Smith v. Municipality of Anchorage: Full Appellate Review of Municipal Campsite Abatements

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Alaska's decision in Gregory Smith, et al. v. Municipality of Anchorage clarifies the scope of superior court review over municipal “campsite abatement” actions under Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 15.20.020. The case arose when six individuals experiencing homelessness appealed the Municipality’s ten‐day “zone campsite abatement” notice in Davis Park. They challenged not only the sufficiency of the abatement notice but also argued that the removal of personal property without a meaningful hearing violated due process and, under certain theories, the Eighth Amendment.

Appellant Gregory Smith proceeded pro se, and the ACLU of Alaska participated as amicus curiae. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that its jurisdiction was confined to reviewing the notice’s legal form and placement, not the substantive propriety of the abatement. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve this jurisdictional question and to address whether the record assembled by the Municipality was adequate for meaningful review.

Summary of the Judgment

The Alaska Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Superior Court’s dismissal, holding:

Under AS 22.10.020(d) and longstanding precedent, superior courts have jurisdiction to entertain substantive appeals of municipal campsite abatement decisions—not merely challenges to the form of the notice.
The plain text of AMC 15.20.020(B)(15)(e) (“a posted notice … is a final administrative decision and appeals shall be to the superior court”) and the notice language itself confirm that the appeal attaches to the decision to abate, including constitutional and statutory claims.
Legislative history shows that when the Anchorage Assembly eliminated the intermediate administrative hearing (in response to Engle v. Municipality of Anchorage), it did not intend to narrow the scope of review but to streamline appeals directly to the Superior Court.
If the administrative record is insufficient for meaningful review, the Superior Court may order supplementation, remand for further agency proceedings, or conduct a de novo hearing.

The case was remanded for further consideration of the appellants’ constitutional challenges and for any steps needed to ensure an adequate record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Bethel Utilities Corp. v. City of Bethel (1989): Administrative decisions are presumptively judicially reviewable absent a clear legislative bar.
Keiner v. City of Anchorage (1963): “Administrative agency” jurisdiction extends to municipal councils performing administrative functions.
Engle v. Municipality of Anchorage (2011): Struck down the prior abatement‐appeal regime for due process deficiencies, prompting ordinance revision.
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State (1983): A decisional document must show the reasons for agency action, and courts may remand for supplementation of an inadequate record.
Fields v. Kodiak City Council (1981): Appeals require an administrative record that ties evidence to findings to allow for “substantial evidence” review.
Osborne v. State, Dept. of Corrections (2014) & Brandon v. State, Dept. of Corrections (1997): Limited appellate jurisdiction when appeals are not “provided by law” and only where an “adjudicative record” exists.
Martin v. City of Boise (9th Cir. 2019) & City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (2024): Eighth Amendment limits on criminalizing homelessness status—background to appellants’ state‐created danger/Eighth Amendment arguments.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in two main steps:

Scope of Superior Court Jurisdiction. AS 22.10.020(d) grants superior courts jurisdiction over administrative appeals “when appeal is provided by law.” AMC 15.20.020(B)(15)(e) expressly provides for appeal “to the superior court” from the final administrative decision embodied in the posted notice. Contrary to the Superior Court’s narrow reading, the phrase “final administrative decision” signals only when the 30‐day appeal clock begins, not a limitation to notice‐only review.
Legislative History and Ordinance Structure. The 2009–10 ordinance provided a full administrative hearing addressing two issues: (1) whether the campsite was unlawful, and (2) whether personal property could be disposed of as waste. Engle struck the process for failing to protect appellants’ due process rights. In 2011 the Assembly removed the two‐step hearing but did not intend to eliminate substantive review—rather, it channeled appeals directly to the Superior Court, trusting the courts’ expertise on constitutional and statutory issues.

On record sufficiency, the Court drew on Southeast Alaska Conservation Council and Fields, holding that if the existing record is too sparse for “meaningful appellate review,” the Superior Court may:

Order the Municipality to supplement the record with internal memoranda, findings, or factual materials.
Remand to the Municipality for further administrative proceedings and issuance of a reasoned decision.
Conduct a de novo trial on the issues raised.

Impact

This decision will reverberate in several ways:

Municipal Ordinance Drafting. Legislatures must draft abatement and appeal procedures that unambiguously preserve full judicial review of substantive and constitutional claims.
Due Process Protections. Individuals affected by property‐seizure ordinances will have clearer pathways to challenge both notice form and underlying legality, reinforcing procedural safeguards.
Administrative Recordkeeping. Agencies will need to maintain contemporaneous records—memoranda, findings, factual summaries—to support appellate review.
Homelessness and Property Rights. The decision underpins future challenges to campsite abatements, potentially affecting how municipalities manage public spaces and homeless encampments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Final Administrative Decision. The point at which an agency’s decision is firm enough that the appeal clock starts; not necessarily the notice itself.
Stay of Abatement. Temporarily halting enforcement (removal) while an appeal is pending, though the ordinance’s vestigial language allowed personal‐property removal even during a stay.
State‐Created Danger Doctrine. A theory that government entities can be liable when their actions place individuals in danger they would not otherwise face.
Adjudicative Proceeding. A process with notice, opportunity to present evidence, defined issues, and a final decision—necessary for meaningful judicial review when no statutory appeal exists.
Supplementing the Record. Adding documents or evidence after the fact so that a court can understand why and how an agency reached its decision.

Conclusion

The Smith decision marks a significant expansion of superior court oversight of municipal campsite abatements. It rejects any ordinance‐based restriction confining review to notice form, affirming that substantive and constitutional challenges—due process, property rights, Eighth Amendment theories—are within the court’s jurisdiction. It also underscores the necessity of a robust administrative record or, failing that, of judicial remedies such as record supplementation, remand, or de novo hearing to ensure meaningful appellate review. In the broader context, Smith strengthens the rule of law in municipal governance, safeguards individual rights, and guides agencies to adopt transparent, well‐documented decision-making processes.