Smith v. State: Defining the Limits of “Counsel Abandonment” and Pro-Se Filings in Idaho Post-Conviction Practice

1. Introduction

The Idaho Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Smith v. State, Docket No. 52468, provides pivotal guidance on two recurring themes in post-conviction litigation:

When an incarcerated petitioner may invoke “attorney abandonment” to justify missed deadlines or obtain equitable relief; and
How courts must treat pro-se motions filed by litigants who are simultaneously represented by counsel.

Jason Kelley Smith, serving a life sentence (20-year fixed) for lewd conduct with a minor, sought post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. After his petition was dismissed, Smith filed several pro-se motions—most notably a motion for extra time to amend his petition and a Rule 60(b)(6) motion alleging abandonment by post-conviction counsel. The district court denied both, and the Supreme Court has now affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Bevan, C.J.) unanimously:

Affirmed the district court’s denial of Smith’s motion for extension of time, holding that:
- Smith failed to demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” warranting equitable tolling.
- He remained represented by counsel; therefore, the district court could not entertain his pro-se filing.
Affirmed denial of Smith’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion on the unchallenged, alternative ground that he never noticed the motion for hearing as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7.

In doing so, the Court clarified that ordinary negligence or miscommunication by counsel does not equal “abandonment,” and that a represented litigant’s pro-se submissions carry no legal effect unless counsel endorses them or withdraws.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012). Smith invoked Maples to argue abandonment. The Court distinguished Maples—where counsel literally severed contact and missed a jurisdictional deadline—from Smith’s scenario, where counsel remained of record, evaluated amendments, and communicated (albeit belatedly).
Bahr v. State, 172 Idaho 373 (2023) & Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650 (2010). These cases articulate Idaho’s two-prong test for equitable tolling (diligence + extraordinary circumstance). The Court applied this framework to reject Smith’s tolling request.
Ward v. State, 166 Idaho 330 (2020) & Rodriquez v. State, 171 Idaho 634 (2023). Cited for procedural principles: Rule 60(b) review standards and the doctrine that an unchallenged alternative ground below is fatal on appeal.
Walker v. Meyer, 170 Idaho 408 (2021). Reaffirmed that pro-se litigants receive no special leniency in complying with rules.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Counsel Abandonment vs. Negligence
The Court adopted a strict reading of “abandonment,” requiring total disengagement by counsel. Merely failing to pursue a desired amendment or to communicate timely is negligent but not “abandonment.” Consequently, Smith could not bypass procedural bars via Rule 60(b)(6) or equitable tolling.
Effect of Dual Representation
Idaho courts cannot consider pro-se motions from represented parties (“hybrid representation prohibition”). Smith’s filings were therefore nullities unless submitted by counsel.
Rule 7 Prerequisite
Even if Smith’s Rule 60(b) motion were cognizable, it had to be noticed for a hearing (I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E)). Failure to do so provided an independent and unchallenged basis for denial—decisive on appeal.
Equitable Tolling Test
Applying Bahr, Smith lacked evidence of diligent pursuit or an extraordinary barrier—his own affidavit showed counsel’s ongoing involvement. Thus, no tolling.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Immediate Practice Effects

Post-conviction counsel and inmates must maintain clear communication; however, ordinary breakdowns will not excuse deadlines.
District courts may summarily deny defective pro-se motions filed by represented parties without reaching the merits.
Rule 60(b)(6) remains an “extraordinary” avenue—attorney negligence alone will rarely suffice.

Long-Term Jurisprudential Influence

Sets a higher bar in Idaho than in some federal jurisdictions for proving abandonment, thereby limiting the use of federal cases like Maples in state post-conviction settings.
Reinforces that procedural missteps (e.g., failure to notice a hearing) can and will dispose of substantive claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 60(b)(6): A catch-all provision allowing courts to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Should be used sparingly and only in extraordinary situations.
Equitable Tolling: A doctrine that pauses a statutory deadline when (1) the litigant diligently pursues rights and (2) some extraordinary obstacle prevents timely filing.
Abandonment vs. Ineffective Assistance: “Abandonment” suggests counsel altogether ceased representation without notice, whereas “ineffective assistance” includes poor performance within an active representation.
Hybrid Representation: Simultaneous self-representation and attorney representation. Idaho generally prohibits it; courts consider only filings made through counsel.
Rule 7(b)(3)(E) Hearing Notice: Idaho civil motions must be set for hearing or be accompanied by a waiver of oral argument. Otherwise, the court may deny them outright.

5. Conclusion

Smith v. State fortifies Idaho’s procedural guardrails in post-conviction litigation. It underscores that:

Attorney abandonment is a narrow, fact-intensive concept; routine negligence does not qualify.
Civil procedure rules—especially hearing-notice requirements—are strictly enforced even in criminal-related collateral proceedings.
Pro-se pleadings from represented litigants carry no force unless counsel joins or withdraws.

By affirming on an unchallenged, procedural ground, the Court also signals the importance of attacking every basis for a lower-court ruling on appeal. Practitioners should view Smith as a cautionary tale: diligence, procedural compliance, and strategic completeness are indispensable in safeguarding post-conviction rights.