Sixth Circuit: Four-Month Gap and a Conflated OCRC Probable-Cause Letter Are Insufficient to Prove Causation in Title VII Retaliation

Introduction

In Theresa A. Kovacs v. University of Toledo, No. 25-3035 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against a former university human resources director on her Title VII retaliatory termination claim. The court held that, even assuming her internal objection to a proposed promotion constituted protected activity, she failed to present sufficient evidence that her eventual termination was caused by that activity.

The decision provides two central takeaways for Title VII retaliation litigation in the Sixth Circuit:

Temporal proximity alone—particularly a gap of roughly four months between protected activity and termination—is insufficient to establish a causal connection.
Agency probable-cause findings (here, from the Ohio Civil Rights Commission) warrant “little to no” evidentiary weight when they conflate legal theories (race discrimination vs. retaliation) or otherwise lack indicia of trustworthiness relevant to the claim actually pleaded.

Parties: Plaintiff–Appellant Theresa A. Kovacs, a long-time HR professional at the University of Toledo, challenged her termination as retaliatory under Title VII. Defendant–Appellee University of Toledo prevailed on summary judgment in the district court; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Background

Kovacs worked in the University’s HR department from 2003 to 2021 and became director of the academic, student services, and administration unit in 2018. In mid-2020, a new interim president initiated an HR “modernization” that led to leadership changes, including replacing the chief HR officer with John Elliott. Elliott found operational deficiencies in Kovacs’s team.

In October 2020, the University contemplated promoting Tracey Brown, moving her from a union to a non-union role and giving her a raise without posting the position. Kovacs objected internally, asserting that bypassing posting and minimum qualifications risked violating OFCCP requirements and equal employment opportunity laws, and raised potential disparate-impact concerns for minority candidates.

In November 2020, the University demoted Kovacs from HR director to senior HR consultant (salary unchanged), citing “ineffective leadership.” Kovacs began her new role in December 2020. In January 2021, Elliott terminated another HR director, Dreyon Wynn, who, along with two previously-terminated Black HR directors (including Wendy Davis), formed a pattern Wynn reported to the University’s vice president of diversity and inclusion, Willie McKether. Wynn contrasted the treatment of Black HR directors (terminated) with Kovacs (white, demoted with salary retention) and said he would file an OCRC charge.

Approximately two weeks after Wynn’s communications, on February 9, 2021, the University terminated Kovacs. The University attributed the termination to performance deficiencies (missed meetings, absences, insufficient mentorship, and incomplete projects). Kovacs claimed the termination was retaliation for her October 2020 objection to the Brown promotion proposal.

After the OCRC issued a probable-cause letter as to unlawful employment practices against Kovacs, she sued in federal court under Title VII for retaliation. The district court dismissed her retaliatory-termination claim at summary judgment (finding causation lacking), but allowed her retaliatory-demotion claim to proceed. The parties later stipulated to dismiss the demotion claim with prejudice, rendering the summary judgment final and appealable.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University on Kovacs’s retaliatory termination claim. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for cases relying on circumstantial evidence, the panel assumed without deciding that Kovacs engaged in protected activity when she challenged the proposed promotion. The court focused on causation and held:

A four-month gap between protected activity (October 2020) and termination (February 2021), standing alone, is insufficient to establish a causal connection.
In the absence of close temporal proximity, a plaintiff must pair timing with other evidence of retaliatory animus; Kovacs did not.
The OCRC probable-cause letter deserved “little to no” weight because it conflated theories and supported, if anything, a race discrimination narrative, not retaliation—the claim Kovacs pleaded.
Other facts Kovacs cited (e.g., Wynn’s race-discrimination allegations, her short tenure post-demotion, reduced responsibilities) did not create a triable issue on causation for retaliation.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities the Court Relied On

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Sixth Circuit applications (Laster v. City of Kalamazoo; George v. Youngstown State Univ.; Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys.; Michael v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corp.): The court used the burden-shifting framework for Title VII retaliation based on circumstantial evidence—requiring a prima facie case, the employer’s legitimate non-retaliatory reason, and pretext.
Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003): For the causation element, a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a factfinder could infer the employer would not have taken the adverse action but for the protected activity. The panel quoted Abbott’s “would not have taken” formulation, consistent with Title VII retaliation’s but-for causation standard.
Temporal proximity line of cases:
- Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2013) and Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009): Temporal proximity can support causation when very close in time.
- Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2020): A roughly 75-day gap, by itself, is not convincing evidence of causation.
- Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Prods., 515 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008): Periods exceeding four months are too long to support an inference of causation based on timing alone.
- Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2008): When temporal proximity is not especially close, the plaintiff must pair timing with additional evidence of retaliatory conduct.
Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2009): District courts should consider state agency determinations for their factual content at summary judgment but may give them “little weight” where circumstances call their trustworthiness into question. The panel applied Alexander to discount the OCRC letter here, noting it confused retaliation with race discrimination and failed to substantively address the causal link Kovacs needed to prove.

Legal Reasoning

The court streamlined the analysis by assuming (without deciding) the first element—protected activity—was met. Even on that assumption, the claim failed for want of causation.

On causation, the panel applied the Sixth Circuit’s well-settled temporal proximity doctrine. A four-month interval is too attenuated to infer causation without more. Where the time gap is longer, the plaintiff must offer additional circumstantial evidence—such as intervening antagonism, suspicious timing paired with inconsistent explanations, or other indicia of retaliatory animus—to bridge the causal divide. Kovacs did not.

Turning to the OCRC letter, the court emphasized two points anchored in Alexander:

Agency determinations can be considered for their factual content, but courts assess trustworthiness and relevance to the claim at issue.
Here, the OCRC’s analysis conflated race discrimination and retaliation. It reasoned that Kovacs’s termination was a “cover up for race discrimination” and even stated that, but for Kovacs’s race, “it would not have been necessary [for the University] to remove her.” Those are race-discrimination inferences, not retaliation inferences.

The panel considered that very conflation decisive: evidence that arguably supports a different theory (race discrimination) does not substitute for causation evidence on the actual claim (retaliation). If anything, the race-based narrative functioned as an alternative explanation for the University’s decision, which weakens rather than strengthens the but-for causal chain between Kovacs’s protected activity and her termination.

Finally, the court examined the remaining facts cited by Kovacs—her short post-demotion tenure, reduced responsibilities, and asserted absence of performance issues—and found they did not speak to retaliatory causation. Without additional evidence tying the termination decisionmakers’ motives to her October 2020 objection, the record could not support a reasonable inference that retaliation caused her February 2021 termination.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although the opinion is unpublished and non-precedential, it is a concise roadmap for district courts evaluating Title VII retaliation claims at summary judgment within the Sixth Circuit:

Temporal proximity must be truly close to suffice by itself. Intervals of several months are insufficient without corroborating evidence. Counsel should assume that a four-month gap requires additional, concrete indicia of retaliatory animus.
Agency probable-cause letters are not a panacea. Courts will read these determinations critically for trustworthiness and, crucially, for alignment with the specific claim asserted. A letter that analyzes the wrong theory (or blends distinct theories) may carry “little to no” weight.
Alternative-cause narratives can defeat causal inference. Where the record suggests another non-retaliatory (even unlawful but different) motive—such as race discrimination in a case pleading only retaliation—the plaintiff still must prove retaliatory but-for causation. Evidence pointing elsewhere does not fill that gap.
Pleading and proof must track each other. Lawyers should avoid conflating discrimination and retaliation theories in administrative filings and litigation. If both theories may be viable, they should be distinctly pleaded and developed, because evidence of one does not automatically prove the other.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Protected activity: Under Title VII, this includes opposing practices reasonably believed to be unlawful (e.g., objecting to a promotion process believed to violate EEO norms) or participating in administrative proceedings. The court assumed Kovacs’s objection qualified.
Materially adverse action: An employer action that might dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity—termination clearly qualifies.
Prima facie case and burden shifting (McDonnell Douglas): The plaintiff first shows protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, and causation. The employer then must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason. The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext. Here, the case failed at the prima facie causation element, so the court did not need to analyze pretext.
Temporal proximity: Timing can suggest causation when the adverse action follows closely on the heels of protected activity. But as time lengthens, timing becomes weaker evidence and must be bolstered with other proof of retaliatory animus.
But-for causation: In Title VII retaliation cases, the plaintiff must show the adverse action would not have occurred but for the protected activity. Evidence pointing to a different motive—especially one not pleaded—does not establish that retaliatory but-for link.
Agency probable-cause findings: Determinations from agencies like the OCRC or EEOC can be considered at summary judgment for their factual material. Courts weigh their trustworthiness and relevance. If the analysis is misdirected (e.g., discussing race discrimination to support a retaliation claim), courts may give it little or no weight.
Conflation of legal theories: Title VII race discrimination and Title VII retaliation are distinct claims analyzed under different frameworks. Evidence supporting one does not necessarily prove the other; they must be separately alleged and proven.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kovacs reinforces familiar but critical constraints on Title VII retaliation claims at the summary-judgment stage. First, timing alone—particularly a gap of several months—will not carry a plaintiff’s burden on causation. Second, courts will not credit agency probable-cause determinations that lack trustworthiness or that conflate distinct legal theories. Third, a plaintiff’s evidence must track the specific claim alleged; proof that better fits an unpleaded claim cannot substitute for the required causal proof on the pleaded claim.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of building a causation record beyond timing: contemporaneous communications linking protected activity to decisionmakers, inconsistent or shifting explanations, comparator evidence tied to retaliation (not just discrimination), and patterns of antagonism. For those relying on administrative determinations, it is essential to ensure that the agency’s analysis addresses the precise theory at issue and marshals facts probative of that theory’s elements. Absent such alignment, as in Kovacs, courts in the Sixth Circuit will not hesitate to grant summary judgment.