Small v. Woods: A Seventh-Circuit Blueprint for Overcoming AEDPA Barriers When State Courts Misread the Record

Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dante Small v. Ryan Woods (No. 23-1397, July 29 2025) addresses a recurring yet rarely clarified problem in federal habeas practice: What happens when a state post-conviction court summarily rejects an ineffective-assistance claim because it misreads or oversimplifies the plea-stage record?

Dante Small, convicted in Cook County of battering one police officer and attempting to murder two others with his car, alleged that his trial lawyer wildly under-stated his sentencing exposure (telling him 6–30 years instead of the mandatory 40–160). He said he would have taken a plea offer of 10 years had he been properly advised. The Illinois courts denied relief without a hearing, relying on a confusing pre-trial transcript suggesting a 20-year offer that Small had rejected.

On federal habeas review, the Northern District of Illinois also refused a hearing, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the state court had made an “unreasonable determination of fact” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) when it concluded the record completely contradicted Small’s claim. The panel ordered a limited remand for an evidentiary hearing, clarifying how federal courts should navigate AEDPA when state fact-finding goes awry.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rovner, Jackson-Akiwumi, Maldonado, JJ.) held that the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably determined facts when it inferred from a single transcript that Small necessarily understood the mandatory consecutive nature of his sentences.
Because that misreading infected both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis, § 2254(d)’s deference dropped away.
The district court further erred in denying an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2); Small had diligently attempted to develop the record, and his proffered facts—if true—could entitle him to relief.
The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for a focused evidentiary hearing, expressly taking no position on ultimate habeas relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – The touchstone for ineffective-assistance claims. The court reiterated that both deficient performance and prejudice must be shown, and that bad plea advice can satisfy both.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) – Defines “fail[ure] to develop” a record under § 2254(e)(2). The Seventh Circuit applied Williams to conclude that Small was diligent: he requested a hearing, attached sworn statements, and explained missing exhibits.
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) and progeny – Framed the exhaustion requirement. The State argued default because Small altered his plea-offer theory (10- vs 20-year offer). The panel disagreed, relying on Brown v. Eplett, 48 F.4th 543 (7th Cir. 2022) to show that the “core substance” of the claim remained intact.
People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1997) – Illinois precedent mandating counsel to advise clients of consecutive sentencing exposure. The panel’s reading of the pre-trial exchange hinged on the parties’ reference to “Curry admonishments.”
Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2007) and Pidgeon v. Smith, 785 F.3d 1165 (7th Cir. 2015) – Both confirm that misadvice on sentencing exposure at the plea stage violates Strickland.

Legal Reasoning

Unreasonable Determination of Fact (§ 2254(d)(2)).
• The state court treated a confused transcript as conclusive proof that Small knew a 20-year minimum applied.
• But the transcript never referenced mandatory consecutiveness or the compounded 40-year floor.
• Thus, finding the record “contradicted” Small’s claim was objectively unreasonable.
Dissolving AEDPA Deference.
Once the factual determination was deemed unreasonable, the federal court could revisit the merits de novo (citing Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2013)). That opened the door to the possibility of defective plea advice.
Entitlement to an Evidentiary Hearing.
• § 2254(e)(2) blocks hearings only when the petitioner was not diligent in state court. Small had tried: sworn petition, grievance explaining confiscated affidavits, repeated hearing requests.
• His allegations—misadvice that changed the plea decision—would, if proven, satisfy both Strickland prongs (deficiency + prejudice).
• Therefore, a federal hearing was mandatory under circuit precedent (Avila v. Richardson, 751 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2014)).

Impact of the Judgment

Guidance on § 2254(d)(2) Litigants. The opinion offers a structured roadmap for showing how a state court’s limited look at the record can be “unreasonable,” thus unlocking federal review.
Plea-Stage Ineffective Assistance. Reinforces that inaccurate advice on mandatory consecutive sentencing—especially where minimums stack dramatically—can satisfy Strickland.
Diligence Standard under § 2254(e)(2). Clarifies that pro se petitioners who explain missing affidavits, produce grievances, and repeatedly request hearings are “diligent,” even without the actual evidence in hand.
Practical Effect for District Courts. Signals that denying hearings based on transcript snippets or incomplete factual assumptions risks reversal; judges must parse whether the state fact-finding genuinely confronted the contested issue (here, consecutive sentencing).
State-Court Practice. Encourages Illinois trial and appellate courts to ensure clear records on plea discussions and consecutive ranges, lest their decisions be unraveled in federal court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

AEDPA Deference (§ 2254(d)): Federal courts must defer to state court merits decisions unless they are (1) contrary to or unreasonable applications of Supreme Court precedent, or (2) based on unreasonable fact findings.
§ 2254(e)(2) Evidentiary Hearing Bar: Even if deference drops away, a federal court cannot hold a new hearing if the petitioner was not “diligent” in state court—unless the bar is lifted by showing diligence or satisfying narrow exceptions.
Unreasonable Determination of Fact: A finding so against the weight of the evidence that no fair-minded jurist could reach it; not mere error, but objectively unreasonable.
Strickland Deficiency vs. Prejudice: Deficiency = lawyer’s performance fell below professional norms; Prejudice = reasonable probability result would have been different (e.g., defendant would have taken a plea) but for the error.
Curry Admonishment: In Illinois, a trial judge’s inquiry (post-People v. Curry) to confirm a defendant understands sentencing ranges and any plea offer before trial proceeds.

Conclusion

Small v. Woods is more than a routine remand; it is a clarion call reminding courts that AEDPA deference is not blind deference. When state courts gloss over critical facts—here, the mandatory consecutive nature of sentences—federal courts must intervene, provide hearings, and protect the integrity of plea bargaining and the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Future habeas petitioners now have a sharpened tool for demonstrating both the unreasonableness of state fact-finding and their own diligence in seeking to correct it.