Sixth Circuit Reaffirms: No Pleading-Stage Qualified Immunity When Complaint Plausibly Alleges Arrest Without Probable Cause; 12(b)(6) Cannot Be Converted into Summary Judgment

Introduction

In Andrew Evans and Ryan Geheb v. Mark Gordon et al., the Sixth Circuit addressed a familiar but consequential intersection of campus policing, student discipline, and civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Three college athletes took a joyride during which the front-seat passenger pointed a brightly colored toy Nerf pistol out of a car window and shouted “Give me all your money!” at pedestrians. Campus police arrested all three for armed robbery, and the university immediately suspended them. Criminal charges were later dismissed, but two of the students sued university police and administrators for constitutional violations.

The district court dismissed two claims but denied qualified immunity on others at the pleadings stage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity and dismissed the students’ cross-appeal. The opinion—though not recommended for publication—reiterates critical principles about:

How courts assess qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage;
The limits on using extrinsic evidence to manufacture probable cause on a motion to dismiss;
The clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause, including in aiding-and-abetting contexts; and
The prudential reasons to defer qualified-immunity determinations until after discovery when key facts are undeveloped.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Cole, Kethledge, and Nalbandian) affirmed the district court’s refusal to grant qualified immunity to Oakland University police officers on the plaintiffs’ false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims and to the Dean of Student Affairs (Michael Wadsworth) on the suspension-based due process claim. The court held that at the pleadings stage, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and without converting the motion to dismiss into summary judgment, the plaintiffs plausibly alleged an absence of probable cause and a due process violation.

The court rejected the officers’ attempt to rely on interview excerpts and a 911 transcript attached to their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, emphasizing that such extrinsic materials—untethered to correcting omissions in the complaint—are for Rule 56, not Rule 12. Because the facts are not yet developed, and because freedom from arrest without probable cause is a quintessentially clearly established right, the case may proceed.

The Sixth Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of the dismissal of their “rigged hearing” due process claim for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction because that issue is distinct from the qualified-immunity questions properly before the court.

Factual and Procedural Background

In March 2022, three Oakland University swimmers—driver Ryan Geheb, backseat passenger Andrew Evans, and front-seat passenger Valance Washington—drove to and from the cafeteria. Washington, without notice to the others, pointed a yellow-orange Nerf toy pistol out the window and shouted “Give me all your money!” at students. Witnesses reported being frightened but believed the gun was fake; another witness thought the demand was “kind of a joke.”

Campus police identified the vehicle, interviewed the students, and arrested all three for armed robbery. They spent the night in county jail, were released the next day, and were cited for disturbing the peace. The Dean of Student Affairs immediately suspended all three and charged them with several code violations. Four days later, the Dean reinstated them but the charges remained. Washington took a plea deal in the campus process; Evans and Geheb contested their charges and were found responsible for “Disruptive Behavior” and “Intimidation,” receiving probation and sanctions. Prosecutors later dismissed the criminal charges with prejudice.

About two years later, Evans and Geheb filed a § 1983 action asserting:

False arrest and malicious prosecution against campus police;
Procedural due process violations against Dean Wadsworth for immediate suspension without a pre-deprivation hearing;
Procedural due process violations against Wadsworth and Associate Dean Hurse for allegedly “rigging” the hearing; and
Equal protection violations related to charging and discipline parity.

The district court dismissed the “rigged hearing” and equal protection claims but denied qualified immunity on the false-arrest, malicious-prosecution, and immediate-suspension due process claims. Defendants took an interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity; plaintiffs cross-appealed the “rigged hearing” dismissal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity and dismissed the cross-appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Franz v. Oxford Community School District, 132 F.4th 447, 449 (6th Cir. 2025): The court reiterates the Rule 12(b)(6) standard—accepting the complaint’s allegations as true—framing the lens through which probable cause and due process are evaluated at the pleadings stage.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985): Establishes appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory denials of qualified immunity. This opens the door to this appeal despite the absence of a final judgment.
Bey v. Falk, 946 F.3d 304, 311–12 (6th Cir. 2019): Confirms that the court’s review of the qualified-immunity ruling is de novo and limited to legal questions on interlocutory appeal.
Sterling Hotels, LLC v. McKay, 71 F.4th 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2023): Clarifies that a refusal to grant qualified immunity is treated like a denial for appellate purposes, eliminating disputes about label versus substance.
Martinez v. Wayne County, 142 F.4th 828, 835 (6th Cir. 2025): Recites the two-prong qualified-immunity test: a constitutional violation and clearly established law.
Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2019): For false arrest, courts assess probable cause for any offense, not only the charged offense. This frames the officers’ defense that, even if “armed robbery” lacked probable cause, ordinance violations might save the arrest.
Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011): Under Michigan law, aiding and abetting requires knowing assistance. This is pivotal: the complaint alleges the prank was unilateral and spontaneous, undermining probable cause that the driver or backseat passenger knowingly aided the conduct.
Howell v. McCormick, 148 F.4th 834, 852–53 (6th Cir. 2025): The Sixth Circuit’s recent articulation that a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim “likewise requires an absence of probable cause for the crime charged,” aligning that claim’s viability with the same probable cause analysis.
Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 486 (6th Cir. 2024), and Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 688 (6th Cir. 2024): District courts may decline to consider extrinsic evidentiary exhibits on a Rule 12 motion. Attempts to insert curated evidence at the pleadings stage risk improperly converting the motion to summary judgment.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018): Clearly established law must be particularized to the facts faced by the officer. The panel reconciles Wesby with the reality that, at the pleadings stage, the “situation” the officer confronted is not yet known; thus, general propositions can suffice until the record is developed.
Jones v. City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 915 (6th Cir. 2020): Identifies freedom from arrest without probable cause as a quintessential clearly established right—sufficient at the pleadings stage to defeat a premature qualified-immunity motion when allegations plausibly show no probable cause.
Salter v. City of Detroit, 133 F.4th 527, 534 (6th Cir. 2025): Limits pendent appellate jurisdiction; issues not inextricably intertwined with qualified-immunity rulings (like the “rigged hearing” claim here) are not within interlocutory jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s analysis proceeds along three tracks: probable cause and qualified immunity for the officers, procedural due process and qualified immunity for the Dean, and appellate jurisdiction over the cross-appeal.

First, on probable cause and the officers’ qualified-immunity defense, the court cabins review to the complaint. The complaint alleges that:

Washington acted spontaneously and unilaterally with the toy Nerf pistol;
Geheb kept driving, never stopping or slowing for the prank; and
Evans was in the backseat; the toy belonged to him; but neither he nor Geheb knowingly aided the prank.

Under Michigan aiding-and-abetting law, mere presence, ownership of the toy, and continued driving without more do not amount to knowing assistance. Taking those allegations as true and drawing favorable inferences, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the driver and backseat passenger for aiding and abetting ordinance violations. Because false arrest turns on probable cause for any offense, and malicious prosecution requires an absence of probable cause for the charged offense, both claims plausibly survive the pleadings.

The officers’ attempt to rehabilitate probable cause with extrinsic exhibits (interview snippets, a 911 call transcript) fails at Rule 12. The panel endorses the district court’s decision not to consider these materials, describing them as a “curated sample of evidence” more suited to Rule 56 than to a motion to dismiss. This preserves the formal boundary between pleadings and summary judgment practice.

On clearly established law, the court acknowledges the post-Wesby admonition against high-level generality, but emphasizes that the record is undeveloped: “we lack knowledge of what that situation was.” In that posture, the clearly established right “to freedom from arrest without probable cause” suffices to defeat qualified immunity at the pleadings stage. As discovery clarifies the “situation” each officer faced, the specificity demanded by Wesby can be tested at summary judgment.

Second, as to Dean Wadsworth and the immediate suspensions, the court applies the same prudential logic. Although the district court found that plaintiffs adequately alleged a violation of clearly established law, the Sixth Circuit does not undertake a merits-heavy due process analysis. Rather, recognizing that the necessary particulars are not yet in the record, the court affirms denial of qualified immunity at this early stage. The opinion notably comments that motions asserting qualified immunity “should usually be brought after discovery, not before,” because early motions “usually waste the time of the parties and courts alike” when the allegations remain a “nebula of favorable inferences.”

Third, the court dismisses the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of their dismissed “rigged hearing” claim for lack of jurisdiction. That due process theory is distinct from and not inextricably intertwined with the qualified-immunity issues properly before the court, so pendent appellate jurisdiction does not extend to it.

Impact and Implications

Although unpublished, the opinion has practical consequences across several domains.

Pleading-Stage Qualified Immunity: The decision reinforces a disciplined approach to qualified immunity at Rule 12. When complaints plausibly allege arrests without probable cause or due process violations, courts should hesitate to grant qualified immunity before discovery clarifies the operative facts. Defendants who need to rely on evidence outside the pleadings are signaling that summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss, is the proper vehicle.
Probable Cause in Group Conduct: For aiding-and-abetting arrests, the opinion underscores that mere proximity, property ownership (e.g., owning the toy), or passive presence (e.g., continuing to drive) do not, without more, create probable cause for knowing assistance under Michigan law. This will resonate in cases involving group pranks, protests, and other collective activity where individual culpability varies.
Campus Policing and Student Discipline: Campus police should calibrate arrest decisions to individualized probable cause—especially in low-stakes, juvenile misjudgment cases. University administrators should expect procedural due process scrutiny when imposing immediate suspensions; quick reinstatement does not retroactively cure the absence of pre-deprivation process if the circumstances did not warrant emergency action.
Motion Practice Discipline: The court’s refusal to consider “curated” extrinsic exhibits at Rule 12, and its critique of premature qualified-immunity motions, will influence litigation strategy. Parties should avoid attempting to litigate the merits through motions to dismiss thinly veiled as summary judgment.
Appellate Jurisdiction: The dismissal of the cross-appeal reiterates that only the qualified-immunity rulings travel on interlocutory appeal; tangential issues (such as other dismissed claims) must await final judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: Shields government officials from damages liability unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time, such that every reasonable official would understand the conduct was unlawful. At the pleading stage, courts assume the complaint’s facts are true and ask whether those facts, if proven, would overcome the shield.
Probable Cause: A reasonable basis to believe a person committed a crime. For false-arrest claims, officers are insulated if probable cause existed for any offense, not just the one cited at arrest. For malicious-prosecution claims (in the Sixth Circuit’s current formulation), lack of probable cause to support the charge is required.
Aiding and Abetting (Michigan): Liability requires that the defendant knowingly assisted or encouraged the principal offender. Mere presence, association, or property ownership without knowing assistance is insufficient.
Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Rule 56: A motion to dismiss focuses on the complaint’s allegations; a court generally cannot consider outside evidence. Summary judgment (Rule 56) is where parties marshal evidence beyond the pleadings.
Procedural Due Process in Student Discipline: Before imposing significant discipline (like suspension), schools generally must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, absent exigent circumstances justifying immediate removal with prompt post-deprivation process. Whether circumstances are exigent is a fact-intensive inquiry.
“Not Recommended for Publication”: The decision is nonprecedential under the circuit’s rules. It can be cited for persuasive value but does not bind subsequent panels.
Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction: On an interlocutory appeal limited to qualified immunity, only issues inextricably intertwined with that ruling can piggyback. Separate issues (e.g., unrelated claim dismissals) must await final judgment for appellate review.

Key Takeaways

Complaints alleging arrests without probable cause can defeat qualified immunity at the pleadings stage—especially where asserted probable-cause theories depend on extrinsic evidence not properly considered on a Rule 12 motion.
Michigan aiding-and-abetting probable cause requires facts supporting knowing assistance; mere presence in the car, owning the toy, or continuing to drive does not, without more, suffice.
The clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause supports denial of qualified immunity pre-discovery; Wesby’s specificity requirement is properly tested after the facts are developed.
University administrators invoking qualified immunity for immediate suspensions face the same procedural posture: if the complaint plausibly alleges a due process violation and facts are undeveloped, dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds is premature.
Parties should resist turning Rule 12(b)(6) into summary judgment with “curated” exhibits; courts retain discretion to ignore such materials.
Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction remains narrow; unrelated cross-appeals will be dismissed.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a straightforward but often contested proposition: qualified immunity generally should not be resolved on the pleadings where the complaint plausibly alleges constitutional violations and the defense depends on facts outside the complaint. In the campus context presented here, the opinion underscores individualized probable cause for arrests tied to group conduct and reaffirms that immediate student suspensions invite procedural due process scrutiny. Practically, the ruling nudges litigants toward summary judgment for qualified-immunity disputes that turn on contested facts and reminds courts to police the boundary between Rule 12 and Rule 56. The case now returns to the district court for discovery and further proceedings; whether the officers and administrator ultimately prevail on qualified immunity will turn on the facts the parties develop, not on “curated” assertions at the threshold stage.