Sixth Circuit Reaffirms: Unauthorized Overtime as Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Basis for Termination; No ADEA Hostile Environment Without an Age Nexus

Case: Cynthia Barnes v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs (No. 24-3576)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date: July 17, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (summary judgment for the Secretary)

Opinion by: Judge Murphy (joined by Judges Kethledge and Mathis)

Publication Status: Not recommended for publication

Introduction

This appeal arises from the termination of Cynthia Barnes, a 64-year-old nurse expeditor at the Cincinnati VA hospital, following repeated instances of working overtime without prior approval. After the VA reorganized its transfer center and emphasized cost efficiencies, Barnes—motivated by what she viewed as obligations to veteran patients—regularly exceeded her scheduled hours without authorization. The hospital escalated discipline from written counseling, to a reprimand, to a suspension, and ultimately to termination in January 2020.

Barnes sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), asserting two theories: (1) her termination was motivated by age discrimination; and (2) she was subjected to an age-based hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the VA’s stated reason—insubordination for repeated unauthorized overtime—was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for termination and that Barnes failed to produce evidence of pretext. The court also held that Barnes offered no evidence connecting any alleged workplace harassment to her age.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework (assuming, without deciding, that it applies in the federal-sector ADEA context) and concluded:

Termination claim: The VA articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge—repeated insubordination by taking overtime without preapproval despite clear instructions and progressive discipline. Barnes failed to show this reason was pretextual: she admitted approximately 20 incidents of unauthorized overtime, acknowledged repeated warnings, lacked comparator evidence of similarly situated employees treated better, and conceded no age-related comments or conduct by decision-makers. Her disagreement with the VA’s cost-management priorities did not establish age discrimination under the ADEA (business-judgment rule).
Hostile work environment claim: Even assuming such claims are cognizable under the ADEA for federal employees, Barnes offered no evidence that any alleged harassment—managerial pressure to meet deadlines and control overtime—was “based on age.” She admitted her supervisor never linked criticism or overtime directives to age.

Although the court flagged potential differences between private- and federal-sector ADEA claims in light of Babb v. Wilkie, it found any such differences immaterial here because Barnes’s claims failed regardless under the assumed framework.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981) and 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a): Establish that the ADEA applies to federal agencies and that personnel actions affecting employees 40+ must be free from age discrimination. The court sets the statutory backdrop for federal-sector ADEA claims.
Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399 (2020) (distinguishing Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)): Babb interprets § 633a(a) to impose a more lenient causation standard in the federal sector than Gross’s but-for standard for private-sector claims under § 623(a). The panel flags this distinction to question whether federal-sector ADEA claims should always mirror private-sector frameworks, but proceeds under McDonnell Douglas because any differences do not affect the outcome.
Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1998): Prior Sixth Circuit precedent applying McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims, which the panel follows here by assumption (consistent with longstanding circuit practice) despite Babb’s potential implications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Provides the burden-shifting framework—prima facie case; employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; employee’s pretext showing. This structure frames the court’s termination analysis.
Pelcha v. MW Bancorp., Inc., 988 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2021) and Fullen v. City of Columbus, 514 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2013): Recognize “insubordination” (disregard of directives) as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse action and outline routes to show pretext. The court relies on these to classify repeated unauthorized overtime as insubordination and to evaluate pretext arguments.
Blizzard v. Marion Technical College, 698 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2012): Articulates common methods of proving pretext—no basis in fact, did not actually motivate, or insufficient to motivate. The court uses this structure and finds Barnes did not satisfy any path.
Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam): Addresses whether the employer’s proffered reason was sufficient to motivate the action, informing the court’s “insufficient to motivate” pretext avenue.
Cline v. BWXT Y-12, LLC, 521 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2008) and Stein v. National City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991): Emphasize the business-judgment rule—courts do not sit as “super personnel departments” to reweigh business choices where no unlawful discrimination is shown. This undermines Barnes’s assertion that her disobedience was justified by patient-care concerns.
Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996): Recognizes ADEA hostile work environment claims in the private sector and requires harassment “based on age” that is sufficiently severe or pervasive. The court uses Crawford to assess the absence of any age nexus here.
Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 992 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2021): Cited as an example of applying hostile-environment standards to federal ADEA claims. The Sixth Circuit assumes, without deciding, similar standards apply to federal employees.
Smith v. Newport Utilities, 129 F.4th 944 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for the de novo standard of review on summary judgment.

Legal Reasoning

1) Framework choice and the Babb question

The court acknowledges an unresolved tension: § 633a(a) (federal-sector ADEA) contains text and a causation standard, per Babb, that differs from private-sector § 623(a). Still, because the parties proceeded under the private-sector framework and because any potential differences would not alter the analysis or result, the panel applies McDonnell Douglas without definitively resolving whether Babb alters the framework in federal-sector cases. This pragmatic approach leaves the doctrinal question open while adjudicating the case on well-established grounds.

2) Termination claim

Prima facie case assumed: The court bypasses debate and assumes Barnes met her initial showing.
Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason: The VA’s reason—repeated unauthorized overtime despite explicit directives and progressive discipline—plainly qualifies as “insubordination,” a neutral basis long recognized by the Sixth Circuit.
No pretext:
- No basis-in-fact theory: Barnes admitted to approximately 20 incidents of unauthorized overtime and to repeated warnings. That concession forecloses an argument that the proffered reason is factually false.
- Did not actually motivate theory: Barnes pointed to no age-based comments or evidence suggesting decision-makers harbored age-related animus. She conceded her supervisor did nothing “specifically” suggesting an age motive.
- Insufficient-to-motivate theory: Barnes offered only conclusory assertions that others also worked overtime. She lacked evidence that any comparator was similarly situated in all relevant respects (e.g., same supervisor, same policy violations, similar history of disobedience). The most analogous coworker, the other transfer-center nurse, generally completed tasks within scheduled hours, undermining her comparator argument.
Business judgment: Barnes’s belief that overtime was necessary to provide the best care could not convert a policy disagreement into an ADEA violation. Courts will not second-guess an employer’s cost-control or staffing decisions absent evidence of unlawful discriminatory motive.

3) Hostile work environment claim

Even assuming federal employees may bring ADEA hostile environment claims under standards parallel to the private sector, the claim fails on an essential element: the harassment must be “based on age.” Barnes’s description of managerial pressure to meet deadlines and avoid overtime did not include any age-linked remarks or conduct, and she expressly testified that her supervisor never tied criticisms to age. Without an age nexus, no reasonable jury could find age-based harassment.

Impact

On federal-sector ADEA litigation in the Sixth Circuit

Continued use of McDonnell Douglas: The panel proceeds with McDonnell Douglas for a federal-sector ADEA claim, reflecting a practical continuity with prior circuit practice (e.g., Barnett) notwithstanding Babb. However, the court flags—without resolving—doctrinal differences introduced by Babb. Practitioners should be prepared to brief how Babb affects both causation and analytical frameworks in federal cases.
Evidence matters more than labels: Where an employer articulates a clear, well-documented, nondiscriminatory rationale (insubordination), a plaintiff must marshal concrete evidence of pretext. Admissions of policy violations and the absence of comparator or age-related evidence will be dispositive at summary judgment.

On workplace discipline and overtime policies

Unauthorized overtime = insubordination: Repeatedly working beyond approved hours contrary to explicit directives is a legitimate basis for progressive discipline and termination. Employers who document warnings and escalate sanctions consistently place themselves in a strong position on summary judgment.
Policy disagreements do not equal discrimination: Even admirable motives (e.g., prioritizing patient care) do not transform noncompliance into protected conduct under the ADEA absent evidence of age discrimination.

On hostile work environment claims under the ADEA

Age nexus is essential: Pressure to control costs, meet deadlines, or enforce workplace rules—without age-related comments or differential treatment—will not establish an ADEA hostile environment.
Practical lesson: Plaintiffs must link alleged harassment to age (e.g., on-the-record ageist remarks, age-based slurs, or proof of disparate treatment tied to age) and meet the severity/pervasiveness threshold to reach a jury.

Procedural posture and summary judgment practice

De novo review: The court reiterates that summary judgments are reviewed de novo, reinforcing that the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact—especially where facts are admitted—precludes trial.
Comparator rigor: Vague assertions about “others also did X” will not suffice; plaintiffs need evidence that comparators shared a supervisor, violated the same policy, had similar disciplinary histories, and were treated more favorably.

Complex Concepts Simplified

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting:
1. Prima facie case: Minimal showing suggesting discrimination.
2. Employer’s reason: Employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
3. Pretext: Employee must show the reason is false, did not actually motivate the decision, or is insufficient to justify it under the circumstances.
Pretext (three common routes):
- No basis in fact: The stated reason is factually untrue.
- Did not actually motivate: The employer’s stated reason was not what actually drove the decision; another (unlawful) motive did.
- Insufficient to motivate: Even if true, the reason is too trivial to justify the action in this context.
Comparator evidence: To show differential treatment, the plaintiff must identify similarly situated coworkers in all relevant respects (same supervisor, same rule, similar conduct, similar disciplinary history) who were treated more favorably.
Business-judgment rule: Courts do not reweigh the wisdom of an employer’s decisions; they assess only whether unlawful discrimination motivated those decisions.
Babb vs. Gross causation:
- Gross (private sector, § 623): Typically requires proof that age was the but-for cause of the adverse action.
- Babb (federal sector, § 633a): Interprets “free from any discrimination” to impose a more lenient causation standard for whether age tainted the decision-making process, though full remedies may still turn on but-for causation for ultimate outcomes. The Sixth Circuit did not decide how Babb affects the framework here.
Hostile work environment (ADEA): Requires harassment that is severe or pervasive and, critically, based on age. Managerial pressure unrelated to age does not suffice.

Conclusion

Barnes underscores core ADEA litigation principles in the Sixth Circuit. First, an employer’s consistent, well-documented enforcement of overtime authorization rules constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for termination. Second, absent concrete proof of pretext—particularly where the employee admits the conduct at issue—summary judgment is appropriate. Third, hostile work environment claims require a clear age nexus; generalized workplace pressures or cost-control measures unconnected to age do not meet that requirement.

Doctrinally, the panel signals continued use of McDonnell Douglas for federal-sector ADEA claims while acknowledging Babb’s distinct causation standard. The court does not resolve that tension because it does not matter to the outcome. Practitioners should read Barnes as a practical reinforcement of evidentiary burdens at the pretext stage and a reminder that the ADEA targets age-based animus—not disagreements over management priorities—and that comparator and age-link evidence are crucial to surviving summary judgment.

Although not precedential, this opinion offers persuasive guidance: repeated unauthorized overtime may constitute insubordination warranting termination, and ADEA claims—whether framed as disparate treatment or hostile environment—fail in the absence of evidence tying the challenged action or conduct to age.