Smith v. Sheriff’s Office: Unserved Federal Defendants Do Not Trigger the 60‑Day Civil Appeal Period

I. Introduction

In Smith v. Sheriff’s Office, No. 25‑1076 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed a pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on an untimely notice of appeal. Although formally labeled an “Order and Judgment” and designated as non‑precedential, the opinion provides an important and concrete clarification of how appellate deadlines operate in multi‑defendant civil litigation, particularly where federal agencies or employees appear in the caption but have never been properly served.

The decision restates, applies, and slightly sharpens three core principles:

• The deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil case is jurisdictional and strictly enforced.
• The longer 60‑day appeal period in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 4(a)(1)(B) applies only when the United States or its agencies/officers are true “parties” to the case, which generally requires proper service and participation—not mere inclusion in the caption.
• Courts of appeals lack authority to create equitable exceptions to these statutory deadlines, even in sympathetic circumstances or where a litigant seeks a “mistake exception.”

The case arises from a broad civil rights action brought by Nathan J. and Holly M. Smith, proceeding without counsel, against a very large group of defendants including local law enforcement officers, state and county agencies, and various federal entities such as the FBI and DEA. After the district court dismissed their suit and later denied their motion to extend the time to appeal, the Smiths attempted to appeal that denial. The Tenth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal itself was late and could not be saved by arguments about ECF upload timing, service on federal entities, or equitable relief.

As a result, Smith stands as a persuasive Tenth Circuit statement that:

• Unserved federal defendants are not “parties” for purposes of the 60‑day appeal period; and
• There is no “mistake” or “fairness” exception to jurisdictional appeal deadlines in civil cases.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Civil Rights Lawsuit

In 2023, Nathan and Holly Smith filed a sweeping civil rights complaint in the District of Colorado. The caption—reproduced in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion—is unusually long and includes:

• Local and county entities and officers (e.g., “Sheriff’s Office,” Grand Junction Police Department, Mesa County Sheriff, SWAT teams, task forces, UAV division, various divisions within law enforcement agencies).
• Numerous individually named officers and public officials.
• State and local prosecutorial entities and officials (e.g., District Attorney’s Office, Deputy and Special Deputy District Attorneys).
• Two federal agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—and “25 other agents, all participating police, specific officers.”

The Smiths served some, but not all, of these many defendants. Those defendants who were properly served filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted on September 9, 2024. A separate final judgment entered the same day.

B. The First Appeal: No. 24‑1490

Under the ordinary rule in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(A), the Smiths had 30 days from the September 9, 2024 judgment to file a notice of appeal. They did not file until December 11, 2024. The Tenth Circuit opened appeal No. 24‑1490 but dismissed it on December 16, 2024 as untimely. That earlier dismissal is explicitly cited in the present opinion:

“On December 16, 2024, this court dismissed No. 24‑1490 for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was untimely.” (citing Smith v. Sheriff’s Office, No. 24‑1490, 2024 WL 5711342 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (unpublished)).

C. The Motion to Extend Time and the Second Appeal

Having lost their first appeal on timeliness grounds, the Smiths then tried to repair the problem in the district court:

• January 22, 2025: They filed a “request to reopen the time to file an appeal or to file an untimely appeal.”
• January 28, 2025: The district court denied relief, construing the motion as one under FRAP 4(a)(5)(A) (motion to extend time to appeal). The court held:
  • The motion was filed outside the 30‑day window after the original appeal period expired, so it was untimely under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(i); and
  • The Smiths had not shown “excusable neglect or good cause” under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii).
• March 3, 2025: The district court filed the Smiths’ notice of appeal from the January 28 order.

Because the January 28 order was itself a final, appealable order, a new 30‑day appeal period started from that date. As the Tenth Circuit explains:

“Because the district court denied their motion on January 28, 2025, the thirty-day appeal period expired on Thursday, February 27, 2025.” (footnote omitted).

Thus, to obtain appellate review of the district court’s denial of their extension motion, the Smiths needed to file their notice of appeal by February 27, 2025. Instead, the notice was entered on the docket on March 3, 2025. The court of appeals flagged the apparent untimeliness and ordered the Smiths to submit a jurisdictional memorandum, which they did. The case then proceeded to a merits panel, which addressed jurisdiction first—and last.

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision

A. Core Holding

The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal from the January 28 order was untimely. The court held:

1. The ordinary 30‑day appeal period under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(A) applied because the United States and its agencies/officers were not actually parties to the litigation—they had never been properly served, and the docket contained no proof of service.
2. The Smiths’ attempt to invoke the 60‑day appeal period in § 2107(b) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) failed because naming federal entities in the caption is insufficient to make them “parties.”
3. Even taking the Smiths’ factual assertions at face value about ECF upload attempts on February 27 and filing at 7:10 p.m. on February 28, they had not filed a notice of appeal by the February 27 deadline.
4. The court lacked authority to create any equitable exception or “mistake” remedy to excuse the late filing, under Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).

The court therefore dismissed the appeal, granted the Smiths leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and denied as moot the appellees’ motion to strike the Smiths’ opening brief.

B. Procedural and Doctrinal Anchors

The panel’s reasoning rests on:

• Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), which holds that statutory time limits for filing a civil appeal are jurisdictional and admit of no equitable exception;
• Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2020), reaffirming the Tenth Circuit’s practice of “routinely and uniformly” dismissing untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction;
• U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009), for the proposition that being named in a complaint’s caption does not necessarily make one a “party” to the action;
• Bristol v. Fibreboard Corp., 789 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), for the related proposition that unserved defendants are not treated as parties; and
• FRAP 4(a)(1), 4(a)(5), and 26(a)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)–(b), governing civil appellate deadlines and their calculation.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Jurisdictional Nature of Civil Appeal Deadlines

1. The Bowles Principle

The court begins with a straightforward recitation of black‑letter law:

“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”
(citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)).

Bowles involved a habeas petitioner whose district court granted an extension to file a notice of appeal beyond the time authorized by statute. The petitioner relied on the district court’s order and filed within the extended period, but outside the statutory limit. The Supreme Court nevertheless held the appeal untimely and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, rejecting the former “unique circumstances” doctrine and any equitable exceptions to statutory appeal deadlines.

In Smith, the Tenth Circuit quotes Bowles’ formulation:

“As [the Supreme Court has] long held, when an appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” (quoting Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213).

The upshot is that deadlines derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (and incorporated into FRAP 4) are not merely “claim‑processing rules” that can be waived or forfeited; they are jurisdictional. If they are not met, the court of appeals lacks the legal power to decide the appeal.

2. The Tenth Circuit’s Consistent Practice

The panel reinforces this understanding by citing its own precedent:

“Accordingly, ‘[w]e routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction.’”
(quoting Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094, 1097 (10th Cir. 2020), which in turn quotes Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210).

In other words, there is no special leniency for pro se litigants, nor for complex procedural histories. Once the deadline is missed, the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to the merits. Smith is an application of that rule, not an exception.

B. Calculating the Appeal Deadline

1. The Basic 30‑Day Rule

Because this is a civil case not involving the United States or its agencies/officers as actual parties, the default rule applies:

• Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a): notice of appeal must be filed “within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree.”
• Rule: FRAP 4(a)(1)(A): same 30‑day period for most civil appeals.

The key event here is the district court’s January 28, 2025 order denying the Smiths’ Rule 4(a)(5) motion. Counting the days is governed by FRAP 26(a)(1), which excludes the day of the triggering event and counts all subsequent calendar days, including weekends and holidays, unless the last day falls on a weekend or legal holiday.

The court explains the calculation explicitly:

“The Smiths’ notice of appeal was due on February 27, 2025. The Smiths incorrectly posit that February 28 was the deadline. The first day to be counted is the day after the order is entered. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Starting January 29, the thirtieth day is February 27.”

Thus:

• Order entered: January 28 (not counted).
• Day 1: January 29.
• Day 30: February 27.

The notice of appeal was filed March 3, 2025—four days too late.

2. The E‑Filing Timing Arguments

The Smiths attempted to contend that technical issues with uploading documents to the district court’s electronic filing system (ECF) on February 27 should count as timely filing. They asserted:

• They were “trying to upload documents on February 27,” but the upload did not complete until 12:10 a.m. on February 28; and
• They filed a notice of appeal at 7:10 p.m. on February 28, after business hours.

The panel rejects both theories as irrelevant to the dispositive fact: no notice of appeal was filed on or before February 27. The opinion does not delve into FRAP 25(a)(2)(A) (governing filing in the district court), but the implicit rule is clear: what matters is the actual filing date recorded by the court, not when a litigant begins attempting to upload documents or drafts them.

The court’s concise conclusion:

“Under either scenario, however, the Smiths fail to show they filed a notice of appeal on or before the deadline of February 27, 2025.”

This is consistent with the broader principle that technical or logistical difficulties with filing do not expand jurisdictional deadlines unless a specific rule so provides—and FRAP 4 contains no such safety valve.

C. The 60‑Day Rule and the Question of Who is a “Party”

1. The Smiths’ Argument for a 60‑Day Appeal Period

The Smiths argued they were entitled to a 60‑day appeal period under:

• 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b); and
• FRAP 4(a)(1)(B).

These provisions extend the appeal deadline to 60 days “if one of the parties is the United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee” sued in an official capacity (and, in some cases, individual capacity). The Smiths pointed to the fact that their fourth amended complaint’s caption listed federal agencies and unknown federal employees, including the FBI and DEA.

Their theory: because federal agencies/employees were “parties,” they had 60 days instead of 30 to file an appeal, which would make their March 3, 2025 filing timely.

2. Naming in the Caption Is Not Enough: Eisenstein

The panel rejects this argument by invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009). In Eisenstein, the issue was whether the United States was a “party” to a qui tam False Claims Act action where it had declined to intervene. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a party in those circumstances and that the relator was bound by the 30‑day appeal period, not 60 days.

Critically, the Court in Eisenstein observed:

“A person or entity can be named in the caption of a complaint without necessarily becoming a party to the action.” 556 U.S. at 935.

The Tenth Circuit quotes this language verbatim and uses it to emphasize that simply appearing in the case caption does not make an entity a party for appellate‑deadline purposes. Party status requires more—either intervention (as in Eisenstein) or, as relevant here, proper service of process and participation in the litigation.

3. Unserved Defendants Are Not “Parties”: Bristol

The panel also cites its own precedent, Bristol v. Fibreboard Corp., 789 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), for the principle that an unserved defendant is not considered a party:

“The Smiths have not shown they ever served any of the federal defendants, and we do not consider an unserved defendant to be a party, see Bristol v. Fibreboard Corp., 789 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).”

This is a critical doctrinal move. It dovetails with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: service of process is what brings a defendant into the case and subjects that defendant to the court’s jurisdiction. Until that occurs, a named individual or entity in the caption is, in effect, a placeholder—someone who could be a party, but is not yet.

4. The Court’s Treatment of the Smiths’ Service Assertions

The panel scrutinizes the Smiths’ contention that they served federal defendants, particularly the FBI. The Smiths stated that “served papers . . . were dropped off at the FBI [office in] Grand Junction,” and that federal defendants “failed to appear, failed to respond to a summons, and failed to defend themselves.”

The court responds bluntly:

“The quoted assertions are not a proper proof of service, and nothing we can do can construe them as such. The district court’s docket does not reflect service on any federal defendant, and our careful review does not reflect such service.”

Two points are embedded here:

1. Substance: Dropping papers off at a local FBI office does not satisfy the detailed requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) for serving the United States and its agencies. Proper service generally requires service on the U.S. Attorney for the district and mailing to the Attorney General, and for an agency, delivery to its chief officer or designated agent—not simply leaving papers at a field office.
2. Record‑based Decisionmaking: The appellate court looks to the official district court docket and filed proofs of service, not to litigants’ informal assertions in briefs. Without a proper proof of service on file, the court treats the federal entities as unserved.

On this record, the FBI, DEA, and unnamed federal agents were never served and thus never became parties. Therefore, the 60‑day appeal period in § 2107(b) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) does not apply.

5. Resulting Rule Clarified by Smith

Smith crystallizes the following practical rule for the Tenth Circuit:

Merely naming a federal agency or employee in the caption of a complaint does not trigger the 60‑day appeal period. Only properly served and participating federal defendants qualify as “parties” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(B).

This rule is consistent with Eisenstein and Bristol but applies them in a new factual setting involving unserved federal law‑enforcement defendants in a broad civil rights suit.

D. The Limited Role of FRAP 4(a)(5) and the Inability to Cure Jurisdictional Defects

Although the Tenth Circuit’s opinion focuses on the untimeliness of the appeal from the January 28 order, it is worth noting the role of FRAP 4(a)(5) in the background.

FRAP 4(a)(5)(A) permits the district court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal if:

1. A party moves “no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires”; and
2. The party shows “excusable neglect or good cause.”

Here, the district court held that the Smiths’ January 22, 2025 motion came too late relative to the original appeal period from the September 9, 2024 judgment, and that they failed to show excusable neglect or good cause in any event. The Tenth Circuit does not re‑examine those determinations because it never reaches the merits; it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal from that order itself.

Embedded in this procedural posture is an important reminder: even attempts to extend or reopen the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(5) (or 4(a)(6)) are themselves bounded by strict timing requirements, and appeals from the denial of such motions are subject to the same jurisdictional deadlines as any other appeal.

E. Rejection of Equitable Relief and “Mistake” Exceptions

1. The Smiths’ Equitable Pleas

The Smiths asked the Tenth Circuit to fashion some kind of “mistake exception” or grant “special permission,” arguing that all involved (court and parties) had in some sense been “in the wrong.” They made statements like:

• Asking “for a mistake exception to the rules” as a “remedy for all of us [court and parties] being in the wrong.”
• “Request[ing] special permission from the court of appeals.”

These requests essentially sought equitable leniency or a waiver of the jurisdictional deadline in light of the complexities and alleged confusion in the case.

2. Bowles Forecloses Equitable Exceptions

The panel’s response is categorical:

“To the extent the Smiths request this court create or apply an equitable exception to the filing deadline … we do not have the ability to do so. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (recognizing courts have ‘no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements’).”

Under Bowles, statutory time limits like those in § 2107 are jurisdictional, and courts cannot override them based on fairness, mistake, or reliance interests—even where the error is induced by the court itself (as in Bowles) or where litigants are pro se.

Smith thus reinforces the post‑Bowles landscape:

• No equitable tolling of § 2107 deadlines;
• No “unique circumstances” doctrine;
• No judicially created “mistake exception.”

The court of appeals simply lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely appeal, regardless of the equities.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)

Bowles is the key Supreme Court case defining the jurisdictional character of the civil notice‑of‑appeal deadline. Its core holdings:

• The time limits for filing an appeal in a civil case, as set forth in § 2107 and implemented in FRAP 4, are jurisdictional.
• Because they are jurisdictional, they cannot be waived, forfeited, or altered by courts, and are not subject to equitable tolling or “unique circumstances” exceptions.
• Even reliance on a district court’s erroneous order granting too long an extension does not justify jurisdiction over an otherwise untimely appeal.

Smith relies on Bowles for both the general jurisdictional rule and the rejection of equitable exceptions.

B. Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2020)

Bunn is a Tenth Circuit case that applied Bowles to dismiss an untimely appeal and contained the quoted statement that the court “routinely and uniformly” dismisses such appeals for lack of jurisdiction. It illustrates the Tenth Circuit’s consistent enforcement of § 2107 and FRAP 4.

By quoting Bunn, the Smith panel situates its decision within a stable line of circuit authority: there is no flexibility in civil appeal deadlines.

C. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009)

Eisenstein addressed whether the 60‑day period in FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) applies when the United States declines to intervene in a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act. The Supreme Court held it does not: the United States is not a “party” for purposes of Rule 4(a)(1)(B) in that scenario.

Two important propositions from Eisenstein are leveraged in Smith:

1. Being named in a complaint’s caption does not automatically mean one is a “party” to the case.
2. For the 60‑day appeal period to apply, the United States must actually be a party, i.e., actively participating in the litigation (e.g., by intervening, appearing, and being properly served).

Smith extends this reasoning to the context where—not only has the federal government not intervened—it has never even been properly served. In that circumstance, it plainly is not a party.

D. Bristol v. Fibreboard Corp., 789 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)

Bristol holds that unserved defendants are not treated as parties for purposes of determining finality and appealability. The Tenth Circuit has long recognized that mere naming of a defendant without service and participation does not create party status.

By citing Bristol, the panel in Smith ties that pre‑existing rule directly to the question of which appeal period applies: if a federal defendant has not been served, it is not a party, and the 60‑day period under § 2107(b) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) does not apply.

E. Statutes and Rules

• 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a): 30 days to appeal in civil cases.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b): 60 days to appeal when the United States, its agency, or its officer/employee is “one of the parties.”
• FRAP 4(a)(1)(A)–(B): Implements the 30‑day and 60‑day periods.
• FRAP 4(a)(5): Governs motions to extend time to appeal, including a separate 30‑day window after the original appeal period, and requires excusable neglect or good cause.
• FRAP 26(a)(1): Explains how to compute deadlines (excluding the trigger day, counting calendar days, etc.).
• FRAP 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1: Allow citation of unpublished/nonprecedential decisions for persuasive value.

The opinion also notes that it is “not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel,” but may be cited for persuasive value consistent with FRAP 32.1 and local Rule 32.1.

VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Jurisdiction” and Jurisdictional Deadlines

“Jurisdiction” means the court’s legal authority to hear and decide a case. A jurisdictional rule is one that, if violated, deprives the court of power to act. Unlike non‑jurisdictional rules:

• Jurisdictional rules cannot be waived or forfeited by the parties.
• Courts must enforce them even if no party objects.
• Equitable considerations cannot expand or modify them.

Because § 2107’s time limits are jurisdictional under Bowles, a notice of appeal filed after those limits leaves the court without authority to consider the appeal, no matter how compelling the underlying merits might be.

B. “Party” Status vs. Being Named in a Caption

A “party” to a lawsuit is a person or entity who is properly before the court—typically one who:

• Is named as a plaintiff or defendant; and
• Has been properly served (for defendants); or
• Has formally intervened or otherwise appeared; and
• Is subject to the court’s jurisdiction and bound by its judgments.

By contrast, someone may appear in the caption but not actually be a party because:

• They were never served with process, or
• They declined to intervene (as the U.S. in Eisenstein), or
• The caption simply lists them incorrectly or anticipatorily.

Smith applies this distinction in a concrete way: the FBI and DEA were named in the caption of the fourth amended complaint, but because they were never properly served and did not appear, they were not “parties” when calculating appellate deadlines.

C. Service of Process and Proof of Service

“Service of process” is the formal method of notifying a defendant of a lawsuit, usually by delivering the summons and complaint in a manner prescribed by law. Proper service is essential to:

• Establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and
• Make the defendant an actual party to the case.

For the United States and its agencies, service is more complex (see FRCP 4(i)): it generally requires serving the U.S. Attorney for the relevant district, mailing copies to the Attorney General, and sometimes serving the agency itself. Informal acts such as dropping papers at a field office do not satisfy these rules.

“Proof of service” is the document filed with the court showing when, where, and how a defendant was served, typically accompanied by an affidavit or declaration of the process server. Courts rely on the docketed proofs of service—not litigants’ later assertions—to determine whether service occurred.

D. Excusable Neglect and Good Cause (Rule 4(a)(5))

Although not decided on the merits in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, FRAP 4(a)(5) was central to the district court’s reasoning. It allows a district court to extend the appeal deadline if:

• The motion is filed “no later than 30 days after” the original appeal period ended; and
• The party shows “excusable neglect or good cause.”

“Excusable neglect” is a flexible concept that may account for a range of human errors (e.g., calendaring mistakes) but is assessed under a multi‑factor standard (danger of prejudice, length of delay, reason for delay, whether the movant acted in good faith). “Good cause” usually addresses circumstances where something outside the moving party’s control prevented timely filing.

However, even if excusable neglect or good cause exists, the court cannot grant an extension if the Rule 4(a)(5) motion itself is filed too late. That appears to have been the case with the Smiths’ January 22 motion to extend the appeal time from the original September 9 judgment.

E. The Non‑Precedential Nature of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit expressly notes:

“This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.”

In practical terms:

• Law of the case: The decision binds the parties in subsequent stages of the same litigation.
• Res judicata: The judgment has preclusive effect on later suits between the same parties involving the same claims.
• Collateral estoppel: Issues actually litigated and decided may be precluded in future litigation between the same parties.
• Persuasive value: Lawyers and courts may cite the opinion to suggest how the Tenth Circuit may handle similar issues, although it does not bind other panels.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Pro Se Litigants and Practitioners

Smith underscores several practical lessons:

1. Deadlines are unforgiving: Even meritorious or sympathetic cases will be dismissed if the notice of appeal is late. Litigants should aim to file well before the deadline.
2. Don’t assume the 60‑day period applies: The presence of “United States” or federal entities in the caption does not automatically grant a 60‑day appeal period. Counsel (and pro se litigants) must confirm that:
   • The federal parties were properly served; and
   • The record reflects their participation or at least their formal presence as parties.
3. Service on federal entities must follow Rule 4(i): Informal acts—like dropping papers at an FBI office—may not qualify. Failure to effect service can have critical downstream effects, including the loss of the extended appeal period.
4. ECF uploads don’t stop the clock: Beginning to upload a document before midnight on the last day is not enough; the filing must be completed and accepted by the system before the deadline.
5. Post‑deadline requests rarely help: Motions to extend the appeal time under FRAP 4(a)(5) are tightly time‑limited and cannot rescue appeals that fall outside the statutory framework.

B. For Multi‑Defendant and Government‑Related Litigation

In complex cases involving numerous defendants, especially overlapping state and federal entities, Smith offers the following doctrinal clarifications:

• Party status is specific and defendant‑by‑defendant: Some defendants may be parties (served and active), while others named in the caption may never properly enter the case. Appellate deadlines are calculated based on which defendants are actually parties.
• 60‑day rule is narrow: It applies only when the United States or a federal agency/officer is truly a party—something that depends on service and participation, not just naming in the caption.
• Finality and appealability: The presence of unserved defendants does not necessarily prevent entry of final judgment against the served ones, and unserved defendants do not transform the time to appeal.

C. For Courts and Clerks

Although oriented toward litigants, the opinion also implicitly guides courts:

• When confronted with a timeliness dispute regarding the 30‑day versus 60‑day appeal period, courts should examine the docket to confirm whether federal defendants were actually served and appeared.
• Courts should not credit bare assertions of service in briefs where the docket lacks proper proof.
• Nonprecedential opinions like Smith can be used to resolve recurring pro se issues with minimal need for extended published opinions, while still providing clear guidance.

D. Systemic Impact on Jurisdictional Doctrine

Smith is consistent with, and incrementally reinforces, the post‑Bowles trend toward strict separation between:

• Jurisdictional rules (which cannot be relaxed or waived); and
• Claims‑processing rules (which may sometimes be flexible).

By re‑emphasizing the jurisdictional nature of § 2107 and rejecting any equitable exception, the case helps maintain a clear boundary: once the statutory deadline passes without a notice of appeal, the appellate courts’ hands are tied.

VIII. Conclusion

Smith v. Sheriff’s Office is, on its surface, a straightforward dismissal of an untimely pro se appeal. Beneath that procedural outcome, however, the opinion offers a significant and precise clarification of how appellate deadlines interact with party status—especially in cases naming federal entities.

The key takeaways are:

1. The 30‑day deadline to file a notice of appeal in most civil cases is jurisdictional under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and Bowles. Missing it deprives the court of appeals of power to decide the case.
2. The 60‑day appeal period in § 2107(b) and FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) applies only when the United States or its agencies/officers are actually parties—meaning properly served, on the docket, and part of the litigation. Merely naming them in the caption is not enough.
3. Unserved defendants, including federal agencies, are not treated as parties for purposes of determining which appeal period applies, consistent with Bristol and Eisenstein.
4. Equitable pleas for “mistake exceptions,” “special permission,” or fairness‑based relief cannot overcome jurisdictional deadlines. Courts lack authority to create such exceptions under Bowles.
5. Technical difficulties with electronic filing, or misunderstandings about day‑counting rules, do not extend or alter these jurisdictional time limits.

While nonprecedential, Smith provides persuasive guidance in the Tenth Circuit regarding the strict enforcement of appellate deadlines and the limited circumstances under which the government’s presence in a lawsuit extends the time to appeal. It serves as a cautionary example for litigants—especially those proceeding pro se—that careful attention to service of process and to the appellate calendar is indispensable if they hope to obtain merits review of their claims.