Southampton 100, LLC v. Alabama Department of Revenue: Limiting Dismissal Sanctions for Rule 30(b)(6) Discovery Violations and Encouraging Hearings on Contested Dispositive Motions

Southampton 100, LLC v. Alabama Department of Revenue: Limiting Dismissal Sanctions for Rule 30(b)(6) Discovery Violations and Encouraging Hearings on Contested Dispositive Motions

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision in Southampton 100, LLC v. Alabama Department of Revenue (Nov. 26, 2025) is essentially a discovery-sanctions case arising in the context of a multi-year property-tax valuation dispute. Although the underlying merits concern the ad valorem tax value of a low-income housing property in Jefferson County, the opinion sets a significant precedent in two related areas:

  • Substantive standard for dismissal under Rules 37(b)(2) and 37(d): The Court reinforces that dismissal with prejudice for discovery violations—especially failure to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) witness—requires clear evidence of willful, deliberate misconduct and must be proportionate to the actual discovery abuse.
  • Procedural best practice on dispositive motions: In a special concurrence, Justice Cook articulates that the “norm and best practice” is for trial courts to hold a hearing before granting contested dispositive motions (including motions for dismissal as a sanction), grounding this in Rule 78 and prior Alabama cases on summary judgment.

This commentary will (1) outline the factual and procedural background; (2) summarize the Court’s holdings; (3) analyze the precedents and legal reasoning; (4) explore the practical impact on discovery practice and trial-court procedure; (5) simplify the key legal concepts; and (6) assess the broader significance of the ruling.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Tax Dispute

Southampton 100, LLC (“Southampton”) purchased a low-income-housing tax credit property in Jefferson County, Alabama, in July 2019 for $2,570,000. For the 2021 tax year, the Jefferson County Tax Assessor valued the property at $3,823,800. Southampton contested this figure before the Jefferson County Board of Equalization and Adjustments, which reduced the assessment to $3,250,000 but did not satisfy Southampton.

Southampton then:

  • Appealed the Board’s 2021 assessment to the Jefferson Circuit Court under §§ 40-3-24 and -25, Ala. Code 1975.
  • Over the following years, separately appealed the 2022, 2023, and 2024 tax-year assessments for the same property.
  • Obtained consolidation of all these tax appeals into a single proceeding in circuit court.
  • Requested a jury trial to determine fair market value.

The Alabama Department of Revenue (“ADOR”) filed a notice of appearance under § 40-3-26(b) and became the named appellee in the circuit court proceedings.

B. Scheduling Order and the Birmingham Differential Case Management Plan

The circuit court initially set a jury trial for October 16, 2023, later continuing it to February 24, 2025. On October 28, 2024, the court entered a new scheduling order that:

  • Disfavored further continuances absent “good cause”; incomplete discovery would not qualify as good cause.
  • Required all discovery to be completed by December 26, 2024 (60 days before trial), later extended to January 24, 2025.
  • Incorporated a provision from the Birmingham Differential Case Management Plan regarding Rule 30(b)(6) depositions:
    • If corporate representatives are out of state, the party is “expected to produce only one such representative in Jefferson County, Alabama” absent contrary agreement or order.
    • Further corporate-representative depositions are expected to be at the deponent’s location.

This local-management provision later became an important interpretive backdrop for Southampton’s argument that a second in‑person corporate-representative deposition in Birmingham was not required.

C. Discovery Disputes and Initial Sanctions Motions

ADOR served interrogatories and document requests on September 5, 2023. Southampton responded over a year later, on October 16, 2024. ADOR complained that the responses were incomplete and filed a motion to compel and to extend the discovery deadline. The circuit court:

  • Granted the motion to compel; ordered full responses by January 10, 2025.
  • Extended the discovery cutoff to January 24, 2025.

Southampton supplemented its responses four days late (January 14, 2025). ADOR immediately moved for sanctions, including dismissal, for the untimely supplementation. Without a hearing, the circuit court denied ADOR’s motion.

D. The Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions

On January 17, 2025, ADOR served a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice listing 20 topics relating to valuation. Southampton designated two corporate representatives:

  • Adam Castleberry – property manager.
  • Ari Majer – one of Southampton’s owners, residing in California.

The parties coordinated the 30(b)(6) depositions to coincide with Southampton’s deposition of ADOR’s representative, Craig Hall, ultimately setting January 29, 2025.

On January 29:

  • Southampton deposed Hall.
  • ADOR deposed Castleberry for about three hours. Castleberry addressed 14 of the 20 noticed topics but lacked knowledge regarding:
    • The circumstances of the property’s purchase; and
    • The property’s purported value.
    He indicated that Majer was the appropriate person for those subjects.

At the conclusion of Castleberry’s deposition, Southampton:

  • Offered to produce Majer, via Zoom, that same day.
  • ADOR refused, insisting on an in‑person deposition in Alabama.
  • Southampton’s counsel asked whether they should move for a protective order because flying Majer from California would be unduly burdensome. ADOR’s counsel said, “You can do that.”
  • Southampton never filed a motion for protective order.

E. Renewed Motions to Compel and for Sanctions

On February 7, 2025, ADOR filed a:

  • Renewed motion for sanctions; and
  • Alternative motion to compel Majer’s deposition in person in Birmingham.

ADOR argued that:

  • Southampton failed to produce a 30(b)(6) witness competent on all 20 topics.
  • Majer’s in‑person appearance was required because the 30(b)(6) notice specified an in‑person deposition at counsel’s Birmingham office.

Southampton responded:

  • Claimed full compliance with discovery.
  • Asserted that flying Majer in was unduly burdensome in light of repeated rescheduling.
  • Offered to make Majer available for an in‑person deposition “before going on the witness stand,” i.e., immediately before trial.
  • Filed a witness list including Majer.

On February 12, 2025, the circuit court denied ADOR’s renewed motion for sanctions and motion to compel, without holding a hearing. ADOR promptly moved to reconsider. Southampton reiterated that Majer “intends to be in town for the trial, assuming it goes forward,” and that he could be deposed that Monday afternoon (February 24). The court never expressly ruled on the motion to reconsider.

F. Continuance, Further Deposition Notices, and Dismissal

On February 18, 2025, ADOR moved to continue the February 24 trial, stating it needed time to:

  • Depose Majer in person, and
  • Allow Southampton to depose ADOR’s expert.

ADOR’s motion relied on the representation that Majer was already scheduled to be in Jefferson County on February 24. The court granted the continuance, rescheduling trial to March 10, 2025.

Subsequently:

  • On February 19, ADOR noticed Majer’s deposition for February 25 in Birmingham.
  • On February 24, ADOR’s counsel emailed Southampton’s counsel to confirm in‑person attendance; Southampton responded that Majer would not be there.
  • ADOR asked for another day that week; Southampton replied, “I don’t have any availability this week,” and did not propose alternatives.
  • On February 25, ADOR served yet another deposition notice for Majer and, at 5:10 p.m., filed a motion for sanctions seeking dismissal, incorporating its prior sanction arguments.

On February 26, 2025, at 1:28 p.m.—less than 24 hours after the filing of the sanctions motion and without a hearing or allowing time for a written response—the circuit court:

  • Granted the motion for sanctions; and
  • Dismissed Southampton’s tax appeal with prejudice under Rule 37(b)(2).

The order contained no explanatory reasoning.

Southampton filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, or vacate on March 10, 2025, arguing:

  • No violation of any existing discovery order.
  • The in‑person demand for Majer violated the scheduling order’s incorporation of the Birmingham Differential Case Management Plan, under which only one out‑of‑state corporate representative need appear in Jefferson County.
  • Alternative request for a hearing on the post‑judgment motion.

The circuit court denied the motion about an hour later, again without a hearing. Southampton appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Standard of Review

The Court applied the familiar “exceeded its discretion” standard for reviewing discovery sanctions, as articulated in Daily v. Esser and Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc.:

  • Discovery sanctions are reviewed under a highly deferential standard.
  • But appellate courts may reverse when the trial court “exceeds its discretion,” especially where sanctions cause substantial harm, such as dismissal with prejudice.

B. Core Holding on Sanctions and Willfulness

The Court held that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by dismissing Southampton’s tax appeal with prejudice. Key points:

  • Both Rule 37(b)(2) (failure to obey a discovery order) and Rule 37(d) (failure to attend a properly noticed deposition) allow dismissal as a sanction, even without a prior order under Rule 37(d).
  • However, dismissal is the most severe sanction and must be:
    • Proportionate to the discovery abuse; and
    • Supported by evidence of willful and deliberate disregard of discovery obligations.
  • On the facts, Southampton’s conduct—although imperfect—did not amount to willful obstruction:
    • One Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representative (Castleberry) appeared in Birmingham and answered most topics.
    • Southampton offered to produce Majer via Zoom the same day as Castleberry’s deposition.
    • Southampton offered an in‑person deposition of Majer immediately before his trial testimony.
    • The court previously denied ADOR’s motion to compel Majer’s in‑person deposition and never clearly ordered such a deposition.
    • The later continuance of trial created ambiguity as to whether Majer had to appear on the original (now vacated) trial date.
  • Given this ambiguity and Southampton’s partial cooperation, the record did not support a finding of willfulness sufficient to justify dismissal.

The Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, expressly noting its “concerns” about Southampton’s conduct but concluding that the extreme remedy of dismissal was unwarranted.

C. No Need to Decide Local Rule Issue

Southampton argued that ADOR’s demand for a second in‑person corporate representative in Jefferson County contradicted the Birmingham Differential Case Management Plan, which the scheduling order had incorporated. ADOR disputed that interpretation.

The Court explicitly pretermitted resolution of that issue, finding it unnecessary in light of its decision reversing the dismissal for lack of willful conduct.

D. The Special Concurrence: Hearings on Contested Dispositive Motions

Justice Cook, writing specially (in addition to authoring the main opinion), addressed whether a trial court should hold a hearing before granting a contested dispositive motion such as a motion for sanctions resulting in dismissal:

  • He emphasized that:
    • The “norm and best practice” should be to hold a hearing on contested dispositive motions.
    • This is consistent with Rule 78, which contemplates hearings for motions “requiring notice and hearing,” and allows exceptions only in specific circumstances (e.g., motions not seeking final judgment, denial of motions to dismiss absent hearing when no hearing is requested).
    • Rule 56(c) and cases such as Zieman v. Zieman Speegle, LLC and Cartron v. Board of Governors of Valley Hill Country Club, Inc. already require hearings for summary-judgment motions, barring limited exceptions.
  • He noted that motions like:
    • Rule 37 sanctions (dismissal), and
    • Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissals for failure to prosecute
    are especially in need of hearings because they inquire into the conduct of litigants and attorneys, including communications and circumstances not obvious from the written record.
  • Justice Cook stopped short of declaring an absolute requirement for hearings in all cases but strongly urged trial courts to make hearings the rule rather than the exception when dealing with contested dispositive motions.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Daily v. Esser; Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc.; Kyser v. Harrison

These cases supply the general standard of review and core sanction principles:

  • Daily v. Esser, 391 So. 3d 268 (Ala. 2023) – Quoted for the proposition that sanctions are reviewed for an abuse (now framed as “exceeding”) of discretion, underscoring the deference ordinarily given to trial courts.
  • Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989) – Central to Alabama’s sanctions doctrine. It establishes that:
    • Dismissal is the most severe sanction and must be carefully scrutinized.
    • A party’s willfulness in flouting discovery is a “key factor” justifying dismissal.
    • Alabama has a “long-established” policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits.
  • Kyser v. Harrison, 908 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2005) – Clarifies the Court’s terminology (“gross abuse of discretion” vs. “exceeded its discretion”), but confirms that the underlying standard remains substantively unchanged.

Southampton leans heavily on Iverson to justify its insistence that dismissal must be proportionate and tied to willful misconduct.

2. Mobile Investments, LLC v. Corporate Pharmacy Services, Inc.

Mobile Investments, LLC v. Corporate Pharmacy Services, Inc., 415 So. 3d 1018 (Ala. 2024), is the principal comparative precedent.

In Mobile Investments:

  • The defendants’ corporate representative repeatedly canceled or failed to appear for deposition over two years.
  • The trial court issued multiple orders compelling deposition and expressly warned that default judgment could follow noncompliance.
  • The defendants still failed to comply, leading to a default judgment under Rule 37(b)(2)(C).
  • The Supreme Court affirmed, finding clear willfulness in:
    • Repeated failures to appear,
    • Failure to respond to discovery requests, and
    • Ignoring explicit, repeated court orders.

In Southampton, the Court carefully distinguishes these facts:

  • Only one corporate representative’s in‑person appearance was at issue (Majer), after another had fully complied in Birmingham.
  • There was no clear, unambiguous order compelling Majer’s in‑person deposition.
  • Southampton offered alternative accommodations (Zoom, pre‑trial in‑person deposition).

By contrasting with Mobile Investments, the Court implicitly defines the kinds of patterns that do amount to willful obstruction (multiple orders violated, long-term noncompliance) and distinguishes this case as falling below that threshold.

3. Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corp.

Ex parte Hankook Tire Am. Corp., 400 So. 3d 585 (Ala. 2023), is cited to explain that:

  • Once a Rule 30(b)(6) notice is properly served, the responding party must identify and produce appropriate corporate representatives.
  • Failure to produce a designated corporate representative may lead to Rule 37 sanctions.

However, Hankook is not used to support dismissal here; rather, it supplies baseline obligations and supports the notion that non‑appearance can be sanctionable—but subject to the proportionality and willfulness limitations the Court emphasizes.

4. Ex parte Seaman Timber Co.; Weatherly v. Baptist Medical Center; National Hockey League; Societe Internationale; Trans World Airlines; Cine Forty-Second

These authorities shape the Court’s willfulness and proportionality analysis:

  • Ex parte Seaman Timber Co., 850 So. 2d 246 (Ala. 2002) – Reiterates that:
    • Dismissal must be “proportionate to and compensatory of” the specific abuse.
    • Alabama strongly favors adjudication on the merits.
  • Weatherly v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 392 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 1981) – Confirms “willfulness” as a key criterion for dismissal based on discovery noncompliance.
  • National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976); Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) – Federal authorities often cited in sanctions jurisprudence, reinforcing the notion that where a party deliberately and repeatedly flouts discovery orders, severe sanctions may be justified.

Southampton draws from these authorities but applies their principles to a different factual matrix, emphasizing that the factual record here does not fit typical “extreme misconduct” patterns.

5. W.W.H. v. D.L.H.; Smith v. Davidson

The Court quotes W.W.H. v. D.L.H., 352 So. 3d 765 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) and Smith v. Davidson, 58 So. 3d 177 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) for the proposition that:

  • A Rule 37 dismissal must rest on evidence that noncompliance was a “conscious or intentional failure to act,” not accidental or involuntary noncompliance.

This further cements “conscious/intentional” behavior as the operative standard for severe sanctions.

6. Ex parte AMI West Alabama General Hospital; Rule 1(c) and 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.

These sources are used to emphasize expectations of professional cooperation and proper use of procedural safeguards:

  • Ex parte AMI West Alabama Gen. Hosp., 582 So. 2d 484 (Ala. 1991) – Stresses that discovery should proceed with minimal judicial supervision because lawyers “acting professionally” should resolve most disputes.
  • Rule 1(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. – Requires Rules to be construed and administered to secure the “just, speedy and inexpensive” determination of actions.
  • Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. – Governs protective orders; requires a party resisting discovery to:
    • Attempt to resolve the matter informally; then
    • Move for a protective order for good cause, normally before the date of the disputed discovery.

The Court notes that Southampton should have filed a protective-order motion if it believed an in‑person deposition of Majer in Birmingham was unduly burdensome. Its failure to do so is criticized, though not deemed willful enough to justify dismissal.

7. Rule 37(b)(2) and Rule 37(d)

The Court gives a careful doctrinal explanation:

  • Rule 37(b)(2) – Authorizes sanctions, including:
    • Deeming facts established;
    • Excluding claims/defenses or evidence; and
    • Dismissing an action or entering default judgment;
    if a party fails to obey a discovery order.
  • Rule 37(d) – Permits the same sanctions (via cross-reference to 37(b)(2)(A)-(C)) where a party or Rule 30(b)(6) designee:
    • Fails to appear for a properly noticed deposition; or
    • Fails to serve answers to interrogatories, etc.,
      • even without a prior order compelling compliance.

The opinion squarely acknowledges that dismissal can be imposed purely on a failure-to-appear basis under Rule 37(d). But it stresses that such power must be exercised in light of the overarching willfulness and proportionality requirements.

8. Ex parte Sansom

Ex parte Sansom (2025) (forum non conveniens transfer) is cited to support the idea that a trial court should give parties a reasonable opportunity to respond to significant motions:

  • In Sansom, the trial court granted a transfer motion one day after filing, without giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to reply; the Supreme Court found that insufficient.
  • Southampton analogizes: the trial court granted a dispositive sanctions motion the day after it was filed, without allowing Southampton to respond or be heard.

While the main opinion does not hold that a hearing was strictly required, it invokes Sansom to criticize the procedure and reinforce its conclusion that the dismissal was an improper exercise of discretion.

9. Zieman v. Zieman Speegle, LLC; Cartron v. Board of Governors; Rule 78 and Rule 56(c)

These cases are central to the special concurrence:

  • Zieman v. Zieman Speegle, LLC, 295 So. 3d 66 (Ala. 2019) – Reversed a summary judgment due to the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on the summary-judgment motion. The Court held that Rule 56(c) entitles parties to such a hearing and connected this to the structure of Rule 78.
  • Cartron v. Board of Governors of Valley Hill Country Club, Inc., 372 So. 3d 1175 (Ala. 2022) – Reaffirmed that summary-judgment motions generally require a hearing, subject only to limited exceptions spelled out by Rule 56(c).
  • Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. – Requires courts to maintain regular times for hearing motions “requiring notice and hearing.” It:
    • Allows routine motions (not seeking final judgment) to be decided on written submissions.
    • Allows denial (not granting) of a motion to dismiss without oral hearing unless hearing is requested.
    The concurrence emphasizes that these explicit exceptions suggest that hearings are the rule for motions seeking final judgment—i.e., dispositive motions.

Justice Cook's concurrence extrapolates from the summary-judgment line of cases to argue that devices like dismissal-as-sanction should be treated similarly with respect to hearing norms.

10. Henderson v. G & G Corp.; Watts v. Mitchell; Rule 55(b)(2)

Justice Cook acknowledges that not all dispositive outcomes require hearings:

  • Henderson v. G & G Corp., 582 So. 2d 529 (Ala. 1991) and Watts v. Mitchell, 617 So. 2d 693 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) – Affirm dismissals for failure to prosecute where a party fails to appear at a duly noticed hearing and offers no explanation.
  • Rule 55(b)(2) – Allows default judgment without three days’ notice of hearing if the defendant fails to appear at a scheduled trial date.

These examples show that while hearings are typically important, there are procedural contexts where a party’s own nonappearance at a scheduled event can justify dispositive action without an additional hearing on a motion.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Obligations in Discovery: Cooperation and Protective Orders

The Court starts by reaffirming Alabama’s expectation that discovery generally proceeds without heavy judicial oversight:

  • Lawyers are expected to cooperate and resolve most disputes themselves.
  • When a party believes a deposition is unduly burdensome, the proper course is:
    1. Confer with opposing counsel; and, failing agreement,
    2. Move for a protective order under Rule 26(c), showing “good cause.”

By its own admission, Southampton understood it should seek a protective order but failed to do so. The Court characterizes this as a misstep and criticizes Southampton’s lack of cooperation (e.g., refusal to offer alternative dates after the February 25 notice). Nevertheless, this failure is not equated with willful obstruction of discovery.

2. Scope of Sanctions Under Rules 37(b)(2) and 37(d)

The Court clarifies:

  • Rule 37(b)(2) allows dismissal only if a party has “fail[ed] to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.”
  • Rule 37(d) permits dismissal even without a prior order if a party or Rule 30(b)(6) witness fails to appear for a properly noticed deposition.

The circuit court cited Rule 37(b)(2), but ADOR argued on appeal that Rule 37(d) justified dismissal without a prior order compelling Majer’s deposition. The Supreme Court accepts that Rule 37(d) could authorize dismissal in principle, yet insists that:

  • Sanctions, including dismissal, must still be “just” and proportionate.
  • Willful, deliberate conduct remains the key predicate for severe sanctions, under Iverson, Seaman Timber, Weatherly, etc.

3. Defining “Willfulness” in the Discovery Context

Drawing from prior cases, the Court describes willfulness as:

  • Noncompliance that is “conscious or intentional,” not accidental or involuntary.
  • Situations where a party:
    • Intentionally fails to attend a deposition; and/or
    • Offers no explanation for failing to comply with discovery requests or court orders.

Applying that test, the Court finds that Southampton:

  • Did not flatly refuse to present Majer.
  • Did not repeatedly ignore clear discovery orders.
  • Engaged in partial cooperation (one 30(b)(6) deponent appeared; offers for remote and pre‑trial depositions of Majer).
  • Operated under ambiguous procedural signals:
    • The court denied ADOR’s motion to compel Majer’s in‑person deposition.
    • Southampton’s commitment to produce Majer “assuming [trial] goes forward” on February 24 became uncertain once the trial was continued.
    • The new trial date of March 10 created confusion about when and how Majer’s deposition should occur.

Thus, the Court concludes:

[T]here is no evidence indicating that Southampton willfully tried to prevent Majer’s deposition from taking place or willfully disobeyed an unambiguous order of the circuit court.

4. Ambiguity in Court Orders and Parties’ Expectations

A key theme is that ambiguity in the orders and procedural posture cuts against attributing willful misconduct to Southampton:

  • The circuit court’s denial of ADOR’s motion to compel suggested that Majer was not currently required to appear in person.
  • Southampton’s offer to produce Majer on February 24 was explicitly conditioned on the trial “going forward” that day.
  • Once trial was continued to March 10, reasonable confusion existed about:
    • Whether Majer still needed to be present in Birmingham on February 24 or 25; and
    • Whether his in‑person deposition could instead occur near the new trial date.

The Court implies that when a trial court has not issued a clear, specific order delineating discovery obligations and consequences, it is unjust to treat a party’s noncompliance as willful obstruction warranting dismissal.

5. Failure to Provide Opportunity to Respond

The Court also underscores procedural fairness:

  • ADOR’s final motion for sanctions was filed at 5:10 p.m. on February 25.
  • The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the case at 1:28 p.m. on February 26, without any hearing and without allowing time for a written response.

Citing Ex parte Sansom, the Court criticizes this practice. Although it does not hold that a hearing was absolutely required, it plainly suggests that:

  • Issuing a case-terminating sanction without giving the opposing party a fair chance to respond is a strong indicator that the court exceeded its discretion.

Justice Cook’s concurrence then expands on this point, recommending that hearings be considered the default for contested dispositive motions.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

1. Narrowing the Circumstances for Dismissal as a Discovery Sanction

Southampton reinforces a high bar for dismissal sanctions in Alabama:

  • Courts must look for clear evidence of willful and deliberate misconduct.
  • Ambiguous orders, partial compliance, or bona fide disputes about the method or timing of discovery do not generally justify dismissing an entire action.
  • Trial courts are implicitly encouraged to use lesser sanctions first (e.g., costs, orders compelling specific action, or evidentiary sanctions) before resorting to dismissal.

For practitioners:

  • Seeking dismissal or default under Rule 37 now clearly requires a detailed showing of:
    • Repeated noncompliance;
    • Clear, violated court orders (in the Rule 37(b)(2) context); and/or
    • Unjustified non-appearances under Rule 37(d) despite reasonable opportunities and clear expectations.

2. Expectations for Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions and Remote Testimony

The decision has meaningful implications for corporate-representative depositions:

  • Parties must make good-faith efforts to produce witnesses knowledgeable on the noticed topics.
  • However, if a party:
    • Produces one representative in person; and
    • Offers another by remote means (e.g., Zoom) or at a different time (e.g., immediately before trial),
    trial courts and opposing parties should consider whether such accommodations satisfy the spirit of Rule 30(b)(6), particularly where local case-management plans (like Birmingham’s) limit out-of-state travel of corporate representatives.

Although the Court does not issue a formal rule about remote depositions, the factual acceptance of Southampton’s offers suggests that:

  • Remote depositions are a legitimate tool to balance burdens and discovery needs, particularly when travel is costly or schedules are tight.

3. Role and Interpretation of Local Case-Management Plans

The incorporated Birmingham Differential Case Management Plan provision, which expects only one out-of-state corporate representative to appear in Jefferson County, indirectly influenced the Court’s assessment, even though the Court declined to decide its exact meaning:

  • This underscores the importance of reading scheduling orders—including any incorporated local plans—carefully when planning discovery.
  • Parties will likely cite this provision (and the Court’s acknowledgment of the ambiguity) in future disputes about where and how Rule 30(b)(6) depositions must be conducted.

4. Procedural Norms: Hearings on Contested Dispositive Motions

Justice Cook’s concurrence, though not binding as black-letter law, will likely be influential:

  • Trial courts are explicitly encouraged to hold hearings before granting contested dispositive motions, including:
    • Summary judgment;
    • Motions to dismiss (depending on context);
    • Motions for dismissal as a Rule 37 sanction; and
    • Involuntary dismissals under Rule 41(b).
  • Appellate panels may increasingly treat the absence of a hearing—especially when a decision is rendered almost immediately—as a factor suggesting an abuse of discretion.

Practically:

  • Lawyers seeking dispositive relief should expect that a hearing may be required or at least strongly preferred.
  • Opposing parties should consider formally requesting a hearing (to reinforce the procedural necessity and preserve error).

5. Guidance for Tax and Other Civil Litigation

While the underlying subject matter is ad valorem property taxation, the discovery principles articulated in Southampton are broadly applicable:

  • They govern any civil action in which Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and Rule 37 sanctions arise—commercial disputes, tort cases, contract actions, etc.
  • Tax-appeal litigants are reminded that:
    • The merits of valuation disputes should not easily be foreclosed on discovery technicalities; and
    • Trial courts must balance the state’s need for information with taxpayers’ rights to adjudication on the merits.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Ad Valorem Property Tax

“Ad valorem” literally means “according to value.” In Alabama:

  • Each year, the county tax assessor determines a property’s fair market value as of October 1 of the prior year.
  • That value is used to compute property taxes based on statutory millage rates.
  • Taxpayers can challenge the assessment before a local Board of Equalization and then appeal to circuit court.

2. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Property

A low-income housing tax credit property:

  • Is a property developed or rehabilitated under a federal program that grants income tax credits in exchange for providing affordable housing.
  • Often has complex valuation issues because:
    • Rents are restricted; and
    • The federal tax credits and compliance requirements affect market value.

In this case, those underlying valuation complexities were never reached due to the procedural focus on sanctions.

3. Rule 30(b)(6) Corporate Representative Deposition

Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., allows a party to depose a corporation (or similar entity) by:

  • Serving a notice listing the topics for examination.
  • Requiring the corporation to:
    • Designate one or more representatives; and
    • Prepare them to testify about the listed topics to the extent of the corporation’s knowledge.

Key points:

  • The duty is on the organization, not the individual witness, to gather and provide information.
  • Failure to produce a prepared representative can lead to sanctions.

4. Protective Order (Rule 26(c))

A protective order is a court order that limits or changes discovery to protect a party or person from:

  • Annoyance
  • Embarrassment
  • Oppression
  • Undue burden or expense

Examples:

  • Ordering that a deposition be held by remote means instead of in person.
  • Limiting the topics or duration of a deposition.
  • Changing the location of a deposition.

In Southampton, the Court notes that Southampton should have moved for a protective order if it wished to object to Majer’s in‑person deposition in Birmingham.

5. “With Prejudice” Dismissal

A dismissal “with prejudice”:

  • Is final and on the merits for claim-preclusion purposes.
  • Bars the plaintiff from refiling the same claim in the future.

Because it extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim, it is treated as an extreme remedy and triggers careful appellate review when imposed as a discovery sanction.

6. “Exceeding Its Discretion” Standard

Appellate courts generally defer to trial courts on discovery management. But they may reverse when:

  • The trial court’s decision has no reasonable basis in the record; or
  • The sanction is disproportionate to the conduct; or
  • Key principles (like the need for willfulness in dismissals) are ignored.

This is what the Supreme Court concluded occurred in Southampton.

7. Dispositive Motion

A “dispositive motion” is one that, if granted, ends the case (or a substantial part of it), such as:

  • Motion to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6), lack of jurisdiction, etc.).
  • Motion for summary judgment (Rule 56).
  • Motion for involuntary dismissal (Rule 41(b)).
  • Motion for sanctions seeking dismissal (Rule 37).

Because such motions have case-terminating consequences, Justice Cook urges trial courts to hold hearings before granting them when contested.

8. Birmingham Differential Case Management Plan

This is a local, division-level plan in Jefferson County’s Birmingham Division, referenced in the scheduling order. For discovery:

  • It creates different tracks (expedited, standard, complex) with varying discovery timelines and limits.
  • Relevant here, it includes a guideline that:
    • Out-of-state corporate representatives: only one is expected to appear in Jefferson County for deposition absent contrary agreement or order.
    • Further corporate representative depositions are to be held at those witnesses’ location.

This provision gave Southampton a plausible basis to think Majer need not appear in person in Birmingham, especially once Castleberry had already done so.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of the Decision

Southampton 100, LLC v. Alabama Department of Revenue is an important addition to Alabama’s discovery-sanctions jurisprudence. It reaffirms and sharpens several core principles:

  • Willfulness as the key predicate for dismissal: Dismissing a case with prejudice for discovery violations—particularly for failure to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) designee—requires clear evidence of conscious, intentional obstruction, not mere confusion, imperfect cooperation, or procedural ambiguity.
  • Proportionality and preference for merits decisions: Even when a party’s conduct is less than ideal, the sanction must fit the misconduct. Alabama courts continue to express a strong preference for resolving disputes on their merits rather than through terminating sanctions.
  • Procedural fairness in dispositive motions: While not yet an absolute rule, the Court strongly indicates that contested dispositive motions—especially those seeking dismissal as a sanction—should generally be decided only after the non-movant has a meaningful opportunity to respond, ideally in an oral hearing.
  • Guidance for practitioners:
    • Parties resisting burdensome discovery must promptly seek protective orders, not simply refuse compliance.
    • Parties seeking severe sanctions must document clear patterns of willfulness and disregard of court orders.
    • Lawyers should anticipate and request hearings on dispositive motions, particularly where factual disputes exist regarding conduct and intent.

In sum, Southampton both restrains the use of dismissal as a discovery sanction and nudges Alabama trial practice toward greater procedural robustness in handling dispositive motions. It emphasizes that the power to end litigation for discovery abuses, while real, must be exercised with caution, clarity, and respect for a party’s right to be heard.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

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