Introduction

In Smith v. State (2025), the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated, for the second time, the trial court’s denial of Danyel Smith’s extraordinary motion for a new trial. Smith was convicted in 2003 of felony murder and aggravated battery following the death of his infant son, Chandler, based on a diagnosis then-described as Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS). In 2021, Smith filed an extraordinary motion for new trial grounded in post-conviction scientific developments and new expert analysis of Chandler’s medical records—contending that evolving medical understanding undermines the SBS diagnosis and furnishes alternative, non-abuse explanations for the infant’s symptoms.

The Supreme Court previously held in Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287 (2022) (Smith II), that the trial court could not deny the motion without a hearing because the allegations, if proven, might warrant relief. On remand, the court conducted a six-day evidentiary hearing, heard eight defense experts and two State experts, and again denied relief—this time adopting a State-drafted order wholesale. The Supreme Court has now vacated that order, concluding the trial court misapplied the controlling legal framework that governs extraordinary motions based on new expert analysis of existing evidence.

The core issues addressed are: (1) what constitutes “newly discovered evidence” when the motion rests on new expert analysis rather than new physical facts; (2) how to assess “due diligence” when scientific knowledge evolves over time; and (3) how to apply “materiality” under Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488 (1980), particularly when the new evidence is expert opinion admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. The Court provides detailed guidance on each prong, clarifies the reasonable-juror lens required for materiality, and cautions against conflating credibility weighing by judges with the jury-focused probability inquiry Timberlake demands.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s denial of Smith’s extraordinary motion and remanded with instructions to apply the correct legal framework. The Court held:

• Newly discovered evidence: The trial court erred by focusing on whether prior trial experts were “presumptive” or “materially flawed” rather than asking whether the specific new expert opinions and analyses now presented were unknown at the time of trial and during the period for filing an ordinary motion for new trial (Timberlake’s first factor).
• Diligence: The court misapplied the due diligence inquiry by asserting that “general” criticism of SBS was possible for decades. The relevant question is whether the specific new expert analysis—rooted in evolved scientific understanding—could have been discovered and presented earlier with reasonable diligence. In science-based motions, diligence must account for the maturation of scientific consensus, peer review, and error-rate visibility, and must not force defendants to file prematurely before materiality becomes ascertainable (Timberlake’s second factor).
• Materiality: The trial court improperly substituted its own assessment of expert credibility for the jury’s, rather than asking whether a reasonable juror would probably reach a different verdict if the new expert opinions had been presented alongside the State’s trial evidence (Timberlake’s third factor). Courts must consider how the new evidence would interact with the State’s original proof, not merely which expert the judge finds more persuasive in the abstract.

On admissibility, the trial court implicitly admitted the defense experts’ testimony (by qualifying them and considering “everything” presented), and the State did not appeal that determination. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on admissibility under OCGA § 24‑7‑702 and Daubert but confirmed that Daubert now governs hearings and trials commenced after July 1, 2022 (superseding Harper).

The Court also noted that while trial courts may adopt party-drafted orders, the practice warrants care—especially where prior orders have been vacated—and urged dispatch given the age of the motion.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Shaping the Decision

• Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488 (1980): Establishes the six-part test for new-trial motions based on newly discovered evidence: (1) newly discovered; (2) due diligence; (3) materiality (probable different verdict); (4) non-cumulative; (5) affidavit or explanation; (6) not solely impeaching. Smith turns primarily on the first three.
• Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287 (2022) (Smith II): Recognizes that “new expert analysis of existing physical evidence” can qualify as newly discovered evidence capable of supporting an extraordinary motion, and warns that scientific developments may warrant waiting until materiality can be established.
• State v. Gates, 308 Ga. 238 (2022): Provides the “reasonable juror” lens for materiality and a model for analyzing how new evidence recalibrates the total evidentiary picture, not merely which side’s evidence is more persuasive to a judge. Also clarifies that new analytical tools (e.g., DNA software) can produce new evidence even from old samples.
• Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530 (2014): Extraordinary motions are disfavored; appellate review affords deference but requires adherence to correct legal principles and relevant facts. Courts abuse discretion when they apply the wrong framework or rely on irrelevant findings.
• Stinchcomb v. State, 308 Ga. 870 (2020): Newly discovered evidence focuses on the evidence itself (the content of the affidavit/opinion), not merely that a person or topic was “known” at trial.
• Bharadia v. State, 297 Ga. 567 (2015), and Drane v. State, 291 Ga. 298 (2012): Diligence requires showing the evidence could not previously have been obtained and that the defendant acted promptly once it became available; “good reason” exists when circumstances beyond control prevented earlier discovery.
• Debelbot v. State, 305 Ga. 534 (2019): Materiality can account for whether a reasonable jury would find expert opinions persuasive; but this credibility assessment is only one factor in a holistic, reasonable-juror analysis.
• Fields v. State, 212 Ga. 652 (1956); Bowden v. State, 250 Ga. 185 (1982); Bell v. State, 227 Ga. 800 (1971); Moody v. State, 277 Ga. 676 (2004): Materiality requires contextualizing new evidence within the full record; evidence need not conclusively prove innocence to be material if it supplies a “missing link” or meaningfully undermines the State’s theory.
• OCGA § 24‑7‑702 (Rule 702) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993): Post‑2022 Georgia law requires Daubert reliability for expert evidence. The trial court here implicitly admitted the defense experts; admissibility wasn’t before the Supreme Court on this appeal.
• Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (1982), and Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923): Historical expert-evidence standards; Harper applies pre‑July 1, 2022, whereas Daubert governs thereafter.
• United States v. Shea, 989 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2021): Expert opinions are opinions, not facts; once admitted under Rule 702, the factfinder assigns weight based on coherence and consistency, not “truth/falsity.” Cited to underscore how to treat expert opinion at the materiality stage.
• Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882 (2020); Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621 (2011), overruled in part on other grounds: Adoption of party-drafted orders is permissible; trial courts are presumed to consider only legal evidence. The Court nevertheless urged care on remand here.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Admissibility (Rule 702/Daubert)

The State challenged portions of the defense experts’ testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert. The trial court “qualified several experts” and stated it considered everything presented, implying admission of the defense experts’ testimony. Because the State did not appeal admissibility, the Supreme Court did not reach that issue. The Court reiterated the Daubert factors in a footnote and signaled that admissibility assessments remain distinct from Timberlake analysis: first ask whether the testimony is admissible; if it is, evaluate whether it is newly discovered, could have been obtained with diligence, and is so material that a new verdict is probable.

b) Newly Discovered Evidence

The trial court erred by asking whether the State’s trial experts had made “presumptive or materially flawed” SBS diagnoses and whether the SBS framework had “changed.” The correct inquiry focuses on whether the specific new evidence—the defense experts’ current opinions re-interpreting Chandler’s medical records in light of evolved science—was unknown to Smith at trial and during the period for an ordinary new-trial motion (see Stinchcomb; Smith II).

Put differently, even if “SBS skepticism” existed in the 1990s, what matters is whether Dr. Ghatan’s and the other experts’ specific opinions—grounded in post‑trial consensus statements, re-evaluated etiologies (e.g., birth trauma, seizures, dehydration, vaccination timing/dosage in a low-birth-weight preterm infant), and modern literature—were available. The trial court’s reliance on the existence of generalized criticism of SBS missed Timberlake’s focus on the actual content of the new expert analyses.

c) Diligence

The trial court’s diligence finding was flawed for two reasons:

• It treated the defense case as mere “general criticism” of SBS, rather than a specific, medically reasoned reanalysis of Chandler’s injuries based on developments since 2003. Diligence must be measured against the availability of these specific opinions, not against the mere existence of earlier dissent in the field.
• It sought to pinpoint a date by which Smith “should” have filed, without accommodating the nature of scientific maturation. For science-based motions, “a prudent defendant” may wait until the theory has been adequately vetted (testing, peer review, error rates, acceptance) and its materiality can be demonstrated—especially because a defendant gets only one extraordinary motion (Smith II; Bharadia).

The Court emphasized that diligence in the scientific context requires a “delicate balance”: defendants must not sandbag, but neither must they file prematurely before the new science is reliable and material enough to affect a verdict. Trial courts must avoid conflating diligence with “earliest conceivable moment,” and must not collapse the diligence inquiry into the “newness” inquiry.

d) Materiality

The trial court devoted most of its order to choosing between the State’s and the defense’s experts on causation, ultimately finding the State’s experts “more persuasive.” That is the wrong lens under Timberlake. The question is not which expert the judge believes, but whether a reasonable juror would probably reach a different verdict at a new trial if they heard the new expert opinions in conjunction with the State’s original evidence (Gates).

Because expert opinions (once admissible under Rule 702) are opinions rather than facts (Shea; Smith, 318 Ga. 868 (2024)), courts assessing materiality should not treat them as “true/false.” Instead, courts must estimate how the jury would likely weigh them—considering plausibility, coherence, internal consistency, and whether they undermine or reframe the State’s case. Credibility remains a factor, but only one factor, within a holistic reasonable-juror analysis that accounts for the strengths and weaknesses of both sides (Gates; Bowden; Bell).

Here, the trial court failed to conduct that holistic, jury-centered analysis. It did not explain how the defense’s re-interpretations of subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, diffuse axonal injury, bruising consistent with CPR, prematurity, low birth weight, dehydration after a long car ride, and vaccine timing/dosage, would likely shift the evidentiary balance a reasonable juror would perceive when reassessing the 2003 record.

3) Doctrinal Impact and Future Litigation

a) A clarified framework for science-based extraordinary motions

Smith cements and elaborates the framework first articulated in Smith II and applied in Gates:

• New expert analysis of existing evidence can constitute newly discovered evidence.
• Diligence in science-based claims must be sensitive to evolving consensus and reliability criteria (testing, peer review, error rates, acceptance), not merely to the earliest availability of any criticism.
• Materiality must be evaluated through the reasonable-juror lens, with a narrative analysis of how the new expert opinions would alter the jury’s view of the original trial record, rather than by a judicial head-to-head weighing of experts.

b) Effects beyond SBS/AHT

Although the underlying case involves SBS/AHT, the Court’s reasoning applies broadly to convictions premised on forensic or medical theories that have evolved (e.g., arson pattern analysis, microscopic hair comparison, bite mark analysis, shaken baby/triad in infant head trauma, some syndromic diagnoses). Defendants pursuing extraordinary motions based on modernized interpretations of old evidence now have a clearer path to satisfy Timberlake—provided they can demonstrate admissibility, actual newness of the specific analysis, diligence calibrated to scientific maturation, and materiality under the reasonable-juror standard.

c) Practical consequences for trial courts

• Orders must apply Timberlake’s factors to the specific new expert opinions, not to the general state of a field. Conflation of factors (newness vs. diligence; credibility vs. materiality) risks reversible error.
• Materiality requires a narrative of how the jury would likely process the new expert analysis alongside the trial evidence—not a bench-trial style verdict on causation between dueling experts.
• While adopting party-drafted orders is permissible, courts should ensure careful, independent application of the correct framework, particularly when prior orders have been vacated.

d) Prosecutorial and defense strategy

• The State should be prepared to defend the reliability and persuasiveness of legacy forensic/medical theories under current Rule 702/Daubert standards and to address how new expert analyses interact with the old record under the reasonable-juror lens.
• Defendants should frame their motions around specific new expert opinions—anchored in peer-reviewed literature and consensus statements—and demonstrate why earlier filing would have been premature given scientific development and why the new opinions would likely alter a juror’s assessment.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Extraordinary motion for new trial: A late-stage request for a new trial filed after the time for an ordinary motion has expired. Disfavored because it challenges the finality of judgments, but permitted where new evidence is so strong it probably would produce a different verdict.
• Timberlake test: Six requirements for new-trial relief based on newly discovered evidence; in Smith, the first three were dispositive—newness, diligence, materiality.
• New expert analysis of existing evidence: No new physical evidence is found; rather, new expert opinions re-interpret the old evidence using modern science. Georgia law recognizes that such opinions can be “newly discovered evidence.”
• Diligence in evolving science: Defendants need not file at the first hint of a new theory. They must wait long enough for the science to be reliable and materially meaningful (peer review, error rates, acceptance) and then act promptly.
• Materiality’s “reasonable-juror” lens: The judge asks how a typical juror would probably view the combined record with the new opinions—not which expert the judge personally believes.
• Expert opinions vs. facts: Once admitted under Rule 702/Daubert, expert opinions are not judged “true/false” but weighed for plausibility and coherence against other evidence.
• Rule 702/Daubert vs. Harper: Georgia now follows Daubert for expert reliability in proceedings commencing after July 1, 2022; Harper governed previously. Admissibility is a gateway question separate from Timberlake’s newness/diligence/materiality.

5) Guidance for the Trial Court on Remand (and for Future Cases)

1. Identify the specific “new” expert opinions and analyses at issue; distinguish them from generalized critiques of an entire field.
2. Confirm admissibility under Rule 702/Daubert if raised. If admitted, proceed to Timberlake.
3. Newly discovered evidence: Determine whether those specific opinions and their supporting bases were unknown at trial and during the ordinary motion period (focus on the content, not whether the witness or general topic existed).
4. Diligence: Assess whether the defense could reasonably have discovered and presented those specific opinions earlier, accounting for scientific maturation (peer review, testing, error rates, acceptance), and whether the defense acted promptly once the opinions became material and available.
5. Materiality: Using the reasonable-juror lens, analyze how the new expert opinions would likely alter the jury’s assessment of the 2003 evidence, including:
   • How the new opinions reframe the triad (subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhages, diffuse axonal injury) and alternative etiologies (birth trauma, seizures, dehydration, vaccination timing/dosage in a vulnerable infant, CPR-related bruising).
   • How these reinterpretations weaken or counter key planks of the State’s original theory.
   • The overall strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case and the defense case, with the new opinions included.
   • Whether the new opinions fill gaps or supply missing links relevant to guilt or innocence.
6. Draft an independent order applying the correct standards and linking factual findings to the relevant legal questions. Avoid substituting a judicial credibility choice between experts for the reasonable-juror materiality analysis.

Conclusion

Smith v. State meaningfully advances Georgia law on extraordinary motions for new trial premised on evolving science. It confirms that new expert analysis of existing evidence can be “newly discovered” under Timberlake; that diligence in science‑based claims must accommodate the maturation of theory and consensus; and that materiality turns on whether a reasonable juror, hearing the new expert opinions alongside the State’s trial evidence, would probably reach a different verdict.

The decision also reinforces disciplined role‑separation: admissibility is governed by Rule 702/Daubert; once admitted, expert opinions are weighed for plausibility, not treated as facts to be declared true or false by the court. Trial courts must avoid conflating their own evaluation of expert credibility with the jury-centric probability analysis required by Timberlake. In remanding, the Supreme Court provides a roadmap for scientifically grounded post‑conviction litigation and signals that as medical and forensic understanding evolves, Georgia courts must evaluate such claims with rigor, balance, and fidelity to the governing principles.

Key takeaway: When an extraordinary motion rests on new, admissible expert opinions that materially reframe the original trial evidence, the Timberlake inquiry must be applied to the actual new analyses, with diligence calibrated to scientific maturation and materiality assessed through the eyes of a reasonable juror—not through a judicial reweighing of dueling experts.