Sixth Circuit: CJA Investigative Funding Requires Specific, Defense-Tied Necessity; No Evidentiary Hearing Absent Contested Facts

I. Introduction

In United States v. Udell Carroll, III (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit addressed a recurring Criminal Justice Act (CJA) problem: what an indigent, pro se defendant must show to obtain publicly funded investigative assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), and whether the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing before denying such a request.

The case arose from a traffic stop on Interstate 40 in Fayette County, Tennessee. After the stop, Carroll admitted he had marijuana. Officers searched the vehicle and found marijuana and methamphetamine; an inventory search after towing later revealed a firearm in the trunk. Carroll was indicted on firearm and drug charges, but the government later dismissed the firearm counts, leaving trial on methamphetamine possession with intent to distribute.

Central to Carroll’s post-stop litigation was his claim that body-camera footage of the stop had been “edited” and omitted approximately five minutes. Proceeding pro se, Carroll sought CJA funding to hire an investigator to obtain materials (e.g., a dispatch radio log and chain-of-custody documentation) that, in his view, would expose inconsistencies in the video evidence. The district court denied the requests without an evidentiary hearing. Carroll appealed those denials.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court held:

• The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carroll’s (second) § 3006A(e)(1) motion because the motion offered only generalized assertions of “inconsistencies” and failed to explain specifically what the requested investigative services would likely show and how that would be necessary to mount a plausible defense or avoid prejudice.
• The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the funding motion. Even assuming a hearing requirement could apply, Carroll did not make an initial showing of contested facts in the funding motion itself.

The panel also observed that it “appears to remain an open question” in the Sixth Circuit whether § 3006A(e)(1) itself statutorily requires a hearing, citing United States v. Robinson, but the court declined to decide the question because Carroll did not raise it.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Gilmore

United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) supplied the governing standard for CJA investigative services: a defendant must show (1) the services are “necessary to mount a plausible defense” and (2) without them, “the defendant’s case would be prejudiced.” Gilmore also cautions that courts need not grant funding “on the off chance” services “might turn up something.”

Gilmore did the decisive work here. The panel treated Carroll’s motion as the kind of speculative request Gilmore rejects—broad claims of “grave concerns” and “numerous inconsistencies,” without identifying what the investigator would likely uncover or how it would concretely matter to a defense theory.

2. United States v. Darwich

The court reinforced Gilmore’s specificity requirement by citing United States v. Darwich, 574 F. App'x 582, 594-95 (6th Cir. 2014), which upheld denial of requested services where a defendant provided “only general averments” and did not specify what he expected the expert/investigator to find. Darwich functioned as an on-point comparator: Carroll’s motion, like the one in Darwich, lacked details connecting the requested work to a concrete evidentiary payoff.

3. Williams v. Bagley and Bojicic v. DeWine (Standard of Review and Abuse of Discretion)

The panel cited Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 977 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing) and Bojicic v. DeWine, 145 F.4th 668, 670-71 (6th Cir. 2025) (defining abuse of discretion as applying the wrong legal standard, misapplying the correct standard, or relying on clearly erroneous factfinding). These cases framed the lens of deference: the appellate question was not whether an investigator might have been helpful in some abstract sense, but whether the district court acted irrationally or on an erroneous legal premise given what Carroll actually presented.

4. United States v. Robinson (Open Question on Statutory Hearing Requirement)

United States v. Robinson, 95 F.3d 1153, 1996 WL 490379, at *11 (6th Cir. 1996) was cited for the proposition that it “appears to remain an open question” in the circuit whether § 3006A(e)(1) requires a hearing. The panel carefully avoided turning that observation into a holding. The practical takeaway is procedural: litigants who want a statutory-hearing ruling must squarely present it.

5. United States v. Shields and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Limits of the “Nonfrivolous Claim” Hearing Principle)

Carroll relied on United States v. Shields, 850 F. App'x 406, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2021), which applied a “general rule” requiring an evidentiary hearing for nonfrivolous double jeopardy claims, quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 797 F.2d 1377, 1385 (6th Cir. 1986). The panel rejected the analogy: Shields concerned double jeopardy, not § 3006A(e)(1), and the Sixth Circuit has not extended that hearing principle to CJA funding motions as a categorical matter.

6. United States v. Giacalone (Threshold Showing of Contested Facts)

Even if a hearing framework applied, the panel invoked United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that a defendant generally is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing without “at least some initial showing of contested facts.” This provided an alternative, fact-focused ground to affirm: Carroll’s funding motion did not itself set up a concrete factual dispute requiring live resolution; it consisted of general claims and unspecified “inconsistencies.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court confined review to what the motion actually argued

A central feature of the opinion is its insistence on motion-based justification. Carroll’s appellate theory was that missing footage would have changed the suppression outcome and aided cross-examination by undermining the stopping officer’s credibility. But the panel noted that Carroll did not articulate those specific purposes in the second § 3006A(e)(1) motion under review. Instead, he raised “missing footage” arguments later in a letter requesting effectively a second suppression hearing. The court treated the later letter as insufficient to retroactively supply the required showing for the earlier funding motion.

2. Application of § 3006A(e)(1): “necessary” and “prejudiced” require more than suspicion

Applying Gilmore, the panel credited the district court’s conclusion that Carroll failed to show necessity and prejudice because:

• Carroll did not identify what the “inconsistencies” were, beyond broad skepticism about the integrity of the case.
• He did not explain what the requested dispatch log, chain-of-custody receipt, or transcript would likely show.
• He did not connect the requested materials to a concrete defense theory in a way showing the services were “necessary,” rather than exploratory.

Put simply, the opinion treats § 3006A(e)(1) as requiring a defendant to articulate a reasoned, testable hypothesis about what the services will produce and why that production matters to guilt, suppression, impeachment, or sentencing—not merely a desire to investigate.

3. No evidentiary hearing required on this record

The panel declined to announce any categorical rule that a § 3006A(e)(1) motion requires an evidentiary hearing. But it went further: even if one imported hearing principles from other contexts, Carroll did not satisfy the threshold described in Giacalone. Because his motion lacked an initial showing of specific contested facts, the district court’s decision to deny the motion without a hearing was within its discretion.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is practically significant in three ways:

1. Specificity is the price of CJA funding. The opinion reinforces that § 3006A(e)(1) is not a general investigative entitlement. Defendants—especially pro se litigants—must specify what they seek, what they expect it will reveal, and how that revelation supports a plausible defense or prevents prejudice.
2. Appellate review tracks the motion, not later correspondence. The decision underscores that arguments offered later (e.g., in letters or separate filings) may not rehabilitate an earlier underdeveloped funding request.
3. Hearing requests must be grounded in a factual dispute presented in the motion. The ruling signals that, at least absent a developed factual proffer, district courts in this circuit may deny § 3006A(e)(1) requests without convening evidentiary hearings.

The opinion also leaves unresolved—but highlighted—the statutory question whether § 3006A(e)(1) requires an “appropriate inquiry” to take the form of a hearing. Future litigants may attempt to squarely present that issue, especially where a defendant makes a detailed ex parte proffer that cannot fairly be assessed on paper.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (CJA services): A mechanism allowing indigent defendants to obtain public funds for investigators or experts, but only if the court finds the services are necessary for the defense and the defendant cannot pay.
• “Necessary to mount a plausible defense”: Not “could be helpful.” The defendant must explain how the service supports a concrete defense strategy (e.g., suppression, impeachment, alibi, forensic rebuttal) in a non-speculative way.
• “Prejudiced” without authorization: The defendant must show a real risk of harm to the defense if the services are denied—such as inability to obtain evidence central to a dispositive motion or to rebut a key government contention.
• Ex parte proceeding: A process conducted without the other side present (commonly to avoid revealing defense strategy). Section 3006A(e)(1) contemplates ex parte handling when appropriate.
• Evidentiary hearing: A live proceeding with testimony and exhibits used to resolve factual disputes. Courts often require a threshold showing of a real dispute before holding one.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard; the question is whether the district court made a legal error, clearly misapplied the law, or relied on plainly wrong facts—not whether the appellate court would have decided differently.
• Chain of custody: Documentation tracking how evidence was collected, handled, and stored, used to show the item has not been tampered with.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Udell Carroll, III cements a practical rule for § 3006A(e)(1) litigation in the Sixth Circuit: a defendant must do more than allege irregularities and ask to investigate. To obtain CJA-funded investigative services, the motion must explain with specificity what the investigator will likely uncover and why it is necessary to a plausible defense and to avoiding prejudice. On procedure, the opinion confirms that, at least where a motion fails to present contested facts, a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying the request without an evidentiary hearing— while leaving open for future cases whether the statute ever mandates a hearing as the form of “appropriate inquiry.”