Smart Study v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi: The Second Circuit Bars Email Service on Chinese Defendants Under the Hague Service Convention

I. Introduction

In Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, No. 24‑313 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted, for the first time at the circuit level, whether plaintiffs suing Chinese defendants may serve process by email when the Hague Service Convention applies. The answer is unequivocal: they may not.

The case arises out of a familiar modern scenario: a global intellectual property owner (Smart Study, creator of the “Baby Shark” franchise) suing dozens of Chinese-based e‑commerce merchants for alleged counterfeit sales through online marketplaces, including Amazon. Seeking swift relief and facing significant delays associated with formal Hague Convention service in China, Smart Study obtained an ex parte order authorizing email service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). After defaults were entered, two defendants challenged personal jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention. The district court agreed and ultimately dismissed as to the two remaining Chinese defendants for improper service.

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court held that:

• The Hague Service Convention creates an exclusive, closed set of permissible methods of service when it applies, and “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service.”
• Service by email on defendants in China is inconsistent with the Convention and thus prohibited when the Convention applies.
• Rule 4(f)(3) cannot be used to authorize email service when an international agreement (here, the Convention) prohibits it.
• Rule 4(f)(2) does not provide a backdoor to email service where there is already an “internationally agreed means” that governs.
• Article 15 of the Convention does not furnish an “urgency exception” allowing a default judgment as a “provisional or protective measure” absent valid service and personal jurisdiction.

This decision significantly constrains the widely used practice of email-only service on Chinese e‑commerce defendants in the Second Circuit and clarifies the relationship between the Hague Service Convention and Rule 4(f). It also sets a precedent likely to influence other circuits and reshape cross‑border IP enforcement strategy.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Hague Service Convention in General

The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”), concluded in 1965, was designed to “simplify, standardize, and generally improve the process of serving documents abroad.” It was ratified by the United States in 1969 and has been treated by the Supreme Court as governing service in all cases within its scope. Over 85 states are now parties.

Key structural features include:

• Central Authority (Art. 2–7): Each contracting state designates a Central Authority to receive requests for service from other states. That authority must serve documents either by methods allowed by its internal law or by requested methods compatible with that law (Art. 5), and must complete a certificate of service (Art. 6).
• Alternative channels (Arts. 8–10):
  • Art. 8: Service through diplomatic or consular agents, under conditions set by the Convention.
  • Art. 10: Where the state of destination does not object, the Convention “shall not interfere with the freedom” to use certain channels, including sending judicial documents “by postal channels, directly to persons abroad” (Art. 10(a)).
• Further flexibility (Arts. 11, 19):
  • Art. 11: States may agree by bilateral or multilateral arrangement to “channels of transmission other than those provided for” in the Convention.
  • Art. 19: The Convention does not affect a state’s internal law that permits methods “other than those provided for in the preceding Articles” for serving documents from abroad.
• Default judgments (Art. 15): Sets conditions under which a default judgment may be entered if no certificate of service has been received, and preserves a judge’s power, “in case of urgency,” to order “provisional or protective measures.”

China is a contracting state and has designated its Ministry of Justice as its Central Authority for Convention purposes. The opinion, relying on academic sources, notes that service through the Chinese Ministry of Justice can be “slow, if not impossible,” with delays of months or years and some instances of non‑cooperation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)

Rule 4(f) governs service of an individual in a foreign country. It offers three broad avenues:

1. Rule 4(f)(1): By any “internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention.”
2. Rule 4(f)(2): If there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, then by certain methods reasonably calculated to give notice (including as prescribed by the foreign country’s law, as directed by foreign authority, or by clerk-sent mail unless prohibited).
3. Rule 4(f)(3): “By other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.”

In short:

• If the Hague Service Convention applies, Rule 4(f)(1) points the litigant to the Convention’s mechanisms.
• Rule 4(f)(2) and 4(f)(3) are alternative routes only where:
  • No applicable international agreement exists, or
  • The agreement allows but does not specify other means, or
  • The Convention does not apply by its own terms (as when the address of the person to be served is unknown under Article 1).
• Any method under Rule 4(f)(3) must not be “prohibited by international agreement.”

C. Smart Study’s “Baby Shark” Litigation

Smart Study, based in Seoul, is the creator of “Baby Shark,” a globally popular children’s song and associated brand. It holds U.S. trademark rights in the Baby Shark marks and sells a wide array of licensed products. On July 6, 2021, Smart Study filed a sealed action in the Southern District of New York (Judge Gregory H. Woods) against fifty‑eight China-based companies, alleging:

• Trademark infringement under federal law;
• Copyright infringement;
• Federal unfair competition; and
• New York unfair competition.

The gravamen was that these defendants allegedly “manufactured, imported, exported, advertised, marketed, promoted, distributed, displayed, offered for sale and/or sold” counterfeit Baby Shark products through online platforms.

Smart Study sought:

• A temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against the sale of counterfeit goods;
• Ex parte authorization under Rule 4(f)(3) to serve all defendants by email.

The district court granted the TRO, the order to show cause for a preliminary injunction, and the ex parte motion authorizing email service. Using addresses obtained from Amazon, Smart Study served the defendants by email.

No defendant initially responded, and on July 30, 2021 the court entered a preliminary injunction barring counterfeit activity. Later, two defendants (YLILILY and Topivot) appeared and moved to dissolve the injunction, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service, because email service on Chinese defendants contravened the Hague Service Convention. Smart Study voluntarily dismissed those two defendants before the court ruled.

Smart Study then:

1. Obtained a clerk’s entry of default against the remaining defendants; and
2. Moved for default judgment.

D. The District Court’s Expert Consultation and Rulings

To address the service issue in a technically complex area of international civil procedure, the district court took the unusual step of appointing a disinterested legal adviser: Professor Benjamin Liebman of Columbia Law School, an expert in Chinese law. Smart Study submitted its own expert declaration from a Hong Kong‑based partner at Allen & Overy.

In a July 2022 order (Smart Study Co. v. Acuteye‑Us, 620 F. Supp. 3d 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)), the district court held:

• The Hague Service Convention applied to the Chinese defendants whose addresses were known or could reasonably be ascertained.
• The Convention did not permit service by email on defendants located in China.
• Because service was improper, the court lacked personal jurisdiction and could not enter a default judgment.

Smart Study appealed, but that first appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, because the order denying default judgment was not a final judgment. Smart Study then re‑approached the issue by filing a renewed motion for partial default judgment.

In that renewed motion, Smart Study argued:

• The Convention did not apply to 49 defendants because, despite diligent efforts, their physical addresses could not be discovered (Article 1 of the Convention excludes cases where the defendant’s address is “not known”).
• As to those defendants, email service authorized by the court was sufficient under Rule 4(f)(3), and default judgment should issue.

The district court accepted that distinction, entered default judgment against those 49 defendants, awarded $2,450,000 in statutory damages, and permanently enjoined those defendants from further infringement.

However, for the two remaining defendants—Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi and Changgesshangmaoyouxiangongsi (the Defendants‑Appellees in this appeal)—Smart Study ultimately conceded that their physical addresses were likely accurate and ascertainable. The court ordered Smart Study to show cause why the action should not be dismissed against them for failure to serve in compliance with Rule 4(f) and the Hague Convention.

Smart Study contended again that:

• The Convention did not prohibit email service and therefore email service was valid under Rule 4(f)(3); or
• Alternatively, email service was valid under Rule 4(f)(2)(A) because Chinese law allegedly allowed such service.

The district court rejected these arguments, adhered to its prior reasoning, and dismissed the claims against the two Defendants‑Appellees, without prejudice, for lack of proper service. Smart Study appealed that final judgment, creating the appeal now under review.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Holding

The Second Circuit (Judge Sullivan, joined by Judges Parker and Bianco) affirmed the dismissal. Core conclusions:

1. The Hague Service Convention precludes email service on Chinese defendants when the Convention applies.
   The Convention establishes specific, “approved methods of service” and “pre-empts inconsistent methods.” Email is not among the Convention’s methods and is inconsistent with the treaty’s closed system of service. It is therefore prohibited.
2. Rule 4(f)(3) cannot be used to circumvent the Convention.
   Because email service is “prohibited by international agreement” (the Convention), courts may not authorize it as “other means” under Rule 4(f)(3).
3. Rule 4(f)(2) does not apply where there is already an “internationally agreed means” governing service.
   Rule 4(f)(2) is a fallback provision that only applies if there is no international agreement, or if such an agreement allows but does not specify other means. The Hague Service Convention is an applicable “internationally agreed means,” so Rule 4(f)(2) cannot be invoked to justify email service in China.
4. Article 15 of the Convention does not create an “urgency exception” permitting final default judgment in the absence of valid service.
   While Article 15 authorizes “provisional or protective measures” in urgent cases, Smart Study did not show that entry of default judgment is such a measure or that it could bypass the jurisdictional requirement of proper service.
5. Because service was improper, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction and correctly refused default judgment and dismissal was proper.

The decision is explicitly characterized as resolving “an issue of first impression” in the Second Circuit regarding email service under the Hague Service Convention for defendants located in China.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Supreme Court Cases on the Hague Service Convention

1. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988)

Schlunk is the foundational Supreme Court case on the Hague Service Convention. It held:

• The Convention applies “only when there is occasion to transmit a judicial document for service abroad.”
• When applicable, compliance with the Convention is “mandatory.”
• The Convention’s objective is to provide “simple and certain means” to serve process abroad and to “assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions will receive actual and timely notice of suit.”

The Second Circuit relies on Schlunk’s statement that the Convention “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service” to support a closed‑universe reading: if a method is not authorized or accommodated within the Convention’s framework, it is effectively prohibited when the treaty applies.

2. Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271 (2017)

In Water Splash, the Court addressed whether Article 10(a)’s reference to sending documents “by postal channels” permits service by mail. It held:

• Article 10(a) does allow service by mail, but only if:
  • The state of destination has not objected to Article 10; and
  • Service by mail is authorized by otherwise applicable law.
• The Convention does not itself “affirmatively authorize” service by all conceivable means; rather, it allows certain methods and pre‑empts inconsistent ones.

The Second Circuit draws two critical points from Water Splash:

1. The Convention “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service wherever it applies.”
2. Article 10(a) is an example of the Convention’s framework for expanding permissible methods (like mail) where not objected to by the state of destination—but that expansion is still within the treaty’s textual structure.

By analogy, email is neither textually referenced nor embedded in the Convention’s framework; thus, it falls outside the sphere of permitted methods unless validated by bilateral arrangements (Art. 11) or domestic law preserved by Art. 19.

B. Other Supreme Court Authorities

• Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) — Cited to articulate the constitutional due process standard: a method of service must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise” the defendant of the action. This standard applies particularly when the Convention does not apply (e.g., because the defendant’s address is unknown).
• United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999) — Quoted for the proposition that “shall” is mandatory, supporting the view that the Convention’s procedural prescriptions are obligatory, not merely hortatory.
• Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) — Cited for the interpretive principle that structural choices in a statute (or treaty) are presumed deliberate. Used here to give weight to Articles 11 and 19 as confirming the closed structure of the Convention’s approved methods of service.

C. Second Circuit Procedural Authorities

• Thompson v. Maldonado, 309 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2002) — Supplies the standard of review: dismissals for improper service are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• Kaplan v. Bank Saderat PLC, 77 F.4th 110 (2d Cir. 2023) — Defines abuse of discretion as a decision reflecting error of law, clearly erroneous factual findings, or a judgment outside the range of permissible options.
• Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2005) — Cited for the proposition that a default judgment entered without valid service is void under Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
• Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2010) — Confirms that courts, when considering default judgments, may sua sponte dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

D. District Court and Other Lower‑Court Authorities

• Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus. Co., 312 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) — An S.D.N.Y. case holding that “postal channels” in Article 10(a) do not include email.
• Elobied v. Baylock, 299 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Pa. 2014) — Cited as an example of a district court that has interpreted “postal channels” in Article 10(a) broadly enough that it “might be interpreted” to include email, although the Second Circuit does not adopt that view.
• Anova Applied Elecs., Inc. v. Hong King Grp., Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 465 (D. Mass. 2020) and Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule ‘A’, 391 F. Supp. 3d 816 (N.D. Ill. 2019) — Used to illustrate how allowing email service under the Convention would render slower, more costly treaty mechanisms effectively obsolete and encourage circumvention.
• Zobay v. MTN Grp. Ltd., No. 21‑cv‑3505, 2024 WL 4664675 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024) and Schluter Sys., L.P. v. Sanven Corp., No. 22‑cv‑155, 2023 WL 130888 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2023) — Cited as examples of prolonged delays and high costs associated with attempting service through China’s Central Authority.

E. Academic and Treatise Sources

• 4B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1133 — Describes Rule 4(f)(2) as a fallback when “internationally agreed process methods are not intended to be exclusive or when no international agreement is applicable,” supporting the Second Circuit’s treatment of 4(f)(2) as subordinate to the Convention where it applies.
• 14 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 8 (2016) — Emphasizes that the Hague Convention “establishes a specific mechanism” and allows “other specified methods in certain circumstances,” emphasizing the limited, enumerated nature of alternative methods.
• Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 941 (2017) — Quoted for the observation that “unless the Convention does not apply by its own terms, any method of service not approved by the Convention is effectively prohibited under Rule 4(f)(3).”
• Guangjian Tu, Service of Process (Documents) in International Civil and Commercial Proceedings: A Critical Review of the Chinese Approach, 13 Chinese J. Int’l L. 577 (2014) — Discusses China’s designation of its Ministry of Justice as Central Authority.
• Jesse M. Fried & Ehud Kamar, China and the Rise of Law‑Proof Insiders, 48 J. Corp. L. 215 (2023) — Describes the difficulties and delays of service through China’s Ministry of Justice, famously dubbing it “The Great Legal Wall of China.”
• Lei Zhu, Made in China, Sued in the U.S.: The Exploitation of Civil Procedure in Cross‑Border E‑Commerce Trademark Infringement Cases, 34 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 139 (2023) — Cited regarding the prevalence of Chinese‑sourced counterfeits and China’s limited regulatory effectiveness, contextualizing why plaintiffs often seek expedited alternative service.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Does the Hague Service Convention Permit Email Service on Chinese Defendants?

1. The “postal channels” debate under Article 10(a)

The Court first acknowledges that the Convention was drafted in 1965 and does not mention email. Article 10(a), however, allows—subject to non‑objection by the state of destination—the “freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.” The opinion notes:

• Some courts have interpreted “postal channels” to potentially include email.
• Others (including S.D.N.Y. in Sulzer Mixpac) have held that “postal channels” refers solely to physical mail, not electronic communications.

The Second Circuit deliberately sidesteps the need to resolve that debate. It points out that China has objected to Article 10 methods altogether (“service by the methods provided by Article 10 of the Convention”). Thus:

• If “postal channels” do include email, China’s objection forecloses email.
• If “postal channels” do not include email, email is not authorized by Article 10(a) at all.

Either way, Article 10(a) cannot be a vehicle for email service on defendants in China.

2. The Convention as a closed universe of methods

The more fundamental move in the Court’s reasoning is to treat the Convention as creating a closed set of permitted methods, such that “methods not created by the Convention” are not “appropriate” when the treaty applies. The Court grounds this view in:

• Preamble language: The Convention’s first objective is “to create appropriate means” for service abroad. The Court infers that appropriateness, within the scope of the Convention, attaches to methods the Convention “creates” or specifies.
• Mandatory language in the Articles: Repeated use of “shall” (e.g., “Each Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority”; the Central Authority “shall itself serve the document”; it “shall complete a certificate”) underscores that the treaty’s procedural framework is obligatory, not illustrative.
• Supreme Court characterization: Schlunk and Water Splash describe the Convention as providing “simple and certain means” and “pre-empt[ing] inconsistent methods of service wherever it applies.”
• Articles 11 and 19: These provisions allow:
  • Bilateral or multilateral agreements between states to adopt “channels of transmission other than those provided for” in the Convention (Art. 11); and
  • Domestic law that “permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding Articles” to continue to operate (Art. 19).

The Court reasons that Articles 11 and 19 would be superfluous if parties already had the freedom to adopt any method of service not explicitly mentioned in the Convention. Their very existence presupposes that, absent such bilateral agreements or domestic laws preserved by Article 19, methods not provided for in the Convention are not allowed.

Thus, even if Article 10(a) does not itself address email, the treaty’s structure and purpose mean that unenumerated methods like email are off‑limits unless:

• Two states agree on such methods under Article 11; or
• The state’s domestic law (preserved by Article 19) clearly opens the door to such methods, and their application can be reconciled with the Convention.

No such agreement or domestic-law exception was shown here.

3. Why email is “inconsistent” with the Convention

The Court characterizes email service as “inconsistent” with the Convention for at least two reasons:

• Practical circumvention: If email were allowed whenever the Convention applies, there would be no incentive to use slower and more expensive methods like Central Authority service. Plaintiffs would circumvent the treaty wholesale, undermining its carefully negotiated structure.
• Textual design: The Convention provides specific mechanisms and specific avenues for expanding or supplementing them. Allowing unlimited extra‑treaty methods simply because they are not expressly forbidden would “render meaningless its ‘approved methods of service’” and invite end‑runs around the bargain the Convention represents.

The Court thus holds that email is a method “inconsistent” with the Convention within the meaning of Water Splash and Schlunk.

B. Rule 4(f)(3) and the “exigent circumstances” theory

Rule 4(f)(3) allows service “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.” Smart Study contended that:

• Rule 4(f)(3) could, in “exigent circumstances,” function as an “alternative to compliance” with the Convention.
• The urgency associated with ongoing infringement and the practical futility of seeking service through China’s Central Authority justified email service under 4(f)(3).

The Second Circuit rejects these arguments:

• No text-based urgency exception: Rule 4(f)(3) contains no language about exigency or urgency. It simply requires that methods not be “prohibited by international agreement.”
• Direct conflict with the Convention: Because the Hague Service Convention does prohibit inconsistent methods (including email) when it applies, a court cannot authorize email service under 4(f)(3) without violating the Rule’s own limitation.
• No extraordinary circumstances shown: The Court notes that since filing, Smart Study’s own Beijing counsel concluded the physical addresses were likely accurate—meaning the Convention squarely applied. Even if Hague service might prove difficult or unlikely to succeed, “compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies.”

In sum, Rule 4(f)(3) is not a flexible override of the Convention; it operates only in the space the Convention leaves open. Here, there was no such space.

C. Rule 4(f)(2) as a fallback — and why it does not apply

Smart Study alternatively invoked Rule 4(f)(2)(A), which allows service “as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction,” but only:

“if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means.”

The Second Circuit, echoing Wright & Miller, emphasizes that Rule 4(f)(2) is a fallback for situations where:

• No applicable treaty mechanism exists (e.g., service in a non‑Hague state), or
• A treaty explicitly allows additional methods but does not specify them, leaving room for domestic law to fill the gap.

Because the Hague Service Convention is an “internationally agreed means” that applies to China, Rule 4(f)(2) is not triggered. The Court underscores that Smart Study cannot use 4(f)(2) to bypass a treaty that is both applicable and mandatory.

The opinion notes that the district court discussed 4(f)(2)(C) rather than 4(f)(2)(A), but characterizes this as a “distinction without a difference,” because 4(f)(2) in its entirety is conditioned on the absence of, or gap within, an applicable international agreement. That precondition fails here.

D. Article 15 and the attempt to justify default judgment

Smart Study also invoked Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention, which:

• Allows default judgments where no certificate of service has been received if certain conditions are met (e.g., at least six months have elapsed, reasonable efforts to obtain the certificate have been made, and the document was transmitted by a Convention-approved method).
• States that “each Contracting State shall be free to apply” a rule that a judge may, in case of urgency, order “provisional or protective measures” even if no certificate of service has been received.

Smart Study characterized default judgment as a kind of “provisional or protective measure” justified by urgency (ongoing infringement) and argued that Article 15 therefore allowed the court to proceed despite defects in service.

The Second Circuit rejects this theory:

• Smart Study failed to explain how a final default judgment fits the concept of “provisional or protective” relief, which typically connotes interim measures (like preliminary injunctions, asset freezes, or preservation orders), not final adjudication on the merits.
• Nothing in Article 15 suggests that urgency can override the fundamental requirement of proper service as a predicate to personal jurisdiction.
• Absent compelling authority treating default judgment as a permissible provisional measure under Article 15, the Court declines to stretch the text so far.

Thus, the district court’s refusal to enter default judgment is well within the range of permissible choices, particularly given the jurisdictional nature of the service defect.

E. Acknowledging practical difficulties but enforcing the treaty

The Court closes its analysis by expressly recognizing:

• The pervasive problem of counterfeiting in China and cross‑border e‑commerce;
• The Chinese authorities’ slow and sometimes uncooperative approach to serving foreign lawsuits;
• The strong practical incentive for IP owners to seek expedited relief using modern communication methods like email.

Nonetheless, the Court underscores that:

• The Hague Service Convention was not designed to make service in China as “efficient and fast as domestic service.”
• Where the Convention applies, its procedures must be followed; litigants cannot simply opt for more convenient alternatives.
• Smart Study did not even attempt Convention service on these defendants, making it impossible to argue that they had exhausted the treaty’s mechanisms or that those mechanisms had proved futile.

Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing for lack of proper service and declining default judgment.

VI. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

A. The Hague Service Convention’s “Central Authority” Mechanism

Each Convention state must designate a Central Authority. In practice:

1. The plaintiff (via its own state’s competent authority) sends a request for service, along with the summons and complaint, to the Central Authority of the state where the defendant is located.
2. The Central Authority serves the defendant according to local procedural law or pursuant to a method specified by the requesting party that is compatible with local law.
3. The Central Authority returns a certificate of service specifying how and when service was effected or explaining why it was not.

This mechanism is mandatory when the defendant’s address is known and the defendant resides in a Convention state.

B. “Internationally agreed means” and preemption

Under Rule 4(f)(1), when there is an “internationally agreed means of service” (like the Hague Service Convention), that means becomes the primary mode of service. The Supreme Court has held that:

• Such conventions pre-empt inconsistent domestic methods where they apply.
• Only methods allowed within the treaty’s framework—either explicitly (e.g., Central Authority, diplomatic/consular service, certain postal service) or via Articles 11/19—are permissible under Rule 4(f)(1).

Any attempt to authorize an inconsistent method (like email to China) under Rule 4(f)(3) runs into the textual limitation: such methods must not be “prohibited by international agreement.”

C. Default Judgment and Void Judgments Under Rule 60(b)(4)

A default judgment is a judgment entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend. However, a basic principle of U.S. civil procedure is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction—i.e., without valid service or waiver of service—is void.

Rule 60(b)(4) allows a party to move to set aside a judgment that is “void.” The Second Circuit’s prior decision in Burda Media confirms that:

• Insufficient service of process means the court never acquired personal jurisdiction.
• A default judgment entered in such circumstances must be vacated as void.

This is why courts, as in Sinoying Logistics, may and should examine personal jurisdiction and service propriety before granting default judgment. The Hague Convention’s requirements go directly to that jurisdictional inquiry.

D. Letters Rogatory and Letters of Request

Though not central to the holding, Rule 4(f)(2)(B) references service as directed “in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request.” These are formal, diplomatic or judicial communications by which one court asks another country’s court or authority to perform judicial acts, such as serving documents or taking evidence. They are traditional tools of transnational judicial assistance, often slow and formal, but recognized mechanisms where treaties do not supply direct procedures.

E. Article 1 and “Unknown Address” Exception

Article 1 of the Hague Service Convention states that the Convention applies “in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad,” but it “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.”

This creates an important carve‑out:

• If the defendant’s physical address is reasonably ascertainable, the Convention applies, and its mechanisms are mandatory.
• If, after diligent inquiry, the address is truly unknown, the Convention does not apply, and service may proceed via Rule 4(f)(2) or 4(f)(3), subject to due process (Mullane).

The district court used this feature to distinguish between:

• Defendants whose addresses could not be discovered—against whom default judgment was allowed after email service; and
• The two Defendants‑Appellees, whose addresses were eventually conceded to be accurate and known—bringing them squarely within the Convention and its restrictions.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Immediate Impact on IP and E‑Commerce Litigation in the Second Circuit

This decision has substantial implications for a class of cases that has become common in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York: large‑scale “Schedule A” lawsuits against dozens or hundreds of Chinese‑based online sellers accused of selling counterfeit goods through marketplaces like Amazon and other platforms.

Key consequences:

• Email‑only service on known Chinese addresses is no longer viable in the Second Circuit where the Hague Convention applies.
• Rule 4(f)(3) orders authorizing email service to China are invalid if the defendant’s address is known or reasonably discoverable and no Hague‑compliant service (or treaty‑consistent alternative) has been attempted.
• Default judgments obtained solely on the basis of email service against Chinese defendants with known addresses will be susceptible to later collateral attack (e.g., under Rule 60(b)(4)) if those defendants appear and challenge jurisdiction.
• Litigation timelines and costs will increase for IP owners seeking relief against Chinese infringers, because they must:
  • Either proceed through China’s Central Authority under the Hague Convention; or
  • Demonstrate that the address is unknown (so that the Convention does not apply) before using 4(f)(3) alternatives.

In practice, litigants may now:

• Invest more in investigatory efforts to show that certain defendants’ addresses are unknown, thus staying outside the Convention.
• Seek to identify domestic agents or U.S.-based affiliates to serve within the United States (obviating the need for foreign service).
• Be more selective in naming defendants, focusing on those where service can realistically be achieved.

B. Impact on District Court Practice and Prior Email‑Service Orders

Before this decision, some district courts, including in S.D.N.Y., had been relatively open to email service on Chinese defendants under Rule 4(f)(3), sometimes reasoning that:

• The Hague Convention did not expressly forbid email; or
• Email was not “service abroad” within the Convention’s meaning; or
• China’s objection to Article 10 did not extend to email.

The Second Circuit’s opinion undercuts those lines of reasoning by:

• Adopting a clear statement that the Convention “pre-empts inconsistent methods” and that email service in China is inconsistent.
• Emphasizing that the Convention’s approved methods form a closed universe, except where Articles 11 or 19 (or non‑applicability under Art. 1) come into play.
• Rejecting a purely “negative prohibition” reading—that anything not expressly forbidden by the Convention is permissible under Rule 4(f)(3).

District courts in the Second Circuit will now be bound by this interpretation. Prior precedents or practices authorizing email service on Chinese defendants despite known physical addresses will have to be revisited.

C. Influence on Other Circuits and Potential for National Split

Because this is an issue of first impression at the circuit level, other circuits may look to Smart Study as highly persuasive authority when confronting similar questions. Some district courts nationwide have taken more permissive stances toward email service under the Hague Convention, particularly in the e‑commerce counterfeiting context. The Second Circuit’s reasoning—grounded firmly in Supreme Court precedent, treaty text, and structure—may push other circuits toward a more restrictive, treaty‑faithful interpretation.

If other circuits adopt a materially different reading (e.g., by holding that email is permissible absent express treaty prohibition), a circuit split could emerge, potentially inviting Supreme Court review. For now, the Second Circuit’s approach stands as a strong textualist model, emphasizing treaty obligations over convenience.

D. Broader Doctrinal Significance for Rule 4(f)(3)

The decision also refines the understanding of Rule 4(f)(3):

• Not a “free‑floating” catch‑all: Rule 4(f)(3) is not a broad equitable license to authorize any method deemed efficient and reasonably calculated to give notice. It is constrained by international agreements, including the Hague Convention.
• Subsidiary to treaties: Courts must first determine whether an applicable treaty governs. Only if the treaty does not apply (e.g., unknown address) or affirmatively allows but does not specify other methods can 4(f)(3) fill gaps.
• Due process is necessary but not sufficient: Even if email is “reasonably calculated” to provide notice (satisfying Mullane), it may still be impermissible if treaty‑inconsistent.

For litigants, this means that creative service strategies under 4(f)(3) must be vetted for treaty compliance, not just for due process sufficiency.

E. Encouraging Diplomatic or Legislative Solutions

The Court’s strict adherence to the treaty implicitly channels the pressure created by cross‑border e‑commerce into:

• Diplomatic initiatives under Article 11, where states could negotiate bilateral protocols recognizing modern methods like email or platform‑based notice as valid channels of service.
• Domestic law reforms under Article 19, if China (or other states) choose to adopt more liberal internal rules on service from abroad and make them known to other contracting states.
• Platform‑level solutions, where marketplaces could require merchants to designate U.S. agents for service or consent to service through the platform’s messaging system, which could transform some service into domestic service not governed by the Convention.

Until such changes occur, however, courts must apply the Convention as written and interpreted by binding Supreme Court and circuit precedent.

VIII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Smart Study v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi establishes a clear and significant precedent in the Second Circuit:

1. Where the Hague Service Convention applies (i.e., the defendant’s address is known, and the defendant is in a Convention state), its mechanisms are mandatory, and it “pre‑empts inconsistent methods of service.”
2. Email service on Chinese defendants with known addresses is inconsistent with the Convention and therefore prohibited.
3. Rule 4(f)(3) cannot be used to authorize a method of service that an applicable international agreement forbids or pre‑empts.
4. Rule 4(f)(2) is a fallback provision that does not displace an existing, applicable international agreement.
5. Article 15 of the Convention does not create a broad “urgency exception” that would permit entry of a final default judgment without proper service.

Doctrinally, the case reinforces a treaty‑faithful, text‑ and structure‑based approach to the Hague Service Convention, emphasizing that:

• The Convention is not merely a suggestion; it is a binding international commitment that shapes and limits the permissible methods of foreign service under U.S. law.
• Modern practical challenges, including rampant cross‑border counterfeiting and slow foreign bureaucracies, cannot justify unilateral departures from treaty obligations.

Practically, the decision will compel IP owners and other plaintiffs in the Second Circuit to rethink service strategies against Chinese and other Hague‑state defendants, investing more in Hague‑compliant service, in identifying domestic agents, or in carefully documenting when addresses are genuinely unknown so that the Convention does not apply.

In the broader legal landscape, Smart Study is likely to serve as a leading authority on the interaction between the Hague Service Convention and Rule 4(f), especially in the context of email service and cross‑border e‑commerce disputes, and may shape how other circuits approach these increasingly common procedural questions.