination.
Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005): Held that an applicant’s explanation for inconsistencies must compel the fact-finder to accept it; mere plausibility is insufficient. This principle underpinned the court’s refusal to accept Singh’s general denial of inconsistency and his nervousness explanation.
Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715 (2d Cir. 2009): Rejected the notion that nervousness or distraction at a credible-fear interview automatically undermines that interview’s reliability. The panel cited this to reject Singh’s attempt to discount his earlier statements.
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013): Confirmed the agency’s discretion in weighing documentary evidence; cited to support limited weight for affidavits and letters that failed to resolve discrepancies.
Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2007): Recognized that a failure to corroborate can bear on credibility, particularly where testimony has already been called into question.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework mandated by the REAL ID Act, considering both the internal consistency of Singh’s narrative and the consistency of that narrative with documentary evidence. The analysis unfolded in three steps:

Identification of Material Inconsistencies:
- Event setting discrepancy: First attack occurred either while biking home (application/testimony) or while hanging posters in a neighboring village (credible-fear interview).
- Injury chronology discrepancy: The serious injuries (broken shoulder, loss of consciousness, hospitalization) were tied to different attacks at different times and places across accounts.
- Specific-injury laterality discrepancy: Conflicting claims about whether the left or right shoulder was broken.
The court treated these as specific, memorable details—precisely the kind of facts that are unlikely to be innocently confused—and therefore probative of credibility. Importantly, while the REAL ID Act permits reliance on non-core inconsistencies, these discrepancies went to the heart of the claimed persecution events and resulting harm.
Evaluation of Explanations and Interview Reliability:
- Singh broadly denied inconsistency and urged that his hearing testimony was correct. Under Majidi, that denial did not compel acceptance; it failed to reconcile concrete differences across records.
- He asserted nervousness and fatigue at the credible-fear interview. The panel, invoking Ming Zhang, reiterated that such claims do not automatically negate the reliability of credible-fear interviews. Without concrete indicators of unreliability (e.g., translation issues, irregular formatting, lack of comprehension), the interview remained a valid source.
Corroboration and Weight of Evidence:
- Medical records: X-rays dated March 3 and March 10, 2015, were tension points: they were offered to corroborate a right shoulder injury but clashed with earlier statements that Singh left the hospital on March 3 for cost reasons and received only home treatment for three months. The March 10 record, not mentioned elsewhere, introduced contradiction rather than clarity.
- Affidavits and letters: Statements from family, friends, and a doctor lacked detail on key points (e.g., recommendation for surgery), did not resolve the laterality inconsistency, and came from interested parties not subject to cross-examination. Under Y.C. and Likai Gao, the agency permissibly accorded them limited weight.
With credibility already in doubt, the failure of corroboration to rehabilitate testimony bolstered the adverse finding, consistent with Biao Yang.

Finally, because all claims shared the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief, echoing Hong Fei Gao.

Impact

While this is a summary order (and therefore non-precedential under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1), it provides several practical and doctrinal signals likely to influence litigation tactics and agency adjudication:

Elevated salience of “memorable detail” inconsistencies: Discrepancies about concrete, specific facts—such as which shoulder was broken, which attack led to hospitalization, and whether an attack occurred during an activity (biking vs. hanging posters)—are especially persuasive bases for adverse credibility findings.
Credible-fear interview statements remain potent: Generic claims of nervousness or fatigue are insufficient to disqualify such interviews as evidentiary anchors. Practitioners must develop record-based challenges (translation problems, lack of verbatim Q&A, misunderstanding of questions, or cognitive/medical barriers).
Corroboration must be targeted and consistent: Documentary submissions that fail to reconcile specific inconsistencies—or that introduce new contradictions—can harm more than help. Detailed, consistent medical records and independent affidavits from non-interested witnesses (or affidavits with indicia of reliability) are critical.
Affidavits from interested parties are inherently limited: Expect skeptical weighting absent cross-examination or strong indicia of reliability and detail. Where feasible, obtain testimony or declarations from disinterested witnesses, or provide corroborative documentary scaffolding.
CAT claims require independent factual footing when credibility is in doubt: The order reiterates that when all claims share a factual predicate, an adverse credibility finding forecloses relief across the board. To preserve CAT, practitioners should marshal independent, objective country-conditions evidence and medical/forensic proof that does not depend on discredited testimony.

In short, this order reinforces that the combination of specific cross-statement inconsistencies and weak corroboration will almost invariably satisfy the substantial evidence threshold for adverse credibility in the Second Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse Credibility Determination: The IJ/BIA’s conclusion that an applicant’s testimony is not believable. Credibility can be assessed based on any inconsistencies or inaccuracies, even if they do not go to the heart of the claim, as long as the totality of circumstances supports the finding.
Substantial Evidence Standard (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)): A highly deferential appellate standard. A reviewing court upholds the agency’s fact-finding unless the evidence compels the opposite conclusion. The court does not reweigh evidence; it asks whether a reasonable fact-finder could reach the agency’s conclusion.
REAL ID Act Credibility Factors (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)): Allows fact-finders to consider inconsistencies across written/oral statements and with other evidence, regardless of whether they are central to the claim. The inquiry is holistic.
Credible-Fear Interview (CFI): An early-stage screening interview for certain arriving noncitizens to assess a “significant possibility” of eligibility for asylum. Statements made at the CFI can be used to assess credibility later. Nervousness alone does not undermine reliability; objections must be grounded in concrete problems with the interview process or record.
Corroboration: Evidence supporting the applicant’s account (medical records, police reports, affidavits). When credibility is in question, the absence of corroboration—or the presence of inconsistent or vague corroboration—can confirm an adverse credibility finding.
Interested Party Affidavit: A statement from someone aligned with the applicant (e.g., family). Such affidavits may receive limited weight, particularly if the author is unavailable for cross-examination or if the affidavit lacks detail or independent corroboration.
Common Factual Predicate: When multiple forms of relief (asylum, withholding, CAT) rely on the same set of facts. If those facts are deemed not credible and there is no independent support, all related claims may fail together.

Conclusion

Singh v. Bondi is a careful application of settled Second Circuit doctrines on credibility, corroboration, and the use of credible-fear interviews. The court underscored that:

Specific, memorable-detail inconsistencies across an applicant’s accounts are powerful indicators of incredibility;
Generic claims of nervousness at a credible-fear interview do not, without more, undermine its reliability as a source of statements;
Corroboration must be detailed, internally consistent, and directly responsive to identified discrepancies; and
Adverse credibility can defeat asylum, withholding, and CAT when those claims are built on the same factual foundation.

Though non-precedential, the order provides a clear, practitioner-focused template for how the Second Circuit expects credibility issues to be analyzed and documented. For applicants, the opinion is a reminder that early statements matter, that seemingly small discrepancies can carry outsized weight when they concern core events and injuries, and that corroboration must be thoughtfully curated to resolve—not amplify—gaps in the narrative.