Snow v. People: Deferring Restitution in Its Entirety at Sentencing Creates an Illegal Sentence; Post‑Sentencing Fixes Are Invalid and the Remedy Is “No Restitution”

Snow v. People: Deferring Restitution in Its Entirety at Sentencing Creates an Illegal Sentence; Post‑Sentencing Fixes Are Invalid and the Remedy Is “No Restitution”

Introduction

In Shaun Jeff Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, the Colorado Supreme Court held that when a trial court “reserves” the issue of restitution in its entirety at sentencing—rather than entering one of the four statutorily authorized restitution orders under section 18-1.3-603(1)—it imposes a sentence “not authorized by law,” i.e., an illegal sentence. Such illegality is cognizable under Crim. P. 35(a) as an illegal sentence (not merely an “illegal manner” claim) and may be corrected at any time. Crucially, the Court reaffirmed its 2021 decision in People v. Weeks and ruled that the only remedy consistent with the restitution statute’s architecture and legislative intent is to vacate any untimely post‑sentencing restitution order and to enter an order of “no restitution” under subsection (1)(d)—even if the victim suffered pecuniary loss.

The decision reverses the court of appeals, which had characterized Snow’s challenge as an illegal‑manner claim time‑barred by the 126‑day limit in Crim. P. 35(b). The Supreme Court clarified that where the sentencing court failed to enter any authorized restitution order, the entire sentence is illegal and correctable at any time. The opinion provides definitive guidance to trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel: a generic “reservation” of restitution at sentencing is not permitted; a post‑sentencing § 18-1.3-603(1)(a) order cannot cure that defect; and vacatur with a subsection (1)(d) “no restitution” order is the proper corrective mechanism.

Summary of the Opinion

  • At sentencing, the trial court imposed imprisonment but merely “reserved” restitution for 60 days without entering any of the four authorized restitution orders under § 18-1.3-603(1). This made the sentence illegal because restitution is a required component of every sentence (with one narrow exception not applicable here). See ¶¶ 2, 20–23.
  • The prosecution later filed a motion for restitution on day 78, and the court entered a post‑sentencing restitution order on day 108. Snow eventually challenged the restitution order under Crim. P. 35(a).
  • The court of appeals treated the challenge as an “illegal manner” claim subject to the 126‑day limit and affirmed the order. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding Snow’s claim was an illegal sentence claim and not time‑barred. See ¶¶ 1–2, 13–15, 21–25.
  • Remedy: The Supreme Court reaffirmed Weeks and held that the untimely post‑sentencing restitution order must be vacated and replaced with an order under § 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that no restitution is owed. See ¶¶ 4–5, 31–41.
  • Key doctrinal refinements:
    • Deferring restitution “in its entirety” at sentencing is not one of the four authorized orders in § 18‑1.3‑603(1) and renders the sentence illegal. ¶¶ 2, 22–23.
    • Subsection (1)(a) orders (a specific amount) must be entered at or before sentencing; they cannot be used post‑sentencing to “cure” an illegal sentence. ¶¶ 32–35.
    • Even where victims suffered losses, a subsection (1)(d) “no restitution” order is the appropriate remedy if the court fails to enter a timely, authorized restitution order. ¶¶ 38–40.
    • The decision aligns with People v. Weeks and with Tennyson v. People (Tennyson II), decided the same day, on the classification and remedy framework. ¶¶ 21, 30, 41 & n.14.

Case Background

Snow was charged with multiple offenses, including first‑degree murder and drug and weapon charges. Under a plea agreement, he pled guilty to an added count of second‑degree murder in exchange for dismissal of the original charges and a stipulated sentencing range of 16 to 24 years. The plea agreement did not mention restitution, and restitution was not discussed at the providency hearing. At sentencing, the prosecution did not request restitution and merely asked the court to “reserve” restitution; the court did so for 60 days. See ¶¶ 6–8.

The prosecution filed its restitution motion on day 78, and the court entered a restitution order on day 108. Snow did not directly appeal, but years later he moved pro se to waive restitution, invoking his indigence and asserting procedural irregularities. The district court denied the motion; the court of appeals affirmed, treating the challenge as an illegal‑manner claim barred by Rule 35(b)’s 126‑day clock. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether such a challenge is cognizable as an illegal‑sentence claim and whether the division erred in relying on Tennyson I rather than Weeks. See ¶¶ 8–15.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, 498 P.3d 142:
    • Holding: When a court enters a subsection (1)(b) finding of restitution liability at sentencing but determines the amount beyond the 91‑day period without a good‑cause extension, the court acts without authority, and the appropriate remedy is vacatur of the untimely restitution order. ¶¶ 4, 27, 31–32.
    • Relevance in Snow: The Court “stands firmly by” Weeks and applies its remedial logic, even though Snow is not a pure (1)(b) case. Weeks supplies the vacatur/no‑restitution remedy because any other rule would undermine the statutory scheme and legislative intent. ¶¶ 4, 30–38.
  • Tennyson v. People (Tennyson II), 2025 CO 31:
    • Key proposition cited in Snow: A sentence that fails to include one of the subsection (1) restitution orders is not authorized by law and may be corrected at any time. ¶ 21 (quoting Tennyson II, ¶ 2).
    • Harmonization: The Court explains that Tennyson I (court of appeals) is not at odds with Weeks; Snow’s case differs because there was no subsection (1)(b) order at sentencing. ¶ 14; n.14.
  • Whiteaker v. People, 2024 CO 25:
    • Reinforces that illegal sentences can and must be corrected at any time. ¶ 24.
  • Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23; Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19:
    • Meza recognizes restitution as a component of the judgment of conviction and sentence. ¶ 22.
    • Veith confirms de novo review of sentence legality. ¶ 19.
  • Statutes and Rules:
    • § 18‑1.3‑603(1)(a)–(d): Four authorized restitution orders; every sentence must include at least one. ¶¶ 20–21.
    • § 18‑1.3‑603(1)(b): 91‑day deadline to set the amount after a finding of liability at sentencing, with potential good‑cause extension. ¶ 12.
    • § 18‑1.3‑601: Legislative findings emphasizing effective and timely restitution assessments and procedures. ¶ 35.
    • Crim. P. 32(b): Sentencing must “consider restitution” and include an order or finding. ¶ 16 & n.8.
    • Crim. P. 35(a), (b): Distinguishes illegal sentence (correctable at any time) from illegal manner (correctable within 126 days). ¶ 1.
  • Statutory interpretation cases:
    • Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2008); People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M; Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83; McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40: Standards for statutory and rule interpretation applied de novo, focusing on plain meaning and legislative intent. ¶¶ 16–18.
  • Standing to challenge restitution timing:
    • While the People raised lack of standing in the Supreme Court, the Court rejected the argument as meritless and noted parties need not separately establish standing to appeal when they were parties below. See Arapahoe County Dep’t of Human Services v. People in Interest of D.Z.B., 2019 CO 4. ¶ n.6.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Classification: Illegal sentence, not illegal manner. The Supreme Court’s threshold holding is that a mere “reservation” of restitution in its entirety at sentencing does not satisfy any of the four options in § 18‑1.3‑603(1). Because restitution is a mandatory component of the sentence, the failure to enter one of those four orders renders the sentence “not authorized by law.” That defect is an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a), correctable at any time. See ¶¶ 2, 21–25.

b) Why Weeks still governs the remedy. Although Weeks involved a true subsection (1)(b) posture (liability found at sentencing; amount set late), the remedial logic applies here. Any other remedy would gut the statute’s temporal structure and legislative purpose to ensure an “effective and timely assessment” of restitution. See ¶¶ 31–38.

c) No post‑sentencing cure via subsection (1)(a). The People argued that the court’s later order specifying an amount functioned as a valid § 18‑1.3‑603(1)(a) order that cured the earlier omission. The Court rejected this: subsection (1)(a) orders must be included in the judgment of conviction at or before sentencing. Post‑sentencing resort to (1)(a) would “render portions of section 18‑1.3‑603 meaningless,” would allow untimely restitution in defiance of the statute, and would revive the “longstanding practice” repudiated in Weeks. See ¶¶ 32–36.

d) The appropriate corrective order is subsection (1)(d)—even if losses exist. The Court held that a “no restitution” order under § 18‑1.3‑603(1)(d) is the only remedy that effectuates the legislature’s command for timely assessment and respects the structural requirement that one of the four orders be entered at sentencing. Importantly, subsection (1)(d) is not limited to cases in which victims suffered no pecuniary loss. It is also available where the court failed to timely determine the amount and the statutory process was not followed, because otherwise defendants would be left without a remedy and the deadlines would be toothless. See ¶¶ 38–40.

e) Harmonization with Tennyson I and II. The Court emphasized that its approach is consistent with both Weeks and Tennyson II. Tennyson I (court of appeals) is not inconsistent with Weeks when properly confined to its posture; Snow is different because no (1)(b) order was ever entered at sentencing. See ¶ n.14.

3) The Impact and Forward‑Looking Guidance

Snow delivers clear operational mandates for Colorado criminal courts and practitioners:

  • Sentencing judges must enter one of the four authorized restitution orders at sentencing:
    • (1)(a): Order a specific amount;
    • (1)(b): Find liability and set the amount within 91 days (or longer for good cause);
    • (1)(c): Order payment of actual costs of future treatment;
    • (1)(d): No restitution (including the remedial posture recognized in Snow).
  • “Reservation” language is not an authorized order. A bare “reserve restitution” is invalid and renders the sentence illegal. Trial courts must avoid this practice. ¶¶ 22–23.
  • No post‑sentencing (1)(a) cures. Post‑sentencing attempts to add a restitution amount as a (1)(a) order do not fix the failure to enter an order at sentencing and will be vacated. ¶¶ 32–35.
  • Weeks’ vacatur remedy is entrenched. If the sentencing court enters a proper (1)(b) order but misses the 91‑day deadline (absent good cause), the amount order is unauthorized and must be vacated. Snow confirms and extends that remedial discipline by applying analogous vacatur where no (1)(b) order existed at all. ¶¶ 30–38.
  • A no‑restitution order may be required even when victims suffered loss. Where the statutory framework is not followed, the remedy is a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution to vindicate the legislature’s insistence on timely procedures. ¶¶ 38–40.
  • Postconviction posture: Illegal sentence claims are not time‑barred. Challenges like Snow’s can be raised at any time under Crim. P. 35(a), and they do not depend on preservation or on the 126‑day limit applicable to “illegal manner” claims. ¶¶ 1, 24.
  • For prosecutors: Intent to seek restitution should be announced at sentencing, and where relying on (1)(b), the record must reflect a finding of liability and the 91‑day window (or a contemporaneous finding of good cause for an extension). Filing the required “information” late risks vacatur. ¶¶ 27–29, 35–37.
  • For defense counsel: Silence or failure to object does not waive an illegal‑sentence claim; ensure the judgment of conviction includes a compliant restitution order at sentencing. ¶¶ 14, 24.
  • For victims: The statutory scheme strongly favors timely assessment; stakeholders must coordinate early. Failure to follow the scheme may forfeit restitution in the criminal case, though civil remedies may remain.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Illegal sentence vs. sentence imposed in an illegal manner:
    • Illegal sentence: A sentence not authorized by law or imposed without jurisdiction—e.g., failing to include any authorized restitution order at sentencing. It can be corrected at any time. Crim. P. 35(a); ¶ 1.
    • Illegal manner: The sentence is lawful in kind, but the procedure used to impose it violated rules—these claims are generally subject to the 126‑day time limit in Crim. P. 35(b). ¶ 1.
  • The four restitution orders under § 18‑1.3‑603(1):
    • (1)(a): Order a specific dollar amount—must be in the judgment at or before sentencing. ¶¶ 20, 34.
    • (1)(b): Find liability now, set the amount later—court must set the amount within 91 days of sentencing, unless it makes a good‑cause finding for more time. ¶ 12.
    • (1)(c): Order payment of actual costs of future treatment for victims (can be in addition to or instead of other orders). ¶ 20.
    • (1)(d): No restitution owed—Snow clarifies that this order also serves as the remedy when courts fail to follow the statutory procedures and deadlines. ¶¶ 38–40.
  • “Reserving restitution” is not an order. Saying “restitution is reserved” at sentencing does not satisfy § 18‑1.3‑603(1). The court must choose one of the four authorized options. ¶¶ 22–23.
  • The 91‑day deadline (subsection (1)(b)):
    • Applies only when the court at sentencing makes a finding of restitution liability under (1)(b) and postpones setting the amount. ¶¶ 12, 27–29.
    • If there’s no (1)(b) order at sentencing, the 91‑day clock is not triggered; nevertheless, the sentence is illegal for lack of any authorized order, and later efforts to add a (1)(a) order will be invalid. ¶¶ 27–35.
  • Legislative intent:
    • The General Assembly overhauled restitution procedures to ensure effective, consistent, and timely assessment of restitution. Courts and prosecutors must adhere to the statute’s structure and deadlines. ¶ 35.

How the Court Applied These Principles to Snow

  1. At sentencing, the court did not enter any of the four authorized restitution orders; it only “reserved” restitution. That omission rendered the sentence illegal. ¶¶ 22–23.
  2. The court later entered a post‑sentencing order setting an amount. That cannot cure the defect because (1)(a) orders must be at or before sentencing, and accepting post‑sentencing cures would nullify the statute’s structure and timing. ¶¶ 32–35.
  3. The appropriate remedy is to vacate the post‑sentencing restitution order and enter a subsection (1)(d) order that no restitution is owed—even if there were proven losses—because the statute’s timing and procedural guarantees must be enforced. ¶¶ 31, 38–40.

Practice Pointers

  • For judges:
    • At sentencing, ensure the judgment of conviction includes one of the § 18‑1.3‑603(1) orders. Avoid boilerplate “reservation” language.
    • If ordering under (1)(b), explicitly find restitution liability on the record and set a 91‑day deadline (or make a contemporaneous good‑cause finding for any additional time).
    • Do not attempt to “fix” an omission post‑sentencing by adding a (1)(a) order; Snow holds such orders are untimely and invalid.
  • For prosecutors:
    • Signal your intent to seek restitution at sentencing; if using (1)(b), be ready to identify victims and categories of loss and to file the required “information” promptly.
    • If the 91‑day period will not suffice, move early for a good‑cause extension.
  • For defense counsel:
    • Confirm that the sentencing court has selected one of the four authorized restitution orders; object to generic “reservation” language.
    • Remember that illegal‑sentence challenges are not time‑barred; consider Crim. P. 35(a) if the judgment lacked a proper restitution order.

Conclusion

Snow v. People cements a bright‑line rule: Colorado sentencing courts must enter a statutorily authorized restitution order at sentencing. A bare “reservation” of restitution fails to satisfy § 18‑1.3‑603(1), renders the sentence illegal, and cannot be retroactively cured by a post‑sentencing (1)(a) amount order. Reaffirming Weeks, the Court holds that the appropriate and only effective remedy is to vacate the unauthorized post‑sentencing order and enter a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution. This remedial framework enforces the legislature’s command for the timely and expeditious assessment of restitution and ensures that the statute’s deadlines and procedures have real force.

The opinion clarifies the classification of such postconviction challenges: when the sentencing court fails to enter one of the four authorized restitution orders, the defect is an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a), correctable at any time. By aligning the remedy with legislative intent and procedural fidelity, Snow provides critical guidance for future cases and restores structural rigor to Colorado’s restitution regime.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Colorado Supreme Court

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