Solis v. City of New York: Confiscated Medical Assistive Devices and the Summary Judgment Burden in Custodial Negligence Cases

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, First Department’s decision in Solis v. City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 06673 (Dec. 2, 2025), addresses a recurring but under-litigated problem: what happens when an institutional defendant’s routine security practices regarding medically necessary assistive devices (here, a cane) collide with its lack of recordkeeping, and an injury later occurs while the individual is in another agency’s physical custody.

The decedent, an inmate who recently underwent a debridement of a foot ulcer at Bellevue Hospital, had been prescribed a post-operative shoe and a cane, and instructed to maintain only partial weightbearing. While being transported for a court appearance from Rikers Island to the Manhattan Detention Complex (MDC) and then to Manhattan Criminal Court (MCC), correctional staff followed a common—but undocumented—practice of confiscating canes when inmates were on buses or in holding cells. When the decedent was later escorted down a stairway in MCC by a New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) officer, he was walking without his cane, fell headfirst, and died days later from his injuries.

The plaintiff, acting on behalf of the decedent, sued the City of New York and Corizon Health, Inc. (“defendants”), alleging that their negligent deprivation of the decedent’s medically necessary cane proximately caused the fall and his death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that they no longer had custody of the decedent at the time of the fall and that there was no non-speculative evidence that DOC personnel had deprived him of the cane.

The Supreme Court, New York County, denied summary judgment in relevant part. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, crystallizing a key principle: a moving defendant cannot obtain summary judgment in a negligence case merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff’s proof about who exactly removed or failed to return an assistive device, especially where the defendant’s own institutional practices and lack of documentation obscure the chain of custody.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

• Trial court: Supreme Court, New York County (Kingo, J.) denied the City’s and Corizon’s motion for summary judgment in part, allowing the negligence claims to proceed.
• Appeal: The City and Corizon appealed from the portion of the order that denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
• Appellate Division holding: The First Department unanimously affirmed the denial of summary judgment, without costs.

B. Core Holding

The Court held that the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden on summary judgment. They did not establish, as a matter of law, either (1) that they were not negligent in depriving the decedent of his medically necessary cane, or (2) that any negligence on their part was not a proximate cause of the decedent’s fall and resulting death.

Key to the Court’s reasoning were:

• Testimony from the MDC deputy warden that DOC’s common practice was to take away canes on transport buses and whenever inmates were placed in holding cells, and that no written record was kept of removal or return.
• Testimony from OCA Officer Magrino that the decedent did not have his cane at the time of the fall, and that if the decedent lacked the cane on the way back to DOC custody, he must also have lacked it when initially transferred from DOC to OCA custody.
• A statement by another inmate, Michel, that the decedent had said “they took” his cane.

In light of this evidence, the Court rejected the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff’s theory was purely speculative or that it was equally plausible that OCA, rather than DOC, deprived the decedent of his cane. Instead, the record raised triable issues of fact as to both negligence and causation, thus precluding summary judgment.

III. Factual and Legal Background

A. Medical and Custodial History

On November 15, 2013, the decedent underwent a debridement of a foot ulcer at Bellevue Hospital Center. Bellevue:

• Recommended daily dressing changes to the wound;
• Prescribed and dispensed a post-operative shoe and a cane; and
• Directed that the decedent continue partial weightbearing only.

Given his medical condition, the decedent was housed at the North Infirmary Command at Rikers Island. Four days later, on November 19, 2013, he was scheduled for a court appearance in MCC. DOC transported him from Rikers Island to MDC, which serves as the housing point for inmates going to court, and from which they are escorted to MCC and the relevant court part.

B. DOC Practices Regarding Canes and Holding Cells

The DOC deputy warden responsible for MDC described a routine security protocol:

• When an inmate who uses a cane is transported by bus from Rikers to MDC, the cane is “taken away” and stored in a secured area at the front of the vehicle.
• When an inmate with a cane (or other assistive device) is placed in a holding cell, DOC staff remove the device because it could be used as a weapon.
• The cane is supposed to be returned when the inmate is mobile again or exits the holding cell.

Critically, the deputy warden admitted:

• There is no written record documenting when a cane is removed or when it is returned, either on the bus or in holding cells.
• MDC is not equipped with surveillance cameras that would visually corroborate what occurred.
• The staircase between the 12th and 13th floors of MCC, where the accident occurred, is not supervised or maintained by DOC and lies outside DOC’s jurisdiction.

C. Transfer to MCC and the Accident

Upon arrival at MDC, inmates destined for court appear in a holding area near MCC. In this case:

• The decedent was scheduled to appear in a 13th-floor court part at MCC.
• He was initially placed in DOC’s “12-4” holding area on the 12th floor of MCC.
• Custody passed from DOC to OCA only when inmates moved from “12-4” to the 13th-floor holding cells adjacent to the court parts.

OCA Officer Daniel Magrino testified that:

• He was definitely the officer escorting the decedent after the court appearance.
• He could not recall if he was the officer who first accepted custody from DOC.
• The decedent did not have his cane at the time of the fall and was not handcuffed.

While being escorted with another inmate, Ralph Michel, from the 13th floor down toward the 12-4 DOC holding cell, the decedent apparently lost his balance on the stairway and fell headfirst, striking the landing and sustaining ultimately fatal injuries.

In a post-incident interview, Michel stated that just before the fall he had asked the decedent about his cane, and the decedent replied that “they” had taken it, without specifying who “they” were.

D. The Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion

At the close of discovery, the City and Corizon moved for summary judgment, arguing in substance:

1. No custody at time of incident: Because the decedent was in OCA custody on a staircase outside DOC’s jurisdiction, DOC and its agents could not have been responsible for the fall.
2. No proof they took the cane: There was no evidence that DOC personnel actually deprived the decedent of his cane, and it was equally plausible that:
   • OCA officers removed the cane; or
   • The decedent lost or misplaced it himself.
   Therefore, any jury finding that DOC took or failed to return the cane would rest on “sheer speculation.”
3. No breach, no causation: Without proof of who took the cane, plaintiff could not establish a breach of duty, and without a breach, there could be no proximate cause linking defendants’ conduct to the fall.

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and denied summary judgment. The Appellate Division agreed and affirmed.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Summary Judgment Framework

The Court anchored its reasoning in a familiar line of New York Court of Appeals and Appellate Division cases that define the stringent burden a movant faces on summary judgment.

1. Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 (1986)

Alvarez is a leading case on summary judgment in negligence and malpractice actions. It holds that:

The party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact.

In other words, the moving party must come forward with evidence—not mere assertions—demonstrating that, even if all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, no triable issue remains.

2. Voss v. Netherlands Insurance Co., 22 NY3d 728 (2014)

Voss reaffirmed and applied the Alvarez standard, emphasizing:

• The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.
• If the movant fails to meet that threshold, the court must deny summary judgment regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers.

In Solis, the Court quotes Voss and Alvarez to underscore that the defendants could not satisfy their burden merely by criticizing weaknesses in plaintiff’s proof or by speculating about alternative scenarios.

3. Vega v. Restani Construction Corp., 18 NY3d 499 (2012)

Vega similarly reinforces the burden on the summary judgment movant. It explains that:

If the moving party fails to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment must be denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers.

The Solis Court uses Vega in tandem with Voss and Alvarez to reiterate that the defendants’ failure to affirmatively eliminate material factual questions about who deprived the decedent of his cane, and when, is dispositive against them on this motion.

4. Cross v. Cross, 112 AD2d 62 (1st Dept 1985)

Cross is cited for the principle that when deciding a summary judgment motion, the court’s role is to search the record for triable issues of fact—not to weigh the strength of either side’s case. The Court in Solis invokes Cross to emphasize that its inquiry is limited to whether factual disputes exist, not which party will likely prevail at trial.

5. Hairston v. Liberty Behavioral Management Corp., 157 AD3d 404 (1st Dept 2018), lv dismissed 31 NY3d 1036 (2018)

In Hairston, the First Department held:

Merely pointing to gaps in an opponent’s evidence is insufficient to satisfy the movant’s burden.

This principle is central in Solis. The defendants tried to argue that plaintiff could not identify exactly which entity took the cane, and therefore plaintiff’s case failed. The Court, relying on Hairston, rejects this attempt to shift the burden. The defendants must come forward with affirmative evidence—such as testimony or records—that DOC did not, in fact, remove or retain the cane, or that any such removal did not contribute to the accident.

V. Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. The Summary Judgment Burden and Why Defendants Failed to Meet It

The fulcrum of the decision is the allocation of the summary judgment burden:

1. Step 1 – Defendants’ burden: They had to show, through admissible evidence, either (a) that they were not negligent (i.e., did not wrongfully deprive the decedent of his cane), or (b) that any negligence on their part was not a proximate cause of his fall.
2. Step 2 – Only if satisfied: Would the burden then shift to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact.

The Court concluded the defendants never cleared Step 1. Evidence in the record—including their own deputy warden’s testimony—created, rather than dispelled, factual issues:

• The deputy warden confirmed that:
  • DOC commonly takes canes from inmates on transport and entering holding cells.
  • DOC keeps no documentation of removals or returns.
• Magrino’s testimony suggested continuity: if the decedent did not have the cane when he was being escorted back to DOC custody, he must not have had it when first handed to OCA.
• Michel’s report of the decedent saying “they took” the cane indicates that someone in the custodial chain removed or failed to return it, and DOC’s acknowledged practices made DOC a plausible, if not primary, candidate.

Instead of presenting concrete evidence that DOC returned the cane at a specific point, that OCA took it for independent reasons, or that the decedent voluntarily relinquished it, the defendants argued that plaintiff’s case was too speculative. Under Hairston, this mere highlighting of “gaps” in plaintiff’s proof is legally insufficient.

B. Speculation Versus Reasonable Inference

A recurring theme in negligence cases is whether a plaintiff’s theory of causation rests on impermissible speculation or permissible inference from circumstantial evidence. Here, the defendants argued that because there was no direct eyewitness testimony or documentary proof of who took the cane, liability would necessarily rest on speculation.

The Court disagreed. The following circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference, at least sufficient to raise a fact issue:

• DOC policy and practice—admitted by its own official—of removing canes in precisely the settings through which the decedent passed (transport bus and holding cells).
• Absence of any evidence that OCA had a similar policy or that OCA actually took the cane.
• The decedent’s statement to Michel that “they” had taken his cane, combined with the timeline of custody and DOC’s practices.
• The fact that by the time of the fall, the decedent—a person with a recent foot surgery, instructed to partially weightbear and provided a cane—was walking unaided down a staircase.

From this, a jury could reasonably infer that DOC had removed the cane pursuant to its standard practice and had not returned it at a time when the decedent needed it for safe ambulation. This is classic circumstantial evidence, not “sheer speculation.”

C. The Significance of DOC’s Lack of Documentation

The deputy warden conceded that DOC kept no records of:

• When it confiscated canes or other assistive devices; or
• When it returned them to inmates.

This institutional choice not to document directly undermines the defendants’ summary judgment motion. They cannot rely on the absence of records they chose not to create as evidence that they never removed or failed to return the cane. Instead, that gap in documentation creates factual uncertainty that must be resolved by a jury, not by a judge on summary judgment.

Put differently, where an institution’s own practices produce evidentiary obscurity, it is particularly inappropriate to allow that institution to secure judgment as a matter of law by claiming the plaintiff’s case is unprovable.

D. Proximate Cause and the Transfer of Custody to OCA

The defendants also argued that they could not be liable because:

• The decedent was in OCA custody at the time of the fall.
• The accident occurred on a staircase that DOC did not staff, maintain, or control.

Although the Court does not dwell at length on this point, its refusal to grant summary judgment implicitly recognizes a critical principle of proximate cause: a defendant’s duty and liability can extend beyond the period of direct physical custody where its earlier negligence continues to exert a foreseeable, operative effect.

If DOC negligently deprived the decedent of his medically necessary cane and then transferred him without that cane to OCA, the risk that he would fall while walking—particularly on stairs—is foreseeable, regardless of which agency technically had custody at the moment of the fall.

Thus, even if DOC did not control the staircase or the supervising OCA officer, DOC’s earlier acts or omissions could still be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. The Court’s focus on DOC’s failure to show it was not negligent, or that its negligence was not a proximate cause, reflects this broader conception of causation.

E. The Role of Corizon Health, Inc.

The opinion refers to the City and Corizon collectively as “defendants,” but the explicit factual discussion centers on DOC practices and custody. The appellate decision’s affirmance of the denial of summary judgment “as to them” suggests that, at this stage, Corizon remains implicated in the litigation, presumably based on its role in medical care and possible involvement in assessing and accommodating the decedent’s mobility restrictions.

While the opinion does not detail Corizon’s specific alleged negligence, the procedural posture is important:

• The Court is not deciding liability on the merits.
• It is simply concluding that the defendants (including Corizon) have not shown, as a matter of law, that there is no triable issue of fact about their role in the deprivation of the cane or in the chain of care surrounding the decedent’s mobility needs.

At trial, those distinctions may become more sharply drawn. For now, the ruling signals that private medical contractors embedded within correctional systems may not be able to exit such cases on summary judgment merely by pointing to gaps in documentation or uncertainty about specific acts.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid trial when there is no genuine dispute about the key facts requiring a jury’s resolution. The moving party (here, the defendants) must show that, even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the plaintiff), no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.

In negligence cases, this usually means the defendant must show:

1. There was no breach of duty; and/or
2. Even if there was a breach, it did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.

If the defendant fails to provide evidence negating one of those elements, the court must deny the motion, whether or not the plaintiff’s opposition papers are strong.

B. Negligence and Proximate Cause

• Negligence is generally the failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. In a custodial setting, this can include failing to provide or maintain medically necessary accommodations, such as a cane prescribed after surgery.
• Proximate cause means that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, and that the type of harm was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s conduct.

Here, the plaintiff’s theory is straightforward: removing and not returning a medically necessary cane to an inmate recovering from a foot procedure foreseeably increases the risk that he will fall when walking down stairs, even under the supervision of another agency’s officer.

C. Circumstantial Evidence vs. Speculation

Circumstantial evidence allows a fact-finder to infer a fact from other proven facts. For example:

• DOC’s admitted policy of confiscating canes in settings the decedent passed through;
• The lack of any cane at the time of the fall; and
• The inmate’s statement that “they” took his cane

Together, these allow a reasonable inference that DOC took and failed to return the cane. This is not guesswork; it is inference grounded in evidence.

Speculation, by contrast, occurs when a conclusion is drawn without sufficient factual basis—such as guessing that the decedent might have lost the cane on his own, without any evidence supporting that possibility. The Court in Solis indicates that it is the defendants’ alternative scenarios that are more speculative than plaintiff’s theory.

D. Institutional Practices and Recordkeeping

A subtle but important theme in this case is the legal consequence of institutional recordkeeping practices. When an institution:

• Regularly engages in actions that affect safety (e.g., confiscating assistive devices), and
• Chooses not to document those actions,

it creates evidentiary uncertainty. Courts are reluctant to reward such institutional opacity by granting summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff cannot prove exactly what happened. Instead, the uncertainty itself becomes a triable issue of fact.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Correctional and Court System Defendants

The decision in Solis carries several practical and doctrinal implications:

1. Policies on Assistive Devices: Correctional agencies and court security operations that routinely confiscate canes, wheelchairs, walkers, or other assistive devices for security reasons must carefully balance those concerns against the risk of injury to inmates and detainees who rely on those devices.
2. Documentation Requirements: The case starkly illustrates that failing to document the removal and return of assistive devices can make it difficult for such institutions to obtain summary judgment. If they cannot show when and whether a device was returned, they may be forced to defend negligence claims before a jury.
3. Liability Beyond Physical Custody: Municipal defendants cannot assume that handing an inmate to another agency (like OCA) will insulate them from liability for earlier negligent acts that continue to pose a risk (e.g., depriving an inmate of a medically necessary cane).

B. For Plaintiffs in Custodial Injury Cases

Solis is significant for plaintiffs because it:

• Confirms that circumstantial evidence, combined with documented institutional practices, can defeat a summary judgment motion even where no one can testify with certainty about a specific moment (e.g., who physically took the cane).
• Reinforces that defendants cannot win summary judgment by simply arguing that plaintiff cannot identify which of several institutional actors is at fault, especially if defendants’ own lack of recordkeeping created that ambiguity.

This may encourage plaintiffs’ counsel to focus discovery on institutional policies and practices and to press defendants on their documentation (or lack thereof), rather than chasing elusive eyewitness testimony.

C. Intersection with Disability and Medical Accommodation Issues

Although the opinion is framed purely in negligence terms and does not explicitly address disability rights statutes (such as the ADA or Rehabilitation Act), it has practical consequences for how institutions handle medically necessary assistive devices.

The case implicitly recognizes:

• That a medically prescribed cane for someone instructed to partially weightbear is not a mere convenience but a safety device.
• That removing such a device without ensuring a safe alternative or prompt return can create a foreseeable risk of serious harm.

Future litigants may invoke Solis as persuasive authority in both negligence and disability accommodation contexts to argue that institutional defendants must have coherent, documented protocols for handling medically necessary assistive devices.

D. Influence on Summary Judgment Practice More Generally

More broadly, Solis reinforces a consistent message from New York appellate courts:

• Defendants moving for summary judgment cannot carry their burden by theorizing about alternative causes or by attacking the plaintiff’s inability to fill every factual gap.
• When a record is ambiguous because of the defendant’s own practices, that ambiguity will typically be resolved by a jury, not by a judge on motion.

The decision thus fits squarely within, and slightly sharpens, the trend of New York appellate cases insisting on a robust evidentiary showing from summary judgment movants in negligence actions.

VIII. Conclusion

Solis v. City of New York does not revolutionize New York negligence law, but it meaningfully develops the application of established principles to the custodial context, particularly where:

• A medically vulnerable inmate relies on an assistive device;
• An institution has security-driven practices of confiscating that device;
• The institution fails to keep records of when the device is removed or returned; and
• An injury occurs later, possibly under another agency’s custody.

The First Department’s core messages are:

1. Summary judgment movants bear a heavy, affirmative burden; pointing to evidentiary gaps in the opponent’s case is not enough, particularly where the movant’s own practices created those gaps.
2. Circumstantial evidence and institutional policy testimony can create triable questions of fact as to both negligence and causation, precluding summary judgment.
3. Correctional and court system defendants may remain liable for the downstream consequences of earlier negligent conduct, even after formal custody has passed to another agency.

In practical terms, Solis is a strong signal to municipal and contracted health-care defendants: if they wish to avoid trial in cases involving confiscated medical assistive devices, they must implement and maintain defensible, well-documented protocols. Absent such measures, courts are likely to follow Solis and allow juries to decide whether institutional negligence contributed to serious injuries or death.