Slander Limitations: W.T. Farley, Inc. v. Bufkin Establishes Boundaries of Actionable Per Se Defamation

Slander Limitations: W.T. Farley, Inc. v. Bufkin Establishes Boundaries of Actionable Per Se Defamation

Introduction

W.T. Farley, Inc., et al. v. Bufkin, adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1931, is a seminal case in defamation law, particularly concerning the boundaries of actionable per se slander. The appellants, W.T. Farley, Inc. and others, faced allegations from the appellee, Bufkin, who claimed that abusive and insulting language used by a company collector constituted slander. This case delves into whether certain defamatory statements qualify as actionable per se or require proof of special damages.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed an appeal from the circuit court of Warren County, where Bufkin had sued W.T. Farley, Inc. for slander. The central issue was whether the derogatory language used by the company's collector was actionable per se, thereby negating the need for Bufkin to prove special damages. The lower court had instructed the jury to find in favor of Bufkin, awarding her damages. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, determining that the language in question did not fall within the recognized categories of actionable per se slander and that special damages had not been adequately demonstrated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references precedents to delineate the boundaries of actionable per se slander. Cases such as Davis v. Farrington, Cocke v. Weathersby, and Bindfield v. Howeth were utilized to underscore the necessity of defamatory statements falling within specific harmful categories to be actionable without the need for special damages. These precedents collectively establish that mere insults or general abusive language do not suffice for per se slander unless they imply severe misconduct or defamation directly impacting the individual's reputation or professional standing.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning hinged on the established classifications of slanderious statements that are actionable per se. These classifications include statements imputing criminal offenses involving moral turpitude, the existence of contagious diseases, unfitness for office, lack of integrity in professional capacities, and, specifically for females, a lack of chastity. The appellate court found that the language used by the collector—calling Bufkin a "crook," "liar," and stating "you are not ladies"—did not align with these categories. Therefore, without evidence of special damages resulting from these statements, the slander claim could not sustain a judgment.

Impact

This judgment clarifies the stringent requirements for defamation claims to be considered actionable per se. It emphasizes that not all defamatory statements equate to slander unless they pertain to inherently damaging categories that inherently harm an individual's reputation or professional standing. Consequently, this case serves as a caution for plaintiffs to meticulously establish the nature of defamatory statements and the resultant damages. For legal practitioners, it underscores the importance of aligning defamation claims with recognized actionable per se categories to succeed in litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Actionable Per Se Defamation

Actionable per se defamation refers to defamatory statements deemed harmful enough that the plaintiff does not need to prove actual damages to seek legal remedy. These statements inherently damage a person's reputation, such as falsely accusing someone of a crime.

Special Damages

Special damages are specific losses that a plaintiff must prove resulted directly from the defamatory statements, such as lost wages or medical expenses. Unlike actionable per se defamation, claims requiring special damages need demonstrable proof of these specific harms.

Conclusion

The W.T. Farley, Inc. v. Bufkin judgment serves as a pivotal reference in defamation law, delineating the parameters that separate mere abusive language from actionable per se slander. By reinforcing the necessity for defamatory statements to fall within specific harmful categories, the court ensures that defamation claims are substantiated with substantive damage to reputation or professional standing. This case reinforces the legal principle that not all offensive language qualifies for slander actions, thereby protecting individuals and entities from frivolous lawsuits while ensuring that genuine reputational harms are adequately addressed.

Case Details

Year: 1931
Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division A.

Judge(s)

Cook, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Attorney(S)

Dabney Dabney, of Vicksburg, for appellants. In an action for slander it has long been laid down as the correct guide that only in the following classes of cases may there be a recovery. 1. Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge be true, may be indicted and punished. 2. Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society. 3. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment for profit or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an office or employment. 4. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade. 5. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which, although not in themselves actionable, occasion the party special damage. 25 Cyc. 264. Oral words not included within the first four classes of words actionable per se, as enumerated above, are not as a general rule actionable per se, and without proof of special damage, although tending to expose to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. 25 Cyc. 265; Davis v. Farrington, Walk. 304; Cocke v. Weathersby, 5 S. M. 333; Woodville v. Pizatti, 80 So. 491. There is nothing actionable per se in speaking the words "liar," "crook" and "no lady." Interstate Co. v. Garnett, 123 So. 373; Bindfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566; 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 583. Oral words imputing to a person not in business a state of indebtedness or inability to pay his debts are not actionable per se. Rock v. McClarnon, 95 Ind. 415; Elliot v. Ailsbury (Ky.), 5 Am. Dec. 631; Buck v. Hersey, 31 Me. 558. Oral imputations of falsehood are not actionable per se unless they charge a crime, or affect one in his business or profession. Studdard v. Trucks, 31 Ark. 726; Smalley v. Anderson, 4 T.B. Mon. 367; Barnes v. Trundy, 31 Me. 321; Harding v. Brooks, 5 Pick. 244; Cook v. Cook, 100 Mass. 194. It is not slanderous per se to say of one that he cheated the government. Havemeyer v. Fuller (N.Y.), 10 Abb. N. Cas. 9, 60 How. Pr. 316; Harvey v. Boies, 1 Penn. W. 12; Kimmis v. Stiles, 44 Vt. 351. An oral charge of dishonesty or rascality is not actionable per se, unless such charge is uttered or spoken of a person in his business or employment, or unless there is an implication of the commission of a crime. Knight v. Blackford (Dist. Col.), 51 Am. Rep. 772; Porter v. Choen, 60 Ind. 338; Bays v. Hunt, 60 Iowa 251; Winter v. Sumvalt (Md.), 3 Harr. J. 38; Richmond v. Post, 69 Minn. 457; Rammell v. Otis, 60 Mo. 365; Pike v. Van Wormer (N.Y.), 5 How Pr. 171; Colbert v. Caldwell (Pa.), 3 Grant. 181. It is not actionable per se to say of a person that he is a rogue. Ford v. Johnson, 21 Ga. 399; Mills v. Taylor (Ky.), 3 Bibb 469; Artieta v. Artieta, 15 La. Ann. 48; Winter v. Sumvalt (Md.), 3 Harr. J. 38; Quin v. O'Gara, 2 E.D. Smith 388; Oakley v. Farrington(N.Y.), 1 Am. Dec. 107; Idol v. Jones, 13 N.C. 162; Horst v. Borbridge, 57 Pa. St. 62. Mere words of common abuse are not actionable per se. Davis v. Tacoma R., etc., 66 L.R.A. 802; Robertson v. Edelstein, 104 Wis. 440; Ritchie v. Stenius, 73 Mich. 567. Chaney Culkin and Vollor Kelly, all of Vicksburg, for appellee. In considering and determining the meaning of a word, it must be considered in the connection in which it is ordinarily used and understood by the public in the community in which it is used, and liability depends, not on what one intended to imply by the use of the language, but on what the language actually implied, or what it might reasonably have implied, as understood by those in whose presence it was spoken, and by those to whom it was spoken. For one to say in this country, and more especially in Mississippi, that a woman is not a lady and that she is crooked, means that she is unchaste and lewd. Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kans. 267; Interstate Company v. Garnett, 154 Miss. 325; Battles v. Tyson, 77 Nebr. 563. The language complained of was actionable. Furr v. Speed, 74 Miss. 423; Trimble v. Yazoo Mississippi Valley Railroad Company, 103 Miss. 1; Valley Dry Goods Co. v. Buford, 114 Miss. 414; Nabors v. Mathis, 115 Miss. 564; Doughtery v. L.B. Price Mercantile Co., 132 Miss. 39; Interstate Co. v. Garnett, 154 Miss. 325; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Boltz, 123 Miss. 550. Argued orally by J.B. Dabney, for appellant.

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